著者
野口 和彦
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.4, pp.37-55, 2007-10-31 (Released:2014-09-30)
参考文献数
68

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the existing power shifts theory and to test this theory using the case of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States. In this paper, I try to show that only the power shifts theory can explain the timing of the Pacific War by using a strong test method.According to the realist theory of power shifts, war is more likely when the distribution of power in the international system fluctuates dramatically. In particular, as many realists have pointed out, a declining state relative to a rival rising state has an incentive to launch a preventive war due to its vulnerability. It is tempted to start an early war in order to avoid a later war in an inferior power position.A state in a process of sharp decline might tend to open hostilities against a strong adversary even if the chance of winning is small, because it perceives that there are no other options for survival.The opening of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States in 1941 confirms these hypotheses of the power shifts theory. A careful research of the Pacific War shows that the fear of declining Japanese military and economic power led Japanese policymakers to perceive that a war against the United States was the only option for survival. The United States imposed a total oil embargo on Japan in July 1941. This economic sanction made Japan extremely vulnerable because almost all of the oil consumed in Japan was imported from the United States. Without its oil supply, the Japanese navy would soon have been unable to operate and the Japanese economy would have fallen into deep recession.The Japanese war leaders faced a serious dilemma: they had to choose between a war with no hope of total victory and the collapse of imperial Japan. In the eyes of the Japanese leaders, a war with the United States was a better option than the end of the Japanese empire because Japan’s navy at that time had a slight superiority against the US navy in the Asia-Pacific region.However, the rapid build-up of the US navy was threatening Japan’s military advantage. To avoid military inferiority in the near future, Japan decided to fight the United States sooner rather than later.This outcome cannot be explained in terms of any other domestic factor than the systemic factor.In other words, the power shifts theory provides a unique explanation of the Pacific War.Therefore, the theory of power shifts is validated through this case study.
著者
野口 和彦
出版者
[出版者不明]
巻号頁・発行日
2009

制度:新 ; 報告番号:甲2897号 ; 学位の種類:博士(学術) ; 授与年月日:2009/9/15 ; 早大学位記番号:新5124
著者
野口 和彦
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2021, no.203, pp.203_80-203_93, 2021-03-30 (Released:2022-03-31)
参考文献数
43

Although the United States and the Soviet Union seriously competed with each other through nuclear arms racing, they never fought each other directly. This is a puzzle because the more severe the conflict is, the higher the incentives become for the conflicting parties to fight. To tackle this issue, I pick up two classical hypotheses explaining the surprising stability of the international system. H1 is the theory of nuclear revolution developed by Robert Jervis. H2 is the stability of bipolar world constructed by Kenneth N. Waltz. The Cuban Missile Crisis is used here to test these hypotheses. This case study is timely because we now know the details of this important political event. As a result of testing these two hypotheses, H1 passed and H2 failed: U.S. decisionmakers, especially John F. Kennedy, first got angry about the Soviet’s sudden installation of nuclear missiles’ sites on Cuba, but he gradually come to favor a quarantine because he was afraid of nuclear retaliation if the U.S. military attacked Cuba. This evidence confirms that H1 is valid. As for H2, this assumes that superpowers do not have to care about alliance politics in the bipolar world because their security is ultimately threated only by the other power, so it should only balance against the other superpower internally. Nevertheless, the United States and the Soviet Union both did worry about how their allies reacted, the US even endangered the missile deal with the Soviets for the sake of its relatively minor ally, Turkey. This evidence of superpower behavior is inconsistent with H2. In sum, the stability of the international system was maintained by the nuclear revolution, at least during the Cold War.
著者
野口 和彦
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.153, pp.175-185, 2008-11-30 (Released:2010-10-01)
参考文献数
40
著者
野口 和彦
出版者
東海大学
雑誌
東海大学紀要. 教養学部 (ISSN:03892018)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, pp.237-257, 2005-03-30

中ソ関係は1950年代後半から悪化し,60年代末に緊張は最高潮に達した。そして社会主義陣営の「冷戦」は,1969年のダマンスキー島/珍宝島事件で「熱戦」へと転化した。本論文では,中国とソ連の国境をめぐる武力衝突の根本的原因を究明する。ここでは,国際システム・レベルと国内レベルの両面から,中ソ国境紛争の原因を探る。ソ連の軍事的強大化による力の不均衡は,中国のソ連に対する脅威認識を強めた。中国はソ連の攻勢を抑止するために,紛争がエスカレートしにくい小島で,挑発の範囲と規模を限定した対ソ攻撃に踏み切ったと思われる。同時に中国の文化大革命は反ソ的特徴を持っていたため,ソ連との安全保障上の競争を極度に激しくしてしまった。つまり,69年の中ソ国境武力衝突は,中国がソ連に対して仕掛けた予防攻撃だと説明できる。
著者
野口 和彦
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2003, no.133, pp.124-140,L13, 2003-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
61

The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of power shifts on war. Realists have argued that the change of the distribution of power among states is a major cause of war. Yet, they failed to explain how and why it affects state's incentive to attack another country. I propose a window theory for clarifying the causal relationship between them. I argue that the rapid change of relative power affects state's motivation to initiate a war in two ways. First, war is more likely when the window of vulnerability opens. When a state is the declining power, it tends to begin a preventive war for stopping its weakening. Second, war is more likely when the window of opportunity opens. Under the condition that the costs of an offensive war are low, a state in the rising process may want more secure position by the use of forces.I examine the cases of the opening of the Korean War and the Entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers in 1950 for testing the above hypotheses. North Korea decided to invade South Korea with the approval of the Soviet Union because it expected that the United States would not militarily intervene in the war. The Acheson's announcement of the defensive perimeter indirectly excluding South Korea gave Stalin an opportunity to permit the North's war plan against the South. Kim Il Sung also estimated that North Korea would win the war without US intervention in the short period of time because South Korea was quite weak. Chinese decision makers almost agreed to send the Chinese People's Volunteers to Korean peninsula immediately after that the US-led UN forces advanced across the 38 parallel. China expected better outcomes from the preventive war than a war started later because time would make its security worse. In short, the empirical tests confirm this window theory.
著者
野口 和彦
出版者
安全工学会
雑誌
安全工学 (ISSN:05704480)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.6, pp.501-507, 2011-12-15
参考文献数
7
被引用文献数
1

<p>東日本大震災は,亡くなられた方と行方不明の方をあわせると2 万人を超え,避難者も一時期40 万人を越える大きな災害となった.さらには,震災の影響は,日本にとどまらず,原子力発電所事故により世界のエネルギー戦略にまで大きな影響を与えた. このような東日本大震災を「津波への対応が不十分」,「原子力の安全対策が問題」など,直接経験した事象に対する断片的な反省に終始すると,次は,別のタイプの災害事象での大きな被害を受けることになる.本稿は,東日本大震災をリスクマネジメントの視点で総括し,今後の防災活動改善のために重要と考える課題を整理したものである.</p>
著者
三船 恵美 天児 慧 堀本 武功 小笠原 欣幸 倉田 秀也 野口 和彦
出版者
駒澤大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
2007

中国と、東南アジアから南アジア・中央アジア・西アジアにかけての中国の周辺地域との関係構造と戦略に関する体系的な分析を行い、3年間の研究成果として、全メンバーの執筆による、天児慧・三船恵美編著『膨張する中国の対外関係-パクス・シニカと周辺国』頸草書房、2010年、を出版する。また、国際シンポジウムの成果として、Srikanth Kondapalli and Emi Mifune (eds.), China and its Neighbors, New Delhi : Pentagon Press, 2010)を出版し、本研究プロジェクトの成果を国内外に広く社会に公表した。