著者

松本 ますみ

出版者

静岡大学人文社会科学部アジア研究センター

雑誌

アジア研究

巻号頁・発行日

vol.別冊3, pp.27-54, 2015-02

著者

石原 享一

出版者

静岡大学人文社会科学部アジア研究センター

雑誌

アジア研究

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, pp.61-81, 2018-03

著者

上利 博規

出版者

静岡大学

雑誌

アジア研究

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.29-40, 2016-02

著者

新美 達也

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, no.2, pp.69-90, 2015-01-10 (Released:2015-01-27)

参考文献数

29

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This paper discusses Vietnam’s out-migration policy and the current situations of its overseas workers, and the impact of out-migration on the regional development of the regions where the migrants come from. The paper also discusses the prospects for sending nurses and caregivers to Japan from Vietnam, which is about to start at the time of writing this paper.Vietnam dispatched workers mainly to East European countries before 1991 through official channels, based on intergovernmental contracts with these countries. Since 1991, out-migration of workers from Vietnam has been based on contracts between private companies. Out-migration has contributed to the Vietnamese economy and to regional development. In 2013 alone, Vietnam sent about 90,000 workers to Taiwan, Malaysia and Korea. The Vietnamese government has been encouraging out-migration, because it will contribute to reducing poverty, developing regional economies, and fostering international cooperation.Although the total number of overseas Vietnamese workers is far less than those of Filipinos and Indonesians, the number of Vietnamese workers sometimes exceeds those of Filipinos and Indonesians in Taiwan, Korea and Japan. The most important destination in 2013 was Taiwan, which absorbed 40,000 Vietnamese workers, or 45% of all workers that left the country in that year. On the other hand, Korea, which had also been an important destination for overseas Vietnamese workers, stopped the acceptance of the Vietnamese.The incidence of out-migration is high in some particular districts. Nghe An province, which is one of such districts, received US$ 85 million in 2009 as remittances from the 45,000 workers who went abroad from this province. The amount of remittance was equivalent to 50% of the provincial government’s total revenue. The most important destinations for overseas workers from Nghe An province are Taiwan and Malaysia, accounting for 30~40% of all overseas workers from Nghe An. Work experiences in foreign countries, however, did not contribute so much to transferring modern industrial techniques to the workers’ origins, because almost all of the returnees engage in farming after returning home.Based on the economic partnership agreement (EPA) between Japan and Vietnam, the first batch of the candidates for nurses and caregivers from Vietnam will come to Japan in June 2014. These nurses and caregivers come from the same regions where other types of overseas workers come from. Considering the insufficiency of medical staff, especially highly educated nurses, in Vietnam, the out-migration of nurses may have a detrimental impact on the domestic supply of medical services. Besides this, the candidates from Vietnam may not be able to pass the examination necessary to work as qualified nurses in Japan, considering the low rate for Filipino and Indonesian candidates—who came to Japan earlier—to pass the examination.Even with these problems, we can still conclude that out-migration has positive impacts on Vietnamese regional development. The knowledge and experiences acquired by the candidates for nurses and caregivers who are about to start their training in Japan will contribute to the development of medical services in Vietnam.

著者

上野 正弥

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.1, pp.40-55, 2018-01-31 (Released:2018-03-02)

参考文献数

57

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To control Christians and their religious activities, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM) committees in 1954 and required Protestant churches to register with these committees. However, the number of non-registered house churches has been growing rapidly since the end of the Cultural Revolution. During the first decade of the 21st century, new house churches, whose leading members are students and intellectuals, developed in large cities. This paper studies the Chinese government’s response to the development of Protestant churches. The national government has devolved the mandate to develop religious policies to local government in order to address concerns about Protestant churches. Provincial governments have a mandate to establish regulations for religious affairs, and some have established regulations that allow local churches in their jurisdiction to receive donations from Christian organizations abroad. Local governments adopt these policies in order to encourage Protestant churches to supply welfare and public services to the residents instead of the government. In 2001, the CCP central committee decided to build networks of religious affairs management among governments of counties, townships, and villages to post religious affairs staff to a grassroots community. However, local governments have not been willing to build these networks or strengthen the management of Protestant churches for the following reasons. First, local governments want the churches to provide public services. Second, they emphasize economic development rather than religious affairs management in their jurisdictions. Third, they have been ordered to reduce and simplify government organizations by the central government; hence, it is difficult to increase the number of staff members assigned to religious affairs. On the other hand, some local governments and churches registered with TSPM committees have begun to approach individual house churches directly. TSPM churches provide pastoral work, services, and materials for some house churches. The government is trying to apply this approach across the country, but even some pastors of TSPM churches have doubts about this approach because some house churches fundamentally do not want to involve with the government or TSPM churches. Meanwhile, some local governments scout out house churches and order them to dissolve if they have connections with hostile forces abroad. Through these analyses, this paper reveals that the Chinese government has been confronting challenges in implementing policies for church affairs management because each stakeholder has different priorities.

著者

土屋 健治

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.30, no.2, pp.61-70, 1983 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

森 悠子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.1, pp.31-35, 2016-01-31 (Released:2016-02-09)

著者

天野 健作

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.61, no.2, pp.55-68, 2015-06-30 (Released:2015-07-07)

参考文献数

54

被引用文献数

3

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The confrontation between China and India concerning water resources in the Brahmaputra River (known as “Yarlung Zangbo” in Chinese), which flows through both countries, has been deepening in recent years. There have also been diplomatic negotiations between the two countries. This study aims to analyze the conflict and cooperation over the Brahmaputra’s waters.First, the study describes the South–North Water Transfer Project, a multi-decade Chinese infrastructure mega-project that aims to channel the abundance of fresh water from southern China to the more arid north through canal systems. One development included in a western route of this project involves expanding the Brahmaputra. Ten dams have already been completed on this river, and China plans to build the world’s largest dam, even larger than the Three Gorges Dam, on the Brahmaputra. India fears that the project will have a significant impact on the lower river region.Second, the study considers both India’s protest as a lower riparian country and China’s reaction as an upper riparian country. Even though India’s fisheries industry and ecological system are affected by Chinese development on the river, China did not publicly acknowledge its development activities until 2010. Instead it pursued what could be called a silent strategy. Since admitting the project’s existence, China has sought to minimize the impact on downstream countries. However, the initial silent strategy has clearly amplified distrust on the Indian side.Third, the study considers steps toward a cooperative relationship between the two countries. Although there is no binding legal agreement, China and India have established an expert-level committee and provided hydrological information to each other. They have also signed a memorandum of understanding that will guide expansion of their cooperative relationship.As a guide to future work, the study indicates the immaturity of international standards and law to settle a conflict concerning an international river. In this respect, it is important to analyze the applicability of “the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,” which entered into force in August 2014. Furthermore, the study indicates that there is a third country, Bangladesh, with concerns regarding the Brahmaputra’s resources. A water allocation agreement has been signed between India and Bangladesh.When we emphasize only the aspects of conflict taking place regarding this international river, it appears that two large Asian countries are heading toward a collision. However, as shown in this study, China and India are trying to build a cooperative relationship. This situation can be perceived as a case study in international trust-building.

著者

谷川 栄彦

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, no.1, pp.41-60, 1957 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

永積 昭

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.15-30, 1967 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

栗原 浩英

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.46, no.3.4, pp.111-140, 2000 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

中西 嘉宏

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.35-54, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

参考文献数

42

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The changes in Myanmar’s political regime, from the transition to civilian rule in 2011 to the post-coup period after 1st February 2021, can be divided into three stages: first, the transition from one type of authoritarian regime to another; second, the progress of democratization; and finally, the re-authoritarianization through a coup d’état and coercive suppression. However, these transitions have also led to unintended consequences. This paper focuses on the interplay and discrepancies between domestic politics and the international political economy, coincidental timing, political trade-offs, institutional design errors, and miscalculations by involved parties, which are often overlooked in a clearcut and linear understanding of political development. The main points of each section are as follows:First, the transition to civilian rule was driven by coincidental timing and the impunity of Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military. The formation of the new government in 2011 marked a tran­sition from an autocratic authoritarian regime to a more competitive authoritarian regime. The retirement of State Peace and Development Council Chairman Gen. Than Shwe and the shift to a collectively led leadership were the essence of this transition, which coincided with a change of U.S. policy toward Myanmar, leading to subsequent reforms and improved diplomatic relations. However, this development was facilitated by a trade-off with the state military’s impunity for past human rights abuses and violations of international law.Second, the advancement of democratization can be largely attributed to inadequate institutional design. The competitive authoritarian regime, constructed during the preceding military rule, lacked sufficient institutional mechanisms necessary for its prolonged sustainability. This deficiency significantly contributed to the electoral triumph of the National League for Democracy in 2015, consequently leading to the establishment of Aung San Suu Kyi’s government in 2016. Of particular importance is the fact that the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party, which was expected to maintain power while striking a balance between hardliners of Tatmadaw and pro-democracy forces, was weakly organized as a political party. And the ruling government’s inability to “manipulate” the electoral system and operations to win elections also contributed to the regime’s lack of durability. As a result, an unstable power-sharing arrangement was created in which the Tatmadaw, which sought to protect its own gurdianship in the constitutional order, and the democratic forces that pursue further democratization.Third, while the coup d’état and subsequent crackdown by Tatmadaw have eliminated pro-democracy forces from the top decision-making process on one hand, such actions have been self-undermining the legitimacy and governing capacity. Tatmadaw is planning to return to the competitive authoritarian regime, but this is becoming a mission impossible, because the coincidences that occurred during the former transition in 2011 can no longer be expected, and the aftermath of the coup is not limited to power struggles among elites but has turned into violent social conflicts.The rapid political transformation in Myanmar from the early 2010s to the present is entering a new phase due to the reactionary actions of the junta. This transformation is irreversible, and if democratization were to resume in the country, it would follow a different path than that of Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership.

著者

岡 通太郎

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.44-61, 2006-01-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

参考文献数

22

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According to the Agricultural Wage in India, published yearly by the Indian Government, the agricultural wage rate in central Gujarat remains around Rs. 24–30 per day. This is much lower than the rates in other areas such as northern and peninsular Gujarat, where the rate has risen sharply, reaching Rs. 60 during the 1990s. It is also perhaps surprising that the agri cultural wage in central Gujarat remains low even after the recent increase in rural non-farm employment opportunities that provide wages of around Rs. 60–200 per day. This suggests that the ‘trickledown’ effect of economic development to the agricultural labor classes is not working well. Why does the agricultural wage rate in central Gujarat remain at such a low level despite the opportunities of high wage, non-farm employment? Why doesn’t the‘ trickle-down’ effect work well in central Gujarat? This paper aims to examine this question through an intensive field survey at a sample village in central Gujarat.The paper addresses this question by considering two factors, one external the other in ternal.The external factor is the limitation of non-farm employment opportunities. If these opportunities are separated from agricultural labor markets by high barriers (e.g. high education requirements), the ‘trickle-down’ effect will not work well. The internal factor is the local informal credit institution. As K. Basu (1983) explained in his ‘inter-linkage theory’, if the agricultural laborer is in debt to his employer with a low interest rate, his wage will also be low because the employee gets the benefit of low interest.Investigation showed that 44% of the agricultural laboring classes (landless and marginal farmers) are working in non-farm sectors, and 40% out of the 44% are employed in high-wage and low-education sectors. No clear segmentation is found. On the other hand, the internal factor has a stronger effect on low agricultural wages. There is a local informal credit institution called Kaymi that exists especially in rural areas of central Gujarat. Under this local institution, 22% of agricultural laborers are in debt to their employers free of interest. Evaluating the benefit of interest-free credit that is enjoyed by these laborers gives their ‘effective wage’ to be Rs. 48, which is close to the wage of non-farm employment. This local institution also affects low wages of the other 78% of agricultural labors. With restricted opportunities for the agricultural labor classes to get formal loans, this local informal institution is the only way for them to obtain credit and ease risk burdens associated with their livelihood. This paper also asserts that this kind of ‘social institution’ has been developed upon long-term social relationships that are based onland distribution inequity, which closely corresponds to caste segmentation.

著者

高橋 孝治

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.4, pp.18-35, 2019-10-31 (Released:2019-12-17)

参考文献数

30

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In the People’s Republic of China, the Criminal Procedure Code was revised on October 26, 2018. In China, RENZUIRENFA system, the judgment by default system and the prompt decision procedure were introduced by this revision. As for this report, an exegesis does the Chinese revised Criminal Procedure Code from these three systems. The defendant confesses it about own criminal act, and there is not an objection about a crime fact pointed out, and RENZUIRENFA system is the system that it is tolerant and processes by law when I agree about the assessment of a case. It is a system of so-called plea bargaining. The prompt decision procedure must conclude a hearing for a person agreeing to RENZUIRENFA and the application of the prompt decision procedure as a general rule for (when you may be sentenced to penal servitude more than one year less than 15 days) for less than ten days on a case acceptance day of the court and must start judgment in the court which you examined. And when the judgment by default system is a crime of the national crime and terrorist activity to harm serious safely that the best People prosecution House ratified when it is necessary to let a trial go promptly in the case of a corruption bribe crime, evidence is certain, and a crime suspect and defendants are enough when I am abroad and are the system that can submit an indictment for people method House when you should investigate a criminal liability by law even if the defendant is absent. About RENZUIRENFA system and the prompt decision procedure, it was taken effect before Criminal Procedure Code revision experimentally in some cities. Therefore, in this report, I examine the statistics documents of the experimental enforcement. A limit points out the point that there is not the rule in the text is very plain, and what kind of crime RENZUIRENFA system in particular is applied to about the point that I can interpret, the prompt decision procedure in this report even how. And an application is done about the penalty used for political oppression about RENZUIRENFA system and the prompt decision procedure in the district enforced experimentally. Therefore, political oppression and a crime to get will point out the aggressive evaluation in future from a point to have possibilities to let a trial progress without an investigation and public speaking in China that hard to please. And I point out that I can read it when I take an opportunity of the public speaking away from the defendant because the case by the circumstances of the government “to have to let a trial go promptly” applies about the judgment by default system. And this report settles a conclusion as follows. It is said, “there was the agreement of the defendant” formally by RENZUIRENFA system, and there will be possibility to have that a criminal trial is over in future without letting others inspect the contents of the criminal trial by a prompt decision procedure. In other words, I can impose punishment on the defendant if said, “the defendant agreed to RENZUIRENFA” without stopping by to real evidence. Furthermore, I became able to let a criminal trial progress without giving the defendant the opportunity of the argument by a judgment by default system and a judgment, “it was necessary to let a trial go promptly”. The revised Criminal Procedure Code of 2018 goes away from human rights security when I generalize it.

著者

樹中 毅

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.57, no.1, pp.13-29, 2011-01-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

56

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Fascism is a totalitarian movement, which, through power centralization by a dictatorial party and a charismatic leader, aims to achieve state unity and a revival of nationhood. In order to study the ‘Sinicization’ of fascism, this paper discusses the appearance and development of an informal elitist organization, the Blue Shirts, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek in the1930s. Three levels of power politics are used to analyze the overall appearance of Chinese fascism: (1) party faction politics, (2) domestic military politics, and (3) international power politics. First, with regard to party faction politics, an informal organization appeared and its movement spread. After the Manchurian incident, crisis-conscious young men from the Whampoa Military Academy, in imitation of the Italian Black Shirts, established a core organization, the Lixingshe, within the party. This secret organization abided by the Kuomintang’s (KMT) organizational rule (democratic centralism) and pledged loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek—this pledge can be seen as a form of Führerprinzip. The purpose of this military fascist movement was to spur the undisciplined KMT to improve its core function as well as to elevate Chiang Kai-shek to the status of charismatic leader.Second, in the process of becoming a domestic military power, the KMT regime changed from a Soviet-style party-ruling regime to a fascist dictatorial regime led by Chiang Kai-shek. In addition to vigorously expanding informal elitist organizational movements, Chang established the Pieh-tung-tui, modeled on the Nazi Sturmabteilung (SA), under the Military Committee, and started the New Life Movement, which took its inspiration from the Italian and German movements to revive nationhood. Through these steps, Chang wanted to institutionalize fascist ideology, i.e. militarization, the Führerprinzip, and the revival of tradition.Third, Chang aimed to achieve a Hitler-style dictatorship and revival of nationhood by linking domestic fascist policies and international power politics.Though ostensibly compromising with the Japanese, Chang had drawn a plan to wage a war of long-term resistance against the Japanese centered on Sichuan Province as suggested by General von Falkenhausen after the Agreement of He-Mei in August 1935. Chang also approached Hitler via General von Seeckt to carry out diplomatic strategies of allying with Germany to combat Japan. Chang’s purpose for drawing on Nazi Germany was not to fulfill a racial revolution or to mount an invasion, but to gain access to the latest German weapons and industrialized defense techniques through trade exchanges, and to tackle the Chinese communists and the Japanese total war regime by acquiring the Nazis’ highly centralized ruling skills. Therefore, Chang established a unique dictatorial ruling regime by combining informal organizational movements and the Military Committee to replace the KMT’s party-ruling regime, which became a mere formality.Because Fascism lacks clear logic and theory, the results of its“ Sinicization” were, first, the augmentation of Bolshevik methods of revolution (democratic centralism, party dictatorship, and the anti-imperialist struggle), which were integral parts of the KMT regime; and second, the manifestation of nationalism, i.e. anti-communism and resistance against the Japanese. Though the informal elitist organizational movement did not successfully set up a fascist regime, Chang excluded resistant elites from the policymaking process through the autonomous dictatorial system, and he benefited politically and militarily when competing with local warlords and the Communist Party.

著者

奧島 美夏

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.60, no.2, pp.44-68, 2015-01-10 (Released:2015-01-27)

参考文献数

87

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This study aims to describe recent trends in the nurse migration policy of Indonesia. Lagging far behind the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia, Indonesia started to send nurses to the Middle East in 1989 only in a small number, mainly because Indonesian nurses had less professional skills and proficiency in English than those from the abovementioned countries. However, Indonesia found its niche in the international health workforce market—low skilled domestic workers such as maids and babysitters, who also work as caregivers for the elderly and the handicapped. Faced with bad working conditions and frequent ill-treatment at their workplace, however, the outflow of domestic workers from Indonesia is decreasing recently, and the country is now encouraging the out-migration of nurses and qualified caregivers who work in hospitals and care centers.For nurses and caregivers to adapt to the work in foreign countries, they need not only to master local language but also understand the local disease structure, learn related law and local work ethics of nursing and caregiving. In a developing country like Indonesia, medical workers often deal with infectious disease and maternal and child health problems. But what is more important in developed countries, where Indonesian nurses and caregivers will be sent, are nursing and caregiving for the elderly and the handicapped. From 2008, Japan started to accept candidates for nurses and caregivers from Indonesia and some other ASEAN countries on the basis of the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) between Japan and these countries. However, these candidates are facing difficulty in adapting to the work environment in Japan and in passing the examination, which is conducted in Japanese and required to work as qualified nurses and caregivers in Japan. It is argued that the benefit of accepting Indonesian nurses and caregivers to Japan is not enough to compensate for the cost of reeducating them.In this study, Indonesia’s current health policy will be examined and its problems will be revealed. The country’s current nurse migration policy, which is changing under the national goal of human resource development and the increase of out-migration after the Asian economic crisis, will be reported. Finally, the prospects for further changes in the nurse migration policy and challenges it faces will be discussed.

著者

岩井 淳

出版者

静岡大学人文社会科学部アジア研究センター

雑誌

アジア研究

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.19-31, 2013-03

著者

三輪 博樹

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.4, pp.72-89, 2016-10-31 (Released:2016-11-23)

参考文献数

34

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Since the independence in 1947, India has adopted the federal system of government. In India, most of the states are organized along major linguistic lines. Language-based organization of state boundaries started in 1950s and completed in 1987. However, even today there are many demands for the creation of new states. In this paper, I focused on the case of the creation of Telangana state in the Southern India in 2014, and examined three points: (1) Which socio-economic factors contribute to the movements for new states. (2) How the federal and state governments respond to such movements. (3) What are the conditions for the creation of new states. According to the case of the Telangana statehood movement since 2000s, people’s movements for new states in India today are motivated by not only their political and economic interests or so-called identity politics based on caste, religion, etc., but also their demands for the fair distribution of wealth and educational opportunities and for the preservation of their own dignity and self-esteem. A research group led by Kalpana Kannabiran concludes that the Telangana statehood movement is “the emergence of a new politics that is committed to deliberating over the meanings of democracy and direct action.” The existence of such statehood movements is certainly one of the most important factors which contributes to the creation of new states. Nevertheless, whether they are actually created mostly hinges upon the decisions of the federal government and the major political parties. A new state is likely to be created when (1) most of the major political parties in the old undivided state consider that they can get political benefits from the creation of new state, and (2) the ruling party or parties at the center are one of such major political parties in the old undivided state. Although the existence of the statehood movements is important for the creation of new states, it is in fact only a trigger or just cause for the federal government to start the process of the creation of those states. However, if a “new politics” as Kannabiran et al. says is actually emerging in India and the recent movements for new states are one of such “new politics,” it may become more and more difficult for the federal and state governments to deal with such movements in the same old way.

著者

李 秉哲

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.3, pp.1-19, 2022-07-31 (Released:2022-08-10)

参考文献数

91

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This article aims to add a new perspective on how the Japanese government conducted Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation during the early 1980s.The Zenko Suzuki administration judged that Japan could not meet the U.S. government’s expectations of strengthening its own defense capabilities. For this reason, the administration expressed willingness to cooperate with the U.S. for the economic and social development of strategically important countries. This was intended to work as a means to achieve the ‘comprehensive security’ policy adopted by the Masayoshi Ohira administration and burden-sharing in the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In other words, Japan had an economic cooperation policy that aimed to support developing countries, while recognizing the political impact of foreign aid. Japan had this policy in place before South Korea’s request in 1981 for 10 billion dollars in economic assistance.The Suzuki administration had already acknowledged the need to support South Korea to ensure Japan’s cooperative relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, there was a marked contrast in position between Japan and South Korea during the early stages of the negotiations on the official purpose and contents of economic cooperation. Steady negotiation efforts were necessary to create a situation where the Japanese Prime Minister could make bold political judgments and take action on this issue.The Japanese government later decided to negotiate with South Korea based upon its main principles of economic cooperation, such as ‘improving people’s livelihood’ and ‘maintaining a balance among beneficiary countries’, while recognizing the political nature of such cooperation and its indirect contribution to Korea’s security. In other words, the Japanese government intended to maintain its own initiative on economic cooperation while responding flexibly to South Korea’s request for aid.During the negotiations, the Japanese side had explicitly stated that it could not agree with Korea’s view that Japan should promote economic cooperation with Korea in order to ease Korea’s military burden. However, Japan did express some understanding of South Korea’s situation and Korea accepted Japan’s assertion that it would contribute to Korea’s economic and social stability. Negotiations then made progress and the two sides agreed on the official purpose for economic cooperation and the amount of assistance from Japan to Korea. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Suzuki played an important role in deciding the proportion of Japan’s ODA to the total amount of assistance to South Korea. He also explained Japan’s position during the summit talks and dispatched his special envoys to Korea. Consequently, the differences in stance between the two countries on the content of the assistance was narrowed to a considerable extent before the inauguration of the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration.However, negotiations between Japan and South Korea were suspended during the Japanese history textbook controversy that surfaced at the end of June 1982. When the textbook issue was settled, Suzuki announced that he would not run in the Liberal Democratic Party leadership election. Therefore, the Nakasone administration assumed responsibility for resolving the remaining issues.There is thus room for further consideration of whether the Suzuki administration’s pacifist stance should be regarded as the reason behind the failure of negotiations with South Korea. It is important to bear in mind the necessity of examining various aspects of Japan’s domestic and international situations. Furthermore, Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation revealed a high degree of policy continuity among the Ohira, Suzuki and Nakasone administrations.

著者

李 秉哲

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

pp.as22.a01, (Released:2022-06-20)

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This article aims to add a new perspective on how the Japanese government conducted Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation during the early 1980s.The Zenko Suzuki administration judged that Japan could not meet the U.S. government’s expectations of strengthening its own defense capabilities. For this reason, the administration expressed willingness to cooperate with the U.S. for the economic and social development of strategically important countries. This was intended to work as a means to achieve the ‘comprehensive security’ policy adopted by the Masayoshi Ohira administration and burden-sharing in the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In other words, Japan had an economic cooperation policy that aimed to support developing countries, while recognizing the political impact of foreign aid. Japan had this policy in place before South Korea’s request in 1981 for 10 billion dollars in economic assistance.The Suzuki administration had already acknowledged the need to support South Korea to ensure Japan’s cooperative relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, there was a marked contrast in position between Japan and South Korea during the early stages of the negotiations on the official purpose and contents of economic cooperation. Steady negotiation efforts were necessary to create a situation where the Japanese Prime Minister could make bold political judgments and take action on this issue.The Japanese government later decided to negotiate with South Korea based upon its main principles of economic cooperation, such as ‘improving people’s livelihood’ and ‘maintaining a balance among beneficiary countries’, while recognizing the political nature of such cooperation and its indirect contribution to Korea’s security. In other words, the Japanese government intended to maintain its own initiative on economic cooperation while responding flexibly to South Korea’s request for aid.During the negotiations, the Japanese side had explicitly stated that it could not agree with Korea’s view that Japan should promote economic cooperation with Korea in order to ease Korea’s military burden. However, Japan did express some understanding of South Korea’s situation and Korea accepted Japan’s assertion that it would contribute to Korea’s economic and social stability. Negotiations then made progress and the two sides agreed on the official purpose for economic cooperation and the amount of assistance from Japan to Korea. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Suzuki played an important role in deciding the proportion of Japan’s ODA to the total amount of assistance to South Korea. He also explained Japan’s position during the summit talks and dispatched his special envoys to Korea. Consequently, the differences in stance between the two countries on the content of the assistance was narrowed to a considerable extent before the inauguration of the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration.However, negotiations between Japan and South Korea were suspended during the Japanese history textbook controversy that surfaced at the end of June 1982. When the textbook issue was settled, Suzuki announced that he would not run in the Liberal Democratic Party leadership election. Therefore, the Nakasone administration assumed responsibility for resolving the remaining issues.There is thus room for further consideration of whether the Suzuki administration’s pacifist stance should be regarded as the reason behind the failure of negotiations with South Korea. It is important to bear in mind the necessity of examining various aspects of Japan’s domestic and international situations. Furthermore, Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation revealed a high degree of policy continuity among the Ohira, Suzuki and Nakasone administrations.