著者
中西 嘉宏
出版者
一般財団法人 アジア政経学会
雑誌
アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.69, no.3, pp.35-54, 2023-07-31 (Released:2023-08-19)
参考文献数
42

The changes in Myanmar’s political regime, from the transition to civilian rule in 2011 to the post-coup period after 1st February 2021, can be divided into three stages: first, the transition from one type of authoritarian regime to another; second, the progress of democratization; and finally, the re-authoritarianization through a coup d’état and coercive suppression. However, these transitions have also led to unintended consequences. This paper focuses on the interplay and discrepancies between domestic politics and the international political economy, coincidental timing, political trade-offs, institutional design errors, and miscalculations by involved parties, which are often overlooked in a clearcut and linear understanding of political development. The main points of each section are as follows:First, the transition to civilian rule was driven by coincidental timing and the impunity of Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military. The formation of the new government in 2011 marked a tran­sition from an autocratic authoritarian regime to a more competitive authoritarian regime. The retirement of State Peace and Development Council Chairman Gen. Than Shwe and the shift to a collectively led leadership were the essence of this transition, which coincided with a change of U.S. policy toward Myanmar, leading to subsequent reforms and improved diplomatic relations. However, this development was facilitated by a trade-off with the state military’s impunity for past human rights abuses and violations of international law.Second, the advancement of democratization can be largely attributed to inadequate institutional design. The competitive authoritarian regime, constructed during the preceding military rule, lacked sufficient institutional mechanisms necessary for its prolonged sustainability. This deficiency significantly contributed to the electoral triumph of the National League for Democracy in 2015, consequently leading to the establishment of Aung San Suu Kyi’s government in 2016. Of particular importance is the fact that the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party, which was expected to maintain power while striking a balance between hardliners of Tatmadaw and pro-democracy forces, was weakly organized as a political party. And the ruling government’s inability to “manipulate” the electoral system and operations to win elections also contributed to the regime’s lack of durability. As a result, an unstable power-sharing arrangement was created in which the Tatmadaw, which sought to protect its own gurdianship in the constitutional order, and the democratic forces that pursue further democratization.Third, while the coup d’état and subsequent crackdown by Tatmadaw have eliminated pro-democracy forces from the top decision-making process on one hand, such actions have been self-undermining the legitimacy and governing capacity. Tatmadaw is planning to return to the competitive authoritarian regime, but this is becoming a mission impossible, because the coincidences that occurred during the former transition in 2011 can no longer be expected, and the aftermath of the coup is not limited to power struggles among elites but has turned into violent social conflicts.The rapid political transformation in Myanmar from the early 2010s to the present is entering a new phase due to the reactionary actions of the junta. This transformation is irreversible, and if democratization were to resume in the country, it would follow a different path than that of Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership.
著者
玉田 芳史 相沢 伸広 上田 知亮 河原 祐馬 木村 幹 鈴木 絢女 ホサム ダルウィッシュ 中西 嘉宏 日下 渉 岡本 正明
出版者
京都大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
2014-04-01

本研究の目的は、東南アジア諸国における政治の民主化と司法化の関係を考察することであった。司法化は民主化に付随して始まり、民主主義を守る役割を果たすと理解されることが多い。しかし、司法化は、多数派の暴政を言い立てて多数決主義を否定する特権的少数者を保護することがある。民主化途上国では民主主義がまだ脆弱であるため、司法化は民主化を容易に阻害し危機に陥れる。タイはその典型である。司法化の現状は多様である.司法化に大きな影響を与えるのは、2つの要因であることが明らかになった。判事の人事と司法府を取り巻く政治状況である。
著者
玉田 芳史 相沢 伸広 上田 知亮 河原 祐馬 木村 幹 鈴木 絢女 滝田 豪 中西 嘉宏 日下 渉
出版者
京都大学
雑誌
基盤研究(B)
巻号頁・発行日
2020-04-01

SDGs(Sustainable Development Goals/持続可能な開発目標)が世界を席巻している。SDGsが掲げる目標は首肯できるものばかりである。しかし、SDGsの目標群を冷静に眺めると、開発にとって重要な目標の欠落が分かる。その1つが政治の民主化である。途上国の非民主的な指導者が、国際社会に向かって、SDGs推進を謳う例が少なくない。SDGsを錦の御旗とすれば、民主化への外圧を和らげることができるからではないのか。SDGsは権威主義体制の温存に寄与するという副作用があるのではないか。本研究はこの問いに実証的に答えようとする。
著者
中西 嘉宏
出版者
日本貿易振興機構・アジア経済研究所
雑誌
基盤研究(C)
巻号頁・発行日
2007

本研究の成果は以下の2点である。第1に,1962年の軍事政権成立後のミャンマーにおいて,華僑・華人実業家は一貫して周辺化され,現在,経済的には自律化が進んでいるものの,それを政治的権力に転化することができていないことがわかった。この知見を盛り込み,2009年に単著『軍政ビルマの権力構造』を発表した。(2)他の東南アジア諸国同様,ビルマでも華僑・華人社会の歴史は優に100年を越えるが,関連資料が乏しく全く研究が進んでいない。そこでヤンゴンにある緬甸華僑図書館から全関連資料の複写を行って電子化した。近く公開を予定している。
著者
中西 嘉宏
出版者
東南アジア学会
雑誌
東南アジア -歴史と文化- (ISSN:03869040)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2006, no.35, pp.22-52, 2006

This article examines the state ideology formation of the Ne Win regime (1962-1988) in Burma. Drawing on military documents and interviews with key figures, it depicts the interaction between the faction fighting within the military in the 1950s and early 1960s and the development of the future state ideology. I argue that understanding the military institution and the dynamics of military politics is essential to understanding the process and nature of the regime fromation.<br>After March 2nd coup d'&eacute;tat in 1962, the Revolutionary Council announced the organization of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) as the only political party for guiding the revolution. BSPP's official ideology was <i>The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment</i> (SCME). SCME had been the state ideology until the fall of Ne Win's regime in 1988.<br>SCME was written by U Chit Hlaing who belonged to the Directorate of Psychological Warfare, the Ministry of Defence. He received the order from General Ne Win in November 1962 and wrote the draft based on his articles, a series of &ldquo;nam&agrave; rup&agrave; wad&agrave;&rdquo;, published in <i>Myawaddy Magazin</i> in 1957 and 1958. Chit Hlaing wrote those articles as anti-communism and pro-constitutionalism propaganda under the intra-military leadership of Brigadier Aung Gyi and Colonel Maung Maung. They launched a number of initiatives to reform the military in the 1950s. One of them was to forge the military doctrine to ensure anti-communism and pro-constitutionalism.<br>However, the political structure of the military changed in the early 1960s. Colonel Maung Maung was removed in 1961 and Lt-General Aung Gyi lost his leadership in the military. General Ne Win formed an alliance with the hard-liners. It enabled the military took over the state on March 2nd, 1962. General Ne Win rejected pro-constitutionalism. But they were unclear as to the guiding ideology which would be taken to achieve &ldquo;Burmese Way to Socialism&rdquo;. Therefore General Ne Win ordered Chit Hlaing to make out a draft of the BSPP's offical ideology. It is ironic that the articles written under the principle of anti-communism and pro-constitutionalism became the document to legitimate one-party rule and political intervention by the military for 26 years.
著者
中西 嘉宏
出版者
京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.56, no.2, pp.240-246, 2019

伊野憲治『ミャンマー民主化運動 --学生たちの苦悩, アウンサンスーチーの理想, 民のこころ』(めこん, 2018, 442p.)

1 0 0 0 OA 未完の党=国家

著者
中西 嘉宏
出版者
京都大学東南アジア地域研究研究所
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.3, pp.330-360, 2003-12-31 (Released:2017-10-31)

This article examines Ne Win’s attempt to construct a party-state in Burma. Previous studies have argued that Ne Win built the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in 1962 as a political organization to camouflage his dictatorship and military rule. In this article I suggest that Ne Win tried to construct a partystate in the 1970s by changing the rules governing appointment to top state positions, but failed. From 1962 to 1970, the Revolutionary Council consisted of military officers favored by Ne Win, directors of the Ministry of Defense, and regional commanders of the Army. It began to change in 1971, when Ne Win formed the Central Executive Committee (CEC) within the BSPP for top decisionmaking. In 1972, he compelled most CEC members to retire from the military and did so himself. Many CEC members who concurrently held ministerial posts resigned in 1973, effectively separating the CEC from the military and the government. At the third Party Conference in February 1977, Ne Win began to change the type of people appointed to the CEC. Five new members of the third CEC were retired officers who had transferred from the military to the party in the 1960s and rose in the party. They were not former directors of the Ministry of Defense or former regional commanders, but party leaders. This means Ne Win began to shift his power base from the military to the BSPP. But in an attempt that came to light later, some party leaders tried to unseat Ne Win in the election of the Central Committee at the third Party Conference. Ne Win then purged 113 party members including new CEC members and appointed the fourth Central Committee in November 1977. Ne Win never again appointed people to the CEC who had risen through the party. Subsequently, until 1988, the BSPP functioned primarily to camouflage his military dictatorship.
著者
中西 嘉宏
出版者
京都大学東南アジア研究センター
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.41, no.3, pp.330-360, 2003-12

この論文は国立情報学研究所の学術雑誌公開支援事業により電子化されました。
著者
藤田 幸一 遠藤 環 岡本 郁子 中西 嘉宏 山田 美和
出版者
京都大学東南アジア研究所
雑誌
東南アジア研究 (ISSN:05638682)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.2, pp.157-210, 2013-01-31

The Thai economy is supported by a large number of unskilled migrant workers from the neighbouringcountries, especially Myanmar, since the late 1980s. However, the Thai government's system of receivingmigrants has been largely defective, due to internal inconsistencies and conflicts among the differentagencies of the government. Based on recent household-level surveys on Myanmar migrants in Ranong,southern Thailand, we delineate their work and living conditions-how they work hard for wages lowerthan the minimum wage that leave them with no surplus for remitting to their home country yet a largeamount of debt, as well as the harassment and abuse they suffer in the hands of Thai government officials,etc. We also show the actual situation of Myanmar sex workers, including the serious problem of humantrafficking they face. By interviewing various government agencies (including the police, labour department,hospitals, etc.), business associations, and NGOs, we show how the "structure" in which the Myanmarmigrants are situated has emerged and is maintained.