著者

山崎 望

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_14-194_28, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

28

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The liberal democratic regime, which survived confrontation with the fascist and communist regimes, has spread throughout the world, but with the loss of its enemies, it has acquired the problem of creation of legitimacy and effectiveness by oneself. The crisis of the liberal democratic regime, which is unable cope with this, has been pointed out.In this paper, noting the various countries where the liberal democratic regime has been consolidated, we discuss the transition of legitimacy and the concomitant repositioning of violence through the reconsideration of the various discourses of political theory that point out the transition of legitimacy, an element of the political regime.First, we examine the discourses that have noted the transition of legitimacy in the liberal democratic regime. Specifically, we focus on the articulation of the legitimacy of liberalism and democracy; examine the discourses of 1) the undoing of democracy by neo-liberalism (W. Brown), 2) the crisis of liberalism due to populism, also referred to as the shadow of democracy (J.-W. Müller), and 3) the suspension of liberal democracy due to rules in the state of exception (G. Agamben); and discuss the transition from liberal democracy to another type of legitimacy.Next, we examine discourses that point out the transition of the legitimacy of the sovereign or national state system (international political system), which is a prerequisite of liberal democratic regime. Specifically, focusing on the articulation of the legitimacy of sovereignty and nationalism, we examine the 1) disruption of sovereignty due to racism (M. Wieviorka), 2) ruin of nationalism due to cosmopolitanism (U. Beck), and 3) transformation of legitimacy due to the formation of a new form of polity, ‘Empire’ (M. Hart & A. Negri), and discuss the transition from sovereignty and nationalism to another type of legitimacy.In addition, we discuss the transition of legitimacy based on the articulation of various discourses by dividing them into the three levels of national political regime, international political system, and the level of the intersection of international politics and national politics. Finally, we sketch the repositioning of violence associated with the “triple transition” of legitimacy and discuss the challenges that confront it.

著者

松本 弘

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.143, pp.168-171, 2005-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

大山 貴稔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_1-180_16, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)

参考文献数

99

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“International contribution”, diffused in the wake of Gulf War, is a peculiar idea in Japan. Western International Relations Theory (IRT) talks about “international coordination” and/or “international cooperation”, but never deals with “international contribution”. I’m going to focus on the idea of “international contribution”, which enables me to discuss Japanese perception of international relations and encourages me to reconsider so-called IRT. How does the idea of “international contribution” rise up to the surface? The historical overview of this question is presented in the first section. Through the rapid economic growth, the prime ministers of Japan such as Eisaku Sato, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Noboru Takeshita came to feel the enhanced international status as one of big powers, which was unaccompanied by Japan’s actual performance. This gap between the expectation from “international society” and the reality in “international society” provided the setting for the idea of “international contribution”. The emergence of this idea was nothing more than contingent use initially. Notwithstanding this genesis, “international contribution” precisely captured something like the flavor of the time and got into circulation. Then, how was “international contribution” mentioned? The structural outline, which is visible in the use of “international contribution”, is inductively extracted in the second section. The perception that Japan had taken “free ride” on “public goods” arousing international criticism keenly made Japanese realize the necessity of “international contribution”. Furthermore, “international society” is hypostatized in the background of “international contribution”, dredged through the comparison with “international coordination” and “international cooperation”. These understanding denote that at least for most of the Japanese the realm of international relations is not “anarchy”. Besides, how was “international contribution” as practice put into? Alongside of this question, transition of subject positions, especially pertaining to the Self Defense Force (SDF) and the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), is reviewed in the third section. Although dispatching SDF which evokes the shade of military forces had long been regarded as taboo in the postwar period, the SDF brought about recognition as an actor of “international contribution” together with growing necessity of “international contribution”. NGO, on the other hand, came to accumulate fund and human material due to escalating interest in “international contribution”. Then the governmental awareness of NGO has gradually changed and the government has got to utilize NGOs. Various aspects of “international contribution” are sketched through the analysis of these chapters. Based on these aspects, I wonder if “international contribution” is a certain type of IRT. It functioned historically as a “lens” which gave us some “answers” at that time. If that’s the case, we ought to consider what the “academic” theory is and what it should be.

著者

川崎 剛

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_115-154_128, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)

参考文献数

17

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The study in Japan of modern Japanese foreign affairs has been dominated by diplomatic historians. Consequently, we still have a poor understanding as to how much Japanese diplomatic experiences actually support the general theories of international relations. This paper attempts to rectify the problem in the area of alliance formation. It tests Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat hypothesis while taking into account the “bandwagon for profit” argument advanced by Randall Schweller. Its core finding is that the Japanese cases overwhelmingly support the balance-of-threat hypothesis: Japan formed 12 alliances against threats out of its 14 threat-facing experiences (in the remaining 2 cases, Japan could not find alliance partners and did not bandwagon with the sources of threat). The paper also identifies one case of “bandwagon for profit” (the third Anglo-Japanese alliance). It furthermore has found many dual-purpose alliances in which Japan used its alliance not only as a military instrument against threats but also as a political tool to manage its hegemony over subordinate polities.

著者

中村 覚

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_58-178_72, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)

参考文献数

56

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This study aims to examine the real goal of the regional policy in Saudi Arabia, particularly whether it is designed to counter external threat (derived from the international system) or internal threat (aiming at regime change). A case study that delves into the Saudi Arabian policy toward the Syrian Crisis after 2011 is used. This research applies omnibalance theory, which explains the pattern by which the regimes of Third World states react to threats that arise both within and outside the state. Saudi Arabian policy is analyzed through a comparison of several security situations faced by the kingdom with the use of a method combining within-case analysis and process tracing. Omnibalance theory serves as the main research framework because it can provide a coherent explanation of the foreign policy and international security strategies adopted by the Saudi Arabian government. This study hypothesizes that the Saudi Arabian policy toward the Syrian crisis is strongly constrained by its primary security goal of countering any sign of linkage between internal and external threats. The Saudi Arabian commitment to the Syrian crisis cannot be explained simply in relation to an external threat: no foreign country has pressured Saudi Arabia to be involved, and the Assad regime is not a threat to Saudi Arabia. Rather, the Saudi Arabian government recognized the signs of a linkage developing between the internal and external threats it confronts. The government responded to the clamor of its people who advocate humanistic support to the oppressed in Syria, as well took precaution against the risk of a coalition by Iran, the Assad regime, and Hizbullah, which the Saudi Arabian government feared would penetrate the Shia activists in the Eastern region of the kingdom. The concern of the Saudi Arabian government over domestic security constrained its Syrian policy in the following ways: (1) prohibition of participation in both the conflict and in charity activities initiated by Saudi citizens, (2) necessity to maintain moral and humanistic legitimacy of Saudi foreign policies, (3) selection of its allies who will maintain non-intervention in Saudi internal affairs, (4) and prohibition on the Saudi government to provide support to terrorist groups. Therefore, omnibalance theory is a more appropriate concept to explain the Saudi Arabian policy toward the Syrian crisis than the theories of balance of power and balance of threat, both of which claim that the international involvement was the main motivation behind the foreign policy applied to the state.

著者

佐藤 丙午

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.205, pp.205_14-205_28, 2022-02-04 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

35

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An economic statecraft is a policy measures utilizing an economic incentives and disincentives to force targeting county to comply with political demand of the sender. It is not a single definable policy measure but multiple measures to attain policy objectives through reflection of the degree and level of economic interaction among states.Economic statecraft is a policy measures by choice. Its political utilities are wide and politically manipulable since it is flexible in imposing and lifting the measures. It is often used to show senders political discontent without harming the formal political relations. It can also be utilized to execute political and tactical pressure by banning the export of the strategic goods and technologies thus deprive access to those items and control the degree of military development of the target. The UN has imposed various forms of economic sanctions under the UN Charter provisions.Despite the multiple utilities of these policy measures, a casual mechanism of the economic statecraft in changing the political decision of target is unknown. It may cause economic pain to the economy of the target and the mounting domestic pressure to concede to the demand of the sender could be a political driver. In opposite, it may harden the reaction of the target since it may unite the country to resist to the external pressure. As for the positive economic incentive, the domestic audience of the target may not induce by the reward given, thus may blur the mechanism of causal relationships.In many cases, economic statecraft is imposed without setting the specific goal or lifted without tangible result and fulfilling the concrete demand of the target. It is a symbolic policy tools to persuade domestic audience of the sender by showing that their government is executing tangible policy measures to exercise power on the target over contested political agenda. At the same token, a defensive economic measure, most notably export controls, may frame economic interaction corresponding to the strategic relationship. The aim of this measure is to shape the political relationship rather than punish or deter specific action.The assessment of utility of the economic statecraft differs when considering short term and long-term effect of the measures. Additionally, the economic statecraft has positive record when an instant reaction to the developing events is necessary to spare time for further consideration of policy appropriate.

著者

五十嵐 隆幸

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.197, pp.197_42-197_57, 2019-09-25 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

104

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Was the Sino-American Rapprochement a turning point that changed everything? In 1969, the ROC changed the military strategy from “Offensive Posture” to “Unity of Offensive and Defensive”. Certainly, the advent of Nixon gave a big impact to the ROC’s national security, which heavily relied on the US. However, the ROC Government might decide to change its military strategy from “Retaking the Mainland,” which had been attempted for over a decade, to building up the consolidation of Taiwan’s defense when encountering the escalation of the PRC’s military threat even at the peak of the chaotic Great Leap Forward and Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.The chaos in Mainland China in the 1960s provided a chance for the ROC to retake the mainland. The ROC would have been able to initiate military operations if received support from the US Nevertheless, US Government after the Kennedy administration was seeking coexistence with the PRC and therefore rejected all ROC’s requests.At that time the PRC was strengthening its nuclear capability and conventional forces despite being in a state of political chaos. In response to the growing military threat of the PRC, improvement of the ROC government’s defense capability to secure “Taiwan” became its top priority. Moreover, when the US abolition of Military Assistance Program was announced, the ROC Government was forced to improve military advancement at the expense of its own economy and spend the limited budget on defense in priority. Therefore, the ROC Government had begun to reform the “Offensive Posture” strategy that it adopted since 1949, and decided to change to the “Unity of Offensive and Defensive” strategy that focused on defense more than before. This was before Nixon put forth the “Guam Doctrine” and started to approach the PRC.Division of “China” was incorporated into the Cold War and immobilized. Although the chaos in Mainland China in the 1960s was likely to develop into “hot war” if ROC took military action. The US suppressed the ROC’s action for changing the status quo and avoided military conflict with the PRC. There is no doubt that the current US-China-Taiwan relations was formed in the 1970s, beginning with Nixon’s rapprochement to the PRC. However, the structure of maintaining the status quo of the ROC’s endeavor to acquire the US military commitment to resist the PRC’s continuous military expansion was gradually formed through the 1960s.

著者

小野坂 元

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_123-195_136, 2019-03-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

61

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The Shanghai Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) that conducted social work in Chinese society was accused of anti-imperialist, radical actions by the Chinese labor movement after the Shanghai riot on May 30, 1925. While Chinese trade unions endorsed the newly established International Labour Organization (ILO), this international legislation for labor standards could not ensure cooperation between the ILO and the Chinese Government and society; the reason being that any labor condition regulations, both domestic and international, did not exist in the International Settlement as extraterritoriality.This paper clarifies the coordination between the ILO and Shanghai YWCA to remedy the lack of legislative protection that Chinese workers faced in the International Settlement of Shanghai. Although, the Factory Act was enacted in 1929, its enforcement was postponed because of Chinese industrial conditions’ conflict with extraterritoriality.Traditional literature has focused on the conflict between national interests and international standards. This approach notes that international organizations’ activities were disrupted by power politics that sought unilateral interests. However, international organizations established after World War I were dysfunctional. I think that international organizations acquired innovative thinking during the Chinese National Revolution in 1920s. The fact is that the ILO and the YWCA aimed to create a Chinese Labour Inspection System as well as transform themselves from euro-centrism to international socialism.Moreover, we need to consider the connection between Chinese nation building and introduction of ILO standards on both Chinese proper land and extraterritorial areas, particularly Shanghai’s International Settlement. The Chinese government aimed to demonstrate their legitimacy as a nation state by enforcing their labor regulations and inspecting foreign factories.Historical examining the Chinese labor problem regarding extraterritoriality, this article explains that the Shanghai YWCA and the ILO’s activities indirectly influenced the improvement of the International Settlement’s social administration and attained the endorsement of enforcing Chinese factory inspection there.Thus, a condition for reshaping multilateral cooperation with the newly established Chinese Government of Nanking in 1928 was created by this international coordination to enforce international labor standards in Shanghai.

著者

中西 寛

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.151, pp.18-35,L6, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

59

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Despite the quite number of writings on Yoshida Shigeru, his relationship with Asia has not been treated from a broad perspective. The omission is regrettable, for Yoshida had deep involvement and concern with Asia, China in particular both in his prewar diplomat years and in his postwar statesman years. In addition, Yoshida's record of struggle and lack of substantial fruit in his Asia diplomacy is suggestive of the weakness of Japanese modern diplomacy towards Asia from the Meiji period down to the current era. So long as the so-called Yoshida doctrine is said to be the orthodox policy line for postwar Japan, any of the three elements of the said doctrine, light armament for self-defense, Japan-US alliance, and economy-oriented diplomacy, does not give direct clue in terms of Japanese policy towards Asia.By examining Yoshida's involvement with Asia, Korean peninsular and China among others, this paper delineates the continuity of Yoshida's attitude and perspective on Asia from his early diplomat days to the final years of his life. Following his natural father's concern with Korean railway, Yoshida was groomed among the diplomats and soldiers who saw the “Continental Governance” (Tairiku Keiei) holding the vital significance for Japanese security and economic interest. This policy line was thought to be compatible with European and American great powers in the sense that the imperialism was conducted primarily by economic, cultural, and scientific means. At the same time, the policy was seen as spearheading the modernization process in Asia. In the postwar period, Yoshida adjusted his policy towards Asia to the reality of dissolution of Japanese Empire and chose to follow the path of “Maritime State” (Kaiyo Kokka). Despite this shift, Yoshida had to deal with Korean issues such as Korean inhabitants in Japan or normalization with South Korea, while assisting the US for the latter's commitment to the Peninsula. Yoshida also took pains to lull both the US and Great Britain to his cherished idea of detaching Communist China from the Soviet Russia by penetrating into Chinese society via non-military means such as commerce and propaganda. It was his belief that the Chinese culture and tradition would ultimately lead to the conflict with Russia. But Yoshida's main concern was to form the concerted policy among Japan, the US and Great Britain. His policy towards China lacked concreteness and was subject to his higher consideration over Japanese relations with the US and other Western powers.All in all, throughout the prewar and postwar periods, Yoshida's policy toward Asia was quite consistent. He saw the Korean peninsular from Japanese security perspective and almost ignored Korea as a nation. When it comes to China, Yoshida had ambivalent view on Chinese culture and his policy towards China oscillated. These characteristics of Yoshida's Asia involvement was typical for the modern Japanese diplomatic tradition, taking Fukuzawa Yukichi's civilizational perspective and seeing Japan as naturally most advanced in Asia. This conviction no doubt helped Japan to be proud of its rapid modernization, but posed difficulty in handling with neighboring Asia, especially when Asia showed its own way of modernization and demonstrated its own relationship with the West.

著者

藤井 篤

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_28-173_42, 2015-06-25 (Released:2015-06-09)

参考文献数

58

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This paper aims to analyze Anglo-French relations during the first half of the Algerian War (1954–1957) focusing on the perceptions and attitude of the British Foreign Office (BFO) toward the French Algerian problem. What did the British think of this colonial conflict? How did their attitude toward France change? What differences can be observed between BFO bureaucrats in London and the British Ambassador in Paris? France made efforts to ask her NATO allies to support her in order to defend her position in Algeria and fight against the Afro-Asian bloc, which demanded the independence of Algeria in the General Assembly of the United Nations. The British supported the French position formally but were careful not to go too far fearing that it would damage the dignity and interests of Britain in Africa and the Middle East. The African Department at the BFO thought that supporting the French position in Algeria was different from supporting the day-to-day French policy there another. The Western Organizations Department feared that deploying French troops under NATO to North Africa would make defense forces in the central sector of Europe vulnerable. On the other hand, Gladwyn Jebb, the British Ambassador in Paris then, tried to ardently express and promote British support to France by making good use of Cold War rhetoric, insisting that the triumph of Algerian nationalist movements and the retreat of France would bring about a vacuum of power and put not only Algeria but also the whole of North Africa in the orbit of Soviet communism. The British continued to formally support France hoping for a liberal solution to the Algerian conflict, which was regarded as a French internal problem by the British. As terrorism in Algeria worsened and the French Army continued to be unable to defeat the nationalist forces, the British began to discreetly shift their attitude. The African Department thought that it was essential to provide a political solution to the conflict, for which the autonomy or independence of Algeria was considered. Jebb’s Cold War rhetoric became less effective in the BFO. The British intended to cooperate with the Americans to realize a cease-fire in Algeria and keep North Africa on the Western side. They tried to exercise their prudent and informal influence on France to make more efforts to attain a liberal solution, while continuing to provide France their formal support in the United Nations. When the British and Americans were forced to comply with Tunisian requests of arms supply, which the Tunisians would otherwise order from Egypt or Soviet Union, Anglo-French relations became tense and entered a critical phase.

著者

中谷 直司

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_111-180_125, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)

参考文献数

50

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What was it that eventually put a period to the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the beginning of the interwar years, a treaty that had been the most successful treaty in East Asia to that moment, through two victories in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the First World War of 1914–1918? As many previous works have claimed, was the strong pressure from the United States decisive in terminating the alliance? Or else,as some British works in relatively recent years have argued, was the opposition of the United States no more than the last push to bring down the curtain on the arrangement, if discarding the alliance had already become all but a foregone course in London by the time Washington made clear its opposition? This study will challenge both accounts. First, it will show that the American opposition alone was not and could have not been enough to put an end to the alliance, even though this opposition did indeed create the international dispute itself over whether or not the alliance should be continued. At the same time, the study will deny that London was almost independently decided on the matter. The British government did need something external to help it with its decision; however, that was not the increase of American pressure but the restoration of the credibility of America’s commitment to a new international order-building program, at least in the Asia-Pacific region. To this point, American diplomacy had had trouble displaying this commitment, due to the country’s failure to join the League of Nations that the US itself had conceived. Therefore, secondly, this work will emphasize the serious dilemma that the British alone confronted in the international politics that led to the lapse of the alliance. That dilemma can be well understood as a variety of the “security dilemma in alliance politics” very well known to IR students. Major previous works,especially in British research, believe that Japan consistently held the alliance to be more significant than Britain did until the last day of the treaty, because the former gained greater advantages through an alliance with the leading power in world politics. However, this study will largely revise this view by describing both Britain’s international political dilemma and Japan’s diplomatic changeover in the aftermath of the Great War.

著者

高橋 力也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.188, pp.188_15-188_29, 2017-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

66

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This article examines the Japanese government’s attitude toward the issue of “nationality of married women” in the Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law in 1930, the first diplomatic conference hosted by the League of Nations for the purpose of codification of international law. Through investigating the decision-making process on the Conference within the government, it aims at revealing the Japan’s constructive engagement in the codification project conducted by the League of Nations, which set in motion the advancement of international law during the inter-war period.It is well known that the Hague Conference marked a watershed in the history of international law. Though the achievements in the Conference were meager, it surely paved the way of setting up the current codification system in the United Nations, particularly the establishment of the International Law Commission. Seldom discussed and little known is how Japan responded to this major development in the field of international law. While some preceding literatures have elucidated the passive, or sometimes hostile, stance of Japan toward enhancement of laws of war, they have yet to show a complete picture of the Japanese view on international law at that time since they do not sufficiently address the issues of laws of peace with which the Hague Conference was mainly concerned.Probably, no issues discussed in The Hague attracted attention and received publicity more than nationality of married women. One of the reasons was that it touched the heart of the tension between the concept of family unity and gender equality. At the time of 1930, while most countries still adhered to the old principle that wife follows the nationality of husband in case of international marriage, some national legislations had discarded it and allowed an alien woman who married their national to retain her original nationality if she wished so. It was against this background that the Hague Conference attempted to reconcile the difference between legislations in nationality of married women by means of multilateral convention.While Japan still maintained the old principle in its nationality law based on the traditional family values, it took a somewhat flexible stance in The Hague. Interestingly enough, Tokyo instructed its delegation to the Conference that if a consensus emerged among states, they could go along with the proposed article, which granted a married woman the right to choose not to acquire husband’s nationality. These findings suggest that at that time Japan sought to project its image as an important contributor to the development of international law through its active participation to the codification project by the League.

著者

若月 秀和

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.197-217,L23, 2000-10-13 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

104

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The purpose of this essay is, firstly, to analyze how the Japanese government coped with the international situation before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced and how the government aimed at a continuation of détente and secondly, to evaluate the essence and significance of the doctrine, with a greater focus on Mr. Fukuda's diplomatic idea, namely omnidirectional-peace diplomacy. The doctrine was announced during his visit to Southeast Asia in August 1977. The basic principles are (1) to reject the role of a major military power, (2) to establish reliable relationships with Southeast Asian countries, and (3) to contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia by cooperating with ASEAN and its member countries in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina.The essay consists of five sections. In the first section, I review the international circumstances surrounding the Fukuda Doctrine, where so-called “détente” and unstable international relations were mixed. In the second section, I review the omni-directional-peace diplomacy which Mr. Fukuda advocated. Based on the US-Japan relationship, this policy was intended for friendly relationships with all countries, refusing to be a major military power. And this idea was a major influential factor in making the basic nature of the doctrine. Japan's intention to overcome the structure of the cold war was also another influential factor for the doctrine. In the third and fourth sections, I explain concretely how relationships with ASEAN and the countries of Indochina were established before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced. Mr. Fukuda's insight and leadership, together with the accumulation of steady contacts with those countries by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, enabled the announcement of such diplomatic policies for Southeast Asia. In the fifth section, I review the essence and significance of the Fukuda Doctrine. The doctrine stabilized international relations directly after the Vietnam War. It consolidated the foundation of Japan's diplomacy for Southeast Asia and strengthened the feeling of togetherness among free nations. Though Japan could not prevent the diffusion of Soviet-China enmity to Indochina and the new cold war in 1980s, the doctrine left a legacy for Japan's diplomacy and international society after the cold war

著者

長谷川 毅

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.81, pp.61-80,L9, 1986-03-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

61

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The weapons procurement process in the Soviet Union is crucial in understanding the interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics as well as the interconnection in the domestic political dynamics among politics, economy and military factors. This article aims to examine the political dynamics in the Soviet weapon procurement process.The article is divided into three parts. The first part, “the static anlysis of the weapons procurement in the Soviet Union, ” explains the actors and their role in the process. Specifically, the three-layered structure consisting of the party, the military, and the government is examined. The actors explained here include: the Politburo, the Defense Council, the Central Committee Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, each military service, the Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the Military Industrial Commission (VPK), each military industrial ministry, its research institutes and design bureaus, and its enterprises.The second part, “the dynamic analysis of the weapons procurement process, ” examines how these actors interact each other in the actual process of weapons procurement. Requests for weapons development usually originate in one of two ways: from below and from above. From below each military service may request a development of new weapons sytem necessitated from operations requirements. In actuality, it may originate from design bureaus trying to push their new designs. The request must be approved by the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Council, the VPK, and the Politburo. When a request originates from above, the VPK will translate the decision into an actual policy. When a decision is made to develop a weapons system, the VPK, through the appropriate military industrial ministry, begins the process of design competitions among design bureaus. Two or three design bureaus are allowed to proceed to the construction of a prototype. After the prototype is tested by the State committee, only then a decision to proceed to a series production is made. Design bureaus and the voenpredy sent by the military service serve to control the quality of the weapons produced in enterprises.The third part singles out some of the salient characteristics of the Soviet weapons procurement process. First, the Soviets take several measures to ensure the high quality of weapons systems within the framework of the planned economy. These measures include high priority given to the military industry, the existence of the consumer's sovereignty in the military industry, free competition among design bureaus, and stability of the weapons procurement elite. But the high quality of Soviet weapons does not mean efficiency of the military industy. In fact, it has caused waste and delays in modernization. The deepening Soviet economic crisis and the sharp rise in the unit cost of weapons production will no longer make it possible for the Soviet government to treat the military industry as a sacred cow. Second, history and the organizational restrictions have led the Soviets to develop a unique design philosophy, which stresses three principles, “simplicity, ” “commonality, ” and “evelutionary revision.” This approach has both advantages and disadvantages: it helps the Soviet military to be provided with inexpensive, mass-produced weapons, easy to operate and maintain. But the Soviet weapons procurement process is not conducive to generate innovations. Therefore, the systemic crisis of Soviet economy will inevitably engulf the military sector, which has been successfully insulated from the inefficiencies of the command economy.

著者

石田 淳

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_152-165, 2012

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As Stanley Hoffmann has convinced us in his 1977 article, it was in the United States in the wake of the Second World War that the study of international relations, IR as is now called, was established as an independent academic discipline. This article explains in what sense it has been an <i>American</i> social science and explores whether it still offers a useful analytical tool with which to better understand the multifaceted political reality of today's international relations.<br>This article first goes back to the origins of IR and reviews its main features in the foundational work of Hans Morgenthau. His work stressed that perception matters in power politics among nations in that the outcome of diplomacy depends upon the perceived persuasiveness of threats and promises. In addition, it devoted attention to the relations between politics and law to explain how the status quo in international order had been maintained and challenged.<br>And then this article examines the way in which IR has been Americanized since his time. In a nutshell, first, the influence of Thomas Schelling's work in the 1960s was profound and far-reaching in the entire field of IR. The intellectual hegemony of rationalism (or the analytical methods of rational choice) in the 1980s meant that the mainstream IR came to pay less and less attention to actors' perception and law. And second, it was totally ironical that the discipline of IR has recently retrieved the sociological discussion on perception, law, and norm, which it intentionally deleted in the process of importing rationalism from economics.<br>This article concludes by emphasizing that the discipline of Americanized IR should expand its horizons: the study of diplomacy should be broadened to cover not only <i>coercion</i> for the purpose of either deterring a challenger from altering the status quo or compelling it to restore the status quo, but also <i>reassurance</i> for the purpose of achieving peaceful change; and the study of international order should highlight the way in which international and domestic orders have co-evolved in history.

著者

池内 恵

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_115-175_129, 2014

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Jihad is one of the most controversial concepts in the Islamic political thought. This paper shed light on two dominant trends in the theories of Jihad in Modern Islamic World. Modernist thinkers, on the one hand, were concerned with political consequences of waging Jihad against the Western Powers and devised a theory intended to avoid the implementation of Jihad doctrine in the modern international arena. This "avoidance theorists" conducted meticulous research on the history of early Islam and forcefully concluded each and every wars and conflicts fought by the prophet Muhammad and his disciples were acts of selfdefense. By doing so, modernist thinkers presented Islam as an entity reconcilable with international laws and norms. Fundamentalist thinkers, on the other hand, criticized the modernist thinkers and its "subservient" style. Fundamentalists are not opposed to the "defensive" nature of Islam but expanded the concept of "defense" beyond the ordinary bound and redefined it to encompass fighting to root out the un-Islamic political and social institutions and entities from the earth. Although political implications of the two trends are diametrically opposed to each other, theoretically they are mutually supporting, at least in part. Modernists have paved the way to supremacist notion of Jihad by definitively approving the historical acts of war by the early Muslim nation as totally defensive and righteous. Fundamentalists rode on this theory and expanded the realm of the "defense" to such an extent that even most of the offensive warfare can be legitimized as "defense" in the context of eternal struggle for the sake of the cause of spreading Islam.

著者

本多 美樹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_161-175_164, 2014-03-30 (Released:2015-09-05)

著者

千知岩 正継

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_167-178_170, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)

著者

前田 寿

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1960, no.12, pp.80-92, 1960-05-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

11

著者

高坂 正堯

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1959, no.10, pp.17-26, 1959-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

22