- 著者
-
田嶋 信雄
- 出版者
- 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
- 雑誌
- 国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_34-206_50, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)
- 参考文献数
- 62
This study will analyze the political realities of the Japanese–German Anti-Comintern Pact, the Tripartite Pact, and the Japan–Germany–Italy wartime alliance. Particular attention will be paid to the following: (1) introducing a new perspective on Axis relations from the viewpoint of Japan’s policy toward India, Afghanistan, and Iran; (2) providing new historical knowledge on Axis relations while unearthing new materials; (3) demonstrating that the trend of international politics, the development of Axis relations, and the change in the “virtual enemy” of the alliance factored in changing Japan’s Axis Alliance policy. It will also analyze the political transformation of Japan’s Axis policy, which, metaphorically speaking, drastically changed from “a policy to combat Russia and defend against Communism” to “a policy to work with Russia and accommodate Communism.”Conventionally, studies have underscored the continuity in the relationship between Germany, Italy, and Japan, categorized as the “Axis,” from the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 to the collapse of the Japanese–German wartime alliance in 1945. The Axis Pact has been regarded as a “hollow alliance,” as Johanna Menzel Meskill (1966) put it more than half-a-century ago. In addition, the Anti-Comintern Pact has been thought of not as an ideological anti-Soviet alliance but as a power-political anti-British alliance from the beginning, which had a commonality and continuity with the Tripartite Pact, in other words, the anti-British and anti-American alliance. Moreover, scholars have situated the origin of the Tripartite Pact in the “Axis Diplomacy” of the 1930s. They have also emphasized the continuity between the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact.This study will compare the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Tripartite Pact, and the Japan–Germany–Italy wartime alliance, with a focus on the policies toward India, Afghanistan, and Iran, to demonstrate that the Axis relationship was not “hollow” but a real one and that the Tripartite Pact and the wartime alliance were not based on the continuity of the Anti-Comintern Pact but rather on its negation.