著者
井上 順孝
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, pp.28-46, 2018-03-31 (Released:2018-05-11)

Neuroscience and cognitive science have undergone explosive advances since the 1990s, the effects of which have even been felt on religious studies. I will explore here what new perspectives these developments might generate by looking at two specific issues. The first is that of what concepts of kami (deity), imi (taboo) and kegare (pollution) exist in modern Shinto. The second is connected to research concerning the debate over the nature of the founders of new religions and the process by which people adopt those faiths. The question of what is distinctive about the kami concept in Shinto can be seen as part of the broader question of what leads the human mind to conceive of gods and deities in the first place. Similarly, such common Shinto ideas as imi and kegare come under the broader topic of why humans establish taboos for certain acts and behaviors. While discussing prior research, I also stress the need to study these new perspectives. Max Weber’s theory of charisma is widely used in discussions regarding the founders of new religions, but I believe that the phenomenon of people becoming entranced with a certain person can be examined from a broader perspective that incorporates neuroscience. The same may be said for the conversion process.
著者
内記 洸
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, pp.47-60, 2018-03-31 (Released:2018-05-11)

In der buddhistischen Schule des Reinen Landes ist die Darstellung des „Rinju-Raigo“ (臨終来迎) eine der populärsten. Es handelt sich dabei um das Erscheinen des Amitabha-Buddhas und der ihn begleitenden Bodhisattvas, um einen Sterbenden ins Reine Land zu bringen. Der Mensch begegnet also im Sterben dem „Buddha“, worin der unmittelbarste Ausdruck des religiösen Verhältnisses zum Transzendenten liegt.Aber Shinran, der Gründer der Schule des Reinen Landes, legt diese Lehre nicht buchstäblich aus, und hält sie für Buddhas Mittel, uns zur wahren Erlösung zu leiten. Nach seiner Aussage müssen wir von der Zukunftserwartung ihres Erscheinens ins richtige gegenwärtige Verhältnis zum Buddha eintreten. Shinran versucht also, die Lehre von einem grundsätzlich anderen Standpunkt aus zu erfassen.Wenn wir jedoch seine Auslegung der Lehre genauer betrachten, erkennen wir, dass er den Ausdruck und die Idee „Rinju-Raigo“ aus seinem Denken nicht ausschließt. Es ist im Gegenteil so, dass diese originär buddhistische Lehre von Buddhas Erscheinen sogar noch eine bestimmte Rolle in Shinran spielt. Es gibt hier in der Tat zwei unterschiedliche Auslegungen von einer traditionellen Darstellung, und beide, die eine als negative und die andere als positive, stehen zu einander in einem Widerspruch. Shinrans Denken ist daher, so die These, eigentlich zweischichtig.Die Aufgabe in diesem Aufsatz ist es, beide Auslegungen dieser Lehre gemäß Shinrans Verständnis festzuhalten und dadurch aufzuzeigen, dass sich in der Darstellung des „Rinju-Raigo“ selbst diese widersprüchliche Doppelheit deutlich ausdrückt.
著者
須藤 孝也
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, pp.61-74, 2018-03-31 (Released:2018-05-11)

This article reconfigures Kierkegaard’s thought, focusing on four points revolving around secularization: the worldly, history, Christendom and internalization.In the middle of the 19th century Denmark, some people had already begun to transform Christianity into a worldly one. Such move may seem like a practical way to prolong the life of Christianity amid difficulties of having faith in the age of modernization. But Kierkegaard criticized such move based on his dualistic standpoint according to which transcendence and immanence cannot be mediated. Kierkegaard analyzed matters around that time by using the word of “demonic”. The demonic people refuse the good and shut themselves up, not opening themselves to others.However, while Kierkegaard witnessed the beginning of secularization, he did not see the process with an adequate time span. For Kierkegaard passed away six years after the secularization in Denmark started in earnest at 1849. Furthermore, Danish secularization was unique in that instead of abolishing Christianity, it was concerned with transforming it into a worldly one and enlarging the freedom of people’s religious lives. Kierkegaard’s “the single individual” was a subject who was not with non-believers but with believers, even if their faith in God was inappropriate in Kierkegaard’s eyes.
著者
山内 翔太
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, pp.75-89, 2018-03-31 (Released:2018-05-11)

Dans cet essai, nous nous proposons d’élucider le rôle de la « grâce » chez Ravaisson en vue de révéler le sens de sa métaphysique dans sa totalité, notamment la structure de sa téléologie et de sa théologie. La notion de « grâce » a un double sens : d’une part, celui de charme indéfinissable ; d’autre part, celui de don surnaturel que Dieu accorde aux hommes pour leur salut.La méthode philosophique de Ravaisson consiste à réfléchir sur la conscience intime du moi et à contempler la nature par analogie. De ce point de vue, on peut saisir la substance de la nature, non par l’analyse, qui la décompose en éléments inférieurs, mais par la synthèse, qui tente d’atteindre la finalité supérieure comme cause. À travers la finalité, beauté de l’harmonie organique, on a la conscience immédiate de la bonté de Dieu. Car le monde a été créé grâce au sacrifice de soi de Dieu, qui est cause de soi : la fin de l’être, c’est le sacrifice divin.À travers l’expérience de la grâce, celle de l’ondulation observée dans la nature, ou la ligne du serpentement dont parle Léonard de Vinci. Ravaisson considère que c’est par l’art, notamment par le dessin, que l’on apprend le mieux l’essence de la finalité. Ici, la grâce signifie la réunion de la nature avec Dieu. Si l’on saisit la grâce, c’est pour avoir en moi l’âme du héros qui imite Dieu lui-même.
著者
藤田 正勝
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.34, pp.1-13, 2017-03-31 (Released:2017-06-01)

Wir können aus seinem ersten Buch Shukyo Tetsugaku Gaikotsu (Skelett der Religionsphilosophie) wissen, dass Kiyozawa für das Problem „Philosophie und Religion“ ein starkes Interesse hatte. Dieser Buchtitel zeigt, von welchem Standpunkt aus er sich mit dem Problem der Religion zu beschäftigen suchte. Er wollte von dem Standpunkt der Philosophie oder der Wissenschaft aus fragen, was die Religion sei, warum es die Religion gebe. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt fragte er zuerst, wie sich Religion und Wissenschaft, oder Glauben und Vernunft, zueinander verhalten. Dass er an der Universität Tokyo bei Ernest Francisco Fenollosa Philosophie studierte, gab ihm Anlass dazu. Er war von Fenollosas Vorlesungen über die Philosophie Hegels stark beeinflusst. Wir können vor allem in Kiyozawas Verständnis der Dialektik und des Verhältnisses zwischen „Endlichem und Unendlichem“ diesen Einfluss Fenollosas erkennen.Bemerkenswert ist, dass das Verhältniss von „Endlichem und Unendlichem“ für Kiyozawa nicht einfach ein Problem der Philosophie war. Es war für ihn ein zentrales Problem, weil es nicht nur das Seinsverständnis, sondern auch die Praxis, m. a. W. die Erlösung betraf. Das Problem der Struktur der Welt, in der wir leben, hing bei Kiyozawa mit dem Problem eng zusammen, wie wir in dieser Welt leben.
著者
水野 友晴
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.34, pp.14-28, 2017-03-31 (Released:2017-06-01)

D. T. Suzuki (Suzuki Daisetz)'s presentation of “Zen” should be viewed as an attempt to give a prescription for illnesses caused by our modern living. In this sense, he uses the term “Zen” from a new and modern viewpoint, and so it is necessary to draw a line between his “Zen” and traditional Zen Buddhism. In this article, I examine his early work Môzô-Roku (妄想録) in order to demonstrate that he was driven by this motive from early on in his career, that is, from the time he had his first opportunity to stay in the United States in the first decade of the twentieth century.In Môzô-Roku, Suzuki defines religion as an attempt to rediscover and return to an original unitary activity underlying our common dualistic distinctions such as subject/object and good/evil. Moreover, he maintains that “Zen” is an immediate expression of this original unitary activity.In his discussions of “Zen” and religion in Môzô-Roku, Suzuki emphasizes the importance of recovering an insight into the original unitary activity, and of our continuous efforts to keep a passage open to it in our modern lives.In this article, I demonstrate that Suzuki's late vocation, namely, to communicate an Eastern unitary way of living to those caught up in Western dualistic ways of living, was in fact a maturation of his thoughts in this early work.
著者
竹村 牧男
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.34, pp.29-43, 2017-03-31 (Released:2017-06-01)

During the turbulent times from the end of the Edo period to the early Meiji period in Japan, the influence of Buddhism had been declining due to the unceasing whirlwind of anti-Buddhist movements and the accelerating modernization by the Western Impact. Among this historic setting, Dr. Enryo Inoue, the founder of TOYO University, who was born and raised in the branch temple of Higashi-honganji-temple at 1858 was skeptical about Buddhism in childhood.At the stage of youth, he studied philosophy from Prof. Ernest Francisco Fenollosa as well as Buddhism from Prof. Tanzan Hara or Prof. Kakujyu Yoshitani at University of Tokyo. Eventually he regarded the philosophy of Hegel as the better for maintaining every phenomenal thing as absolute being. From this viewpoint he reread Buddhist canons and found out that Buddhist philosophy explains the same philosophy as Hegel's philosophy. After this discovery he energetically wrote and published many articles which clarified that the Buddhist thoughts and values are as good as Western philosophy. Such articles and books were favorably accepted by the Buddhist schools of Japan and created an opportunity to recover the confidence of Buddhism all over Japan.Furthermore Dr. Enryo Inoue brought the top of monks of many Buddhist schools together and set up the social movement which promoted the improvement of the status of Buddhist monks and official permission and proof for Buddhist schools by the government. As a result of these remarkable efforts by Dr. Enryo Inoue the Buddhist community in Japan gradually became more active.Dr. Enryo Inoue also emphasized that the reform of Buddhist schools should not be pessimistic but mainly exist to show the eternal life of Sakya-muni Buddha to the real society and to play a role for salvation of the actual society and people. From this perspective Dr. Enryo Inoue highly appreciated the Nichiren's school which has similar thoughts.Dr. Enryo Inoue proposed the concept of Buddhism engaged in the reform of real society by exploring the philosophy of Buddhism. Now we should incorporate his thoughts and activities and should pursue more of the detailed explorations of Buddhist thoughts and the positive social practices.
著者
下田 和宣
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.34, pp.58-71, 2017-03-31 (Released:2017-06-01)

Das Ziel des Aufsatzes liegt darin, die philosophische Beschreibung der Religionsgeschichte von Hegel in Berliner Zeit als ›Philosophie der Religionsgeschichte‹ zu formulieren. Im Rahmen der Geistesphilosophie Hegels gilt die Entwicklung der geschichtlichen Kulturreligionen als Realisierung des Religionsbegriffs. Hier tauchen weder Gottestheorie noch Gefühlsmoment, sondern kulturelle geschichtliche Phänomene wie Mythen und Kulte als ein zentrales Thema auf. Hinter dieser eigenen Problematik der Hegelschen Religionsphilosophie, welche die Sache der Religion für die Beziehung zwischen Gott und Menschen hält, lässt sich seine Strategie gegen die sich wesentlich an einen Ursprung orientierte traditionelle Denkart erkennen. Hegel versucht nun eine neue Art des Philosophierens aufzuzeigen, indem er aus der geschichtlichen Entwicklung der religiösen Erscheinungen eine vor-begriffliche Phase der Gestaltung des philosophischen Denkens herausarbeitet. Die Philosophie als Religionsgeschichte erschließt nämlich eine Möglichkeit, sich selbst im Kontext der Kultur zu erkennen.
著者
梅野 宏樹
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, pp.57-68, 2016-03-31 (Released:2017-03-10)

In his epoch-making study, Bertrand Russell criticized Leibniz’s ethics as “a mass of inconsistencies.” Leibniz formally emphasizes human responsibility for his/her wrong actions, and affirms the possibility of following reason in spite of the attraction of sensible pleasure. Nevertheless, Russell insisted that Leibniz’s hidden philosophy, which he really held, necessarily concludes an extreme intellectualism. This position makes morality meaningless, because it holds, “all sin is due wholly to ignorance.”This paper responds to the criticism. First, Russell ignored the fact that the primitive passive force (which is one of the essences of Monad) produces passion via corporeal representation by confused perceptions. But passion plays an important role, i.e. the cause of evil will. However rightly human understanding judges, passion intervenes between the judgment and volition. That is why we commit sins in spite of our clear understanding.Second, even if our perception is largely confused, we can realize that to follow reason is truly good, for God is the Supreme Reason. Then, by virtue of our good will, we can improve our understanding little by little, and pursue moral good.Accordingly, Leibniz’s true philosophy is not an extreme intellectualism which denies morality, but a moderate intellectualism which recognizes mutual influence between human understanding and will. As good or evil will takes part in human action, those who will are responsible for it.
著者
山根 秀介
出版者
宗教哲学会
雑誌
宗教哲学研究 (ISSN:02897105)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.33, pp.69-81, 2016-03-31 (Released:2017-03-10)

It is often said that William James and Henri Bergson share a lot of ideas on philosophy: the importance of direct experience, the anti-intellectualism, the notion of reality as changing, etc. There is, however, a fundamental difference between them, which is strongly connected with the core of James’s philosophical thought as well as that of Bergson’s. The purpose of this study is to compare the pluralistic ontology in James and the ontology of pure duration in Bergson, thus to elucidate the similarity and difference between the two, and finally to find out where the difference comes from.It is true that both the ontology of James’s “radical empiricism” and that of Bergson’s “pure duration” agree to admit the plurality of our experience, consciousness, and universe. Especially, “the discontinuity-theory” of the former and the concept of “unities of duration” of the latter form the base of the plurality in a surprisingly similar way. Nevertheless, they differ in how to consider the unity of multiple beings. On the one hand, Bergson observes that each element of duration is determined by the whole, and reflects it at the same time; the unity of duration is holistic and organic. On the other hand, James thinks that this unity is not real and insists the absolute multiplicity of elements. This opposition is derived from the difference in the notion of “relation”.