著者
源河 亨
出版者
美学会
雑誌
美学 (ISSN:05200962)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.2, pp.97, 2017 (Released:2019-01-02)

Peter Kivy claims, from his early works, that music cannot arouse “garden-variety emotion” such as joy, anger, fear, sadness. According to him, the emotion aroused by music is a special “musical emotion”; the object of this emotion is always music. This claim seems to be counterintuitive and thus elicits many objections from philosophers, musicologists, psychologists, neuroscientists, and artists. However, I will argue that Kivy’s position is most plausible given the philosophy of emotion. Especially, I will show that there is no emotion deserving to be called “sadness” that is aroused by music. By appealing to philosophical considerations on emotion, I will support the following two points that Kivy emphasizes. The first is the lack of an object. There are no sad things (no loss) while we listen to music. If sadness does not occur, the lack of an object makes no matter. The second point is the paradox of negative emotion. Sadness has a negative value and we prefer to avoid it. If we can accept this, why then, are we willing to listen to music that make us sad? Again, if sadness does not occur, there arises no paradox.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.2, pp.65-82, 2018-12-30 (Released:2019-11-27)
参考文献数
36

Some features of music are described using emotional terms, for example, sad music, joyful rhythm, fearful melody, and so on. These features are called expressive properties. There are two leading theories concerning expressive properties, the resemblance theory and the persona theory. The former claims that sad music shares some features of the behavior of a sad person, the latter claims that sad music induces an imagining in the listener, of a sad person. In this paper, I will suggest that, given the philosophy of mind, these two theories can be compatible.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
美学会
雑誌
美学 (ISSN:05200962)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.67, no.2, pp.13-24, 2016 (Released:2018-01-01)

In daily life, we judge various things aesthetically. For example: “this picture is graceful”, “this landscape is dynamic”, and “his clothes are old-fashioned”. One aspect of our ordinary practices concerning aesthetic judgement seems to support objectivism, according to which, aesthetic judgment can be assessed as right or wrong based on some objective ground. However, another aspect of our practices seems to support subjectivism (or extreme relativism), according to which, aesthetic judgement is a mere expression of subjective impressions and cannot be assessed as right or wrong. In this study, I survey the dispute between objectivism and subjectivism in recent analytic aesthetics, and present an approach that supports objectivism. I argue that some aesthetic judgement is based on “evaluative perception”. It is a special class of perceptual experience affected by evaluative component of emotion and has Gestalt-like “parts-whole structure”. Furthermore, I claim that evaluative perceptions and aesthetic judgement based on it can be assessed as right or wrong in a similar way as ordinary perception and judgement based on it (e.g. colour perception and colour judgement) can be assessed.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.37-48, 2016-07-31 (Released:2016-11-10)
参考文献数
26

In our daily lives, we assign some value to various things. For example, we say, ‘this picture is dynamic', ‘his clothes are unfashionable' and ‘she is brave'. In these cases, we experience the value of these things. In this study, I examine the nature of such value experiences. I argue that some value experiences are cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences and that what penetrates into them is emotion. In other words, owing to the evaluative component of emotion, which affects perceptual systems, perceptual experiences can represent things as having some value to us. Furthermore, I propose that this cognitive penetration model of value experience supports the particularistic view of evaluative judgement.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.2, pp.81-91, 2014

<p>This paper aims to show that the absence of sounds can be an object of auditory perception. First, I present various types of objections to the possibility of hearing the absence of sounds. Next, I explain that there is a kind of absence of sounds which seems to be heard, namely, the absence of sounds occurred in between sounds. I argue that perception of such an absence can be explained by the same mechanism for hearing sounds and detecting sound sources, that is, auditory scene analysis. I also argue that such an absence can be characterized, analogous to holes, as a dependent object which ontologically depends on previous and succeeding sounds. Based on these considerations, I reply the objections. Finally, I propose a modality-neutral model of absence perception based on the auditory case, and suggest that this model casts a doubt on the basic assumptions about perception.</p>
著者
源河 亨
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.2, pp.87-103, 2014-12-20 (Released:2015-11-08)
参考文献数
24
被引用文献数
1

According to the Sibleyan account, descriptive aesthetic judgments are warranted by aesthetic perception. I defend this account by using a philosophical theory of perceptual experience, that is, Fregean intentionalism. I will then suggest an anti-realistic account of aesthetic properties, which claims that perceivable aesthetic properties are not realistic properties supervening on sets of non-aesthetic sensible properties (e.g. color, shape, etc.) of objects, but some kind of “modes of presentation” of such properties. Proving this argument, I demonstrate how the philosophy of perception can be useful for considering problems in aesthetics.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.47, no.2, pp.87-103, 2014

According to the Sibleyan account, descriptive aesthetic judgments are warranted by aesthetic perception. I defend this account by using a philosophical theory of perceptual experience, that is, Fregean intentionalism. I will then suggest an anti-realistic account of aesthetic properties, which claims that perceivable aesthetic properties are not realistic properties supervening on sets of non-aesthetic sensible properties (e.g. color, shape, etc.) of objects, but some kind of "modes of presentation" of such properties. Proving this argument, I demonstrate how the philosophy of perception can be useful for considering problems in aesthetics.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.2, pp.81-91, 2014-03-30 (Released:2017-08-31)
参考文献数
33

This paper aims to show that the absence of sounds can be an object of auditory perception. First, I present various types of objections to the possibility of hearing the absence of sounds. Next, I explain that there is a kind of absence of sounds which seems to be heard, namely, the absence of sounds occurred in between sounds. I argue that perception of such an absence can be explained by the same mechanism for hearing sounds and detecting sound sources, that is, auditory scene analysis. I also argue that such an absence can be characterized, analogous to holes, as a dependent object which ontologically depends on previous and succeeding sounds. Based on these considerations, I reply the objections. Finally, I propose a modality-neutral model of absence perception based on the auditory case, and suggest that this model casts a doubt on the basic assumptions about perception.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
三田哲學會
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:05632099)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.134, pp.89-100, 2015-03

特集 : 西脇与作君・樽井正義君退職記念寄稿論文Almost all aesthetic experiences involve perceptual experiences. For example, appreciating a picture involves seeing its colors and shapes, and appreciating a musical work involves listening to its tones and pitches. Thus, it is not surprising to believe that considerations of the nature of perceptual experience will facilitate considerations of the nature of aesthetic experience. In this study, I focus on music appreciation. I argue that the consideration of the multi-modality of perception supports not only the "thick view" on appreciation but also the formalistic distinction between "live" and "recorded" music.
著者
源河 亨
出版者
美学会
雑誌
美学 (ISSN:05200962)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.68, no.2, 2017

Peter Kivy claims, from his early works, that music cannot arouse "garden-varietyemotion" such as joy, anger, fear, sadness. According to him, the emotion aroused bymusic is a special "musical emotion"; the object of this emotion is always music. Thisclaim seems to be counterintuitive and thus elicits many objections from philosophers,musicologists, psychologists, neuroscientists, and artists. However, I will argue thatKivy's position is most plausible given the philosophy of emotion. Especially, I will showthat there is no emotion deserving to be called "sadness" that is aroused by music. Byappealing to philosophical considerations on emotion, I will support the following twopoints that Kivy emphasizes. The first is the lack of an object. There are no sad things(no loss) while we listen to music. If sadness does not occur, the lack of an objectmakes no matter. The second point is the paradox of negative emotion. Sadness has anegative value and we prefer to avoid it. If we can accept this, why then, are we willingto listen to music that make us sad? Again, if sadness does not occur, there arises noparadox.