著者
岩下 明裕
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2020, no.49, pp.62-81, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)
被引用文献数
1

This essay sheds light on Soviet and Russian Foreign Policy through use of the “critical geopolitical” concept of the “geo-code.” A state’s “geo-code” refers to the construction of narratives regarding its own space and history over time. Borrowing from Klaus Dodd’s ideal-type categories, which he uses to explain geo-coded narratives of British policy (“little England,” “cosmopolitan,” “European” and “American”), this paper proposes to utilize combinations of four ideal-type categories, “Atlantic/European,” “ethnic Russian,” “Eurasian” and “super power,” in order to analyze and explain Soviet and Russian foreign policy.The first section applies the metaphor of a photograph to the memoirs of several foreign policy leaders: Andrei Gromyko and Eduard Shevardnadze in the Soviet-era; and Andrei Kozyrev, Evgenii Primakov and Serghei Ivanov in contemporary Russia. The paper shows how the composite image of Russia held by these individuals shaped the state’s foreign policy. It also stresses that different concepts of sovereignty have been sustained or reconstructed within Soviet/Russian international law theories in dialogue with changes in images held by the foreign policy leader.The latter half of the paper further develops this theory in order to apply it to Putin’s current Russian foreign policy perception of Northeast Asia, and particularly of China and Japan. From the late Soviet period under Gorbachev to the early Russian period of Yeltsin, Japan was considered as one of the “rising” powers able to aid Russia’s political and economic transition, and it was widely recognized that the relationship would be facilitated by a peace treaty resolving the territorial issue between the two countries. However, following reconciliation between Russia and China, China became the more important partner for Russia, not only in Northeast Asia but also throughout Eurasia.Following its disengagement with the West after the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia’s image of itself as close to “Europe” slipped, while that of the state as “ethnic Russian” and “Eurasian” that must become a “great power” to oppose the US was emphasized. This has meant that Japan is no longer an essential partner from the viewpoint of Russia’s dominant foreign policy images. In turn, the significance of China has increased and developed for Russia beyond the two countries historical “love-hate” relationship. Not only policy makers but also ordinary people look to China as Russia’s “No.1” partner, while the United States is its indefatigable “enemy.” There is no room for Japan in this picture while Japan remains so dependent on the US for security matters.In the conclusion, the paper debunks the myths associated with “classical geopolitics,” which associate foreign policy solely with perceptions of state power and geography. It shows that a “geo-politics” which links the positivist and constructive approaches, and which seeks to account for various analytical scales—from micro to macro, below/beyond the state—can analyze foreign policy change more effectively.
著者
岩下 明裕
出版者
ロシア史研究会
雑誌
ロシア史研究 (ISSN:03869229)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.80, pp.45-59, 2007

This paper focuses on the Soviet attitude towards border delimitation between the Soviet Union and Japan before/during negotiations on normalizing relations after WWII. The so-called "four island" issue, e.g. Japan's strong territorial claims on Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai islets, was then not mentioned. The name of "northern territory" was given to the four islands in the 1960s only after the Soviet Union and Japan failed to sign the peace treaty. The normalization process between the Soviet Union and Japan in the 1950s presents the essential items for academic inquiry: Did the Soviet leadership have an option to return the four islands to Japan? Why did Nikiita Khrushchev suddenly propose to hand back the two islands, Shikotan and Habomai, to Japan during the London negotiations in 1955? Was there really a possibility that Japan would accept the two island proposal and sign the peace treaty? Why did the Soviet Union and Japan finally agree to sign the joint declaration in October of 1956 as proof of normalization and put a clause onto the declaration that stated the two islands would be transferred to Japan after the peace treaty was signed? Russian President Vladimir Putin has renewed Khrushchev's early position. Many hints for breaking the deadlock over the "northern territorial" disputes between the Soviet Union/Russia and Japan are furnished there.
著者
岩下 明裕
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2020, no.201, pp.201_17-201_32, 2020-09-15 (Released:2022-03-31)
参考文献数
27

What do we consider as the Soviet/Russian foreign policy toward East Asia? Many historians tend to discuss its nature using an “expansionist” model in general, particularly in Europe. This may differ in terms of discourse: some have emphasized the security factor against neighbors, while others have focused on ideology as “socialist” in the Cold War era and “Eurasia” in the present day. However, the recent development of Soviet/Russian studies accents more on the “pragmatic” and “state-interested” based causes for policy orientation.As background, this paper sheds a light on comparative studies of Soviet/Russian foreign behavior toward China and Japan. In contrast with the European/Atlantic front, Soviet/Russian behaviors have been more “moderate” and “restraint” toward East Asia/Pacific before/after the Cold War period. Indeed, it depends on the difference of Soviet/Russian power influence between Europe and East Asia. How have the Soviet Union/Russia dealt with China and Japan in East Asia/Pacific? For the Soviet Union/Russia, China and Japan have been big powers to manage for security as an “enemy” or as a “friend” in triangular relations dependent on historical factors.This paper focuses on the foreign activities of Khrushchev era to Putin via Gorbachev. It is well known that Khrushchev’s foreign policy of “peaceful coexistence,” which tried to use “space” between “friend and enemy,” triggered a more pragmatic and flexible orientation than the predecessor’s dichotomy. At the time, with the Soviet Union facing territorial/border disputes with China, a communist ally, and with Japan, a potential enemy under US control, Khrushchev decided to deal with each in a different way: For Japan, a promise in the 1956 joint declaration for the handing over of two islands, Shikotan and Habomai, but for China, the ignoring of its demand for re-bordering the Amur and Ussuri rivers after the negotiations of the mid-1960s. As a result, war with China started while a deal with Japan was frozen mostly because of US pressure on Japan.The failure of Khrushchev’s foreign policy impacted his successor’s decision. The lessons brought about Gorbachev’s success on the border agreement with China in 1989 and Putin’s follow-up on finalizing the remaining border issues in 2004. It also framed Russia’s policy toward Japan. Gorbachev never recognized Khrushchev’s failed proposal of the 1956 declaration and Putin, recognizing the validity of the declaration, has strictly demanded that Japan depart from US influence as a condition of Khrushchev’s deal. As a result, Russia has enjoyed its best relationship with Japan while using the “territorial card” as a theoretical concession of the 1956 declaration to keep Japan from going against Russia.This paper draws conclusions from the transformation of the Soviet and Russian foreign policy toward China and Japan. It also suggests lessons gleaned from Russo-Japan relations for academics and foreign policy circles in Japan and Asia.
著者
岩下 明裕
出版者
山口県立大学
雑誌
山口県立大学大学院論集
巻号頁・発行日
no.1, pp.3-17, 2000
被引用文献数
1

This paper aims to analyze the key issues concerning Central Asia in Russo-Chinese relations after the Cold War. First, it reviews the Russian foreign commitment to Central Asia, which focuses on security items for the border and ex-patriots, which are vital to Russian interests. Second, it pays much attention to the Chinese attitude towards Russian policy on Central Asia, which China has recognized as a sphere of Russian influence. As its future is uncertain, China has supported the Russian presence there. It should keep close and stable relations with Russia to concentrate its resources for economic and political development as a "great power."
著者
ディビッド ウルフ 秋田 茂 泉川 泰博 岩下 明裕 遠藤 乾 松本 はる香 横手 慎二 エルドリッジ ロバート ロバート エルドリッジ 金 成浩
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
基盤研究(A)
巻号頁・発行日
2009

本研究では、歴史家と政治学者の連携のもと、冷戦期の北東アジア、特に日本側の役割と視点にたった多くの資料を収集・統合した。この4年の研究期間で研究メンバーは、ワークショップ、カンファレンスや様々な国際イベントにおいて、新たな資料と結論に基づく80回もの発表(半数が英語発表)を行い、約70もの論文・図書を執筆・刊行した。
著者
岩下 明裕 宇山 智彦 帯谷 知可 吉田 修 荒井 幸康 石井 明 中野 潤三 金 成浩 荒井 信雄 田村 慶子 前田 弘毅
出版者
北海道大学
雑誌
基盤研究(A)
巻号頁・発行日
2006

本研究の実践的な成果は、第1に中国とロシアの国境問題解決法、「フィフティ・フィフティ(係争地をわけあう)」が、日本とロシアなど他の国境問題へ応用できるかどうかを検証し、その可能性を具体的に提言したこと、第2に中国とロシアの国境地域の協力組織として生まれた上海協力機構が中央アジアのみならず、南アジアや西アジアといったユーラシア全体の広がりのなかで発展し、日米欧との協力により、これがユーラシアの新しい秩序形成の一翼を担いうることを検証したことにある。また本研究の理論的な成果は、第1にロシアや中国といった多くの国と国境を共有している「国境大国」は、米国など国境によってその政策が規定されることの少ない大国と異なる対外指向をもつことを析出し、第2に国境ファクターに大きく規定される中ロ関係が、そうではない米ロ関係や米中関係とは異なっており、米ロ中印などの四角形のなかで、構成される三角形が国境を共有するかどうかで異なる機能を果たすことを実証したことにある。