著者
藤原 正寛 瀧澤 弘和 池田 信夫 池尾 和人 柳川 範之 堀 宣昭 川越 敏司 石原 秀彦
出版者
東京大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
1998

本研究ではインターネットに代表される情報化技術の進展が経済的取引のガバナンスにどのような影響を与えるのかを、近年発展してきた経済学的手法(情報の経済学、組織の経済学、メカニズム・デザイン論、ゲーム理論など)を用いて分析することを目的としている。全研究期間を通じ研究会を開催することで、情報技術の進展と拡大がどのような経路をたどって、どのような形で経済活動や経済組織に影響を与えるかについて以下のいくつかの論点に分類して分析することができた。1.情報化革命とコーポレートガバナンス--情報化技術が進展することによって、情報量の爆発、経済のスピード化、グローバル化などの現象が発生し、それによって従来とはことなるガバナンス構造を持つ経済組織が活動できるようになった。2.アーキテクチャーとモジュール化--公開されたアーキテクチャーに基づいてインターフェイスを標準化することで、各分業をモジュール化することが可能になる。それによって、分業間の取引に市場原理が導入され、より分権的な分業が可能になる。3.モジュール化とオープン化--モジュール化はバンドリングやカプセル化の総称、オープン化はインターフェイスの共通化の動きを表す。カプセル化はアーキテクチャーを所与としたときに内生的に説明できることが示された。4.ディジタル化--財・サービスのディジタル化が進むことで、複製を作ることが容易になり、財・サービスを提供する初期費用が回収できないために、事前のインセンティブと事後の効率化が矛盾してしまっている。5.コーディネーションの電子化--情報技術の進歩はプログラムによるコーディネーションを可能にさせた。
著者
池田 信夫
出版者
日本マス・コミュニケーション学会
雑誌
マス・コミュニケーション研究 (ISSN:13411306)
巻号頁・発行日
no.45, pp.133-141, 212-211, 1994-07-30

Recently the problem of media's influence over society has been frequently argued, but never seems to be settled. Major contributions to this field such as the agenda- setting theory or the spiral of silence hypothesis have partly solved it, but have left much more to be solved. What makes this problem so opaque is the lack of a systematic analysis of the interaction between the media and the audience. H.A.Simon found that constituents' voting behavious are bounded by the "frames"by which they decide national issues. His concept of bounded rationality can be the cognitive foundation of the influence of agenda set by the media. It is an optimizing solution to the problem in which few values among many parameters are known exactly and it takes high information cost and algorithmic complexity to decide it by him/herself. A very simple game-theoretical model is introduced to formulate this cognitive view: we model the"spiral"effect as interdependence of two players' optimal strategies (agenda) in a"coordination game"played by the media and the audience (or a medium and another medium), in which one player's payoff is positive if and only if his/her strategy corresponds with another's. Examining its quasi-dynamic behaviour, we found that the more correlated media and audience's agenda, the stronger the spiral effect would be. An important reason for this interdependence is undecidedness of the coordination game: i.e.any cooperative solution is equivalent as long as one's strategy corresponds with another, so there is no criteria for deciding which of these"multiple equilibria"is more desirable than another. What makes such correspondence possible is not the players' rationality but their common knowledge that each other selects more"salient"agenda. This deductive conclusion of game theory coincides with the common wisdom of media theory, and might be a logical foundation of the spiral effect in setting agenda. These findings suggest how to asses the media's influence over the audience: it is not their proper"power"but their function to create such correspondence or momentum that makes them seem so influential. And this momentum will be accelerated by growing ignorance and undecidedness about national issues, because the information matrices we face are becoming more and more complex and multi-dimensional today. Since we will be more bounded and interdependent by sharing information, the media's seemingly strong power is only one symptom of the instability and precariousness of the coming"information society".
著者
竹中 平蔵 池田 信夫
出版者
日経BP社
雑誌
日経ビジネス (ISSN:00290491)
巻号頁・発行日
no.1083, pp.e28-e33, 2001-03-19

日本のインターネット利用者は全人口の20%しかいない。これは驚くべき低さです。米国は52%。アジアでは香港、シンガポールが40%で、韓国にも追い抜かれた。なぜこんなに差がついてしまったのか。これを考えたのが政府のIT戦略会議でしたが、会議では1つの方向性が示されました。
著者
池田 信夫
出版者
文教大学
雑誌
情報研究 = Information and Communication Studies (ISSN:03893367)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.15, pp.153-163, 1994-01-01

The concept of rationality is often quoted in the literature of social sciences, but its implication is not fully unederstood until recently. Traditionally, Hume, Smith, and many economists after the "Marginalist Revolution" has built their theories upon the instrumental rationality, i.e. utility maximization independent of other social contexts. It was an attempt at imitating classical mechanics that is based on the deterministic differential equations describing the motion of independent matters. But human behaviour cannot be exactly described by the mechanical model of neoclassical economics. Hayek rejected the concept of Walrasian equilibrium as erroneous "scientism" and Keynes refered to fallacy of composition due to the psycological interaction, which was confirmed logically by the game theory. In contrast to the neoclassical premise that adding up the individual best lead to the sosical best, game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, does not necessarily coincide with the Pareto optimum (social efficiency). The most famous example is the Prisoner's Dilemma in which cooperation is better than defection for each player but cannot be attained spontaneously. Ironically, the players cooperate if and only if they are not rational. This paradox is rooted in the logical structure of deductive decision-making, because player A's startegy depends on B's that depends on A's ・・・ and so on. As a corollary of G?del’s famous theorem, this kind of self-referential reasoning cannot constitute self-contained system of "right" decision. In 1980's many scientific enterprise such as artificial intelligence, generative grammar, and Bayesian decision theory tried to formulate human intellect as a logically consistent system, but failed at last. Now many social scientists are re-examining Simon's concept of bounded rationality that take into account the complexity of the interaction among people. It corresponds to the new findings in the natural sciences such as deterministic chaos, self-organization and complex adaptive systems.
著者
池田 信夫
出版者
全国学校図書館協議会
雑誌
学校図書館 (ISSN:04350405)
巻号頁・発行日
no.195, pp.13-19, 1967-01