著者

容 應萸

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.2, pp.37-60, 2016-04-30 (Released:2016-05-17)

参考文献数

81

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Some Americans such as Samuel Robbins Brown, Birdsey G. Northrop, and John Hopkins Twichell in late 19th century New England had early contacts with both Chinese and Japanese students. These discoveries led the author to consider the necessity of further pursuing study into (1) the activities of missionaries and intellectuals who had contacts with both Japanese and Chinese students aspiring to learn from the west, and (2) the contacts and relationships between Japanese and Chinese overseas students. This paper firstly clarifies the background and footsteps regarding relationships between Americans and Japanese/Chinese overseas students, then examines whether Japanese and Chinese students themselves built up interactions and friendships through their network of American acquaintances, schools and local communities, and finally makes comparisons from family backgrounds to careers of 21 Japanese and 21 Chinese students studying at Yale University in the period 1870–1887. The students of these two countries were studied because their similar experiences as overseas students may provide important insights to why Japan and China took different paths in their modernization, a topic the author has had continuous academic interest in. This paper also intends, as the first step in a comparative study of modernization processes in Japan and China, to find out whether Japanese and Chinese students studying at Yale University in the same period set off from similar starting points. In conclusion, the ground was set for communication between Japanese and Chinese students in second-half 19th century New England, but deeper interaction and solidarity did not seem to have grown between them. Moreover, although China fell far behind Japan in modernization, both countries had overseas students who had the same western training under the same environment at the start.

著者

五百旗頭 真

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.2, pp.5-12, 2004 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

井上 あえか

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.5-18, 2003 (Released:2014-09-15)

被引用文献数

1

著者

今村 祥子

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.65, no.3, pp.20-36, 2019-07-31 (Released:2019-09-10)

参考文献数

20

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In the early 1980s, Indonesia witnessed the extrajudicial killings of thousands of hoodlums by security forces. The victims’ bodies were left at prominent public places. Because the authorities did not admit to any involvement, the Indonesian media termed the killings “Petrus,” which means “mysterious shootings.” This thesis aims to analyze the ruling style of Suharto’s regime by considering the mass killings. From the beginning, the Suharto regime regarded Indonesian society as a legitimate target for intelligence activities and machinations, as symbolized by the existence of Operasi Khusus (Opsus); this was initially a team set up for the army’s intelligence work in Malaysia, but later became institutionalized to rule over Indonesian society. Applying intelligence and machinations to maintain domestic rule may be considered a rational step for the authorities. Given that other strong political ideologies still had deep roots in society, it was extremely difficult to create the Golkar system based on the state-sponsored Pancasila ideology by means of repression alone. Thus, the government had to rely on intelligence operations, such as machinations, provocations, and propaganda that justified the repression of potential enemies. This thesis, based on interviews, seeks to show that many victims of Petrus were hoodlums who had been recruited as agents for covert operations. They were organized under Ali Moertopo, the head of Opsus and Suharto’s right-hand man in the early days of the regime. Though there has long been a speculation that the real target of Petrus was Moertopo’s network, the rumors have not been substantiated. My argument is as follows. The Suharto regime, in its effort to build up the Golkar system, often used intelligence machinations toward members of its own society to eliminate or weaken potential enemies. This ruling style naturally alienated a specific societal group and created social divisions. The target of Petrus (or in any case, one of the main targets) were the hoodlums who had been used as a tool for such machinations. After their mission was over, the hoodlums came to be seen as unnecessary and dangerous; they were eliminated themselves through another huge machination—Petrus. In this context, Petrus symbolized a fundamental contradiction in the Suharto regime, which sought the thorough permeation of “harmonious” Pancasila ideology, but, in reality, could not rule the country without dividing society.

著者

浅野 豊美

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.62, no.2, pp.72-77, 2016-04-30 (Released:2016-05-17)

著者

菊地 秀樹

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.4, pp.19-38, 2023-10-31 (Released:2023-11-25)

参考文献数

80

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During the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) conducted guerrilla warfare in areas occupied by the Imperial Japanese Army. The Kuomintang aimed to continue the fight against Japan while maintaining their own governing authority in those regions by mobilizing the local population under Japanese occupation for guerrilla warfare. They carried out operations to disrupt logistics and transportation networks controlled by the Japanese forces.Prior studies have evaluated the KMT’s wartime mobilization system as a “total war” system premised on the penetration of ruling power into society. However, according to some empirical studies on the wartime mobilization system in enemy-occupied areas, spontaneously organized self-defense groups and bandit groups were mobilized for guerrilla warfare, and the conscription system that had been established before the war did not function. Considering this point, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive reexamination of the KMT’s wartime mobilization system, including the actual condition of their guerrilla warfare.This paper turns its attention to “Jiangnan” region in southern Jiangsu Province, where Nanjing and Shanghai, which were important political and economic bases for the KMT, were located, and which became the front line after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. The paper then examines the extent to which the KMT was able to build a modern military based on a compulsory military service system in the “Jiangnan” region. Then, this paper will shift its attention to the Loyal Patriotic Army, a paramilitary organization of the Kuomintang that played a leading role in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in “Jiangnan”, and clarified the actual situation of unit management, including the acquisition of soldiers, using primary historical documents. Through this work, this paper reexamines the KMT’s wartime mobilization system at the front-line areas and in the Japanese-occupied areas, which had not been sufficiently examined in previous studies.This paper reveals that the Loyal Patriotic Army’s main source of soldiers was the various armed forces that emerged because of the weakening of the KMT’s rule. These armed forces could have been the immediate military power of the Loyal Patriotic Army, but their behavior was based on their own survival strategy rather than anti-Japanese consciousness, and it was difficult to control them. Therefore, while relying on these armed forces for wartime mobilization, the KMT continued to face the challenge of “domestic pacification,” which is a process of centralized control of the violent apparatus.In conclusion, this paper points out that the KMT’s wartime mobilization in “Jiangnan” during the Sino-Japanese War was not based on a total war system but was dependent on local voluntary armed forces that became active partly because of the retreat of the party’s governing power. The KMT was able to mobilize such armed forces because the interests of both sides coincided in securing the war effort and guaranteeing survival, but this symbiotic relationship was very fragile.

著者

熊倉 潤

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.130-134, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

参考文献数

7

著者

廣野 美和

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.55-70, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

参考文献数

40

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How did China put into practice its non-interference principle before and after the 2021 coup d’état in Myanmar, and how did Myanmar’s key actors perceive China’s practice? Non-interference has been one of the more important foreign policy principles in the Asia-Pacific regional order. However, China’s approaches to the non-interference principle have evolved in the twenty-first century. Moving beyond the government-to-government channel that China had upheld in its diplomacy earlier, China began taking a flexible approach to the principle to work with the government of Myanmar and its opponents, i.e., ethnic armed organizations. In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, too, China’s non-interference policy has been questioned by many, particularly those concerned about China’s “neo-colonial policy” and its alleged “debt trap” diplomacy.However, the meaning of the principle remains ambiguous within academic and policy communities, as the principle is often evaluated politically and subjectively in reality. By addressing the ambiguity, this paper examines China’s actual political and economic practices of what seems to be interventionist behaviour—China’s conflict mediation in Myanmar and the Belt and Road Initiative—and the Myanmarese actors’ perceptions of the practices.This paper employs as its conceptual framework a spectrum of interference consisting of coercion on the one hand and influence on the other. Primarily based on the author’s interviews with key actors in Myanmar in 2018, this paper uses the spectrum to examine China’s practices and the Myanmarese actors’ perceptions of those practices, to determine the extent to which they amount to coercion or influence.This paper finds that China’s political and economic practices in Myanmar and the Myan­marese actors’ perceptions address opposite ends of the spectrum. China’s practices amount to the exertion of influence on both the government of Myanmar and on the ethnic armed organizations, without resorting to coercing either actor to engage in particular behaviour. In contrast, the Myanmarese actors perceive China’s practices as nothing less than coercion and the violation of Myanmarese sovereignty. Those perceptions are linked to anti-China sentiment, wide-spread demonstrations and physical attacks against Chinese infrastructures in Myanmar, which limit the scope of China’s attempt to expand its economic influence in that country. If one takes the view that the establishment of a new regional order has to be endorsed by regional countries, the above finding implies that China’s approach to its non-interference principle suggests that China still has a long way to go to reformulate the regional order.

著者

山田 哲也

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.4, pp.88-102, 2020-10-31 (Released:2020-11-19)

参考文献数

13

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In this article, the author analyses two judgements of the Supreme Court of Korea regarding the payment of compensation to the Korean war time laborers from the view point of public international law. Some of them are said to be forced or deceived at their recruitment by the Japanese private companies. In the judgement of 30 October 2018, the Court adjudicated that the Japanese company were still liable to compensate against the damage caused by such enforcement or deception.However, the Japanese Government has reacted and protested against this judgement through the diplomatic channel. This is because, according to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the issue of the compensation to the Korean war time laborers was already legally settled through the Japan-Republic of Korea Basic Relations Treaty and the Japan-Korea Claims Agreement of 1965. As the basic principle of public international law, particularly the basic principle of the law of the treaties, every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith (the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”). At the same time, a party to each treaty may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. Therefore, Japan has alleged that the 2018 Judgement were internationally illegal and that the Korean Government were obliged to suspend the execution of the judgement. On the other hand, Moon Jae-in Administration has been supportive to the 2018 Judgement and refused to refer to arbitrate provided in Article 3 (2) of the Claims Agreement. As a result, Japan-Korea relation became dramatically worse and no one can foresee when the bilateral relation would get out from this situation.This Japanese-Korean confrontation originally caused by the interpretation of the legality of the annexation (colonization) under the 1910 Treaty. Japan has regarded that the 1910 Treaty was concluded legally in light of the legal situation of the beginning of the 20th century. On the contrary, Korea has never accepted the legality of the 1910 Treaty. Therefore, at the time of the conclusion of the Basic Treaty of 1965, the provision that “[i]t is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void” (italics added) was inserted. This article means that the both parties agreed to disagree about the legality of the 1910 Treaty.In conclusion, the author points out that, as far as the Moon Administration’s policy on reconsideration of the past history and policies under the military or conservative régime continues, Japan would have to deal with such “historical” issue again and again. At the same time, the author points out that what is needed by the Japanese Government is the calm diplomacy with well-grounded (international) legal opinion.

著者

シナン レヴェント

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, no.1.2, pp.69-88, 2012-04-30 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

60

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The term Eurasia is more than just a geographical statement; it acquired political meaning in the first half of the 20th century. As the term is capable of various definitions, here we restrict the meaning to former-Soviet lands. This paper examines the political intentions of imperial Japan towards the region in the interwar period in terms of Japanese policy towards Islamic populations and the Axis allies, especially German–Japanese military co-operation. The sources are mainly those that relate to questions about Islam and anti-Soviet feelings during this period.The strategy of supporting those who opposed the regime in Russia dates back to the Russo-Japanese war. Based on this experience, Japan, in an attempt to play a more important role in international issues after the Paris Conference in 1919, tried to make Tokyo an émigré-center, like Berlin, Paris, and Istanbul at the time. From early 1920s Turkic-Muslim people were recruited and formed a community in Japan under the leadership of the influential Muhammed Abdulhay Kurbanali. Subsequently, Abdurresid Ibrahim arrived in 1933 and took the initiative by replacing Kurbanali in 1938. It was assumed that Japan was utilizing these anti-Bolshevik Muslim factions to foster the anti-Sovietism adopted by the military; this explains the infiltration of Japanese influence into the Muslim groups, especially those suppressed by Soviet Russia.As is well known, imperial Japan and Nazi Germany signed the Anti-Commintern Pact in November 1936 against international communism in name, but in fact against Soviet Russia. Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese military attaché to Germany at the time, made an agreement with Wilhelm Canaris on behalf of the German army covering two areas: (i) anti-Soviet intelligence co-operation; and (ii) aid to support propaganda of anti-regime minorities based on an order from the Chief of the Army General Staff of imperial Japan. To summarize the agreement: ‘To collaborate with the German army concerning the intelligence of the Soviet Union so that the independence movements of minorities in the Soviet Union and anti-communist propaganda can be easily supported. This would assist the Japanese army to understand the deficiencies of Soviet Russia and move accordingly in the case of war between Japan and Russia’.Finally, the plans mentioned above did not bear fruit in terms of putting Eurasia under Japanese influence due to the fact that Japanese military operations on the Asian mainland and the German invasion in Russia ultimately ended in failure.

著者

日下 渉

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.2, pp.56-75, 2020-04-30 (Released:2020-06-09)

参考文献数

61

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This paper explains why majority of Filipinos have come to tolerate President Duterte’s violence in the name of “discipline.” His “war on drugs” is estimated to kill almost 20,000 people but nearly 80 percent of Filipinos have supported him. To explain his popularity, previous studies have pointed out such factors as failure of the existing liberal democracy and Duterte’s penal populism. However, these studies do not explain why these issues have come to the forefront only in the mid-2010s although they are the long-standing problems. This paper argues that it is because the neoliberal governmentality has increasingly penetrated into societies and constructed new moral subjectivities among Filipinos as “virtuous citizens” who embrace discipline and diligence in the 21st century.Neoliberalism propagates the doctrine that people’s economic status and welfare are dependent on individual’s responsibility, shifting the blame for misfortunes of lives from the state to individuals. Thus, people are required to discipline themselves to become “virtuous citizens” independent from the state and skillful in the market for subsistence and opportunities. However, despite efforts of self-disciplining, they usually remain helpless to overcome socio-economic inequality and precariousness in the society where the state does not fully function. This shared frustration of disciplined “good citizens” has created a popular resentment against undisciplined “evil others” at the top and bottom: the elites who abuse the state power and resources, and drug users who put danger to their families and communities. It is their resentment that has justified Duterte’s violence.Lower middle class who have emerged in the global service industry in the 21st century mainly constitute the “virtuous citizens.” Based on annual research in Western Leyte, however, this paper argues that struggling poor in rural societies have also developed the moral subjectivities as “virtuous citizens” strengthening resentment against “evil others.” In the localities, the super typhoon Yolanda devastated the feudal coconut agriculture in November 2013. Those who lost the main livelihood have become dependent on resources provided by NGOs, the private sector and the state. Their programs have the neoliberal characteristics to require the beneficiaries to become independent, disciplined and diligent “virtuous citizens” in exchange for resources. While many struggle to live a disciplined life for subsistence, others found alternative source of income in the illegal drug trafficking. The former developed their frustration against the latter and became ardent supporters of the war on drugs in a situation where drugs and violence are perpetrated by a drug lord family.

著者

毛利 亜樹

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.1-17, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)

参考文献数

97

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This paper attempts to clarify why the political term, “the 3 million square kilometers of Chinese marine territory,” formed in Chinese political discourse by close examination of Chinese domestic politics from 1980 to 1996, which the literature has not yet fully addressed. It also discusses how Chinese experts calculated the legal coherence between the term and the United Nations of Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). One finding is that then-director of the State Oceanic Agency, Ruo Yuru, who believed that China lagged behind neighboring countries in ensuring maritime rights in the multiple maritime zones China could claim under UNCLOS, proposed the term “300 million square meters of Chinese marine territory” in 1984 to obtain domestic support for maritime development policy. The term, which conflates territorial water, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and continental shelf into “un-unified space” under Chinese jurisdiction, was designed to appeal broadly to Chinese domestic actors who were unfamiliar with UNCLOS and who had focused on land development rather than the sea. Although Ruo’s conception of the “300 million square meters of Chinese marine territory” maintained compliance with the legal difference between sovereignty and sovereign rights defined by UNCLOS, the term may shape the views of Chinese actors in these maritime zones who perceive it as the “sovereign territory” of China because the different maritime zones defined by UNCLOS is understood through a common emphasis on China’s jurisdiction. The other finding is the Chinese government’s careful handling of the term, including replacing the term “marine territory” with “jurisdictional water” in more authoritative sources. This suggests that the government of China and Chinese experts apparently understand that the term contradicts the legal conception laid out by UNCLOS, which differentiates between sovereignty and sovereign rights, and potentially poses diplomatic problems with neighboring maritime countries. Even after UNCLOS came into force in China in 1996, some Chinese experts criticized the nationalistic view of “marine territory” as sovereign territory. However, despite careful handling of the term by the Chinese government, due to strong domestic consensus on using international law as a tool for ensuring China’s maritime rights, a nationalistic understanding of “marine territory” as “sovereign territory” has been accepted as fait accompli in China as its maritime policy develops.

著者

貞好 康志

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.4, pp.128-132, 2018-10-31 (Released:2018-12-05)

著者

森 巧

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, no.3, pp.30-34, 2022-07-31 (Released:2022-08-10)

参考文献数

3

著者

岩武 照彦

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, no.1, pp.61-82, 1980 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

大竹 慎一

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.26, no.1, pp.53-82, 1979 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

天野 元之助

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, no.2, pp.1-20, 1965 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

遠藤 正敬

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.56, no.3, pp.1-11, 2010-07-31 (Released:2014-09-15)

参考文献数

28

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Manchoukuo, founded in 1932 as a Japanese puppet-state, was a compound-national state, in which it was difficult to enforce nationality law and family registration (koseki) law. ‘Nation registration’ (minseki) was enforced in 1940 as an alternative institution. The governments of Japan and Manchoukuo were faced with the difficulty of how to deal with the koseki of ‘Japanese subjects’, including Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese, and how to treat their identities in Manchoukuo–this problem was exacerbated by the increase in the population of ‘Japanese subjects’ in Manchoukuo caused by Japan’s immigration policy. Japanese colonial rule required the Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese inhabitants of Manchoukuo to have separate registered domiciles (honseki), which reflected their respective ethnicities. Changes in this status were not generally permitted. The Japanese government implemented the policy of requiring ‘Japanese subjects’ who had registered according to minseki also to register their koseki for the purposes of convenience. Consequently ‘Japanese subjects’ in Manchoukuo had dual registered domiciles, koseki and minseki. Although Japanese and Koreans had dual identities, ‘Japanese subjects’ and ‘Manchoukuo nationals’, the governments of Japan and Manchoukuo adopted the policy that ‘Japanese subjects’ had priority over ‘Manchoukuo nationals’. Consequently, minseki were subordinate to Japanese koseki.The majority of Koreans in Manchoukuo had been omitted from Korean koseki. In 1939, The Japanese Governor-General of Korea coerced them into applying for registration. Japanese government decided to adopt conscription in Korea in 1944, and a Korean resident registration law (Chosen kiryu-rei) was enacted to register the persons who had not resided in honseki in Korean koseki.In Japan, the resident registration (kiryu) law had been in force in 1917 to register the Japanese who had resided in places other than honseki. In Manchoukuo, therefore, the honseki of ‘Manchoukuo nationals’ recorded in minseki did not match their actual places of residences. In 1943, the Manchoukuo government also enacted the kiryu law so that they could obtain the actual addresses of ‘Manchoukuo nationals’.‘Japanese subjects’ in Manchoukuo were bound by a system of triple registration. Under Japanese colonial rule, the koseki system had played an important part as a ‘safety device’ to distinguish the Japanese from the Koreans or the Taiwanese. However, the system also had the effect of determining the honseki of registrants. Consequently, the kiryu system was indispensable as a complement to the above-mentioned functions of the koseki system in the Japanese empire.

著者

熊田 徹

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.3, pp.1-27, 2001 (Released:2014-09-15)

著者

長田 紀之

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, no.3, pp.124-129, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)