- 著者
-
佐藤 栄一
- 出版者
- 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
- 雑誌
- 国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.1985, no.80, pp.31-46,L8, 1985
This article attempts to examine the present situation of the strategic nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The analysis starts with the SALT I agreement signed in May 1972, because it is this agreement that provided with the framework of the ongoing U. S. -Soviet arms race.<br>First, section 1 examines the significance of the SALT I agreement, which fixed the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers. In so doing, special attention will be given to how the agreement relates to the concept of “assured destruction.” Then, we look at the fact that the Soviet efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces by deploying MIRV-ed heavy missiles within the ceiling of SALT I led to the signing of the SALT II agreement; it was signed in July 1979 and set quantitative limits on MIRV-ed ICBM's.<br>Next, section 2 analyzes the evolution of the U. S. strategic theories from Robert S. MacNamara's “flexible response strategy” to Richard Nixon's “realistic deterrence strategy”; each of them proposed the way to utilize MIRV-ed delivery systems in practice, the focal point of the U. S. -Soviet nuclear arms race in the 1970s. The close examination of each year's <i>Report of the Secretary of Defense</i> published during the 1970s will reveal how the United States gradually revised its strategic doctrine to adjust it to the new MIRV technology. First it introduced the concept of “strategic sufficiency, ” then “targeting system, ” and lastly completed its doctrinal revision by adopting “countervailing strategy.”<br>Finally, section 3, taking up the concept of “damage limitation, ” another major element in SALT I, shows what ideas brought about the agreement restricting the deployment of ABM's. Based upon this analysis, we also discuss the implication of President Ronald Reagan's initiative, i. e., the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) program.