著者

末綱 恕一

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, no.4, pp.182-184, 1955-06-30 (Released:2009-09-04)

著者

奥田 栄

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, no.4, pp.225-230, 1992

著者

野家 啓一

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.1, pp.31-36, 2016

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<p>Sixty years ago, "metaphysics" was a kind of pejorative word in the philosophical movement of logical positivism. Its slogan was "elimination of metaphysics" and "unification of sciences." But in the 1970's philosophical climate has gradually changed. Nowadays metaphysics rather become popular in the field of analytic philosophy. Such transformation was caused by Michael Dummett and Saul Kripke. Dummett's Anti-realism based on intuitionistic mathematics and Kripke's possible world semantics and new theory of reference based on quantified modal logic introduced metaphysical perspective into analytic philosophy. These are typical examples of interaction between philosophy, mathematics and logic.</p>

著者

谷川 卓

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.77-85, 2010

参考文献数

27

---

In this paper, I argue that non-occurrences of events are not qualified as causal relatas from an ontological point of view. It is a matter of fact that we usually use sentences which appear to report non-occurrences of events as causes or effects. But such sentences do not represent the states of the world straightforwardly and hence requires an interpretation. According to the interpretation I endorse, sentences mentioning non-occurrences of events should be interpreted in terms of counterfactuals. This interpretation shows that non-occurrences of events are mentioned on the basis of the concept of possibility. This view is supported by clarifying the ontology of events, confirming the truth condition for counterfactuals, and analyzing cases of double prevention.

著者

斉藤 了文 SAITO Norifumi

出版者

科学基礎論学会

巻号頁・発行日

2007

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rights : Copy right 科学基礎論学会「本文データは学協会の許諾に基づきCiNiiから複製したものである」Relation : is Version Of.http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/130001435409

著者

藁谷 敏晴 大森 仁

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.9-18, 2009-02-25

被引用文献数

1

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In a paper by Waragai and Shidori, a system of paraconsistent logic called PCL1 was proposed and a result showing the relation between PCL1 and the system of Modal Logic S5 was given. Though the classical negation plays an important role in the result, it was treated in an abstract way, so the present paper focuses on the concrete treatment of classical negation in PCL1 and makes the condition to enrich PCL1 with classical negation explicit. For this purpose, strong negation, which is defined by using a bottom particle in PCL1, is introduced and some of its results will be given. Also the notion of "behaving classically" in the extended system will be discussed.

著者

MAEHARA Shôji

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.5, pp.242-256, 1970

被引用文献数

4

---

The purpose of the following treatise is to remark the fact that the method developed in Schutte [6] is able to give a unification to completeness proofs for several formal systems of logic. Especially in treatments on the predicate logic, the second ε-Theorem in the sense of Hilbert-Bernays [2] is used effectively. In this treatise, we comment on the classical and the intuitionistic logic only. Because, application to other logics, in author's opinion, is easy now and peculiarly needed ideas concerning some modal logics are already shown in Schutte's book [7]. I would like to express my thanks to Prof. G. Takeuti who gave me a remark concerning the fact that the ε-Theorem is useful to the completeness proof of the classical predicate calculus and to Dr. D. P. McCullough who got me interested in those problems by sending me his unpublished papers.

著者

AOYAMA Takuo SHIMIZU Shogo YAMADA Yuki

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:18841228)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, pp.1-18, 2015-03-30

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This paper presents what the authors call the 'divergence problem' regarding choosing between different future possibilities. As is discussed in the first half, the central issue of the problem is the difficulty of temporally locating the 'active cause' on the modal divergent diagram. In the second half of this paper, we discuss the 'second-person freedom' which is, strictly, neither compatibilist negative freedom nor incompatibilist positive freedom. The divergence problem leads us to two hypothetical views (i.e. the view of single-line determination and that of one-off chance), and these views bring humans closer to the afree side - i.e. outside of the contrast between being free and being unfree. The afree side is greatly different from the ordinary human side. This paper tries to secure the second-person freedom as a substitute for the ordinary human freedom while preventing the divergence problem from arising.

著者

中島 義道

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.p127-132, 1979-12

著者

AKIYOSHI Ryota

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.13-29, 2009-03-31

被引用文献数

1

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We can find in several places an assertion that Godel's second incompleteness theorem defeated Hilbert's program. But, (as M. Detlefsen argued in his book) in order to establish this assertion, we need to address additional issues. First we formulate Hilbert's program. Second we reconstruct a standard argument for the claim that Godel's second incompleteness theorem defeated Hilbert's program. In doing so, we formulate a critical, and problematic assumption which we call "DCT" (Derivability Conditions Thesis). Finally we examine three arguments whose aims are to justify DCT. We show that the first and the second argument are not valid, and discuss the third argument, which is based on Kreisel's idea. We identify a difficulty in this argument as well. After examining the difficulty, we conclude that we cannot claim that Godel's second incompleteness theorem defeats Hilbert's program. Moreover we clarify what is essentially needed for such an argument to succeed.

著者

WILLIAMSON Timothy BO Chen Nakatogawa Koji

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.57-87, 2009-11-15

著者

清塚 邦彦

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.77, pp.155-162, 1991

著者

坂本 百大

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.45-48, 1986

著者

Takayuki SUZUKI

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science (ISSN:04530691)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, pp.55-73, 2022 (Released:2022-10-19)

参考文献数

21

被引用文献数

1

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Interesting works on the evolutionary origins of consciousness have been published recently. They are interesting especially because they try to solve the hard problem of consciousness through the study of the evolutionary origins of consciousness. This paper critically examines one of these works, a book by Feinberg and Mallatt. Though it seems that they fail to offer a new and plausible solution to the hard problem of consciousness, studying evolutionary origins remains to be one of the most promising strategies for the naturalization of consciousness.

著者

過能 洋平

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.75-86, 2022 (Released:2022-04-06)

参考文献数

25

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This paper discusses how a discourse of “reporting” thoughts is possible in Jones' myth of EPM. It is unclear how it is possible for the Ryleans to “report” their own thoughts in Jones's myth. Sellars's answer is found in correspondence between Castañeda and Sellars. According to it, it is possible to “report” a thought by “respond[ing] to thought that-p by saying “I am thinking that-p””. I discuss the process by which the first-person authority over their own thoughts is established in EPM through examining of what it means to respond to their own thoughts in meta-thoughts and why it makes it possible for them to “report” their thoughts.

著者

林 知己夫

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, no.4, pp.180-181, 1962-02-28 (Released:2010-05-26)

著者

香川 知晶

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.87-92, 2008-03-30

参考文献数

17

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The nascent field of neuroethics consists of three main divisions: the neuroscience of ethics, the ethics of neuroscience, and the interface between neuroscience and society. This concept originated at the conference, &ldquo;Neuroethics, Mapping the Field, &rdquo; in San Francisco in 2002, sponsored by the Dana Foundation. However, due to its enormity, this concept lacks clarity, and can be more accurately defined in two distinct ways: examining the conditions of neuroscience, and its comparison with the first appearance of the term &ldquo;;neuro-ethics&rdquo; in 1973 which was coined as a protest against an unethical neurological experimentation.

著者

三木 那由他

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.33-48, 2021

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<p>In the process of presenting his theory of conversational implicature, Paul Grice (1975) segmented cases of conversational implicature into three groups: Group A, where no maxims are violated; Group B, where the violation of a maxim is to be explained by the supposition of a clash with another maxim; and Group C, which involves the exploitation of a maxim. Yukiko Kawaguchi, however, claimed in her 2001 article that this categorization is ill-grounded. This paper proposes, in opposition to Kawaguchi, an interpretation of Grice's theory of conversational implicature which accords with his treatment of conversational implicature and provides reasonable evidence in support of his categorization of it.</p>

著者

小林 道夫

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.25, no.1, pp.9-15, 1997-12-25

参考文献数

6

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デカルトは現在の (特に英米系の) 心の哲学においてはたいへん奇妙な扱いを受けている。デカルトの心の哲学の第一の特質はその二元論であるが (ただし, あとで触れるように二元論に尽きるのではない), この二元論のゆえにデカルトの哲学は, しばしば, 反科学の扱いをうけるのである。J.サールは最近の著書で, 現代の心の哲学での (科学主義的的) 唯物論の動向を難じて, その要因の筆頭に,「 (人々は) デカルトの二元論に陥るのが怖いのだ」という点を挙げている。現代の科学の時代にあって, 実在とはすべて客観的なものであり究極的には物理的存在であると思われるにかかわらず, 物理的存在以外に心的実体なるものを認めるデカルトの二元論に同調することは, 科学的知性を脅かす不条理を引き受けることだと見られるというのである(1)。しかし, 改めていうまでもなく, 自然科学の対象から心的性質や目的論的な概念を一切除外して, 近現代の数理科学を方向づけたのは他ならぬデカルトである。彼はまた, 動物や人間の身体をも機械論的に説明しようとして近代の生理学の見地をも設定したのである (デカルトの生理学的な「人間論」はのちの唯物論的な「人間機械論」の一つの有力なソースであった)。デカルトにとっては自分の哲学こそが, 人間の身体をも含む自然全体の科学的探究を推進するものであったのである。しかし, 問題はもちろん, デカルトが科学的探究の対象となる物理的生理学的対象以外に, それとは独立のものとして思惟や意志という心的存在を認めたことである。現代の言葉でいえば, デカルトは, 科学的生理学的探究を推進しながら, それとは独立に「常識心理学」の領域があるとはっきりと認めたということになる。私見によれば, 現代の心の哲学の状況に身を置いて, いわゆる「消去的唯物論」に与するのでなしに, 自然や人間の身体に対する科学的生理学的探究の見地を堅持しながら, 常識心理学が表す心的性質や心的存在に独自の身分を認める方向の哲学を立てようとした場合には, デカルトの心の哲学はなおも極めて有力で説得的な見地と評価しうる。以下で私は, 現代の心の哲学の問題, とくに「心的性質の実在性」や「心的因果性」の問題を念頭におき,「デカルトの心の哲学」からはそれらの問題に対してどのような解答が与えられるか, という点を考えてみたい。

著者

米沢 克夫

出版者

科学基礎論学会

雑誌

科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, no.2, pp.71-78, 1975