著者
今井 静
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_44-178_57, 2014

The Middle East is characterized by repeated conflicts that are rooted in the incongruity of state territories and national identities. This political instability has often engendered refugees, as in the present Syrian conflict that broke out in March 2011 during the so-called Arab Spring. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has protected refugees from adjacent areas for more than 60 years, such as Palestine, Iraq, and Syria, a policy which has given this small buffer state greater access to international politics. However, studies of Jordan's foreign policy and the international relations of the Middle East have not focused on this issue, although they have discussed the relationship of refugees to its domestic politics or the exploitation of its geo-political position for financial aid.<br>In light of this foreign policy and refugee context, this paper analyses the development of the Jordan's refugee protection policy and its strategy to diminish the impact of the Syrian conflict based on the UNHCR reports, local newspapers, and interviews with the UNHCR staffs in Amman office and refugees. The analysis focuses on the Jordanian government's relationship with the international regime, led by the UNHCR and 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, for refugee protection, and it demonstrates that Jordan's pursues a strategy of strengthening its international legitimacy by the acceptance the refugee regime's norms. The first section discusses Jordan's protection of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees before the Syrian crisis. The second section emphases the granting of refugee rights to displaced Syrians in Jordan; it places this process alongside the actions of the Syrian regime that have partially shaped refugee protection under the UNHCR's Syrian Regional Response Plan established. A final section looks at the expansion of the Syrian refugee community and its status as a domestic issue in Jordan. It examines the process of Jordan's self-evaluation as a country contributing to a global refugee protection policy.<br>The examination reveals that the Jordanian government's strategy of attaining international legitimacy by the acceptance of refugee protection norms is an attempt to avoid the negative impact of changes in regional politics. For the government of Jordan, cooperation with the UNHCR involves more than the ratification of treaties and the fulfilment of obligations; rather, its "approach" derives from a larger strategic perspective. In this way, Jordan fulfils its regional political role by contributing to the maintenance of order through aiding refugees as part of its larger strategy for national stability and survival.
著者
西村 もも子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2010, no.161, pp.161_125-139, 2010

In recent years, a growing number of transnational cooperation among private firms has come to play a significant role in making international public institutions. While much of the recent empirical works on this topic emphasize the increasing impact of private interests in international politics, the process of how they exercise the power remains poorly examined. It is still widely believed that only states make international institutions and that the relationships between states are enough to explain the formation process. However some cases show that a firm in one country cooperates with other firms in foreign countries, aiming to make an international public institution without governments' involvement. Here we can see a new political process, which is different from firms' conventional lobbying to their governments. Why does a firm cooperate with a foreign firm so as to make an international institution instead of relying on its government? Under which conditions does such an involvement influence international institutions? In this article, I address these research questions.<br>This article provides one hypothesis with respect to the formation of an international institution and firms by focusing on the regulatory process at domestic level: A firm attempts a direct commitment in building international institution, when its government refuses to change its domestic regulation for a new international institution. In other words, when the government is reluctant to change its domestic regulation that the firm sought, the firm cooperates with those in foreign countries to form an international institution without relying on the government, so that it ultimately enables the domestic regulation to be changed. Furthermore I investigate the effect of this business-to-business cooperation in the formation of international institution, by analyzing the government's reaction to regulatory changes the firm sought.<br>I examine the above hypothesis with one important case: the making process of the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights (TRIPs) administered by the WTO. In this case, there were three private business groups involved; the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC; US), Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe (UNICE) and Nippon Keidanren. They cooperated to craft a proposal and presented it to the GATT Secretariat and the governments that participated in the Uruguay Round. Some researchers regard this business-to-business cooperation as the critical factor to the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement. However the existing studies focus only on the behavior of the US industry. The meeting joined by their counterparts in Europe and Japan remains unstudied. Therefore, this article investigates behaviors of both the government and the firms in each country to draw the conclusion that the domestic regulatory change is the critical factor in the relationship between transnational cooperation among firms and the formation of an international institution.
著者
大木 毅
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
no.109, pp.22-37,L6, 1995

Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Hack is famous for his attempt at peacemaking between Japan and the United States in Switzerland at the end of the Second World War. But he cut a figure not only as a peace-maker, but also as a Key player in Japanese-German naval relations in the 1930's. The aim of this article is to reconstruct the life of Friedrich Hack as for as possible and thereby to shed light on the not well known role of the Imperial Japanese Navy in Japan's policy toward Germany between the two World Wars.<br>Dr. Hack, who was taken POW by the Japanese at the siege of Tsingtao in 1914, became a weapons broker after the First World War and became influential in Japanese-German aero-naval relations, because the Japanese Navy was interested in acquiring German advanced technology, for example U-Boat and war planes, while Germany maintained the level of weapon-technology that was prohibited by Versailles Treaties by selling them to Japan.<br>After the Nazi seizure of power Hack's activity expanded into the sphere of foreign policy. His influence upon Japan absorbed the attention of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the chief of the intelligence department of the German armed forces, and Joachim v. Ribbentrop who intended to bring about better relations with Japan. So Hack played the role as the initiator of "Anti Comintern Pact". But his success brought conflicts with the Nazi Party and others in "National Socialistic Polycracy" and resulted in his arrest.<br>Through the help of the Japanese Navy, Hack could live the life of an exile in Switzerland after the outbreak of the Second World War and served as an informant for the Japanese Navy. This activity of Hack led to the peace-mediation between the Japaneses Navy and the U. S. Office of Strategic Services.<br>Friedrich Hack symbolizes a aspect of Japanese-German naval relations in the 1930's and the early 1940's.
著者
武田 悠
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2010, no.162, pp.162_130-142, 2010-12-10 (Released:2012-10-20)
参考文献数
70

The 1970s was an era of crisis and internationalization for Japan-U.S. relations. Both governments started to settle their bilateral conflicts for their policy cooperation which was required in the changing international environment at that time. To clarify the character of this change, this paper examines the bilateral negotiation of Tokai reprocessing plant held in 1977.In the late 1970s, the U.S. government attempted to rebuild international nuclear nonproliferation system by limiting peaceful nuclear power development such as spent nuclear fuel reprocessing technology. Carter administration took the office in 1977 and called its allies to stop reprocessing. However, Carter's new policy was highly problematic since reprocessing was a key technology in energy policies of other developed countries such as Japan. As Tokai reprocessing plant was planned to begin operation in 1977 and an approval from Washington was required for its operation, they need a settlement.At the first bilateral talk in April, Washington opposed firmly to the operation. On the other hand, international opposition grew rapidly against the new U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Western European countries were especially sensitive to it since it could ban further export of nuclear-related technology to developing countries.Washington started to consider a compromise since Tokyo was the only close ally showing its approval to a framework of new nonproliferation policy. At the second meeting, the United States offered a proposal to alter Tokai plant more resistant to nuclear proliferation by technical modification. Although Japanese government opposed to the modification, they agreed to do a research about possible technical alternatives at Tokai Mura, Japan. As a result of this joint research and other investigations, however, Washington gave up all the technical solutions. Finally, at the third meeting at the end of August, Carter decided to permit the operation without any modification in return of Tokyo's agreement to reconsider reprocessing and suspend large scale Plutonium use for the moment.The above examination shows two aspects of the Japan-U.S. relations in the1970s. One is that Tokyo had an option to refine the U.S. foreign policy and participate in international politics by supporting Washington. In contrast to European countries that stopped the U.S. nonproliferation policy by refusing to cooperate, Japan did the same thing by aligning with the United States.The other is decreased importance of the bilateral relationship itself for the U.S. government, while Japan's substantive contribution to the U.S. foreign policy became a must to the United States. In sum, although both countries agreed to coordinate their policy objectives in the 1970s, this success became a basis of further bilateral conflicts on the way of implementing those goals.
著者
森田 吉彦
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
no.139, pp.29-44,L7, 2004

During the Sino-Japanese negotiations of the mid-nineteenth century, from the Shanghai voyage of the official ship <i>Senzai-maru</i> in 1862 to the treaty conclusion in 1871, one of the first problems was understanding the past and future conditions of the East Asian world order.<br>At first, Japan wanted China to allow Japanese merchants to go and trade there, in the same way as Chinese merchants had been able to come and trade in Japan since the "national isolation" period. However, in addition, China had to argue about whether or not they should treat an Eastern country like Japan like a Western non-treaty country. Although there were also opinions such as in Japan, that they wanted to exclude the Western monopoly for commerce and, that in China, they should be more flexible toward neighboring Japan, their talks did not advance.<br>But in Japan, people like Nagura Nobuatsu continued groping for the possibility of Sino-Japanese strategic cooperation, and this agreed with Iwakura Tomomi's idea of national strategy. On the other hand, in China, people like Li Hung-Chang continued to think about a strategic dynamism between China, Japan and the West. In the 1869-70 argument in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan, Nagura aggressively claimed that Japan must promote "<i>tsüshin</i>" (a traditional communication, which needed no new treaty) relation with China. He was opposed to the prudent opinion that Japan needed to create a Western-style treaty with China so as not to arouse Western suspicion. Under his initiative, preliminary negotiations regarding diplomaticrelations with China were accepted. It was also significant that when China had changed her attitude, Li Hung-Chang refuted objectors pointing out that Japan had not been a tributary state. He advocated a plan to bind Japan and contain the West.<br>The Sino-Japanese Amity Treaty of 1871 was almost unchanged from the original China draft. It also lacked a (one-sided or bilateral) most favored nation clause, and it was not only the second article that caused Western powers to become suspicious of the Sino-Japanese alliance and press for the prevention of a ratification. It was symbolic that the Chinese word "<i>tiaogui</i>" was used and not "<i>tiaoyue</i>" (the usual translation of the word "treaty"). From the beginning, the treaty was planned as special. A most important point was that China had deleted the sovereign names of both countries so that they did not stand on an equal footing. Also, in the latter part of the first article, China aimed to restrain the Japanese regarding the Korean Peninsula, but they hid the Chinese meaning of the words in the treaty. The Japanese will to build an even relationship with China as a traditional communication or a treaty was suppressed.
著者
酒井 哲哉
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1998, no.117, pp.121-139,L12, 1998

This essay intends to analyse the formative process of discourses on international politics in post-war Japan, and by doing so shed light on the hitherto neglected aspects of Japanese political thought. Most of previous studies have understood discourses on international politics in post-war Japan as a simple dichotomy, realism/idealism, and paid little attention to the intellectual contexts in which these discourses had their own roots; While &ldquo;idealists&rdquo; have searched for their identity in that Japan was reborn as a &ldquo;peace-loving&rdquo; nation after the end of the Pacific War, &ldquo;realists&rdquo; have acused the &ldquo;idealists&rdquo; of being naive. Both of them, however, seem to have overlooked or possibly masked from what kind of historical background discourses on international politics in post-war Japan had emerged and to what extent post-war discourses had been influenced by pre-war ones. Therefore, this essay will uncover the complicated relationship of political thought between post-war and pre-war Japan.<br>Chapter I &ldquo;Morality, Power and Peace&rdquo; treats how relationship between morality and power in international politics was argued during the early post-war era. Dogi-Kokka-Ron (Nation Based on Morality), the dominant discourse on peace immediately after Japan's surrender, insisted that Japan search for morality rather than power and by doing so exceed the principle of sovereignty, characterestic of modern states. In spite of its appearance, however, Dogi-Kokka-Ron contained echoes of philosophical argument of the Kyoto School which had advocated morality of Japan's wartime foreign policies vis-&agrave;-vis Western imperialism. Thus Maruyama Masao and other leading intellectuals, who belonged to the school known as Shimin-Shakai-Ha (Civil Society School), tried to differentiate their arguments from Dogi-Kokka-Ron and create another discourse on morality, power and peace. Since the Kyoto School had criticised harshly the modernity and nationalism during the Pacific War, Shimin-Shakai-Ha's undertakings resulted in reestimation of the modern nation-state. This chapter further elucidates Shimin-Shakai-Ha's ambivalent attitudes toward power and norm in international politics with special reference to its understandings of the concept of the equality of states.<br>Chapter II &ldquo;Regionalism and Nationalism&rdquo; focuses on Royama Masamichi's argument on regionalism. Regionalism was a difficult topic to handle during the early post-war era because it could bring to mind the idea of the Great East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during the Pacific War. Royama, founder of the study on International Politics in Japan, was one of the rare figures who continued to advocate the significance of regionalism. This chapter surveys Royama's argument on regionalism from the mid-1920's to the mid-1950's and investigates how his concern about development and nationalism of Asian countries appeared within the framework of regionalism. Royama's argument is also suggestive for better understanding of the context in which the &ldquo;Rostow-Reischauer line&rdquo; surfaced in the early 1960's.<br>Chapter III &ldquo;Collective Security and Neutralism&rdquo; elucidates several aspects of this issue which have not been hitherto fully investigated. Whether positively or negatively, neutralism in post-war Japan has been understood as a typically &ldquo;idealistic&rdquo; attitude toward international politics. However, the context in which the concept of neutrality was understood and argued in the early post-war Japan was more complicated. Discourses on neutralism at that time had still echoes of the controversies over collective security during the inter-war years. The Yokota-Taoka Controversy which took place in the late-1940's witnessed the continuity of pre-war and post-war arguments on this issue. This chapter, therefore, focuses on the Yokota-Taoka Controversy and analyses its impact on the following arguments of
著者
千知岩 正継
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2013, no.171, pp.171_114-171_128, 2013-01-30 (Released:2014-12-13)
参考文献数
40

In recent years, some IR theorists have begun to depart from the assumption of anarchy and to shed light on certain forms of inter-state hierarchy. Stimulated by those new studies, this article engages in a discussion on the legitimacy of a global authority which is expected to preside over ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P)’ norms. The first part of this paper clarifies the global authority governing R2P norms, and explains its critical importance. Drawing upon the concept of “right authority” in just war traditions, it is argued that a global authority in relation to R2P is supposed to decide whether certain states fail to fulfil their responsibility to protect, and if necessary, to take responsibility for authorizing military interventions for human protection. This will inevitably determine the nature of global order. The following two sections examine both the United Nations Security Council and a proposed concept of “Concert of Democracies” as possible candidates to be the global authority. As a universally agreed legal authority, the Council is entrusted with the fulfilling of R2P principles, and in fact many commentators saw the Council decision in the case of Libyan civil war as its first successful implementation of R2P. However, the Council has critical legitimacy deficits in terms of its selective function to the intractable question of “for whom should the Council be ultimately accountable and responsible?” As for the idea of “Concert of Democracies” it is a reflection of “liberal hierarchy” based on the solidarity of liberal democracies, and presented as a preferred alternative to the illegitimate and ineffective Council. On the contrary to optimistic expectations, it is demonstrated that its exclusive membership and misguided assessment of liberal democratic states behaviour will undermine this institution’s legitimacy. In conclusion I suggest two daunting challenges that the Security Council should overcome as the global authority responsible for putting R2P norms into practice. The first is to translate a plurality of values and interests of the Council members into the unity and effective decision making in times of humanitarian tragedies. The other challenge concerns the need for the Council to seek legitimation not only from member states but also from those people severely affected by the Council action or inaction. This might involve a transformation of the Council from globally acting authority into a kind of cosmopolitan authority based on the approval of “we the people” If this is the case, a new form of the Council authority will need further consideration.
著者
山崎 眞
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.154, pp.154_145-154_160, 2008-12-30 (Released:2011-01-26)
参考文献数
57

Recently, it has been closed-up again that Japan relies on the import mostly of the energy source, food, and the raw material because the sudden rise of the oil price and the price hike of food and various raw materials, etc. occurred in early 2008. A serious discussion about the food security is happening, too. Japan imports most 99 percent of oil, 87 percent of wheat, 95 percent of the soybean, and 100 percent of other iron ore and rare metals, etc. and 98 percent of those materials are transported through Sea Lane. Japan has developed economically for 60 years after the war because such a raw material etc. were able to be imported without trouble by can the free use of the sea, and to export the product.A two great sea power of U. S. -Soviet was rivaled, and the stability of the ocean was kept because two great military power of U. S. -Soviet faced it at the cold war era. The balance of such a sea power collapses when the cold war is concluded, and the element of instability in the ocean has increased. Therefore, the confrontation by the race and the religion, etc. came to light, and the pirate and the outrage, etc. for the capital work of these group and organization came to be generated. Moreover, maritime terrorism came frequently to occur chiefly when becoming after 2000 years. Safety and the stability of the ocean are deteriorating than the cold war era because of such a situation, and it has come not to be able to disregard the influence given to the economy of the world. For instance, the Strait of Malacca passes by 50 percent of the amount of the oil transportation in the world and 30 percent of the amount of the world trade, and if here would be blockaded by the terrorism such as mines, it is said that the economy of the world will become a situation that nears panic.And furthermore, recent Chinese naval modernization and reinforcement and North Korean nuclear armament under opaque situation will bring insecurity in this region. 90 percent of the trade of the world depends on marine transport now. Moreover, 75 percent of the world's population and 80 percent of the capital are in the coastal frontier. Safety in the ocean therefore can be called a base for the world economy as well as the human race living. Especially, this is extremely important for Japan that is the maritime country.The ocean policy of Japan was something like a inconsistent stripe passes existed in the situation in which the national interest in the ocean was being lost for this by the government office organizations of lack of coordination so far. The former political administration of Prime Minister Abe enforced “The Basic Law of the Sea” to demonstrate a strong statesmanship considering such a situation and to straighten the situation as the country in July, 2007. The Cabinet Council was continuously decided to “Oceanic basic plan” based on this law in April 2008.On the other hand, the United States that valued safety and the stability of the ocean made “New Maritime Strategy” public after an interval of about 20 years in October 2007. This is a new idea of acquiring safety and the stability of the ocean in the world by cooperate about the ally and the friendly country strong. It is the one that the Maritime Self-Defense Force's being sending the fleet to the multinational fleet in the Indian Ocean coincident with such an idea. Now, there is no country that can defend safety in the ocean in the world by one country. Peace in the sea can be acquired only by concentrating the imperative power such as naval forces and coast guards in the world.It is necessary that Japan cooperate positively in such the world strategy.
著者
芝崎 厚士
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2002, no.129, pp.44-60,L9, 2002-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
56

This article aims at introducing a brief overview of the theoretical perspective of International Cultural Relations (ICR, Kokusai Bunka Ron). ICR employs two meanings of “culture”, one is culture sensu stricto (CSS), the other is culture sensu lato (CSL). In order to understand ICR as one of the new fields of study in International Relations, one would have to elucidate how CSS and CSL are applied into international relations respectively and how these two analyses could be integrated as ICR.The study of ICR based on CSS has two traditions. Both regard ‘culture’ as elements from which the actor or some relations (composed of these actors) are constructed. Students of ICR use CSS in order to examine how ‘culture’ is used inside the reality of international relations.One tradition generated by the study of diplomatic history in the United States from 1970s, was conducted by Akira Iriye and his successors. They insisted on the need to interpret international relations as intercultural relations, rejecting the realist, power oriented approaches which dominated the field. They also tried to change diplomatic history into ‘international history’, which seeks to overcome the somewhat narrow-minded nationalistic view of diplomatic history.The other tradition was initiated in the study of International Relations in Japan from 1970s, launched by Kenichiro Hirano and his disciples. They borrowed their approach from anthropology, especially acculturation theory, which captures culture's dynamic changes and reconstructing processes. Basically they perceive international relations as cultural relations, which implies that international relations need not only to be interstate relations, and international relations are only one part of many cultural relations. They seek to establish ‘mobile International Relations’, which opposes traditional ‘immobile International Relations’.CSL studies consists of two parts. One is ‘international relations (ir) as culture’; the other is ‘International Relations (IR) as culture’. Students of ICR use CSL when they want to understand how ir or IR would look like from outside of the IR discipline, from the historical point of view. Unfortunately, the research stock is not so abundant in the study of ICR based on CSL. However, some recent studies indicate that CSL will be one of the most important future fields of study.Thus, ICR students have to deal with two notions of cultures. Sometimes they apply CSS, which focuses on how international relations could be explained by culture as elements of actors or groups of actors. Sometimes they adopt CSL, which explicates how and why international relations are generated in the history of mankind and International Relations invented in the history of ideas. ICR must deal with these two tasks, which could be accomplished both by the work of a single individual or though collaboration.
著者
大久保 綾子 真田 康弘 石井 敦
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2011, no.166, pp.166_57-70, 2011

This paper aims at revising the analytical framework of institutional interaction established by Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring, and applies the revised framework to the international regimes related to cetacean management in order to demonstrate the usefulness of our proposed revision and to systematically describe the regime complex of cetacean management.<br>After reviewing the relevant literature and explaining the institutional interaction framework, we evaluate the framework and describe our revisions.<br>Based on the evaluation we propose to revise the framework by incorporating the utilitarian causal pathway of institutional interaction.<br>The revised framework is applied to the following regimes: International Whaling Commission (IWC); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR); North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO); Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species ofWild Animals (CMS); Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Contiguous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS); Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas (ASCOBANS); Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT).<br>International organizations such as FAO and UNEP were excluded from the study.<br>The case study revealed that, first, the institutional interactions involved in the cetacean management regime complex have synergistic effects when it comes to cognitive interaction.<br>Because this result is consistent with other studies, this feature can be generalized to a significant extent.<br>Second, some effects caused by institutional interaction other than cognitive interaction cannot be determined because it will depend on the actors'perspectives; and, such undetermined effects are caused only by unintentional interaction.<br>Third, the IWC is mostly the source of institutional interaction and there are only two cases that the IWC is the target of interaction.<br>Fourth, there were some cases of forum shopping in the samples, and the driving force of such forum shopping was the difference in the membership which largely determines the expected success to pursue the forum shopper's interest.<br>Fifth, the regime complex of cetacean management has the IWC as a hub regime and the other regimes function largely as mutually complementary to the IWC.<br>For example, the NAMMCO provides international oversight to the whaling operation, and ASCOBANS, ACCOBAMS, and CMS provide governance means for managing small cetaceans.<br>These functions cannot be provided by the IWC because of its dispute over its basic objectives.<br>Sixth, there are actually cases that exhibit long-term cumulative effects resulting from institutional interaction.<br>We conclude that the proposed revision of the framework proved fruitful, and suggest some policy implications to the IWC and further work necessary to analyze institutional interaction.
著者
戸部 良一
出版者
財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1982, no.71, pp.124-140,L11, 1982-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
70

The aim of this paper is to examine SHIRATORI Toshio's views and thoughts on Japan's foreign relations, as one of the typical advocates of Kodo Diplomacy in the 1930's. The main reason why his diplomatic thought should be the subject of careful study lies in the fact that he was regarded as a “philosopher” of Japanese diplomacy by the younger bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry and he influenced their thoughts and behaviors.With the impact of the Manchurian Incident, SHIRATORI began to declare that Japan should return to Asia. He attacked the evils of Western Civilization and denounced the Washington Treaty System as an international order in the Far East which symbolized the interests of the Occidental (especially Anglo-Saxon) powers, though he had not challenged it in the 1920's. Then he sought an ideological basis to guide Japanese diplomacy, and tried to construct a conceptual framework of a New World Order based upon Japanese morals and interests.At first he looked upon Soviet Russia as the arch enemy whose influences had to be driven out of the Far East. But, as Japan had been bogged down in a war of attrition with China since 1937, he refrained from saying that Russia was the enemy of Japan and the other peoples of Asia. He stressed the global confrontation between the “have” countries, which championed the Popular Front, and the “have not” countries, whose ideological basis was totalitarianism. His search for a new moral world order was joined with Nazi Germany's world view. He began to advocate the tripartite alliance among Germany, Italy and Japan, and then a quadruple one between these three powers and Russia. Britain, which he had regarded earlier as a partner of Japan in driving out Russia from the Far East, became his (and Japan's, in his view) arch enemy. At last he emphasized the wickedness of Jewish financial capitalism which ruled the Anglo-Saxon powers, and in the spring of 1941 he predicted that a war between Japan and the United States would be inevitable, though he was suffering from mental ill health at that time.Did his attempt and effort to seek an ideological or moral basis for Japanese diplomacy achieve satisfactory results? This question is answered in the conclusion of this paper.