著者

藤山 一樹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_30-180_42, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)

参考文献数

70

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This article explores how the British government agreed in the summer of 1922 to fund their debts owed to the American government during the First World War. Since the U.S. entered the war on the Allied side in April 1917 until June 1919, British debts to the U.S. subsequently swelled to approximately $4.3 billion. After the war, the American government firmly insisted on swift repayment by the Allies of their war debts; and they suggested that U.S. economic assistance for European reconstruction was not to come until the debtor countries settled their debt questions with the U.S. Nevertheless, the British government continued to avoid funding their debts since 1920. Claiming on a general cancellation of all the inter-Allied debts, the Lloyd George government declined even to acknowledge their financial obligations. Chief Cabinet members such as the Prime Minister David Lloyd George and the War Secretary Winston Churchill were concerned with the impact on the domestic economy (and public opinion) of expending a vast sum of money; they also wished the Americans to take a more lenient position over the war debts. A sea change in the British policy of the war debt question came in 1922, when European relations reached its nadir in regard to German reparations. The French sought to enforce on Germany the strict execution of the reparations obligations of the Treaty of Versailles; meanwhile, the Germans, undergoing hyperinflation, persistently demanded a moratorium due to its chaotic economic condition at home. Then, from May to June 1922, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Robert Horne and the British Ambassador at Washington Sir Auckland Geddes convinced the Cabinet that such deadlock in the Continent did require some external assistance from the U.S., the largest creditor nation, and they pressed for an early Anglo-American war debt settlement in anticipation of some U.S. commitment to the European problem. Around the same time, the U.S. Ambassador at London George Harvey assured Lloyd George and Churchill that a debt settlement would lead to Anglo-American cooperation to tackle problems in Europe. In July 1922, the Lloyd George government finally consented to dispatch a British delegation to Washington for starting negotiations on conditions of repaying their debt to the U.S. After the British determined to fund their debts to the Americans, Anglo-American relations again stood on a sound footing, which could be a stimulus to their joint effort over German reparations toward the subsequent Dawes Plan of 1924.

著者

福井 治弘

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1975, no.52, pp.97-124,L3, 1975-05-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

51

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The article attempts to analyze and explain the decision process of Okinawa reversion in the Japanese government as a case of what the writer calls a model of “critical” decision making. The model and its general paradigmatic perspective are outlined in the first section, while the middle section discusses in terms of the model five selected events in the evolution of the reversion issue in the years 1964-69. The last section summarizes the major points of the discussion and suggests that the model used in the study deserves further elaboration and refinement as a potential additional tool of empirical research and theory building in foreign policy decision making, in the Japanese government and in general.

著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.109, pp.38-53,L7, 1995

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Among wartime leaders in Japan, no one was more aware that the issue of World War II centered on decolonization than Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru (April 1943-April 1945). As Ambassador to China (January 1942-April 1943), Shigemitsu had become the strong supporter of Japan's “New Deal for China” to approve the Wang Ching-wei regime's voluntary self-independence and freedom. When he became Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu continued to promote “independence, freedom, and mutual equality” towards Asian occupied area as the main principles of Japan's “New Deal for Greater East Asia”. This set of “New Deal” policy could provide a “basic maneuver” for peace proposals towards the Allied Powers. In othe words, if Japan changed its war aims in accordance with those of Great Britain and the United States, there would be no more reason for Japan to keep fighting with China, the United States and Great Britain. At the opening of the Greater East Asian Conference in November 1943, Shigemitsu and the bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry used the Greater East Asian Declaration as an opportunity to redefine Japan's war aims and to appeal to the Allied Powers with their basic peace maneuver. From the viewpoint of Shigemitsu, however, “New Deal” policy including the Greater East Asian Declaration was as much for domestic as for foreign use, to give the Japanese people a clearer conception of war aims, and to reform the militarism which had caused Japan to fall into military colonialism towards Asia. When he was aware that it was impossible to use the “New Deal” policy for domestic reform to exclude military colonialism from Japan, he insisted that the Japanese Government should accept “unconditional surrender” on their own initiative for the attainment of the same purpose.

著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1978, no.58, pp.86-104,L4, 1978-03-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

98

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Leith-Ross mission's visit to Far East (1935-36) was made along the Chamberlain-Fisher Line, and one of purposes of the visit was to attain an Anglo-Japanese cooperation on China issues through co-operative aid to monetary reforms in China.The monetary crisis in China arose from America's 1934 silver policy. The policy makers in Japan, however, had a very optimistic view about the crisis and took Leith-Ross mission's proposals forming a line in the chain of past co-operative economic aid to China. Therefore Japan accepted the proposals within the frame-work of Japan's China policy as was represented by the Amau doctorine.The Japanese Army particularly interpreted the decisive monetary reforms of November in 1935 as defense and expansion of England's rights and interests in China. As a result, the Army took measures to destroy the new monetary system by swiftly propelling the autonomous movement in North China which included the separation of monetary system in North China from Nanking government. The Army also helped the smuggling trade through the demilitarized zone in North China leading to the destruction of the maritime customs.Leith-Ross mission holding the stabilization of the new monetary system as its first aim came to lack a strong confidence in the Army who conducted those political and economic maneuverings in North China. In addition to that, the policy makers in Japan still relying upon the logic of the Amau doctorine tried to treat the maneuverings in North China as domestic affairs of the Nanking government.As far as those circumstances existed there couldn't be found favourable conditions to realize an Anglo-Japanese co-operation on China issues.

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_109-170_124, 2012

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This paper examines how Postwar Japan's initiatives of material assistance and verbal apology promoted reconciliation with Asian neighbors; I address the topic in terms of the interplay of theories and history. After World War II, Japan sought to improve relationships with Asian neighbors,such as South Korea and China, on which it had inflicted suffering through war and colonization. Historical case studies reveal the details of the process of moving toward the normalization of diplomatic relations, and I can find theoretical studies that support these historical descriptions.<br>However, it is not easy to provide consistent, congruent explanations that account for all of the historical studies. Careful analysis supports a mixture of the view that an economic approach to diplomacy has contributed to reconciliation with neighbors, and the criticism that Japan's atonement for the past was not enough. The limited inferences that can be drawn from international relations theories make the situation more confusing. I should transcend the fragmented accounts provided by both history and theories by fusing the two. To achieve this, I can re-examine history by introducing the scientific knowledge of cognitive psychology, as applied to the decision-makers of the parties concerned. This approach sheds light on the fact that perceptions of the historical past, which were products of nationalism, greatly affected the diplomatic positions of Japan and its neighbors, and were relevant to the progress or lack thereof in reconciliation.<br>Based on this perspective, I provide a theoretical framework of diplomacy that focuses on the cognitive psychology of decision-makers in order to reconstruct relationships between the history of Postwar Japan's reconciliation diplomacy and nationalism. I pay attention to both the intentions of offenders who offer reconciliation and the perceptions held by victims.<br>By comparing different Postwar Japanese administrations' efforts at reconciliation with South Korea and China, I can find interactions between an offender's diplomatic options and the influence of nationalism on a victim's diachronic perceptions. The offender's choice between assistance and apology interacts with the victim's relative interests in the past and future, and thereby has effects on the progress of reconciliation. Depending on the perceptions of victims, both assistance and apology can be effective signals, or counterproductive. While assistance is a useful tool for reconciliation with future-oriented victims, apology is an effective signal for nationalistic, pastoriented victims. This suggests that symbolic words and material goods are complementary to each other in international politics, and that their functioning is profoundly related to the characteristics of the perceptions of human beings.

著者

政所 大輔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_131-187_146, 2017-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)

参考文献数

68

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The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is an emerging norm regarding the national and international protection of populations from genocide and mass atrocities. After the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty proposed the principle of R2P in 2001, the idea was unanimously adopted by member states of the United Nations (UN) at the General Assembly in 2005 and 2009, and also used by the Security Council as a rationale for international action in Libya in 2011. The fact of this normative development is a puzzle, because the R2P potentially represents a challenge to state sovereignty for both developing and developed countries, and also because existing literature argues that norms are less likely to be created in the issue area of sovereignty and security. Nevertheless, it is important to ask why the R2P norm has been increasingly accepted by UN member states.Researchers who have attempted to answer this question tend to describe its chronological and historical process, but do not clarify or identify actors, factors and mechanisms which have promoted the norm diffusion of R2P. In addition, constructivist scholars who have been engaged in explaining norm diffusion processes pay attention to the role of norm entrepreneurs who persuade actors to accept their newly advocated norms by changing actors’ preferences. However, based on such explanations, it is difficult to understand the case of R2P norm diffusion, since the agreement of R2P in 2005 was achieved while there was a group of member states who were suspicious of or strongly opposed to the norm, including the United States. The purpose of this article is thus to elucidate the political process in which the R2P norm has diffused by analyzing why and how UN member states unanimously agreed upon R2P in 2005 and 2009.The article concludes that mechanisms of persuasion and negotiation among UN member states functioned successfully in gaining a consensus and promoting norm diffusion of R2P. In the early stage of norm diffusion, agreement is likely to be achieved through negotiation in order to accommodate various preferences of member states and seek mutual concessions. The agreement on R2P in 2005 through such negotiation was then a reference point by which norm entrepreneurs successfully persuaded member states to accept the R2P norm. Through persuasion by such entrepreneurs as the UN Secretary-General, his special adviser and NGOs, many states which were skeptical of R2P in 2005 changed their discourse in its favor. As a result, member states by consensus adopted the General Assembly resolution on R2P in 2009. This shows that norm entrepreneurs succeeded in stimulating the norm diffusion by persuading member states to change their preferences on R2P.

著者

柴山 太

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_46-154_61, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

参考文献数

46

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This article presents an analytic sketch of the Hattori Group's thoughts and behavior in 1947–1952. This group, headed by ex-Colonel of Imperial Japanese Army HATTORI Takushiro, consisted of ex-members of General Staff of Imperial Japanese Army, and it sought for Japan's rearmament and its military independence from U. S. strategic influence. The group, after its establishment in 1947, intended to realize a Japanese rearmament, following the successful model of German Army's rearmament in the 1920s and 1930s. Its members admired Generals Hans von Seeckt and Paul von Hindenburg as spiritual mentors. In spite of the outbreak of the Cold War, the group never changed its original nature of Prussian-style staff officers, characterized by conviction of military rule over politics, militaristic mind, and pride of staff officers. The group vigorously waged lobbying activities for its future enrollment in a new Japanese Army and a reintroduction of prewarstyle military and governmental systems. Moreover, this group intended to revive prewar army dominance in politics, and, if possible, it desired to regain prewar continental resources and interests in Korea and China.Despite the Hattori Group's posture of aiming at Japanese military autonomy from the U. S. auspice, it had been financially and politically dependent on Major General Charles Willoughby, Chief of G-2 (Intelligence), GHQ, the Far East Command. It was the most significant discrepancy, though the group members persuaded themselves that they simply used his support as a temporary measure. Since Willoughby's influence inside GHQ was gradually waning away, even more so after the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, the group had to find another political patron. On the one hand, the group developed its political tie with ex-General SHIMOMURA Sadamu, who was once Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru's military adviser. On the other hand, it endeavored to win a support from HATOYAMA Ichiro.Prime Minister Yoshida, however, denied the Hattori Group's participation in Japanese National Police Reserve, forerunner of Ground Self-Defense Force, Japan. The group continued to advocate the reintroduction of Prussian-style professional army. This vision, no doubt, contradicted Yoshida's vision of founding an Anglo-American style democratic army in Japan. Before Yoshida's unshakable refusal, Hattori and his colleagues became so desperate to consider a coup d'état, aiming at an assassination of Yoshida and an introduction of the Hatoyama cabinet. The group eventually abandoned the coup plot, but it continued to influence over Japanese politics.

著者

永綱 憲悟

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.118, pp.192-196, 1998

著者

池上 萬奈

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.177, pp.177_142-177_155, 2014-10-30 (Released:2015-11-13)

参考文献数

67

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The First Oil Crisis started as a result of the six Persian Gulf members of OPEC announcing a raise in the posted price of crude oil on October 16, 1973 and OAPEC deciding to reduce oil production by 5% per month on the following day, touched off by the breakout of the Yom Kippur War. Japan was faced with an unprecedented dilemma between the Arab countries, who strongly demanded Japan to condemn Israel, and the United States who pressed Japan to align with their Middle East policy based on diplomatic relations with Israel. When the Arabs announced a 25% cut of oil supply on November 4, the European countries, similarly to Japan, who were scarce on resources, immediately criticized Israel, and declared support for the Arabs. However, the Japanese government was hesitant to criticize Israel. And the Arab countries pressed to intensify oil supply reduction unless Japan announced to break off diplomatic relations with Israel in the case Israel would not obey the UN Security Council Resolution 242. On the other hand, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger restrained Japan by stating that condemning Israel would hinder Middle East peace talks with the United States and that cooperative relations with the U.S. would be profitable for Japan from a long-term view. On November 18, the Arab countries announced that they would release the European countries, excluding Holland, from the weighted oil supply reduction measure of 5% from the benchmark set on December, because the European countries had criticized Israel. As a result, the criticism of the weakness of the Japanese diplomacy in attaining resources made the headlines of the Japanese newspapers. How was the Japanese government to escape such dilemma? The Japanese government finally criticized Israel by name and made its pro-Arab positioning clear in the statement made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido on November 22. Further on December 10, Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki, as special envoy, left for eight Middle Eastern countries to offer economic and technical aid. At first glance, the Japanese government took a pro-Arab policy without accepting the warning of the Unites States. This document, however, will empirically clarify that the U.S.-Japan friction related to Japanese Middle East policy was resolved before November 22 in the midst of the development of multilateral diplomacy for the “Kissinger Plan”, a unified framework among Japan, the U.S. and the European countries, and that the Japanese diplomacy during the First Oil Crisis achieved to broaden the permissible scope of the United States.

著者

平井 友義

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1966, no.31, pp.99-113, 1966

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_62-154_78, 2008

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The purpose of this research is to explore political dynamics of the ways of Japan's defense capability, asking why the &ldquo;Concept of Basic Defense Capability&rdquo; (<i>kibanteki boeiryoku koso</i>), which was introduced in the 1976 National Defense Planning Outline (<i>boei taiko</i>), has been maintained for over 30 years and how this concept has affected defense capability construction.<br>The ways of defense capability can be typified as four genres. Type I recognizes the threat level as low and emphasizes the autonomy of Japan's defense capability. Type II also admits the importance of autonomy but does not consider the threat level as low. Type III and IV emphasize operability with forces of Japan's ally, the United States. Type III is distinguished from type IV based on the level threat recognition. In the preceding studies, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was understood as a type I defense concept.<br>In fact, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has consisted of a number of diverse interpretations, so it can be explained by any of the above ways of defense capability. Around the period that the 1976 NDPO was developed, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had type I-III interpretations. The vice minister of defense, Kubo Takuya, understood the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was a type I defense concept, but other defense bureaucrats interpreted the Concept of Basic Defense Capability as type II. Some Self-Defense Force officials downplayed low threat recognition and the autonomy of defense capability. In the new cold war era, some defense officials and politicians insisted on restoring the Concept of Necessary Defense Capability (<i>shoyo boeiryoku koso</i>) or modifying the schedule form (<i>beppyo</i>) in the NDPO. However, these counter-concepts against the Concept of Basic Defense Capability had been co-opted in these interpretations of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability, because it included two interpretations other than Kubo's opinion. When the 1995 NDPO was formulated after the cold war period, the interpretation of the Concept of Basic Defense Capability was expanded to type IV.<br>In conclusion, the Concept of Basic Defense Capability has continued for over 30 years, co-opting its counter-concepts in itself, restoring the cracks among domestic groups, and permitting a consensus to be made over the ways of defense capability through its diverse interpretations.

著者

伊藤 融

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.136, pp.62-78,L9, 2004-03-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

39

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The aim of this essay is to analyze the principle of India's foreign policy, mainly on security. In general, its policy has been illustrated in terms of idealism/realism paradigm. That is to say, Jawaharlal Nehru pursued idealistic policies such as Non-Alignment Movement, whereas Indira Gandhi changed India's policies into more realistic one's, whose lines A. B. Vajpayee also takes over. This essay challenges such dominant discourse and proposes alternative approaches to India's foreign policy.Firstly, most of the observers exclusively focus on the attitude of political leaders or the trend of the times without taking the different fields into account. Turning our attention to the difference of policy fields, we will easily find historical continuity and political consensus in India's foreign policy. Outside the region, India has consistently demanded the revision of global structure and regime. At the same time, inside the region, it has opposed to any change of the situation as its own superpower. In other words, it has adopted both ‘extraregional revisionism’ and ‘intraregional status quo’ as guides to foreign policy-making since its independence.Secondly, more importantly, idealism/realism discourse is devoid of the consideration of India's ‘nation-state’ itself which differs entirely from that of Western ideal type. Political leadership in India has never been able to take the unity of the ‘nation-state’ for granted because of its own diverse and plural society as well as the existence of cross-border ethno-religious identities. India's ruling elite has been exposed to the internal threat and has been obliged to counter it first of all. That is why its foreign policy has been worked out and carried out not only based on its geopolitical strategic interest but also constrained by the recognized vulnerability of ‘nation-state’. Successive Governments of India have endeavored to approximate to the ideal of ‘nation-state’ or at least prevent it from breaking up completely. It is this type of realism against the vulnerability of ‘nation-state’ recognized by every political leader that has affected the decision-making in India.

著者

植田 麻記子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.151, pp.54-72,L9, 2008

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This paper examines "Ashida Amendment" and "Ashida Memorandum" with particular focus on his views on the international affairs. Both are known as the origin of the Japanese postwar security problems: Article 9 of the Constitution and the Japan-U. S. Security system.<br>It illustrates the basis of Ashida's view on the international affairs. He always saw contemporary issues from the perspective of global history. After the World War I, the establishment of the League of Nations and conclusion of Treaty of Locarno and Treaty for the Renunciation of War promoted the idea of renunciation of war. Ashida had a hope that "international partnership" would be advanced in the post-World War I era. At the same time, he understood its uneasy reality. Indeed, the progress toward "international partnership" by the League of Nations, Treaty of Locarno, and Treaty for the Renunciation of War was frustrated by World War II.<br>Right after the war, the world pursued afresh the ideal of "international partnership." Ashida served as chairperson in the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Revision of the Imperial Constitution from July 25 to August 20, 1946. Ashida had the idea that Japan's decision to renounce war should be guaranteed both domestically and internationally by making the Article 9 serve as de facto diplomatic documents. Thus he made a point of the autonomy of the article. This led to the making of the "Ashida Amendment". At the same time, Ashida consistently knew that the right of self-defense was the natural right of the nation despite the trend toward the abandonment of war.<br>The conflict between the United States and Soviet Union became inevitable and overt. With the MacArthur's statement for the early peace with Japan, Ashida, as Foreign Minister, was made to consider the security after the independence. The "Ashida Memorandum" was submitted as a response to the Eichelberger's question about a time of withdrawal of the occupation army. It was handed to Eichelberger on September 13, 1947. The conception in "Ashida Memorandum" was that the best measures of guaranteeing Japan's security was to conclude a specific agreement with the United States and to reinforce the domestic police forces.<br>Ashida had an intention that the "Ashida Amendment" should target international community rather than domestic one. He sought to grasp Japanese opportunity to be actively involved in shaping the postwar international order by acting as a leading advocate for the renunciation of war. At the time of the issuance of "Ashida Memorandum", the most pressing concern in Japan that was sovereignty might be limited with the stationing of the Allied forces even after the independence. With the deterioration of the conflict between the United States and Soviet Union, Ashida thought Japan could resolve security problem while defending its sovereign right by the conclusion of the treaty with the United States which is independent from the peace treaty. Accordingly, "Ashida Memorandum" limited the right of stationing of US forces only at the time of emergencies, and emphasized the necessity of the build-up of Japanese police forces.<br>By examining the process of making "Ashida Amendment" and "Ashida Memorandum", this paper argues that Ashida had the strong desire for the achievement of participation in the postwar international order and early peace with a full sovereignty, so contributed to realization of them with the view on international affairs.

著者

松永 泰行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.149, pp.176-178, 2007-11-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

伊豆見 元 平岩 俊司

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1994, no.106, pp.149-161,L15, 1994-05-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

29

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The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the relationship between the withdrawal of Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) which was completed in 1958 and the establishment of Kim Il Sung's power base. When compared with the U. S. forces still stationed in South Korea, the CPVA withdrawal progressed smoothly upon Chinese-North Korean agreement. The CPVA withdrawal was implemented in two stage, in 1954-1955 and 1958, and suspended in 1956-1957. Why suspended in 1956-1957? According to the Chinese explanation, it was suspended upon Chinese-North Korean agreement with the shakeup within the socialist camp after the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in the background. However, 1956 and 1957 was a period in which Kim Il Sung established his own power base by purgeing the Chinese and Soviet factions within North Korea. In 1956, China suspended the withdrawal of CPVA to pressure Kim Il Sung who trying to eliminate the Chinese faction within North Korea. However, Kim Il Sung has almost completed purging the main members of the Chinese faction by the end of 1957. In 1958, China who judged that the revival of the Chinese faction was difficult, completely withdrew the CPVA to maintain good relations with North Korea. Afterwards, Kim Il Sung continued his all-out purge of the Chinese faction and established his power base. Therefore, the establishment of Kim Il Sung's power base and the timing of the CPVA withdrawal was closely connected. Afterwards, North Korea and China maintained good relations, but it was a delicate relationship between Kim Il Sung and China in the beginning.

著者

井手 康仁

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.136, pp.18-32,L6, 2004

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Nowadays, foreign policy appears not only to be carried out by governments but also by civilian activists. Nishihara Masashi has developed a profound classification of unofficial contact-makers which includes civilian activists. Upon dividing unofficial contact-makers into the following three groups; (1) Official=unnanounced contact-makers, (2) Unofficial=unnanounced contact-makers, (3) Unofficial=pre-announced contact-makers, Nishihara highlights the limited role of the 3rd type contact makers, indicating that serious negotiations can only progress at unannounced negotiations. There is however a case in Japanese-Soviet relations which is not applicable to his conclusion.<br>According to the Japanese history of civilian diplomacy with the Soviet Union, civilian activities carried out by either leftists or pro-Soviet activists had attracted much attention. Matsumae Shigeyoshi who Nishihara refers to as a type 3 activist, acted as the head of the Japan Cultural Association. The Japan Cultural Association was established in 1966 upon accepting the USSR's proposal, having the Japan Socialist Party play its central role. Since Matsumae was personally close to Ivan Kovalenko, the deputy chief of the Central Committee's International Department, the Japanese-Soviet round table conference (<i>Entaku-kaigi</i>) was further established through their efforts in 1979. The round table conference was successful to a certain extent since the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs started attending the round table conference as an observer. The Japanese public, however, considered Matsumae's activities highly influenced by Socialist ideology. For this reason, Matsumae's activities didn't receive sufficient support to have made a significant influence within the country.<br>Suetsugu Ichiro, on the other hand, also referred to as a type 3 contact-maker, is said to have had an enormous impact on Japanese-Soviet relations. Upon participating in various social movements, he established a lobbyist status, which was very rare in Japan then. The Soviet Ambassador in Japan suggested Suetsugu to partake in promoting academic exchange with Soviet scholars. Suetsugu thus took and realized this opportunity by bringing the Council of National Security lead by Suetsugu, and scholars from the USSR together, whereby establishing the Japanese-Soviet Joint Symposium.<br>So why was Suetsugu, being a type 3 unofficial=pre-announced contactmaker able to act so effectively? In my opinion, one of the reasons was that Suetsugu had strong connections with Japanese political leaders. Another reason is that he was a well-known nationalist within the country. In this way, he was completely different from Matsumae and the other leftists and pro-Soviet activists. As a result, having established close relations with Soviet scholars who in time turned to play leading roles within the Soviet office during Gorbachev's rule, he maintained a trustworthy channel in the center of the Soviet regime. He had managed to act as an activist trusted both by Japanese and Soviet counterparts.

著者

前田 幸男

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_147-187_158, 2017-03-25 (Released:2017-05-23)

参考文献数

51

著者

臼井 久和

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.54, pp.100-118, 1976

著者

バックレイ ロジャー

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.82, pp.182-186, 1986

著者

梶田 孝道

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.110, pp.1-22,L5, 1995

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The rights of foreigners, including their right to vote in local elections, are expanding in the European Union as the integration of Europe not only allows people to freely travel across the borders in the region but also has brought about the new legal concept of European citizenship.<br>Western Europe, however, has experienced an inflow and settlement of Asian and African immigrants and faces a serious problem concerning their social, economic and political rights. The purpose of this article is to explain the current status of the right of foreigners to vote in local elections in Western Europe and to generalize over the issue by comparing Western European countries with each other.<br>The current status of suffrage of foreigners in local elections in Western Europe will be briefly discussed. The countries which have granted foreigners the right to vote in local elections include Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. The remains of colonialism can be seen in the United Kingdom's approach to the issue, because the country has vested citizenship and suffrage to people from the Commonwealth of Nations. Ireland has also granted foreigners the right to vote, while the country decides whether it grants foreigners suffrage based on the historical relations between the United Kingdom and the countries the foreigners are from. The suffrage of foreigners has not yet been granted in France and Germany which have attracted many foreign workers, of whom Asian and African immigrants and Muslims account for a large percentage, although the issue has aroused much controversy in the two countries. These examples clearly indicate that the situations surrounding each country affect its approach to the issue of the right of foreigners to vote in a subtle way.<br>We will next examine a group of factors which enable countries to grant foreigners the right to vote and a group of factors which prevent them from doing so. The former group of factors includes the history of granting foreigners suffrage in a certain region, such as North Europe, a close relation between the former colonies and suzerains, the diplomatic policy of the country concerned (e. g. Sweden), free trade and the openness of the country. The latter group includes the ideology of a strong nation state (e. g. France), strong nationality (e. g. Germany), the ratio of foreigners to total population, a large cultural and religious distance between society which foreigners come from and society which accepts them (e. g. France and Germany) and the existence of a strong anti-foreigner movement.<br>Next, the logic behind granting the suffrage to foreigners and the logic against it will be discussed, and based on this discussion, the reasons why some countries have granted foreigners the right to vote and why others have not will be examined. The experiences in Western Europe could offer many suggestions to Japan which is facing the problem of whether to grant foreigners the right to vote in local elections. The problem of the suffrage of foreigners tends to be discussed at the level of norms, and there is little discussion on the matter from a positive point of view, such as how foreigners will be granted the right to vote and how heavy their turnout will be. Japan will be able to learn many things from experiences of Western Europe concerning this problem.