著者

玉田 芳史

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.4, pp.42-60, 2015-10-31 (Released:2015-11-10)

参考文献数

37

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Thai politics has become chaotic since 2006 due to democratization and the tenacious attempts to oppose it. Democratization advanced slowly from the 1970s and accelerated in the 1990s, partly because the military, politically influential for a long time since 1932, retreated from politics after 1992. It became possible for the people to choose the prime minister and the government through general elections. However, anti-democratic demonstrators who felt unhappy with democratization appeared in 2005. They paid little respect to elections results and, instead, asked the monarchy to dismiss the prime minister and appoint a new one. They formed the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in 2006. There have been three waves of de-democratization. Anti-democratic forces, spearheaded by PAD, included judicial institutions and the military as the main actors. They successfully toppled elected governments in 2006, 2008 and 2014. In 2013, the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), led by several politicians of the opposition Democrat Party, assumed the role of commanding demonstrators in place of PAD. Court verdicts and military intervention have become more instrumental in the change of national leaders than national elections. This essay will analyze how the anti-democratic forces succeeded in negating election results and depriving the people of power. In their struggle against democratization, they have resorted to a kind of nationalism. The nationalism is neither ethnic nor exclusionist, partly since democratization in Thailand was not the product of external pressure. Rather it is nationalism opposed to democracy, or popular sovereignty. It gives the highest priority to the monarchy rather than the people. The Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul has called it “royal nationalism.” The Thai political regime officially stipulated in the constitutions since 1978 has been “a democratic regime with the monarch as the head of the state.” The bizarre feature of this regime is that the monarch and the people are co-owners of sovereign power. It is not a democratic regime based on the principle of popular sovereignty. The monarchy is not necessarily under the constitution. Respective percentage shares in sovereign power between the monarchy and the people have never been fixed. It is quite reasonable to allege that the monarchy holds the larger share in order to negate or dilute the democratic legitimacy of elected politicians. This is the reason why the anti-democratic forces, PAD/PDRC, the military and the judiciary have pledged their allegiance to the monarchy and have lavished the highest laudatory statements on the monarchy. Thus the undemocratic forces, unhappy with the advancement of electoral democracy undermining their conventional power and privileges (for example, the royalists hoping for an expanded role for the monarchy, and the urban middle-class feeling disadvantaged due to their numerical inferiority) have supported “royal nationalism.”

著者

有澤 雄毅

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.4, pp.17-32, 2021-10-31 (Released:2021-11-16)

参考文献数

41

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How did Beijing become the capital of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? Surprisingly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has not provided a clear answer to this question. This is because if the “necessity” of Beijing as the capital of the PRC were to collapse, it could contradict the overall historical narrative of the CCP concerning the State formation. Chinese Area Studies scholars argue that the acquisition of political cohesion and legitimacy in the process of selecting a capital has affected the national integration of the PRC. Nevertheless, such arguments do not fully explain how such an event occurred; thus, the logic between the capital selection and national integration remains unclear. Therefore, to clarify these questions, this paper analyzes the perceptions of the political leaders of the Chinese Nationalist Party, the CCP, the Democratic Party (DP), and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) regarding the formation of the State and the selection of the capital. The result of the analysis shows that from the end of World War II to the establishment of the PRC, there was no concrete idea of selecting Beijing as a capital among the people. In the Constituent Assembly held in 1946, Chiang Kai-shek attempted to select Nanjing as the capital. However, the representatives of the Constituent Assembly highlighted various opinions on the selection; in particular, the delegates sought to strike a balance among China’s regions through this process. In response, the CCP delayed the selection and restrained local movements from establishing their own capital. Concerned about the CCP’s authority over the DP, who showed an inactive attitude regarding this, the CPSU demanded that the CCP establish the capital as soon as possible to consolidate their authority. However, on the eve of the establishment of the PRC, the CCP avoided active discussions on the selection of the capital; after the issue attracted public attention, they introduced official procedures to establish Beijing as their capital to consolidate their authority.

著者

佐藤 百合 川島 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.107-118, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

著者

川島 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.2, pp.22-32, 2023-04-30 (Released:2023-05-16)

著者

川島 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.97-106, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

著者

権 香淑

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.3, pp.81-105, 2001 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

崔 智喜

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

pp.as23.a01, (Released:2023-01-17)

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The 1980s was a period when North Korea’s military actions, such as the Rangoon bombing and the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858, drew focus away from Japan-North Korea relations. In terms of North Korea’s foreign policy, it is often contrasted with South Korea’s “Nordpolitik,” which was aimed at improving relations with China and the Soviet Union ahead of the 1988 Seoul Olympics.However, during this period, North Korea did not spare any effort to improve relations with Western countries such as Japan, the United States, or South Korea. Among them, the approach to Japan was remarkable. In 1984, North Korea re-signed a fishing agreement with Japan that had been neglected for two years. In 1985, active personnel exchanges between Japan and North Korea took place, and there were significant moves to improve relations at the political level.North Korea clearly expressed its intention to build political relations, including exchanges with the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese government, and tried to address resolvable issues. While the situation in Northeast Asia was exhibiting increasing fluidity, such as China’s reforms, opening-up policies and efforts to improve China-South Korea relations, North Korea had tried to develop not only economic but also political relations with Japan.On the other hand, North Korea expressed its negative attitude regarding the issue of establishing mutual trade offices, fearing that it would lead to cross-approval. It is presumed that this was largely due to concerns over the rapid development of China-South Korea relations. North Korea was reluctant to enter into a South Korea-led cross-approval initiative aimed at linking Japan-North Korea relations with China-South Korea relations, but tried hard to advance bilateral relations by increasing contacts with Japan’s government.It is no exaggeration to say that North Korea, which had been closely watching South Korea expand its exchanges with socialist countries such as China and the Soviet Union, was trying its own “Southern Policy”. North Korea’s efforts to build relations with the Japanese government and the Liberal Democratic Party in response to South Korea’s improved relations with communist countries such as China in the mid-1980s were maintained amid changes in the strategic environment caused by easing U.S.-Soviet tensions. It led to Kanemaru’s visit to North Korea in 1990 and negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea in 1991.

著者

塚瀬 進

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.4, pp.47-76, 1989 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

峰 毅

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.19-43, 2006-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

105

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The North East Region of China, also known as Manchuria, became the chemical production base of the newly formed socialist China up to the time of the ‘open door’ policy. This chemical production base was originally developed by Japan prior to World War II. Only recently has Japan began to undertake academic research on this region; this hesitation is at least partly a reflection of Japanese attitudes to their invasion of China. However, US researchers had long held a high opinion of the industrial development of this region. Edwin Pauley, the first Westerner to visit Manchuria after the end of World War II, reported in 1946 to US President Truman concerning the Japanese assets in Manchuria, which he evaluated highly, to his surprise, as a war indemnity. Since then many researchers on China have written in the United States about the industrial development of this region as part of China, but not in Japan. However, more recently, researchers have begun to make studies on the industrial development of Japan-era Manchuria. Some remarkable research works have been published, especially concerning the steel and iron industry. Regarding the chemical industry, however, little research work has so far been done. This paper therefore starts with a description of how the Manchurian chemical industry was incubated and developed by Japan.First, this paper outlines the chemical production base developed by Japan in Manchuria. It then describes how Japan needed to develop and construct a chemical production base inManchuria, where natural resources, including coal are abundant, in order to put its economy on to a war footing. The construction of the highly organized industrial production base in Manchuria was only possible with the strong support of the Japanese Army. As a result the industrial structure of Manchuria was highly dependent on heavy industry, including the chemical industry. This paper also analyzes the characteristics of the economy of Manchuria and makes comparisons between the Republic of China and Japan based on GNP/CDP and on some data on three major representative chemical products: sulfuric acid, soda ash and am monia. The analysis shows clearly that the economy of Manchuria was oriented towards the war economy.This paper also analyzes the early days of the newly formed socialist China, when the production base in the North East Region played a key role in the national economy. After the defeat of Japan in 1945, Manchuria was invaded by Soviet soldiers and much of the production facilities were destroyed. Soon after socialist China was formed in 1949, the new government made recovery of the North East Region a top priority. This urgency was caused partly by the Korean War, which broke out in 1950, the year after the formation of socialist China, and partly by the existence of the highly organized modern heavy industry which was indis pensable to the construction of the national economy. Since then this region has contributed a great deal to the development of China’s chemical industry not only as a production base but also as an R&D and technical center. Some examples of the economic heritage of the industry from the days of Manchuria are introduced by referring to the Chinese literature as well as to papers written by the Japanese engineers and technicians who remained in China after World War II in order to help the recovery and reconstruction of China’s economy.

著者

綛谷 智雄

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.2, pp.106-127, 2002 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

38

著者

柿崎 一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.55, no.4, pp.20-38, 2009-10-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

20

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This article discusses two private railways built in Thailand in the 1890s and 1900s. It analyzes the attempts of these two lines to develop into urban railways, and explains why they eventuallyfailed to do so.The two private lines discussed are (i) the Paknam Railway, the first railway in Thailand, which opened in 1893 and connected Bangkok to the mouth of the Chao Phraya river at Paknam; and (ii) the Thachin Railway, connecting Bangkok to Thachin (Samut Sakhon), which opened in 1905 and was extended in 1907 to Maeklong (Samut Songkhram) and was thereafter named the Maeklong Railway.Although initially both railways functioned as inter-city lines, by increasing their service frequency they soon began to serve functionally as intra-city or urban lines. The Paknam Railway introduced a motor-tramcar service within the Bangkok urban area in 1908, which was replaced in 1912 by an electric tramcar. A plan in the 1920s to electrify the entire line was discouraged by the government’s opposition to any extension of the concession period. Although the Paknam Railway was eventually electrified, its intra-city service was largely substituted by the newly extended tramline along it. The Maeklong line also began an electric tramcar service along one section to serve the Bangkok urban area, but global depression prevented it from realizing its full potential.The Thai government, having no intention to renew the private railway concessions, instead purchased the lines outright at the end of the concession periods. However, state ownership resulted in little further investment in the lines. The Paknam line suffered in competition with road transport, and soon became a loss-making venture. The Maeklong line, in contrast, which did not suffer from direct road competition, witnessed an increase in traffic volume, but this enhanced its inter-city, rather than its intra-city, functions. Prime Minister Sarit’s policy of ‘beauty’ brought the closure of the Paknam line in 1959. The Maeklong line also faced closure, but only one section was actually abandoned in the 1960s.There are three reasons why these railways failed to become true urban railways. First, the government’s state-oriented railway policy exhibited excessive caution towards foreign investors. Second, the foreign investors that did exist restrained their investments, particularly in the final periods of their concessions, partly in reaction to government policy. Third, the government failed to recognize the potential of these railways to provide urban mass transport. As a result of these reasons, Bangkok failed to maintain urban railways and developed post-war along a path of automobile-dependency, a path that has brought numerous transport and environmental problems in its wake.

著者

伊藤 融

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.3, pp.43-56, 2007-07-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

35

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In May 1998, India and Pakistan carried out a series of nuclear tests and declared themselves “nuclear powers” — a move that shocked the international community and added a newdimension to the rivalries between these two neighbors. This article will attempt to analyze what led both to this nuclearization and what kind of influence it had on the whole world as well as on the region.From a strategic viewpoint, India had pushed ahead with its nuclear program in order to counter the threat of China, not of Pakistan, whereas Pakistan’s program was aimed at reducing the threat posed by India. That is to say, the power imbalance in the region (China > India > Pakistan) encouraged these two countries to go nuclear. India and Pakistan have faced increased security-related concerns since the collapse of the alliance structure that built up during the Cold War. In addition to these security interests, rising nationalism in the midst of globalization has created a political trend that has encouraged nuclearization.Now, in retrospect, we can ask the question: which side has benefited most from nuclearization?Regionally, Pakistan seems to have seized more advantages militarily and diplomatically, especially regarding the Kashmir issue. Globally, however, nuclearization has helped India to rise in the world: most major powers, including the United States, cannot help regarding and treating India as a global player. In contrast, the international community regards Pakistan with suspicion in the wake of revelations about the “nuclear black market.”In fact, this nuclearization, which drew international concern about the risk of nuclear war, has not only contributed to sustaining the ongoing peace process since 2003, but has also created aninternational environment in which each side stops short of resorting to war even in times of crisis. “Rising India” will also hesitate to draw a sword. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to conclude that a stable“ nuclear peace” has been established between India and Pakistan considering their geopolitical and strategic characteristics, lack of a relationship of mutual trust, persistent cross-border terrorism, and the fragile state foundations of Pakistan.

著者

岩本 卓也

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.4, pp.98-102, 2004 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

井上 一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.4, pp.22-37, 2018-10-31 (Released:2018-12-05)

参考文献数

44

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It is often pointed out that the status of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been declining in the entire party and government system in China in recent decades. As a result, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been unable to cope with many challenges China faces today. With the progress of the Reform and Opening-Up policy since the early 1980s, pluralization and decentralization are increasingly apparent in making and implementing its foreign policy. And recently, media and public opinion and private sector interests have begun to influence Chinese foreign policy. However, the phenomena of the gradual erosion of foreign ministries’ status as well as the expansion of low politics diplomacy in foreign relations have been observed among other advanced countries. This paper studies how the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has reshaped its organization and changed its role as one of the country’s many complex party-government apparatuses in the era of globalization. Traditionally, the scope and jurisdiction of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been rather narrow as compared with foreign ministries in other countries. The departments focusing on managing international economy, foreign aid, national security, cultural exchange, and intelligence and analysis, which are common in other countries, do not seem to exist. In recruiting young diplomats, there has been strong emphasis on foreign language ability rather than basic knowledge of social sciences such as international relations or economics. Consequently, the reality of traditional Chinese diplomatic practice has leaned too much on bilateral relations. However, the spread of globalization has brought significant structural change to the organization of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the apparent shift from regional affairs to functional affairs, several new departments have been established to tackle new global challenges. The impact of globalization has brought the low politics diplomacy dealing with the economics and social affairs to the forefront. Today, multilateral diplomacy is actively practiced. The ministry has been recruiting human resources with more diversified professional backgrounds. As a result, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the globalization era has evolved to become more similar to ministries of foreign affairs of other countries. However, given the rapid change of circumstances both in and outside China caused by globalization combined with the traditionally limited jurisdiction and function of China’s national diplomatic organizations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has still been unable to fully meet the global challenges that today’s China faces.

著者

伊藤 正子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.63, no.3, pp.12-29, 2017

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&lt;p&gt;During the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1973, more than 310,000 Korean soldiers were dispatched to Vietnam. The killings of many Vietnamese civilians that occurred during this period are often mentioned in the recent 'anti-Korean sentiment' boom in Japan. This article discusses narratives of the memory of killings in both Korea and Vietnam. At the end of the 20th century in South Korea, what was once a 'bravery story' that killed 'Aka (Communist)' began to be viewed as an event that 'killed civilians'. This difficulty in facing the reality of the home country's negative history resulted in divided public opinion. A Korean NGO, NAWAURI, has attempted to contribute to future peace by apologizing to the Vietnamese people, listening to the people who survived from the killings, and understanding victims' feelings.
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On the other hand, in Vietnam, based on the slogan 'Close the past and head towards the future', Vietnamese survivors can only mention the historical recognition of the war in a way that does not affect international relations. This slogan has not only been simply championed by the state but also become a national consciousness, so there is little movement to record war memories of the general people so as to convey them to posterity. The slogan suppresses the honest feelings of survivors of mass killings, who have been forced to live difficult lives.
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The national history of the Vietnam War, therefore, is a story of the brilliant triumph of the North Vietnamese army, or the National Liberation Front, who fought risking their lives. As a result, memories of mass killings that are unrelated to the victory would inevitably be unrecognized in Vietnamese national history. This means that when the state regulates memories and constitutes it as 'the history of so-and-so country', only favourable events are recorded, and some memories that do not promote nationalism are truncated. Memories of mass killings by the Korean army usually disappear with the death of the survivors, but ironically, the activities of the Korean NGO, which is revealing war memories of survivors in an attempt to ensure future peace, are contributing to the healing of the survivors and also to maintaining diverse war memories that are not subsumed by the state.
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著者

張 兵

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.3, pp.49-53, 2019-07-31 (Released:2019-09-10)

著者

山田 勅之

出版者

静岡大学人文社会科学部アジア研究センター

雑誌

アジア研究

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, pp.43-59, 2018-03

著者

陳 嵩

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.2, pp.40-54, 2015-06-30 (Released:2015-07-07)

参考文献数

15

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Conventional arguments regarding the attitude of the Chinese populace toward the 2012 anti-Japanese demonstrations in China speculate on the characteristics and motivations of participants in anti-Japanese protests by observing their participation. By conducting surveys with average citizens at their residences immediately prior to anti-Japanese demonstrations rather than observing actual participants demonstrating on the street, this study sheds light on what regions and what types of people have the strongest inclination to demonstrate.First, it became clear that, prior to the occurrence of anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2012, different regions and income brackets differed in their inclination to demonstrate. On the whole, a trend of strong inclination to demonstrate was observed in the eastern region, where economic development is relatively advanced. Additionally, a strong inclination to demonstrate was observed among low-income individuals overall. A variety of factors increases a person’s inclination to demonstrate. A negative attitude toward Japan and a high level of patriotism are the factors that most increase inclination to demonstrate. Further, dissatisfaction with societal inequality and the belief that China protects freedom of speech are also factors that add to the inclination to demonstrate.

著者

江藤 名保子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.4, pp.61-80, 2015-10-31 (Released:2015-11-10)

参考文献数

52

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Chinese nationalism tends to excessively react to some specific problems which oppose to Japan, USA or West European countries in particular. This “anti-West” sentiment of the Chinese society has been regarded as the “trauma” of invasion by the Great Powers. Yet when reviewing Chinese cognition after the national foundation in 1949, there were the times when Chinese nationalism expanded without connecting to the “anti-West” assessment. For example, despite the rise of “patriotism” in the 1980s, Chinese public opinion took a conciliatory attitude to the Western countries, especially to Japan. Similarly, it was observed that while the nationalism kept on surging, Chinese public sentiments towards Japan continuously improved from 2006 to 2010. These phenomena can’t be explained by a simple logic that “the surge of nationalism promotes anti-foreignism.” This paper hypothesizes the contemporary Chinese nationalism as multiple political thought in order to examine the dynamism of its “anti-West” logics. Here, the centripetal force of Chinese official nationalism is extracted as the four elements; national identity, socialism, economic development and notion of great power. Using these factors, this paper discusses the mechanism how Chinese nationalism links to the “anti-West” sentiments. In conclusion, this paper argues that the “anti-West” sentiments is not only an extension of the historical trauma, but it is also promoted by official nationalism. At the same time, however, it is also pointed out two elements of the official nationalism—economic development and notion of great power—functioned to offset the public “anti-West” feelings.

著者

井上 治

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.4, pp.4-22, 2001 (Released:2014-09-15)

被引用文献数

1