著者
野口 和彦
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.4, pp.37-55, 2007-10-31 (Released:2014-09-30)

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct the existing power shifts theory and to test this theory using the case of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States. In this paper, I try to show that only the power shifts theory can explain the timing of the Pacific War by using a strong test method.According to the realist theory of power shifts, war is more likely when the distribution of power in the international system fluctuates dramatically. In particular, as many realists have pointed out, a declining state relative to a rival rising state has an incentive to launch a preventive war due to its vulnerability. It is tempted to start an early war in order to avoid a later war in an inferior power position.A state in a process of sharp decline might tend to open hostilities against a strong adversary even if the chance of winning is small, because it perceives that there are no other options for survival.The opening of the Pacific War between Japan and the United States in 1941 confirms these hypotheses of the power shifts theory. A careful research of the Pacific War shows that the fear of declining Japanese military and economic power led Japanese policymakers to perceive that a war against the United States was the only option for survival. The United States imposed a total oil embargo on Japan in July 1941. This economic sanction made Japan extremely vulnerable because almost all of the oil consumed in Japan was imported from the United States. Without its oil supply, the Japanese navy would soon have been unable to operate and the Japanese economy would have fallen into deep recession.The Japanese war leaders faced a serious dilemma: they had to choose between a war with no hope of total victory and the collapse of imperial Japan. In the eyes of the Japanese leaders, a war with the United States was a better option than the end of the Japanese empire because Japan’s navy at that time had a slight superiority against the US navy in the Asia-Pacific region.However, the rapid build-up of the US navy was threatening Japan’s military advantage. To avoid military inferiority in the near future, Japan decided to fight the United States sooner rather than later.This outcome cannot be explained in terms of any other domestic factor than the systemic factor.In other words, the power shifts theory provides a unique explanation of the Pacific War.Therefore, the theory of power shifts is validated through this case study.
著者
野口 和彦
出版者
東海大学
雑誌
東海大学紀要. 教養学部 (ISSN:03892018)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.35, pp.237-257, 2005-03-30

中ソ関係は1950年代後半から悪化し,60年代末に緊張は最高潮に達した。そして社会主義陣営の「冷戦」は,1969年のダマンスキー島/珍宝島事件で「熱戦」へと転化した。本論文では,中国とソ連の国境をめぐる武力衝突の根本的原因を究明する。ここでは,国際システム・レベルと国内レベルの両面から,中ソ国境紛争の原因を探る。ソ連の軍事的強大化による力の不均衡は,中国のソ連に対する脅威認識を強めた。中国はソ連の攻勢を抑止するために,紛争がエスカレートしにくい小島で,挑発の範囲と規模を限定した対ソ攻撃に踏み切ったと思われる。同時に中国の文化大革命は反ソ的特徴を持っていたため,ソ連との安全保障上の競争を極度に激しくしてしまった。つまり,69年の中ソ国境武力衝突は,中国がソ連に対して仕掛けた予防攻撃だと説明できる。