著者
佐藤 邦政
出版者
日本倫理学会
雑誌
倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, pp.247-261, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

In her pioneering work Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker elucidates how people are wronged as the knowers in various social epistemic practices of knowledge production, acquisition, transmission, and dissemination. In her account, “hermeneutical injustice” in essence refers to injustice caused by prejudice that is structurally internalized in the collective hermeneutical resource, such as conceptual tools and expressive styles, in a particular society at a particular time. Due to this structural prejudice, people of minority and socially powerless people can wrongfully be treated as knowers, so that their distinct voices and experiences remain unintelligible. This paper explores the essential constituents of the vicious agency of perpetrators involved in hermeneutical injustice. In Fricker’s view, structural prejudice in the collective resource is bad not only epistemically but also morally because it causes people of minority and socially powerless people to be hermeneutically marginalized. However, Fricker argues that there is no perpetrator in hermeneutical injustice as prejudice is incorporated implicitly in the collective hermeneutical resource. On the contrary, Medina contends that vicious agency makes sense in terms of responsibility for noticing others’ non-standard voices and distinct experiences. Whereas Medina’s argument illuminates the possibility that people perpetrate hermeneutical injustice, there are other essential constituents of the vicious agency alongside agent’s responsibility. On the basis of virtue theory, I will demonstrate that the vicious agency of agents who commit hermeneutical injustice is assessed not only by their vicious motivations but also by bad results produced by their action. First, if agents have motivations to intentionally disregard others’ sincere voices and experiences, and maintain the structural prejudice in the collective resource, they perpetrate hermeneutical injustice. Second, if agents do not neutralize the prejudice in their own hermeneutical resource, even by a direct interaction with others who appeal their voices and experiences, they are culpable of committing hermeneutical injustice.“ Neutralizing prejudice” here refers to agents’ becoming aware of a lacuna in the present hermeneutical resource as well as recognizing structural prejudices. Conversely, even if agents are unsuccessful in making others’ voices and experiences socially intelligible, they are not deemed as perpetrators if they produce the effect of neutralizing prejudice.
著者
立花 幸司 村瀬 智之 三澤 紘一郎 山田 圭一 土屋 陽介 佐藤 邦政
出版者
熊本大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
2020-04-01

哲学と教育哲学のあいだには研究交流の不在が国内外でたびたび指摘されてきた。このプロジェクトでは、お互いの活動に理解のある哲学者(立花・山田)、教育哲学者(三澤・佐藤)、教育実践者(土屋・村瀬)が一つのグループとなって緊密な共同研究を行うことで、日本という教育文化的風土をフィールドとして、よき認識主体としてもつべき徳と避けるべき悪徳を明らかにする。そして、この解明を通じて、理論的に妥当で教育実践上も有効な徳認識論の一つの理論を構築する。
著者
佐藤 邦政
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.56, no.1, pp.37, 2023-11-15 (Released:2023-11-15)
参考文献数
34

This paper proposes a transformative virtue that counteracts testimonial injustice by responding to two critiques of the virtue of testimonial justice. First, I demonstrate that self-reflection can function in more varied ways than the direct detection of oneʼs own prejudices, as previously assumed in the literature. Hence, self-reflection can holistically be effective in neutralizing the influence of oneʼs prejudices on oneʼs beliefs. Second, I propose a virtue that encourages epistemic agents to be epistemically acute enough to experience dissonance between perceiving a particular testifier (who is talking in person) as trustworthy and having biased beliefs about the testifierʼs trustworthiness: transformative virtue. Third, I argue that the development of a proper indirect contact theory with relevant epistemic practices can offer epistemic environments that facilitate peopleʼs critical imagination to cultivate a transformative virtue, considering the risk of victimized epistemic agentsʼ vulnerability.