著者

大橋 容一郎

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.35-50, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

著者

岡田 勝明

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.51-70, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

著者

片柳 榮一

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.71-85, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Nishida quoted several times the sentences of British philosopher, B. Bosanquet in the middle period of the formation of his own philosophical thought. The sentences express the assertion that the true logical subject is always reality and the logical predicate is always the meaning of an idea and the judgment always appears as a revelation of something which is in reality. This assertion inspired Nishida to the build up his own unique understanding of the judgement. Bosanquet's thesis expresses that the judgment is not the connection of two abstract concepts but that the subject in judgment indicates always the reality of the actual world. Nishida's endeavor consists in the further elucidation of the structure of judgment. The reality that Bosanquet saw behind the logical subject is understood by Nishida as the concrete universal. Nishida defines the concrete universal as the universal that embraces in itself what can be subject without being ever predicate. According to Nishida mathematics can define their concrete universal, but the experience of facts can not define its own concrete universal. The concrete universal in the world of experience suffers the split between the subject-sphere and the predicate-sphere of the concrete universal. What is perceived by the intuition is the subject-sphere which has in itself infinite depth. Nishida owes this understanding to Bosanquet. Nishida's uniqueness consists in elucidating the predicatesphere. The infinitely deep subject-sphere is embracedby the infinitely wide universal which is the predicate-sphere.These two spheres do not coincide with each other in the knowledge of experience. But Nishida finds what bridges this split. That is the concept o f what I experience. Nishida's unique term transcendent predicate-sphere which is Nishida's definition of ego originates from this insight.

著者

熊谷 征一郎

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.103-116, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

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It is well-known that Nishida Kitaro asserted the motive of philosophy must be the grief of life. In early literature, the grief of life has been often dealt with in terms of the Nishida's life. It is true that his life was not a little unhappy and grief was his motive of philosophy. However, the grief of life is important not only in his life, but also in the system of his philosophy. Even when the grief of life was dealt with in terms of the system of philosophy in early literature, it was treated in the context of emotion. But it is more essential in the context of selfrealization. In short, he thinks that self is realized as place of nothingness and as the unique person in the grief of life. He finds a sort of contradiction in selfrealization. Or rather, he thinks of self as the contradiction itself. He finds two aspects in the contradiction. One is that self is intuited when it gets lost and subsumes objects .. That means the fundamental acquisition of the body and the self-realization as subsuming place of nothingness. The other aspect of the contradiction is the coincidence of the realization of the eternal death and that of the uniqueness of self. In both aspects, the negation of the grief plays essential roles.

著者

大西 光弘

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.117-131, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Diese Abhandlung behandelt als Thema die Beziehung zwischen der Nishida-Philosophie und den Prinzipien der Ph註nomenologie.Sie stellt vorwiegend zwei Punkte dar: erstens Nishidas Gedanke der Transzendierung durch den Boden von dem naturalistischen Allgemeinen uber das selbstbewu13te Allgemeine nach dem intelligiblen Allgemeinen tut das Gleiche mit der phanomenologischen Reduktion. Zweitens das Fundament der Nishida-Philosophie jikaku (Selbstbewu13tsein), d.h. das Selbst sieht in dem Selbst das Selbst, entspricht der Konstitution des Noemas durch die Noesis der Phanomenologie. Wenn man diese zwei Punkte versteht, wurde man erkennen, dass Nishidas schwierigen Redewendungen, die der beriihmte Kritiker Hideo Kobayashi das weder durch Japanisch noch durch Fremdsprache geschriebene groteske System genannt hat, eine auf seine Weise folgerichtige Logik haben.

著者

島本 英明

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.133-150, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the essence of Alberto Giacometti's sculpture of human body in the light of the philosophy of Kitaro Nishida. Alberto Giacometti's motif was to express the world just as it is seen. This experience can be considered as one mode of the pure experience, a basic philosophical conception of Nishida. Driven by this motif, the Swiss sculptor in the 20th century left a lot of sculptures in the form of a standing woman or a walking man. Usually one sees in them two typical forms which can easily be confirmed : The one is thin and the other is uneven in her surface. This paper tries to interpret these characters by understanding the artistic experience of Giacometti as one mode of the pure experience of Nishida. That is : These characters as not to be regarded as merely visual, but a clue to look into the invisible dimension of the work. Nishida's thought of the self-developing pure experience and the dynamism of the selfa wareness helps us to understand this invisible dimension of the work of Giacometti. The pure experience of Nishida and the artistic experience of Giacometti are essentially narrow to each other, but not the same with each other. Art can not be absorbed into philosophy, and the latter not into the former. But the philosophy of Nishida sheds a light on the work of Giacometti because of the analogy of the both.

著者

小林 信之

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.60-83, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

著者

リーゼンフーバー クラウス

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.84-104, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

著者

Rolf Elberfeld

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.105-109, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

著者

浅倉 祐一郎

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.110-127, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Throughout his life the philosopher Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945) made references to art in his writings. On occasion the references were quite slight and on other occasions more profound. I think we can infer from this that art had a certain importance in the formation of his philosophy. It is helpful to divide the development of Nishida's philosophy into four periods. The First Stage, J unsui-keiken (pure experience) refers to the immediate or intuitive apprehension of the world about us. In the Second Stage, Jikaku (self-awareness) Nishida deals with self-awareness in the apprehended world, here Nishida was considerably influenced by the famous scholar of aesthetics K. Fiedler (1841 -95). Turning logically from this comes the Third Stage, Basho (place) here Nishida concludes that true selfawareness occurs when one sees oneself as one really is, as a place (Basho) existing in the greater or deeper'place'of the apprehended surrounding world. The Fourth Stage flows naturally from this as the Bensyohoteki-sekai or dialectical world which is the world questioned and examined in relation to these first three principles, that is pure immediate experience, to which is added self-awareness refined to Basho in the philosopher, which eventually leads to a new viewpoint on the actual world. It is when we come to the Fourth Stage that we find the principal influence on Nishida changes, partially leaving behind the theories of K. Fiedler and becoming increasing influenced by the work of J. Harrison (185 0| 1928) whose theories on reality and the historical world may have caused this change in emphasis. Nevertheless the theories of K. Fiedler remained important in relation to Art Theory. I believe that the third Basho stage is the most important in understanding the development of his idea s. Historically scholars have also believed that. However they have so far tended to neglect the r elation between Nishida's thought and art on this Third Stage, attaching far more importance to the second and fourth periods. But for me the Third Stage re , mains probably significant, revealing as it does a process of fundamental change between thought and art.

著者

熊谷 征一郎

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.128-142, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

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The Turn in Nishida's Philosophy of Others Nishida's philosophy of others has been often criticized for identifying self with others. Especially, his paper I and You has been. However, exactly in the paper, Nishida's philosophy of others takes a 180 degree turn. It is, as it were, the turn from sympathetic identification to response relations with others. Therefore, concerning after the paper, the criticisms are beside the point, even though they are right to the point before the paper. In this thesis, I make clear the substance and tracks of the turn. But, the criticisms seem to have the grounds even in the paper. In fact, the paper has a lot of words which suggest that he identifies self with others. However, if you examine the true meaning of those words faithfully, you find that they mean diverse sides of response relations. In short, he finds immediate encounter with others not in the direction of sympathy or empathy, but in the direction of birth of Itself. It is well-known that Nishida uses the concept of he. I prove that Nishida thinks the response relations between self and others can be realized only where they are open to him (a third party)

著者

佐々木 慎吾

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.143-157, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Scince Nishida's thought is greatly affected by his practice of Zen Buddism, some people often regerd him as a speculative metaphysician. This way of looking contains some truth, but it fails the very important point to see. In this article insist that the essential intention of Nisida's philosophycal work is oriented toward the concrete reality of the world. By Nishida, the world of concrete reality is the historical-social world, in which we act, live and die. That's why the idea of life is frequently mentioned in his late works. Life represents the concretness of the world. Nishida argues that real social facts such as folks or nations must be treated as life. On the analogy of J. S. Haldane's physiology, Nishida insists that the species should be considered as self of the maintaining subject in the historical-social world. Being inspired by Haldane's holistic conception of life, Nishida conceptualizes the historical-social species, whose ideal form (paradeigma) is embodied in social acts. But there is a serious misunderstanding in Nishida's argument. Biologically, self-maintaining function cannot be found in species, but in a concrete, individual organism. My conclusion is that Nishida contradicts himself because of this inappropriate interpretation of Haldane's concept of life.

著者

杉本 耕一

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.158-172, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Although absolute contradictory self-identity is one of the most fundamental notions in the philosophy of Nishida, it is also notorious for its ambivalence. Actually, because Nishida uses this term in different senses and in various applications, it appears that it cannot avoid the charge of ambivalence. However, this essay considers the possibility that this very ambivalence can be taken as favorable. That is, this essay suggests that fields which have tended to be thought of as separate, actually overlap each other. This essay draws special attention to the fact that, among the various aspects of absolute contradictory self-identity which he formulates, Nishida develops formulations in both the religious world and the historical world. In general, it is often assumed that the religious world and the historical world are two completely different worlds; the former is assumed to be completely transcendent from the latter. But Nishida's notion of absolute contradictory self-identity can put this assumption into question. This essay claims that if one examines this notion carefully, then one will find that its very ambivalence demonstrate that these two worlds are intimately related and overlapping.

著者

村田 康常

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2, pp.173-191, 2005 (Released:2021-01-16)

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The Summary presented paper deals with three subjects. The first point to be made is that Nishida Kitaro and A. N. Whitehead share the same origin, called the fact of pure experience or immediate experience, in spite of no direct academic exchange between them. They regard the pure experience as the sole starting-point of any thought in which the reality discloses itself as a non-dualistic unity. The problem they face there is whether they can describe the insight gained in that experience. They solve it by reaching at the same idea that the reality expresses itself and its self-expression takes form of a sort of logic. The second point is to show that their conclusions are different from each other. At the beginning, both philosophers regard the fact of pure experience as a flux. And then, they formulate it into the idea of process. Nevertheless, because the pure experience refuses any seat to the substantial self, which is still held in the idea of process, Nishida abandons this idea and searches for a deeper logic. It is a sort of topology that implies a paradoxical content. He finds our own selves in their vanishing point, in which our relative selves encounter with the absolute. In contrast, Whitehead searches for the emerging point of our own selves in his immediate experience. His conclusion puts no emphasis on the idea of nothingness but evidently on that of process. The third point suggests the possibility to construe Whitehead's philosophy not only as a process philosophy but also as a topological philosophy comparable to Nishida's. As Nishida watches the vanishing point of our own selves in order to reveal the depth of reality, Whitehead describes the perishing of actual entities in order to discover the principle of universal relativity of the universe. To perish is to be objectified, and to be objectified is to be present in another, and the presence in another is the main subject of topology. In conclusion, we can say that Nishida's approach to the reality and that of Whitehead are complement to each other.

著者

大橋 良介

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.1-14, 2006 (Released:2021-01-16)

著者

水野 友晴

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.67-87, 2004 (Released:2021-01-16)

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A salient doctrine of Neo-Confucianism is the unification of li (reason / principle). This doctrine must be taken into account in order to properly research many areas within the history of Japanese Philosophy. Nishi Amane himself, who coined the Japanese world tetsugaku in order to translate the conventional Western term Philosophy, started his career as a Neo-Confucian scholar. Although Nishi coined the world tetsugaku, he still was not necessarily released from a Neo-Confucian view of the world. There is no doubt that Nishi intended the term tetsugaku to refer to methodologies and doctrines different than Neo-Confucianism. However, Nishi's endeavors began as, and continued to be strongly informed by, the unification of li in the Neo-Confucian manner. To the extent that Nishi's understanding of tetsugaku did not sufficiently grasp the methods and doctrines of the Western Philosophy which he laboriously translated, he remained a Neo-Confucian scholar and did not fully attain to the title philosopher as that term came to be understood in the context of Modern Japanese Philosophy. On the other hand, Nishida Kitaro was clearly a philosopher in this sense. Nishida rejected the Neo-Confucian monism. Nishida's own tetsugaku fully maintains the autonomy of human reason. Nishida's tetsugaku further rigorously analyzes subjectivity, an analysis never really pursued by orthodox Neo-Confucianism. Nishida adheres to the action of subjective composition, which to the end constitutes the world. Nishida also distinguishes a subjective dimension and a transcendental dimension. The origin of these unique doctrines in Nishida can be located in Kant's philosophy and Buddhism.

著者

杉本 耕一

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.88-102, 2004 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Although the problem of history is no doubt one of the most important problems in the later philosophy of Nishida Kitarô, few scholars have paid attention to Nishida's philosophy from the viewpoint of the philosophy of history. In this paper I try to examine the possibility of reevaluating Nishida's philosophy as philosophy of history. When Nishida speaks of history, he does not necessarily refer to each of the historical facts. His concern was rather to clarify the fundamental structure of the historical world itself, in which each historical event occurs. This attitude of Nishida can be put in the context of the philosophies of history at the beginning of twentieth century. At that time, some existential philosophers like Heidegger were also engaged in the problem of history, and prior to the scientific analysis of each historical fact, tried to analyze the historicity of human beings. Nishida analyzed the historicity of the real world in terms of poiesis. Because this notion includes both historical and super-historical perspective, Nishida's philosophy has a possibility to provide a significant contribution to the philosophy of history, which is confronted with the task of overcoming both superhistorical absolutism and historical relativism.

著者

白井 雅人

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.103-117, 2004 (Released:2021-01-16)

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Der Zweck dieser Abhandlung besteht darin, Gesichter Ich und Du. Ich begegne Du unter der geschichtlic-sozialen Bestimung. Aber Ich begegne Du auch in der originär-absoluten Dimension. Zwar bin Ich werde durch die geschichtliche Welt bestimmt. Aber Ich bestimme zugleich auch sie durch die Herstellung der Dinge. Wenn wir die Dinge herstellen, wird die geschichtliche Welt gestalte. Die geschichtliche Welt gestaltet sich durch unsere Herstellung der Dinge. Ich und Du geschehen in dieser Herstellung der Dinge. Denn wir begegnen uns in der geschichtliche Welt. Diese hergestellten Dinge ist refende Dinge. Wenn das Andere ruft, werden die Dinge hergestellt. Deshalb das Rufen des Anderen ist der Ort, in der Ich und Du geschehen zumal der Ruf die Herstellung ermöglicht, in der Ich und Du geschehen. Dieser Ruf ist der des absolut Anderen. Denn es allein erschließ das relativ ANdere, das auf der relativen Unterscheidung von Ich und Du beruht. Das absolut Andere ist die Wirkung, die die vergangene Welt vernichtet. Die geschichtliche Welt gestaltet sich immer schon erneut, durch die Vernichtung der vergangenen Welt. So können wir schöpferisch handeln. Dieses absolute Andere, absolute Vernichtung ist die religiöse Dimmension. Das ist eine absolute Macht. Die Gesichter Ich und Du sind è 1. geschichtlich-sozialer Gesicht. 2. schöpfersher (in der Herstellung der Dinge) Gesicht, 3. religiöser (in der absolute andere Mach) Gesicht.

著者

重久 俊夫

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.118-127, 2004 (Released:2021-01-16)

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This concept pure experience used in Kitaro Nishida's philosophy is interpreted in two ways. One is that pure experiences mean primitive perceptions or senses yet to be reflected, the other is that they cover all experiences including sentiment, reflections and wills. Not a few scholars insist that only primitive perceptions are true pure experience. Based on the following reasons, however, Nishida's pure experience should be considered all experiences in our daily lives. (1) In Nishida's idea, which is a kind of pantheism, all entities are phenomena taking place in God's consciousness. Everything is in God, so there is nothing outside of God. That means God's consciousness is a pure experience, because His experience doesn't have the dichotomic structure of inner subjects and outer objects. Every personal experience is a limited area in the pure experience of God, therefore, all experiences are, without exception, pure experiences. (2) A primitive perception or sense is a pure experience, because it is not yet reflected. Then a reflection itself is a pure experience, too, because it is not yet reflected. Therefore every experience, so long as it is grasped as a whole. Parts in the content within a consciousness, which are objects of reflections, can be considered not pure experience.

著者

中川 明才

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.128-135, 2004 (Released:2021-01-16)