著者

武田 悠

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.162, pp.162_130-142, 2010-12-10 (Released:2012-10-20)

参考文献数

70

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The 1970s was an era of crisis and internationalization for Japan-U.S. relations. Both governments started to settle their bilateral conflicts for their policy cooperation which was required in the changing international environment at that time. To clarify the character of this change, this paper examines the bilateral negotiation of Tokai reprocessing plant held in 1977.In the late 1970s, the U.S. government attempted to rebuild international nuclear nonproliferation system by limiting peaceful nuclear power development such as spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technology. Carter administration took the office in 1977 and called its allies to stop reprocessing. However, Carter's new policy was highly problematic since reprocessing was a key technology in energy policies of other developed countries such as Japan. As Tokai reprocessing plant was planned to begin operation in 1977 and an approval from Washington was required for its operation, they need a settlement.At the first bilateral talk in April, Washington opposed firmly to the operation. On the other hand, international opposition grew rapidly against the new U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Western European countries were especially sensitive to it since it could ban further export of nuclear-related technology to developing countries.Washington started to consider a compromise since Tokyo was the only close ally showing its approval to a framework of new nonproliferation policy. At the second meeting, the United States offered a proposal to alter Tokai plant more resistant to nuclear proliferation by technical modification. Although Japanese government opposed to the modification, they agreed to do a research about possible technical alternatives at Tokai Mura, Japan. As a result of this joint research and other investigations, however, Washington gave up all the technical solutions. Finally, at the third meeting at the end of August, Carter decided to permit the operation without any modification in return of Tokyo's agreement to reconsider reprocessing and suspend large scale Plutonium use for the moment.The above examination shows two aspects of the Japan-U.S. relations in the1970s. One is that Tokyo had an option to refine the U.S. foreign policy and participate in international politics by supporting Washington. In contrast to European countries that stopped the U.S. nonproliferation policy by refusing to cooperate, Japan did the same thing by aligning with the United States.The other is decreased importance of the bilateral relationship itself for the U.S. government, while Japan's substantive contribution to the U.S. foreign policy became a must to the United States. In sum, although both countries agreed to coordinate their policy objectives in the 1970s, this success became a basis of further bilateral conflicts on the way of implementing those goals.

著者

森田 吉彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.139, pp.29-44,L7, 2004

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During the Sino-Japanese negotiations of the mid-nineteenth century, from the Shanghai voyage of the official ship <i>Senzai-maru</i> in 1862 to the treaty conclusion in 1871, one of the first problems was understanding the past and future conditions of the East Asian world order.<br>At first, Japan wanted China to allow Japanese merchants to go and trade there, in the same way as Chinese merchants had been able to come and trade in Japan since the "national isolation" period. However, in addition, China had to argue about whether or not they should treat an Eastern country like Japan like a Western non-treaty country. Although there were also opinions such as in Japan, that they wanted to exclude the Western monopoly for commerce and, that in China, they should be more flexible toward neighboring Japan, their talks did not advance.<br>But in Japan, people like Nagura Nobuatsu continued groping for the possibility of Sino-Japanese strategic cooperation, and this agreed with Iwakura Tomomi's idea of national strategy. On the other hand, in China, people like Li Hung-Chang continued to think about a strategic dynamism between China, Japan and the West. In the 1869-70 argument in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan, Nagura aggressively claimed that Japan must promote "<i>tsüshin</i>" (a traditional communication, which needed no new treaty) relation with China. He was opposed to the prudent opinion that Japan needed to create a Western-style treaty with China so as not to arouse Western suspicion. Under his initiative, preliminary negotiations regarding diplomaticrelations with China were accepted. It was also significant that when China had changed her attitude, Li Hung-Chang refuted objectors pointing out that Japan had not been a tributary state. He advocated a plan to bind Japan and contain the West.<br>The Sino-Japanese Amity Treaty of 1871 was almost unchanged from the original China draft. It also lacked a (one-sided or bilateral) most favored nation clause, and it was not only the second article that caused Western powers to become suspicious of the Sino-Japanese alliance and press for the prevention of a ratification. It was symbolic that the Chinese word "<i>tiaogui</i>" was used and not "<i>tiaoyue</i>" (the usual translation of the word "treaty"). From the beginning, the treaty was planned as special. A most important point was that China had deleted the sovereign names of both countries so that they did not stand on an equal footing. Also, in the latter part of the first article, China aimed to restrain the Japanese regarding the Korean Peninsula, but they hid the Chinese meaning of the words in the treaty. The Japanese will to build an even relationship with China as a traditional communication or a treaty was suppressed.

著者

北川 誠一

出版者

日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.138, pp.142-156, 2004-09

著者

大山 貴稔

出版者

日本国際政治学会 ; 1957-

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.180, pp.1-16, 2015-03

著者

中谷 直司

出版者

日本国際政治学会 ; 1957-

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.180, pp.111-125, 2015-03

著者

酒井 哲哉

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.117, pp.121-139,L12, 1998

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This essay intends to analyse the formative process of discourses on international politics in post-war Japan, and by doing so shed light on the hitherto neglected aspects of Japanese political thought. Most of previous studies have understood discourses on international politics in post-war Japan as a simple dichotomy, realism/idealism, and paid little attention to the intellectual contexts in which these discourses had their own roots; While &ldquo;idealists&rdquo; have searched for their identity in that Japan was reborn as a &ldquo;peace-loving&rdquo; nation after the end of the Pacific War, &ldquo;realists&rdquo; have acused the &ldquo;idealists&rdquo; of being naive. Both of them, however, seem to have overlooked or possibly masked from what kind of historical background discourses on international politics in post-war Japan had emerged and to what extent post-war discourses had been influenced by pre-war ones. Therefore, this essay will uncover the complicated relationship of political thought between post-war and pre-war Japan.<br>Chapter I &ldquo;Morality, Power and Peace&rdquo; treats how relationship between morality and power in international politics was argued during the early post-war era. Dogi-Kokka-Ron (Nation Based on Morality), the dominant discourse on peace immediately after Japan's surrender, insisted that Japan search for morality rather than power and by doing so exceed the principle of sovereignty, characterestic of modern states. In spite of its appearance, however, Dogi-Kokka-Ron contained echoes of philosophical argument of the Kyoto School which had advocated morality of Japan's wartime foreign policies vis-&agrave;-vis Western imperialism. Thus Maruyama Masao and other leading intellectuals, who belonged to the school known as Shimin-Shakai-Ha (Civil Society School), tried to differentiate their arguments from Dogi-Kokka-Ron and create another discourse on morality, power and peace. Since the Kyoto School had criticised harshly the modernity and nationalism during the Pacific War, Shimin-Shakai-Ha's undertakings resulted in reestimation of the modern nation-state. This chapter further elucidates Shimin-Shakai-Ha's ambivalent attitudes toward power and norm in international politics with special reference to its understandings of the concept of the equality of states.<br>Chapter II &ldquo;Regionalism and Nationalism&rdquo; focuses on Royama Masamichi's argument on regionalism. Regionalism was a difficult topic to handle during the early post-war era because it could bring to mind the idea of the Great East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during the Pacific War. Royama, founder of the study on International Politics in Japan, was one of the rare figures who continued to advocate the significance of regionalism. This chapter surveys Royama's argument on regionalism from the mid-1920's to the mid-1950's and investigates how his concern about development and nationalism of Asian countries appeared within the framework of regionalism. Royama's argument is also suggestive for better understanding of the context in which the &ldquo;Rostow-Reischauer line&rdquo; surfaced in the early 1960's.<br>Chapter III &ldquo;Collective Security and Neutralism&rdquo; elucidates several aspects of this issue which have not been hitherto fully investigated. Whether positively or negatively, neutralism in post-war Japan has been understood as a typically &ldquo;idealistic&rdquo; attitude toward international politics. However, the context in which the concept of neutrality was understood and argued in the early post-war Japan was more complicated. Discourses on neutralism at that time had still echoes of the controversies over collective security during the inter-war years. The Yokota-Taoka Controversy which took place in the late-1940's witnessed the continuity of pre-war and post-war arguments on this issue. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the Yokota-Taoka Controversy and analyses its impact on the following arguments of

著者

渡辺 愛子

出版者

日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.134, pp.121-135, 2003-11

著者

千知岩 正継

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.171, pp.171_114-171_128, 2013-01-30 (Released:2014-12-13)

参考文献数

40

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In recent years, some IR theorists have begun to depart from the assumption of anarchy and to shed light on certain forms of inter-state hierarchy. Stimulated by those new studies, this article engages in a discussion on the legitimacy of a global authority which is expected to preside over ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ norms. The first part of this paper clarifies the global authority governing R2P norms, and explains its critical importance. Drawing upon the concept of “right authority” in just war traditions, it is argued that a global authority in relation to R2P is supposed to decide whether certain states fail to fulfil their responsibility to protect, and if necessary, to take responsibility for authorizing military interventions for human protection. This will inevitably determine the nature of global order. The following two sections examine both the United Nations Security Council and a proposed concept of “Concert of Democracies” as possible candidates to be the global authority. As a universally agreed legal authority, the Council is entrusted with the fulfilling of R2P principles, and in fact many commentators saw the Council decision in the case of Libyan civil war as its first successful implementation of R2P. However, the Council has critical legitimacy deficits in terms of its selective function to the intractable question of “for whom should the Council be ultimately accountable and responsible?” As for the idea of “Concert of Democracies” it is a reflection of “liberal hierarchy” based on the solidarity of liberal democracies, and presented as a preferred alternative to the illegitimate and ineffective Council. On the contrary to optimistic expectations, it is demonstrated that its exclusive membership and misguided assessment of liberal democratic states behaviour will undermine this institution’s legitimacy. In conclusion I suggest two daunting challenges that the Security Council should overcome as the global authority responsible for putting R2P norms into practice. The first is to translate a plurality of values and interests of the Council members into the unity and effective decision making in times of humanitarian tragedies. The other challenge concerns the need for the Council to seek legitimation not only from member states but also from those people severely affected by the Council action or inaction. This might involve a transformation of the Council from globally acting authority into a kind of cosmopolitan authority based on the approval of “we the people” If this is the case, a new form of the Council authority will need further consideration.

著者

白鳥 潤一郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_164-175_167, 2014

著者

白鳥 潤一郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_164-175_167, 2014

著者

井口 武夫

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.155, pp.155_169-175, 2009-03-20 (Released:2011-07-10)

著者

山崎 眞

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_145-154_160, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

参考文献数

57

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Recently, it has been closed-up again that Japan relies on the import mostly of the energy source, food, and the raw material because the sudden rise of the oil price and the price hike of food and various raw materials, etc. occurred in early 2008. A serious discussion about the food security is happening, too. Japan imports most 99 percent of oil, 87 percent of wheat, 95 percent of the soybean, and 100 percent of other iron ore and rare metals, etc. and 98 percent of those materials are transported through Sea Lane. Japan has developed economically for 60 years after the war because such a raw material etc. were able to be imported without trouble by can the free use of the sea, and to export the product.A two great sea power of U. S. -Soviet was rivaled, and the stability of the ocean was kept because two great military power of U. S. -Soviet faced it at the cold war era. The balance of such a sea power collapses when the cold war is concluded, and the element of instability in the ocean has increased. Therefore, the confrontation by the race and the religion, etc. came to light, and the pirate and the outrage, etc. for the capital work of these group and organization came to be generated. Moreover, maritime terrorism came frequently to occur chiefly when becoming after 2000 years. Safety and the stability of the ocean are deteriorating than the cold war era because of such a situation, and it has come not to be able to disregard the influence given to the economy of the world. For instance, the Strait of Malacca passes by 50 percent of the amount of the oil transportation in the world and 30 percent of the amount of the world trade, and if here would be blockaded by the terrorism such as mines, it is said that the economy of the world will become a situation that nears panic.And furthermore, recent Chinese naval modernization and reinforcement and North Korean nuclear armament under opaque situation will bring insecurity in this region. 90 percent of the trade of the world depends on marine transport now. Moreover, 75 percent of the world's population and 80 percent of the capital are in the coastal frontier. Safety in the ocean therefore can be called a base for the world economy as well as the human race living. Especially, this is extremely important for Japan that is the maritime country.The ocean policy of Japan was something like a inconsistent stripe passes existed in the situation in which the national interest in the ocean was being lost for this by the government office organizations of lack of coordination so far. The former political administration of Prime Minister Abe enforced “The Basic Law of the Sea” to demonstrate a strong statesmanship considering such a situation and to straighten the situation as the country in July, 2007. The Cabinet Council was continuously decided to “Oceanic basic plan” based on this law in April 2008.On the other hand, the United States that valued safety and the stability of the ocean made “New Maritime Strategy” public after an interval of about 20 years in October 2007. This is a new idea of acquiring safety and the stability of the ocean in the world by cooperate about the ally and the friendly country strong. It is the one that the Maritime Self-Defense Force's being sending the fleet to the multinational fleet in the Indian Ocean coincident with such an idea. Now, there is no country that can defend safety in the ocean in the world by one country. Peace in the sea can be acquired only by concentrating the imperative power such as naval forces and coast guards in the world.It is necessary that Japan cooperate positively in such the world strategy.

著者

芝崎 厚士

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.129, pp.44-60,L9, 2002-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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This article aims at introducing a brief overview of the theoretical perspective of International Cultural Relations (ICR, Kokusai Bunka Ron). ICR employs two meanings of “culture”, one is culture sensu stricto (CSS), the other is culture sensu lato (CSL). In order to understand ICR as one of the new fields of study in International Relations, one would have to elucidate how CSS and CSL are applied into international relations respectively and how these two analyses could be integrated as ICR.The study of ICR based on CSS has two traditions. Both regard ‘culture’ as elements from which the actor or some relations (composed of these actors) are constructed. Students of ICR use CSS in order to examine how ‘culture’ is used inside the reality of international relations.One tradition generated by the study of diplomatic history in the United States from 1970s, was conducted by Akira Iriye and his successors. They insisted on the need to interpret international relations as intercultural relations, rejecting the realist, power oriented approaches which dominated the field. They also tried to change diplomatic history into ‘international history’, which seeks to overcome the somewhat narrow-minded nationalistic view of diplomatic history.The other tradition was initiated in the study of International Relations in Japan from 1970s, launched by Kenichiro Hirano and his disciples. They borrowed their approach from anthropology, especially acculturation theory, which captures culture's dynamic changes and reconstructing processes. Basically they perceive international relations as cultural relations, which implies that international relations need not only to be interstate relations, and international relations are only one part of many cultural relations. They seek to establish ‘mobile International Relations’, which opposes traditional ‘immobile International Relations’.CSL studies consists of two parts. One is ‘international relations (ir) as culture’; the other is ‘International Relations (IR) as culture’. Students of ICR use CSL when they want to understand how ir or IR would look like from outside of the IR discipline, from the historical point of view. Unfortunately, the research stock is not so abundant in the study of ICR based on CSL. However, some recent studies indicate that CSL will be one of the most important future fields of study.Thus, ICR students have to deal with two notions of cultures. Sometimes they apply CSS, which focuses on how international relations could be explained by culture as elements of actors or groups of actors. Sometimes they adopt CSL, which explicates how and why international relations are generated in the history of mankind and International Relations invented in the history of ideas. ICR must deal with these two tasks, which could be accomplished both by the work of a single individual or though collaboration.

著者

大久保 綾子 真田 康弘 石井 敦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.166, pp.166_57-70, 2011

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This paper aims at revising the analytical framework of institutional interaction established by Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring, and applies the revised framework to the international regimes related to cetacean management in order to demonstrate the usefulness of our proposed revision and to systematically describe the regime complex of cetacean management.<br>After reviewing the relevant literature and explaining the institutional interaction framework, we evaluate the framework and describe our revisions.<br>Based on the evaluation we propose to revise the framework by incorporating the utilitarian causal pathway of institutional interaction.<br>The revised framework is applied to the following regimes: International Whaling Commission (IWC); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR); North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO); Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species ofWild Animals (CMS); Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS); Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas (ASCOBANS); Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT).<br>International organizations such as FAO and UNEP were excluded from the study.<br>The case study revealed that, first, the institutional interactions involved in the cetacean management regime complex have synergistic effects when it comes to cognitive interaction.<br>Because this result is consistent with other studies, this feature can be generalized to a significant extent.<br>Second, some effects caused by institutional interaction other than cognitive interaction cannot be determined because it will depend on the actors'perspectives; and, such undetermined effects are caused only by unintentional interaction.<br>Third, the IWC is mostly the source of institutional interaction and there are only two cases that the IWC is the target of interaction.<br>Fourth, there were some cases of forum shopping in the samples, and the driving force of such forum shopping was the difference in the membership which largely determines the expected success to pursue the forum shopper's interest.<br>Fifth, the regime complex of cetacean management has the IWC as a hub regime and the other regimes function largely as mutually complementary to the IWC.<br>For example, the NAMMCO provides international oversight to the whaling operation, and ASCOBANS, ACCOBAMS, and CMS provide governance means for managing small cetaceans.<br>These functions cannot be provided by the IWC because of its dispute over its basic objectives.<br>Sixth, there are actually cases that exhibit long-term cumulative effects resulting from institutional interaction.<br>We conclude that the proposed revision of the framework proved fruitful, and suggest some policy implications to the IWC and further work necessary to analyze institutional interaction.

著者

臼井 勝美

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, no.116, pp.181-183, 1997-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

平田 忠輔

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1985, no.80, pp.142-160, 1985-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

60

著者

戸部 良一

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1982, no.71, pp.124-140,L11, 1982-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

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The aim of this paper is to examine SHIRATORI Toshio's views and thoughts on Japan's foreign relations, as one of the typical advocates of Kodo Diplomacy in the 1930's. The main reason why his diplomatic thought should be the subject of careful study lies in the fact that he was regarded as a “philosopher” of Japanese diplomacy by the younger bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry and he influenced their thoughts and behaviors.With the impact of the Manchurian Incident, SHIRATORI began to declare that Japan should return to Asia. He attacked the evils of Western Civilization and denounced the Washington Treaty System as an international order in the Far East which symbolized the interests of the Occidental (especially Anglo-Saxon) powers, though he had not challenged it in the 1920's. Then he sought an ideological basis to guide Japanese diplomacy, and tried to construct a conceptual framework of a New World Order based upon Japanese morals and interests.At first he looked upon Soviet Russia as the arch enemy whose influences had to be driven out of the Far East. But, as Japan had been bogged down in a war of attrition with China since 1937, he refrained from saying that Russia was the enemy of Japan and the other peoples of Asia. He stressed the global confrontation between the “have” countries, which championed the Popular Front, and the “have not” countries, whose ideological basis was totalitarianism. His search for a new moral world order was joined with Nazi Germany's world view. He began to advocate the tripartite alliance among Germany, Italy and Japan, and then a quadruple one between these three powers and Russia. Britain, which he had regarded earlier as a partner of Japan in driving out Russia from the Far East, became his (and Japan's, in his view) arch enemy. At last he emphasized the wickedness of Jewish financial capitalism which ruled the Anglo-Saxon powers, and in the spring of 1941 he predicted that a war between Japan and the United States would be inevitable, though he was suffering from mental ill health at that time.Did his attempt and effort to seek an ideological or moral basis for Japanese diplomacy achieve satisfactory results? This question is answered in the conclusion of this paper.

著者

樹中 毅

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.152, pp.67-82,L10, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

67

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E. H. Carr has commented the politics between the periods of the two World Wars as “The Twenty Years' Crisis”: the democracy versus fascism, especially, the conflict between the Bolshevik and the fascist was the source of crisis. However, the composition of ideological opposition in Europe did not directly reflect the Asian power politics in the same era.This study is to analyze the domestic and international power politics with a specially proposed concept “strategic linkage”. The concept can be used to discuss Chiang's closeness towards Leninism and fascism through three levels:(1) Choice of national revolutionary tactic and foreign strategy(2) Institutionalization of ruling(3) and Resistance to Japanese imperialismThere were three characteristics of the pattern of strategic linkage reflecting the Kuomintang's political system.First, Chiang's choice of national revolutionary tactic and foreign strategy (policy of associating Soviet Russia and Germany) was directly linked. Chiang tried to strengthen the national movement of China in order to resist Japanese invasion through the “World Revolutionization” of national revolution and the “Sinicization” of fascism. However, by no means did Chiang intend to meddle with class revolution or overseas invasion. Preferably, he tried to win over the union and independence of the Republic of China through associating Soviet Russia and Germany under the Versailles regime.Second, Chiang used the Bolshevik and the fascist organizational principle and the centralism technique models for his party state, and through formal and informal institutionalization he established dictatorship. Under the democratic centralism and the principle of party leadership, Chiang set up party state, and through imitating the fascist Blue Shirts Movement, he consolidated his political power.Originally, Leninism was created to realize the Marxist revolution, while fascism was characterized by conquest and ethnocentrism; however, Chiang Kai-shek separated class conflicts from Leninism and disconnected fascism from ethnocentrism. In this way, without incorporating the concepts of communism and conquest, Chiang modified the western ideology of dictatorship and turned it into a simple model for dictatorship. Thus the mixed polity of Leninism and fascism was the main feature of Chiang's authoritarian regime based on military force.Third, Chiang combined the leadership-dictatorship and the united front line, and through uniting the KMT and the Chinese communist, he organized a one-party dictatorship regime like that of Leninist party or fascist party, trying to overcome the splitting situation of China. To reach the goal of national union, Chiang was able to cooperate with the communist. Though Chiang believed in the KMT's ideology, he accepted Leninism and fascism based on realism, associating Soviet Russia and Germany to get close to Stalin and Hitler to resist Japan. In “The Twenty Years' Crisis” of Asia, Leninism and fascism were not necessarily antagonized, but combined tactics for organizing national emancipation and independent movement.

著者

鬼丸 武士

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.191, pp.191_64-191_79, 2018-03-28 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

48

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From mid-19th century onwards, the world was increasingly connected by modern modes of transportation and technologies of communication, such as railways, steamships, modern banking systems, the telegraph, and so on. In East and Southeast Asia, the highest degrees of connectivity were found in and between the capitals or maritime port cities, including Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, Nagasaki, Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, Singapore, Batavia, and Rangoon. These cities were linked by steamship, rail, and telegraph services, and covered with networks extending the flows of people, commodities, money, and information. That era of deepening regional connectivity and flows in East and Southeast Asia corresponded with the peak of political revolutionary movements grounded in nationalism, communism, religion, or anti-colonialism. Colonial and national governments regarded these movements as threats, and closely monitored and severely suppressed political activists. Under such circumstances, many revolutionaries were forced into exile by arrest and deportation or in order to escape detention. Exiled activists regularly moved between different cities connected by modern transportation and communication technologies. The cities served as their bases from which they partook of many itineraries of revolutionary activity abroad. This paper focuses on the itineraries of three famous Asian revolutionaries, namely, Sun Yat-sen, Nguyen Ai Quoc, and Tan Malaka, who lived in exile from 1895 to 1916, from 1911 to 1941, and from 1922 to 1942 respectively. The paper offers a comparative study of the particular cities in which these exiled revolutionaries based or pursued their political movements, and explains why these cities were chosen for their arenas of revolutionary activity. Between them, the exiles lived and operated in Tokyo/Yokohama, Shanghai, Manila, Amoy, Canton, Hong Kong, Hanoi, Bangkok, Singapore, and Penang. These were the major maritime cities of Asia, serving as national or colonial state capitals or the leading trading centers in the region. Besides the advantage of having regular services of steamships and communication technologies at hand, the revolutionaries had differing reasons for selecting cities for their revolutionary headquarters. For example, Sun Yat-sen frequently visited and stayed in Tokyo/Yokohama because of his links with Japanese politicians, entrepreneurs, and supporters. On the other hand, Shanghai was the preferred city of underground revolutionaries, such as Tan Malaka, because Shanghai was divided into three municipalities. In short, a close understanding of the relations between cities and revolutionary movements requires a careful analysis of the political, economic, social, and historical background and character of the cities themselves.

著者

千葉 大奈

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_89-181_102, 2015-09-30 (Released:2016-06-08)

参考文献数

39

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Although there are theoretical reasons to expect that stronger agreements promote durable peace,the extant empirical research provides mixed support for this expectation. This paper reexamines this argument empirically, addressing two inferential problems overlooked in the past studies. First, since the strength of cease-fire agreements is endogenous to the baseline prospect for peace, I employ a copula-based estimation that explains agreement strength and peace duration jointly. Second, I allow the effect of agreement strength to vary over time. This is important because agreement strength matters little right after the war, for there exists a rough consensus among the ex-belligerents about the likely outcome of a next war. As time passes, however, the effect of agreement strength will start to show because there will be a greater chance that some exogenous shocks distort this consensus. Analyzing the duration of postwar peace from 1914 to 2001, I demonstrate that stronger cease-fire agreements indeed stabilize peace after war.