著者
西塚 俊太
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.119-134, 2012 (Released:2020-03-22)

Nishida Kitaro expresses his understanding of the integration between human beings and the world by the notion “the creative element of the creative world.” It is certain that he worked out his philosophical system in considering the close and immediate connection between the individual and the world. However, it is not always so easy to find out the specific connection between our ordinary actions in daily life and creations of the world. Scholars have so far mentioned that Nishida had shifted the emphasis of his thinking to the theme of history after his representative treatise “I - thou;” but, they have seldom grasped squarely the meaning of Nishida’s peculiar theory about history. So, we can say that it is necessary to investigate the left problem of unclear connection between them by reexamining Nishida Kitaro’s own theory about history. In this paper, to substantiate this view, I attempt to grasp the consistent theme and logic of history in Nishida’s thought through an examination of his representative writings dating around 1930s in first and second sections. In the third and final sections, I will examine the reason why Nishida depicted human beings as “the creative element of the creative world.” And finally, from this study, I will elucidate Nishida’s view on death and life.
著者
片柳 榮一
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.36-56, 2012 (Released:2020-03-22)

One of the causes of the difficulty of understanding Nishida’s essay “I and thou” is the ambiguity of his use of the word“thou”. This word means not only a human other to whom I can call, but also means the I of the past, because the I of yesterday, for example, is qualitatively different from the I of now, this moment. The “thou” of Nishida’s philosophical construct extends to the full expanse of the universe. It is not easy to clearly decipher his definition of the term “thou,” used as it is in various contexts, but in the aggregate, it is possible to infer that Nishida intends the term “thou” to refer to the being whose presence gives an individual his true existence, despite that individual’s independence. Nishida emphasizes the fact that all things have their existence only in a transient instant and that in the next moment all things transmute. The thing that is now should not, indeed cannot, be considered as the same thing that it just was. What bridges the thing that was and thing that is? Nishida asserts that what bridges each independent thing is true love which he terms Absolute-nothingness. This love finds new life through its own death.
著者
水野 友晴
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.9, pp.96-109, 2012 (Released:2020-03-22)

Nishida Kitaro argued in Inquiry into the Good that only through contemplation of the eternal could a person lead a life of meaning. This view on life and morality was not unique to Nishida, but widely shared by other Japanese intellectuals of this period. In order to highlight this point, in this paper I wish to compare the religious philosophy of Nishida Kitaro with that of two other thinkers of the Meiji period, Tsunashima Ryosen and Uchimura Kanzo, who both made profound contributions to the development of Christian thought in Japan. Through this comparison I hope to shed light on the basic substratum of the Japanese religious mind and determine the relationship found therein between mortality and eternity. My hope is that this paper will assist in the establishment of a new standpoint which treats both God and Buddha as unlimited Absolutes, fostering a religious attitude that may provide a greater opportunity for dialogue between members of different religions.
著者
安藤 恵崇
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, pp.31-49, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

This paper is intended as an investigation for the problem of Body in Bergson and Nishida. In the both philosophers, the problem of body plays an important role to overcome the conflict between materialism and spiritualism, between realism and idealism, between subjectivism and objectivism. Bergson’s theory of “Image” defines the representation perceived in function of the possible action of body. But the presence of “Image” rests irreductible. Moreover, when he attempt to include the material world in the “Duration”, he seems to confront with some difficulties. Criticizing Bergson, the philosophy in Nisida’s later period oppose the individual-time-consciousness against the universal-space-matter in dialectic schema, where the matter has expression. We can say that Nishida's, philosophy of Nothingness has possibility to surmount the conflict in the philosophy of “Being”.

1 0 0 0 OA 身体と混血

著者
谷 徹
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, pp.50-68, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

This presentation attempts to show how Nishida’s philosophy and phenomenology relate to each other in terms of the “body” and “history”. Roughly speaking, phenomenology bases itself upon the principle that “what appears, appears”[das Erscheinende erscheint].(This is not a mere tautology.)Contrary to the prevalent view, body and history are central issues for phenomenology. Phenomenology describes how the Erscheinendes is initially accomplished and how it appears as a sense-unity. The medium of this process is the body, and the sense that appears through the process plays in history the role of a signifier of direction. These analyses relate to Nishida’s concept of the “historical body”. In today’s historical situation, bodies encounter other bodies interculturally and become hybridized(not only in the biological sense, but in the sense that intercultural encounters influence the constitutive functions of the body). New things appear, and those who live within the framework of tradition can easily lose their way. The dialogue between Nishida’s philosophy and phenomenology, which has already begun, can expand our view of this new reality.
著者
須藤 訓任
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, pp.69-87, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

Nietzsche sagt: „es handelt sich vielleicht bei der ganzen Entwicklung des Geistes um den Leib: es ist die fühlbar werdende Geschichte davon, daß ein höherer Leib sich bildet.“ In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich das Verhältnis vom Leib zum Geist beim späten Nietzsche am Leitfaden seiner Ansichten über Kunst und Moral aufzuklären. 1. Nietzsche bestimmt den Geist als Selbst-Auslegung der leiblichen Zustände, die aber nicht dem Leib selber zugeschrieben werden, die also als zum vom Leib unabhängigen Gebiet gehörend falsch geurteilt werden; dann entsteht der Dualismus von Materie und Geist(oder Seele). 2. Moral ist im Grund „ein langer Zwang“, d. h. Orientierung und Festlegung der geistigen(nämlich: mißinterpretierten leiblichen)Kräfte, wodurch Möglichkeiten dieser Kräfte zugleich verwirklicht und beschränkt werden; nach Nietzsche hat besonders die christliche Moral durch die Interpretation von bestimmten leiblichen kränklichen Zustände als geistige „Sünde“ die Entwicklung der leiblichen Möglichkeiten gehemmt. Dagegen 3. kann die „dionysische“ Kunst neue virtuelle leibliche Kräfte freilegen und zur Durchführung gelangen lassen, was zugleich die Entwicklung der noch unentwickelten geistigen Kräfte bedeutet. Deshalb will Nietzsche gerade in der Kunst eine Möglichkeit der Überwindung der europäischen Nihilismus erkennen.
著者
石田 正人
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, pp.88-105, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

This paper develops a comparative analysis of the philosophies of Kitaro Nishida, William James, and Charles Sanders Peirce, who was James’ contemporary logician and lifelong friend. The influence of James on the early philosophy of Nishida is widely known, but there are significant differences between what James and Nishida respectively understand as pure experience. The main view of this paper is that for both Nishida and Peirce pure experience is marked with phenomenal as well as logical unity, whereas James fervently rejected such logical unity. Torataro Shimomura once noted that Nishida was sympathetic with James’ notion of pure experience and that he inherited the term junsuikeiken from James, but not its philosophical content. By focusing on logic in An Inquiry into the Good, this paper identifies striking commonalities between Nishida and Peirce rather than between Nishida and James. Given Nishida’s strong leaning toward logic, on the one hand, and James’ persistent repulsion for logic, on the other, it is unsurprising that this reading receives solid textual support, which may lead to a reappraisal of James’ influence on Nishida’s early philosophy.
著者
石井 砂母亜
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, pp.105-120, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

Nishida discussed the problem of love in his two philosophico-religious works, “A study of Good”(1911)and “Self-conscious Realization of Nothingness”(1932). At first Nishida considered the essence of religion as “Unity of Human with God”, and love as a “Unifying Act” in “A Study of Good”. His concept of religion seems, however, to have been radically changed and deepened in “Self-conscious Realization of Nothingness”: the essence of religion is not to be seen as an immediate unity of Human with God, but as the retrieved oneness mediated through God’s “Agape”, i.e. His self-emptying love. In this paper, I will explain why such a radical sift has happened. To this purpose, I would like to focus on Nishida’s idea of “Reality” and “the historical world” as a new theme of his later philosophy, heralding a new dimension of dialogue between Nishida’s philosophy and Christianity.
著者
中嶋 優太
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, pp.121-137, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

When presented with some forms of nature and works of art, we feel they are beautiful. These kinds of experiences are generally believed to be quite different to cognitive experience and are called “aesthetic experience”. This paper aims to reveal what Nishida thought about aesthetic experience through his paper “Problems of consciousness”. In his theory, aesthetic experience is different from cognition, and does not serve a cognitive purpose. However, it is not purely subjective ― it also has an objective aspect. We think that the world of art is subjective and the world of experience is objective, but artists also have an objective world to discuss with each other(“Problems of consciousness”). In his argument for the objectivity of aesthetic experience, he uses Kant’s argument for the objectivity of cognition to argue for the apriority of aesthetic experience. Cognition has its language of concepts as the base of its apriority and, in the same way, aesthetic experience has its language of senses as the base of its apriority. This is called‘pure seeing’ after Fiedler’s theory of expression(“Über den Ursprung der künstlerischen Tätigkeit”). Nishida also argues that cognition and aesthetic experience represent the same reality in their own languages. By arguing in this way, he invokes the unity of apparently diverse experiences, which is one of the main theses of Nishida’s philosophy.
著者
日高 明
出版者
西田哲学会
雑誌
西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, pp.138-153, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

Dans l’ouvrage De l’agissant au voyant(1927), Kitarô Nishida écrit que les mots ne sont que des signes, mais apprécie aussi positivement le langage comme corps de la pensée. Cet article se propose de lire ensemble ces deux affirmations en examinant les positions de ce livre. Nishida parle, à cette époque, de la réalité intuitive comme d’un hypokeimenon qu’il définit, en référence à Aristote, comme ≪Ce qui est sujet mais jamais prédicat≫. Cependant l’hypokeimenon n’est pas le sujet grammatical d’une proposition, car il est ≪un concept extrême qui n’est même pas sujet≫. En fait, sujet et prédicat sont tous deux des abstractions de cet hypokeimenon, des choses simplement dites ou écrites. Selon Nishida, la définition de l’hypokeimenon s’interprète donc comme ≪ce qui n’est jamais exprimé par le langage≫. Or si l’hypokeimenon transcende le langage, les jugements n’entretiendront plus aucun rapport avec lui, et ils ne pourront plus constituer de connaissances logiques. Nishida établit alors, d’une part, le jugement comme auto-détermination de l’hypokeimenon et, d’autre part, considère celui-ci comme la limite des déterminations de notions universelles formant des séries subsomptives. Nishida renouvelle ainsi le modèle traditionnel de définition par le genre et la différence spécifique.