著者

田中 久文

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.161-167, 2008 (Released:2020-03-24)

著者

井上 克人

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, pp.19-40, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

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The standpoint at the Kitarō Nishida’s philosophy has an extremely strong religious color, especially in relation to Buddhism. That is truly Eastern form of thought, i.e. ‘holistic monism,’which is of a different nature than the Western form, especially with regards to the dualism characteristic of the Latin Western tradition. This monism describes a transcendentally single principle which, while preserving to the end its transcendence, develops itself by arising within itself, is a logic which transforms all things from within, and is a whole from which all origination of development is derived. In other words, we can say that this principle is a logic of ‘substance(tǐ)and function(yòng). It should also be noted, however, that the ‘transcendent unity’of this holistic monism, while we can say that it is transcendent, is not something externally transcendent. In this sense it can be contrasted to that which is featured by the Latin tradition of Western thought in its assumption of an external, personal, singular, divinity which stands outside of that which it transcends. The Eastern transcendent unity of which I speak is, to the utmost, an ‘internal transcendence.’ However, Nishida’s philosophy has inexhaustible depths to offer. We can see this depth in his notion of “oppositional correspondence(gyaku-taiō)”emphasized in his later years. What Nishida tried to teach via his logic of oppositional correspondence is that “the self is itself insofar as it transcends itself.” To put this in other words, we can say that the self which turns its back to God is, just as it is, enveloped within God’s love, or that the self full of desires which cannot cleanse itself of its sin, is, just as it is, receiving the salvation of divine mercy. The paradoxical situation which Nishida describes is that while the individual self is separate in relation to the absolute self, that individual self remains, at the same time and just as it is, unified with the absolute self in deep reality. In short, Nishida’s logic is none other than a “logic of immanence and transcendence.” While transcendence remains utterly within the absolute Other, it is precisely there that the relative existent being is something utterly finite. While there is an absolute division between these two, in the depths they are unified. The finite relative self, in the depths of itself, finds ‘transcendence,’and it is here that such a kind of perspective opens towards the absolute other. This problem of the ‘transcendental other’ at the root of the relation between self and self constitutes the centre of Nishida’s thought.

著者

香西 克彦

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, pp.41-58, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

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Under the theme of “Philosophy and Art”, my task is to consider the relationship between philosophy and the logic of architecture. From the viewpoint of philosophers, Aristotle and Plato, regarded architecture in Greek as representing technology which could control all types of technologies, and architect as a man with both theory and practice. In Idealism in Germany, architecture as art and architectural space became subject of philosophy. In phenomenology, especially by M. Heidegger, architecture became considered from human and living. As to architectural theory, Keiichi Morita (1895-1983)is the pioneer, introducing Vitruvius, who established the logic of architecture in B.C. 30, insisting that architect should learn all of the studies. Morita achieved his original logic of architecture based on studies of Vitruvius and other Western aesthetics. He also referred to architectural space. In his theory, architecture Should represent architecture itself, and should be considered in total. His followers developed various theories referring to aesthetics, space, They seem to trend opposite to Morita’s theory, but the principle of their architectural theory has been the same as that of Morita’s based on something occurring among human and architecture. Reviewing the logic of architecture and comparing it with Nishida’s theory, they seem to resemble each other, particularly considering the original point of these theories.

著者

米山 優

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, pp.59-72, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

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In our era of Hegel’s “end of art” thesis, I shall dare to consider creating art of a sort out of philosophy, taking the risk of being called anachronistic. The clue lies in the efforts of philosophers who employed styles close to those of literature. For example, the writing styles of moralists such as Montaigne, Pascal and Alain will serve as reference. The issue is what precisely “writing style” means. While there are cases where even Nishida’s philosophy has been called “philosophical essayism or essayistic philosophy”and criticized for it, I will instead put this factor in a positive light. Therefore, the “artisticbeauty” to be focused on here will on here will mainly be the beauty inherent in the prose. I consider that the locus for the realization of such beauty is where the prose can be said to be alive, and where the words can be said to have life. This can only be when they become entities with bodies. This state cannot be achieved when the style is something that could merely be called logical. What is the issue then? I shall try to develop the issue manifestly as a story of “language and the body.”That is to say, I am engaging in Nishida’s clearly stated argument of “language as the body of thought.”In addition, I shall clarify how this argument is actively linked with the factors Nishida tried to develop in his later years as “creative monadology.”I shall demonstrate that “creative monadology”is what enables us to elegantly enter the so-called “hermeneutic cycle,”which is generated from the obvious situation that “although individual words constituting prose cannot be understood within the work made from the assemblage of prose without grasping the whole of what is known as the assemblage, the whole also consists of individual words.”In doing so, I shall state the possibility of gaining a hint as to the place of “active intuition,”using as a clue the fact that the active point of departure for Nishida in his commentary on art is the body’s being transcended in the direction of the body, and by examining what is called “thought,” which can be possessed by a flesh-and-blood human being, i.e., by an entity with a body. Finally, I shall suggest that, by expanding the discussion from prose to the world, it will become possible to thematize the situation where the world is formed by monads, and that, in fact, this situation of “formation”itself is the part that should be called the quintessence of “creative monadology.”

著者

朝倉 祐一郎

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, pp.83-94, 2009 (Released:2020-03-23)

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We can see how unique philosopher Nishida Kitaro’s grasp of art was by examining his analysis of Konrad Fiedler, the 19th century philosopher of art. Instead of merely absorbing Fiedler’s aesthetics, Nishida explored its fundamental “religious”nature. According to Nishida, only art that is fundamentally “religious”can be true art. In this sense, a study of his aesthetics may lead us towards a broader and deeper understanding of Nishida’s philosophy. Therefore, we cannot treat aesthetics as an auxiliary discipline to philosophy. Nishida saw how the realms of religion, philosophy, art, and morals all centered on human “Life”and explored their ideal forms accordingly. In the end, he defined this ideal form as “religion”in his philosophical work.

著者

竹花 洋佑

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.157-175, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

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In der Philosophie Nishidas wird der Bezug zu Hegel mit den 1930er Jahren auffällig, als jener begann, sein Denken in Relation zur Dialektik zu entwickeln und der hegelschen „Dialektik des Prozesses“eine eigene „Dialektik des Ortes“entgegenzusetzen. Man kann aber den großen Einfluß der Philosophie Hegels auf ihn schon am Anfang seines Denkens erkennen. Die Idee Hegels, der er seit Űber das Gute durchgängig Sympathie entgegenbringt, ist die Urteilslehre, nach der das Urteil „das Einzelne ist das Allgemeine“durch „die ursprüngliche Teilung“des Begriffes entsteht. Tatsächlich kann man viele Textstellen in der ersten Hälfte seines Schaffens finden, wo diese Auffassung vom Urteil zustimmend angeführt wird, und selbst in der späteren Phase seiner Philosophie, als seine Kritik an Hegel zum Vorschein kommt, wird einzig jene Urteilslehre gleichsam ausnahmsweise gewürdigt. Aber der Schwerpunkt seiner Würdigung in der späten Phase wird anders als in der ersten gelegt. Zwar führt er nämlich zuerst die Theorie, die das Urteil als „Ur- teilen“des Begriffes versteht, in seine Philosophie ein, aber mit der Entwicklung seines Denkens richtet er seine Aufmerksamkeit auf die Kopula, die eine widersprechende Übereinstimmung von dem Einzelnen und Allgemeinen in dem Urteil „das Einzelne ist das Allgemeine“ermöglicht. Diese Verschiebung seines Brennpunktes darf keineswegs nur als äußerlich für den Fortschritt der Philosophie Nishidas verstanden werden. Vielmehr könnte man denken, daß dieses eine enge Beziehung zur Veränderung seines Grundprinzips selbst, nämlich des absoluten Nichts hat. Daher betrachtet dieser Aufsatz das Verhältnis zwischen Nishida und Hegel im Hinblick auf die Stellung der hegelschen Urteilslehre in der Philosophie Nishidas.

著者

大石 昌史

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.1-20, 2008 (Released:2020-03-24)

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The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the logic of field advocated by Kitaro Nishida as fundamental way of thinking about the contradictive self-identical self, is the creative expressive logic of being and nothing, through the analysis of the correlation between the inner cross-structure of sentence and the dynamic movement of consciousness. In the first part, “the structure of sentence and the movement of consciousness”, referring to the structural linguistics of Roman Jakobson, I argue that the inner cross-structure of the composition(formation)of sentences through the selection(resemblance)and the combination(contiguity)of words, in other words the crossing of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of language, and the moving state of poetic language (metaphor, metonymy)characterized by the supremacy of the equivalence of speech sound and meaning, are sustained by the dynamic relation and reverse movement of consciousness, which corresponds to the coexistence (synchronicity)and succession(diachronicity)of objects. In the second part, “the logic of subjectivity and the relation of subject and object”, I introduce some typical logic in Western philosophy, first Aristotle’s logic of the substance as substratum(subject), secondly, after the establishment of the thinking ego through René Descartes’‘cogito’and Immanuel Kant’s ‘apperception’, Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s logic of the interaction between self(subject)and not-self(object), and thirdly Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s dialectic logic of the absolute through self-negativity. In some views, Hegel’s dialectic logic could be regarded as a kind of logic of field, but Nishida criticizes that Hegel’s logic remains objective and is not the absolute dialectics. And in the third part, “the logic of field and the reverse of subject and predicate”,I examine Nishida’s logic of field, which emphasizes the subsuming function of the predicate as field more than that of the subject as substance in a proposition. This logic of field characterized as predicate logic has a similar structure to the following phenomenological and psychological concepts concerning the actual and potential: Edmund Husserl’s ‘horizon’, Edgar John Rubin ’s ‘figure and ground ’ an d Karl Buhler ’s ‘field’. Further, the logic of field contains and surpasses the one-dimensional structure of the sentence dependent on the subsuming relationship of subject-predicate, and of the judgment dependent on the formative relationship. Therefore I conclude that Nishida's logic of field is the creative expressive logic of being and nothing, according to which the potential is actualized through the reversing appearance of the subject as object (formed thing)and the predicate as horizon(unformed possibility).

著者

延原 時行

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.45-62, 2008 (Released:2020-03-24)

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In discussing our theme “Philosophy and Religion in Nishida”my responsibility is to clarify it from the Christian perspective. To tackle the issue properly, let me take up as my critical-comparative means of analysis the thoughts of three unique Christian thinkers : famous American process philosopher Charles Hartshorne who represents Whitehead’s thought as his first disciple, my teacher Katsumi Takizawa, and Thomas Aquinas whose analogical scheme of thought I studied as a viable framework of comparative philosophy of religion in my Ph. D. dissertation entitled “God and Analogy : In Search of a New Possibility of Natural Theology”(Claremont Graduate School, 1981). Appearing to be of crucial importance in this regard are Hartshorne’s neo-classical theism and panentheism, Takizawa’s concern with what he calls “the Proto-factum Immanuel,”and Aquinas’s scheme of theological analogy including four modes of analogy with the famous idea of Analogia Entis at its core. I will approach Nishida’s philosophy appearing in An Inquiry into the Good, Intuition and Reflection in Self-Awareness, and The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview in line with Shizuteru Ueda’s famous elucidation of the dictum “I want to explain all things on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality.” I will end up with the discovery of a triadic thinking throughout his philosophical career involving these volumes.

著者

山田 邦男

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.63-80, 2008 (Released:2020-03-24)

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Ueber die mir gegebene Aufgabe denke ich hauptsaechlich von Standpunkt der Beziehung zwischen “Byojotei”(平常底) und “Gyakutaiou”(逆対応). Dadurch moechte ich erklaeren, was das von Nishida gesagte “Zen- Buddhische”bedeutet. “Byojotei”ist Zen-Buddhischer Begriff und “Gyakutaiou”ist hauptsaechlich der des Jodoshinsyu. In Nishidas Religion(und Philosophie)sind die zwei Begriffe(und Sekten)einander widersprechend und zugleich identisch. Darin sieht Nishida das eigentliche Buddhische und “Zen-Buddhische”. Und nach seiner philosophischen Weltanschauungist diese religioese “widersprechende-selbstidentische”Struktur nicht anders als dem Ausdruck der Welt selbst.

著者

築山 修道

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.81-96, 2008 (Released:2020-03-24)

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The whole subject of the symposium is “Philosophy and Religion in Nishida,”and it is the task imposed on me to approach the subject and bring up what problems there are about it in terms of Shin Buddhism. For that purpose, I tried to think about the theme from three following points : (1) The Fundamental Understanding of Philosophy and Religion in Nishida, (2) The Definition of Religion, Religious Awareness and the Whereabouts of Religious Problems in Nishida, and (3) The Characteristic of Nishida’s View of Shinran or Shin Buddhism and its Meaning. The points of(1) and (2) are what we should know by all means in order to discuss the problem of philosophy and religion in Nishida, therefore I dealt with them to confirm that. As for the point (3), I examined how Nishida grasped the religious essence of Shinran or Shin Buddhism, focusing on Shinran’s words of “Ōchō”, “Jinenhōni”, “Ginaki-o-gitosu”and “Myōgō”which express the core of Shin Buddhism, and are the fundamental words. As a result, it turned out that Nishida considered the essence of Shin Buddhism as teachings of salvation by faith in Amidabha’s absolute power (Other Power) with great compassion, (Zettai-higan-no-tariki-shu). Through the examination, we could simultaneously not only explicate the characteristic and significance of Nishida’s view of Shinran or Shin Buddhism but also present some meaningful matters on philosophy and religion in Nishida. Going right to the point, real teachings of absolute Other Power can be grasped and explained only by “fact of spiritual self-awareness”and “place-logic”, and never by abstract subject and objective logic. In such a way, therefore, philosophy and religion can deepen and develop themselves more through the mediacy of the other, and in this sense both would be able to be complementary to each other. We here find a great possibility and meaning of Nishida Philosophy as philosophy of religion.

著者

岡野 利津子

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.97-111, 2008 (Released:2020-03-24)

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La structure hiérarchique de la philosophie de Plotin est bien connue comme l’émanation de la lumière de l’Un qui finit à l’obscurité de la matière sensible. Vers le milieu du vingtième siècle, les chercheurs de Plotin ont commencé à remarquer les deux étapes dans la procession de l’Intellect à partir de l’Un, à savoir, la génération de la vision indéfinie de l’Intellect(la matière intelligible)et la conversion de cette vision vers l’Un(la définition de l’Intellect). À ce point de vue, on peut considérer l’Un chez Plotin comme ce qui est au delà de la matière, à la direction de la matière. Autrement dit, l’Un est transcendant ploutôt à la direction de l’activité qu’à la direction de l’être. On peut dire que l’activité qui procède de l’Un et qui retourne à Lui est réflexive et l’intellection de soi au niveau de l’Intellect est, pour ainsi dire, la vision réflexive de l’Un qui est lui-même non-réflexif. Quand on remarque cet aspect de l’émanation chez Plotin, on peut reconnaître les resemblances avec la philosophie de Nishida.

著者

沖長 宜司

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.113-128, 2008 (Released:2020-03-24)

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In this paper, we examine the problem of nihilism, conferring Nishida’s theory Basho. The negativity of nihilism appears to be infinite and can never be logically upset. This negativity makes our being complete nonsense. But we can find some cases of experience in which even such nihilism vanishes. These cases indicate that even cruel nihilism has a hidden condition, and that upsetting this condition leads us to make nihilism vanish. Whatever we may think, our thought, in general, must be based on a certain frame which remains not thematic. And Basho corresponds to this frame in the first place. Next, the infinite negativity of nihilism is based on a peculiar frame, and such frame is nothing other than “Basho of genuine nothingness”. Such Basho must include even the quantitative infinite negative nothingness, so this Basho must be qualitatively infinite. And this qualitative infinity conditions any of our thinking and therefore it is situated before the distinction of being and nothing. So it is absolutely unthinkable. Thus the paradoxical character of “Basho of genuine nothingness”is that we are driven to regard it as a certain reality in spite of its incomprehensibility. And such Basho’s transcendence from the quantitative infinity is also incomprehensible for us. As far as we accept such character of Basho, we cannot help us to suppose that reality is not restricted to rational reality.

著者

石井 砂母亜

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, pp.129-145, 2008 (Released:2020-03-24)

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Though Nishida’s speculation always seeks illumination from “the most direct and concrete reality”, it is in “Self- conscious Determination of Nothingness”(1932)that he began to discuss the historical world of Reality as his proper theme. This article is important, because the late Nishida’s philosophy started from here. In this paper, I attempt to explore the historical world of Reality in “Self-conscious determination of Nothingness”. I notice Nishida’s statement that Reality must be considered from “time”, and that the fact itself must be temporal and personal(6-270). Nishida explored “the world of reality”from his theory of personality and time. At first, I notice Nishida’s theory of time as “self-determination of the eternal present”. It is the present that determines the present itself. This way of self- determination explains the constitution of a personal self which realizes itself by self-negation in temporality. Then, I want to see the “continuity”and “discontinuity” of determination in the relationship between “desire”and “self-denying love”. Desire pretends to keep continuity of itself, while self-denying love denies this continuity of self absolutely. But self-denying love unites the separated selves. Nishida says that this love is “absolute love” working through the self-determination of the eternal present. The eternal present realized itself by self- denying. This negativity is “absolute love”, i.e. agape as God’s love. Agape is self-emptying love, as it is called “kenosis”, that Jesus made himself nothing(Philippians 2 : 7). Following a personal God of “kenosis”, the world of Reality denies itself and affirms itself. The personal self is, for Nishida, reality based on absolute love that surpasses the desiring self. It denies itself, and meets another personal self. This self-determination of person is made possible by “absolute love”. I and Thou meet each other in such an absolute love and create the historical world.

著者

吉田 真一

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.55-62, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

著者

岩田 文昭

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.63-77, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

著者

張 政遠

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.79-91, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

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In this paper, I shall discuss Nishida’s philosophy of acting intuition. I shall argue that acting intuition can be understood as a situated action. Situated action is not a philosophical concept, but is from the theory of situatedness in cognitive science. I shall interpret acting intuition as a third position based on the situatedness in our historical world. Like the concept of situated action, acting intuition is a philosophical position that is anti-intellectualism. The later development of Nishida’s philosophy shifts from the position of experience to a socially and historically oriented dimension. The world where we are experiencing and acting is not an imaginary world, but a world that is situated in society and history. Nishida does not use the word “situation”in his philosophy. However, we can see that Nishida has a similar word in “foothold.”Without this foothold or ground, a person will not be able to act in the concrete world. In this sense, to become the thing is an acting intuition, which is always in situ. Acting intuition is a philosophical position abridging cognitive science on one hand, and the phenomenology of action on the other.

著者

藤城 優子

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.93-107, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

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“The universal of induction”in Nishida philosophy has been considered a transitional notion between “the universal of judgment”and ”the universal of self- consciousness.”The purpose of this paper is to find a positive meaning of this notion. That is to say, it already includes three elements in late Nishida philosophy : the logic of copula, the logic of time and the prototype of “the true individual”.

著者

守津 隆

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.109-123, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

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Jun Tosaka schrieb einige Kritiken zur Nishida- Philosophie, worin er sagte, dass die Nishida- Philosophie zwar mystisch-religioese Eigenschaften aufwiese, aber diese vormodernen Eigenschaften nicht wesentlich seien. Vielmehr behaupte er, die Nishida- Philosophie sei eine hoechst moderne Philosophie : “Das Nichts ist hier ein ganz Methodisches(Mechanisches), und man darf es nicht als ein Metaphysisches ansehen. Aber dieses Nichts als logisches Werkzeug ist keineswegs ein mystische Grund(etwa ein Ungrund); sein Sein und sein Entstehen finden Statt in der Tatsache unseres Selbstbewusstseins oder Bewusstseins.”Einerseits vermag Tosaka, die Nishida- Philosophie durch diese originelle Ansicht klar und explizit zu machen. Auf der anderen Seite, bleibt Tosakas Interpretation darin aeusserlich, dass sie die sogenannten Kehre, die Nishida seit die Abhandlung “Ich und Du”vollzieht, gegenueber gleichgueltig bleibt. Diese Kehre hat jedoch die enorume Bedeutung, die bisherige Konstruktion des Selbstbewusstseins voellig zu veraendern.

著者

林 永強

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.125-139, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

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This paper attempts to explore the meaning of “nihon” [Japan] that postulated in Nishida’s work, Nihon bunka no mondai [The Problem of Japanese Culture]. Regarding the notion, “sekai no nihon”[Japan of the world], the concept of “nihon”does not merely convey its significance towards Nishida philosophy, but also entails philosophical connotation, particularly philosophy of history in general. Borrowing the idea of “imagined communities”given by Benedict Anderson, “nihon”as a philosophical concept is neither construed by “monokataru koto”[narration] nor “kiku koto” [hearing]. Rather, it may be considered as a sōzōsuru koto [imagination].

著者

白井 雅人

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.4, pp.141-156, 2007 (Released:2020-03-24)

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Im folgenden Traktat ist die Problematik der “Ethik im SpätwerkKitarōNishidas”anhandseinerSchrift“Ich und Du”zu untersuchen. Im Grunde des Lebens liegt die Begegnung von “Ich und du”, und auch die Wirkung des Absoluten, die das Verhältnis “Ich und du”erschließt. Durch eine derartige Wirkung im Grunde des Lebens wird das Problem der Ethik fundiert. “Ich und du”bedeutet nämlich : das Verhältnis “Ich und du”besteht vor dem Entstehen eines Subjekts als “Ich”. Das Entstehen vom “Ich”basiert auf der Begegnung des “Ich und du”. Nicht das “Ich”als Substanz, sondern das als Wirkendes kommt zum Gewahrnis. Was das “Ich”als Substanz vernichtet und dem Anderen öffnet, ist der über das Ich Hinauswachsende. Wirkung der Negativität. Gerade in dieser negativen Wirkung geht das “Ich”ins Verhältnis zum Anderen hinein, und damit gestaltet sich eine Welt. Aufgrund einer derartigen Vermittlung der Negativität sind wir zur ständigen Gestaltung unsrers Selbst und unserer Welt bestimmt. Um das eigentliche Selbst zu〈sein〉, müssen wir stets vermittels der Wirkung der Negativität eine solche Gestaltung durchsetzen. Insoweit erweist sich diese Welt als eine schöpferische, aber zugleich als eine Welt des Sollens. Die Negativität der Welt stellt sich als Aufgabe dar. Als das Paradigma des Verhältnisses zwischen “Ich”und Welt, welches zur Aufgabe sich bestimmt, fungiert das Verhältnis zwischen “Ich”und Spezies. Die Spezies stellt sich als die uns bestimmende, aber zugleich von uns zu negierende heraus. Soweit unser Selbst aus dem Verhältnis “Ich und du” besteht, wirkt es auf das Andere ein, und realisiert sich als im Sollen Entstandenes, welches in der Wirklichkeit seine Aufgabe freilegt.