著者

川村 暁雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.143, pp.155-164, 2005-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

22

著者

井口 武夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.144, pp.85-98,L13, 2006-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

46

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60 years after the Pacific War, Japanese Foreign Ministry published on October 14 2004 relevant documents related to Japan's Final Memorandum delivered to the U. S. Government at the outbreak of the War. The documents were found in the files of diplomatic archives by the author in 1999. They reveal that the Ministry was supposed to submit to the U. S. Government the Final Memorandum which was originally worded to express an intention to enter into war. This formula was not accepted and the Memorandum was changed to simply inform Japan's intention to terminate the Japan-U. S. negotiations. When Final Memorandum which was divided in fourteen parts was cabled to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, the 14th cable embodying the concluding paragraph was withheld for 15 hours while its phrase underwent subtle wording change. A withholding of cabling the final phrase as well as additional corrigenda for 15 hours caused a fatal delay in transmitting the Memo to the State Department at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time), just before Pearl Harbor attack.There had been no serious in-depth investigation by the Japanese Government to pursue the reason for suspending the telegram of the 14th part of the Memo at the Tokyo side, and in its stead, a wrong search focused on a confused cable-handling and typing of the Final Memorandum by the Japanese Embassy. The delayed dispatch of final part of the Memo could be traced to an obstruction made at Tokyo Central Telegraph Office on the same day in connection with a clandestine army operation carried on by Major Tomura of Communication Section of Japanese Army's General Command when they withheld for ten hours the American President's message to the Emperor. During the seizure of Roosevelt's message, it is conclusively analyzed that a secret decoding was done by the Army before its delivery to the U. S. Embassy at 10: p. m. on December 7 (Japanese time). Major Tomura admitted later that he feared the Emperor might be induced to accommodate the President's appeal to delay the war. This Paper examines that the Foreign Ministry must have been informed of the decoding, and therefore, it had to adjust the wording of the last paragraph of the Final Memo to respond to the final position of the U. S. Government. Also a cover-up of delayed dispatch of correcting cables to Washington was made to block reinvestigation up till now.Author observes that President's Message intended to delay war with Japan since he preferred to fight with Hitler first. Roosevelt opted for a last-minute attempt to send his Message directly to the Emperor to avoid war, as suggested by the Japanese Embassy.

著者

小林 良樹

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.158, pp.158_182-195, 2009-12-25 (Released:2012-02-20)

参考文献数

59

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In December 2004, the United States Congress passed “the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004,” which created the Director of National Intelligence (hereafter DNI). This was the most significant overhaul of the basic framework of the U.S. Intelligence Community since it was established in 1947. The basic idea of this reorganization mainly came from so-called “the 9/11 Commission Report” published in July 2004. The report criticized the weak management of the intelligence community headed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) who was also the head of the CIA, then recommended that the DCI should be replaced by a newly created National Intelligence Director to bring more integration and cooperation to the intelligence community. The object of this paper is to try to examine the following question; “Is the DNI functioning as was expected or not? In other words, is the DNI actually overseeing the Intelligence Community as a real head or not?”Evaluation of Major Factors(1) Status: The DNI, to some extent, has successfully demonstrated his leadership status over the intelligence community. However, some members of the community such as the Department of Defense seem to be still reluctant to recognize DNI's leadership status.(2) Man Power: The DNI has already established his own large institutional manpower base to support him, although it has only analytical function and does not have operational function.(3) Support from the President: The DNI also seems to enjoy strong support from the President to secure his leadership.(4) Budgetary and Personnel Power: The budgetary and personnel power of the DNI endorsed by the legislation is vague and not so strong, more or less similar to the power given to the DCI. The DNI seems to have established actual influence, to some extent, over personnel matters of civilian intelligence institutions such as CIA. However, DNI's actual influence on budgetary and personnel matters of military intelligence institutions affiliated to the Department of Defense seems very limited.(5) Quality of Intelligence Product: There has been some improvement for information sharing in the community after the reform. However, still it is too early to say that the new system has achieved significant improvement in the quality of the analytical products of the community.ConclusionTo some extent, the DNI seems to be successfully overseeing the intelligence community as new head of the community, especially over the civilian intelligence institutions such as CIA. However, DNI's oversight has not been perfect yet, rather partial. Especially DNI's budgetary and personnel power over the military intelligence institutions seems very limited. In other words, as a reality, the intelligence community may be divided into two parts; the civilian part overseen by the DNI and military part overseen by the Secretary of Defense.Given the above-mentioned limitations, it is unlikely that the DNI's oversight on military intelligence institutions would be improved significantly unless the current legislation is amended. The future success or failure of the DNI system also would depend on personality of those who will be actually appointed as the DNI as well as their personal relations with the president and other senior leaders.

著者

麻田 貞雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.34, pp.36-57, 1967

著者

土山 實男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.90, pp.33-53,L8, 1989-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

61

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This essay reviews the renewed strategic debate, with a particular focusing on the issue of deterrence failure. If nuclear deterrence should fail, how will it fail and why? In other words, what are the obstacles to a successful deterrence strategy? It is theoretically impossible to prove or falsify the success of deterrence strategy as long as no aggressive action is taken by an adversary. Only when an aggressive action is taken do we know that the strategy is not working.Based on the various case studies conducted by Alexander L. George, John D. Steinbruner, Robert Jervis, and Richard Ned Lebow, part one of this paper discusses why and how deterrence failed in the past. The historical cases include the 1914 European crisis, the US-Japanese crisis prior to Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the Middle East conflict in 1973. Special attention is paid to the perceptual and psychological factors in the challenger's decision-making process. The evidence suggests that a deterrence strategy may be ineffective, risky, or, at worst, counter-productive under certain conditions. To avoid the tragedy of deterrence failure in the nuclear era, it is essential to maintain crisis stability so that no party has an incentive to launch a pre-emptive attack. Furthermore, it is argued that a strategy of deterrence must be supplemented by crisis prevention measures.The second part of this paper examines why some strategists believe that strategic stability is undermined. We trace the arguments of Fred Charles Iklé, Colin Gray, and others with critical eyes. We also compare the key logic of the strategies with concept of Mutual Assured Destruction and of Limited Nuclear Options.The last part of this essay examines which strategic concepts are valid for stable deterrence, and which concepts are invalid. Finally, we discuss the possibility of reassuring an adversary through the creation of “security regimes, ” as suggested by as Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Alexander L. George.

著者

岩下 明裕

出版者

日本国際政治学会 ; 1957-

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.201, pp.17-32, 2020-09

著者

バークマン トマス・W 酒井 眞理

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.56, pp.102-116,L6, 1977

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The label "Silent Partners of the Peace" is commonly applied to the Japanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. This epithet belies the intense interest of the Japanese government and public in the issues of the post-World War I settlement and masks the extent of Japanese efforts to make major documents of thepeace amenable to her national interests.<br>The historical record reveals that Japan was very uneasy about the kind of global power structure that was taking shape in the wake of Germany's demise. Foreign policy spokesmen feared that Woodrow Wilson's peace program would thwart Japanese intentions to become the predominant power in the Far East. At Paris the emerging international order was taking on concrete embodiment in the Covenant of the League of Nations. At the conference table and behind the scenes Japan made concerted efforts to bring the Covenant and its sister document, the International Labor Convention, into line with her diplomatic goals. Heretofore unpublished amendment drafts found in the papers of Japan's leading spokesman at Paris reveal in a tangible way Japan's fundamental dissatisfaction with the Versailles system and suggest some Japanese alternatives to the Wilsonian vision.<br>Japanese efforts to modify these instruments of international organization were directed at some ten articles encompassing the issues of mandates, disarmament, arbitration, collective security, racial and national equality, and labor standards. Japanese diplomats achieved considerable success in diluting provisions on disarmament and labor. While many of the delegation's actions reflected the nation's search for status equal with the major powers, opposition to the strict standards of the International Labor Convention revealed that Japanese leaders did not regard the prize of equality as worth the price of accelerated domestic social change. On the whole, Japan's modification efforts showed a desire to make the Covenant and the Convention more flexible and hence less enforceable. While the extent of her involvement in the peace conference reflected an internationalist trend, Japan at the same time was intent upon protecting the unique economic, political, and strategic regional advantages accorded by her geographical position.

著者

渡邉 昭夫

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_159-181_169, 2015-09-30 (Released:2016-06-08)

参考文献数

1

著者

清水 謙

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_87-172_99, 2013-02-25 (Released:2015-03-05)

参考文献数

55

---

The impact of 9/11 was strong enough to change the Swedish security doctrine of neutrality that had existed since the Cold War. The Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson and Foreign Minister Anna Lindh stated that the security policy of 1992, that is “Military non-alliance making it possible to remain neutral in the event of conflicts in the vicinity”, had served well. This means that Sweden has practically abandoned its neutrality, confronting international terrorism. Swedish society, generally known as ‘an open society’, has many internal “security holes” and the terrorist incident in central Stockholm on December 11th 2010 exposed such kind of vulnerability. That incident was “home-grown” and the generous migration policy was challenged again. This article investigates ‘the securitization of migration’ in Sweden using the analytical framework of ‘securitization’ the Copenhagen School provided. The Copenhagen School insists that ‘speech act’ by securitizing actor(s) and ‘acceptance of the audience’ are required in the process of securitization and that ‘extraordinary measures’ beyond the state’s standard political procedure will be legitimated. The first two steps mentioned above are well discussed in Sweden in earlier research (e.g. by Abiri), while the third one is still controversial. Therefore, my aim in this article is to present a crucial example of an extraordinary measure. Indeed, the securitization of migration started to occur already in the 1990s or earlier, but a conclusive extraordinary measure was not implemented until December 2001, namely the case of repatriation of two Egyptians (Egyptenavvisningarna). In 2005 the Parliamentary Ombudsmen (Justitieombudsmännen) and the Committee on the Constitution (Konstitutionsutskottet) investigated this deviant case and declared that the governmental action was too optimistic and that the method of the repatriation was inappropriate. The repatriation itself has been treated as an accomplished fact in the Parliament even though the decision was adopted in irregular procedure. Therefore, this result leads us to the conclusion that the process of the securitization of migration has been fulfilled. The Securitization of migration in Sweden is still idling and there are no signs of ‘desecuritization’ after the terrorist incident in Stockholm. Furthermore, the sequential terrorist attacks in Norway in July 2011 are thought-provoking and indicate that the Nordic societies have to cope with migrational issues.

著者

森井 裕一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_88-101, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)

参考文献数

46

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Germany ceased conscription for its military, the Bundeswehr, in July 2011. Ever since the establishment of the Bundeswehr, the system of conscription had played a key role in connecting the Bundeswehr and German society. The concept of “Staatsbürger in Uniform” (citizen in uniform) was a guarantee to keep the Bundeswehr as a military for peace. This paper discusses why Germany stopped conscription, even though it had long been regarded as a vital component of Germany's postwar security culture.In the first section of this paper, historical developments in the German security culture and the role of the Bundeswehr are discussed. During the process of German rearmament in the 1950s, a new military was established in a way that would prevent it from being able to become an independent and undemocratic institution outside society—as it did in the days leading up to World War II. The Bundeswehr gained respect from society and became one of the most successful institutions in postwar Germany.In the second section, the changing role and the military transformation of the Bundeswehr after the end of the Cold War are examined. The changing international security environment forced Germany to reconsider the role of its military. During the period up until the end of the Cold War, the use of Germany's military was restricted to the defense of its own and its allies' territories. However, this previously respected self-imposed restriction became an obstacle in the new international environment. The 1994 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) made the deployment of the Bundeswehr outside NATO areas legally possible, although the FCC at the same time gave more power to the Bundestag, the German parliament, to control the deployment of the Bundeswehr. In the 1990s, the new military role for international crisis management demanded the military transformation of the Bundeswehr. Since the mid-1990s, many proposals were made to reform and reorganize the Bundeswehr, but they were not totally successful, because the domestic political discourse did not change as rapidly as the technical needs had changed. In addition, constraints upon the state budget made the reform even more difficult. After more than ten years of discussion, conscription was finally suspended under the strong leadership of the politically popular defense minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. According to zu Guttenberg's reform, the Bundeswehr would be an effective, efficient and flexible military for international crisis management.The final section analyzes the implications of the reform of the Bundeswehr on Germany's security culture and foreign policy. Germany's security policy defined in multilateralism, i.e. within NATO and the EU, would stay unchanged. However, the new security environment might change the domestic understanding of Germany's military, and thus Germany's security culture in the future.

著者

今井 宏平

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.150, pp.186-202,L18, 2007-11-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

52

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The aim of this paper is to explore how Turkey contributes to American foreign policy during the Post-Cold War era, especially Middle Eastern dimension.The discussion has three parts. Firstly, this deals with American foreign policy toward the Middle East during Post-Cold War era and demonstrates American failure. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, international order started to change and the United States intensified its hegemonic power. But America failed to manage Iraq War, and Middle East region is becoming disorder and nest of terrorism. Furthermore, Anti-Americanism is spreading rapidly in this region. The United States is coming to reach a deadlock.Secondly, Turkey will be situated “Transmission Middle Power” after Iraq War. Since the word of “Middle Power” is ambiguous, it has to be conceptualized at first. In this paper, “Middle Power” is classified as “Classical Middle Power”, “Functional Middle Power” and “Transmission Middle Power”. Historically, Turkey has been described as “Middle Power”. However, its role and quality of power have been changed by relationship of Great Power and international structure. Now, Turkey pioneers “Transmission Middle Power” by using historical and cultural factors.Thirdly, this focuses on American-Turkish relations. Since both states faced the Soviet threat during the Cold War period, Turkey contributed American containment policy. The end of bipolar system, however, changed their relationships. During the Gulf War, Turkey assisted the United States through economic sanction against Iraq and offered the multinational force to military bases. Turkey acted as “Classical Middle power” in the Cold War era. But after the Gulf War, both countries disagreed with OPC (Operation Provide Comfort) and OPCII in Northern Iraq. In Iraq War, Turkey did not offer to military bases. This was watershed of American-Turkish relations. After this decision, Turkey seeks to contribute to Middle Eastern stability as “Transmission Middle Power”. In particular, the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) is a good deliberative place among Middle Eastern countries to prevail democracy. Turkey is one of chair countries in Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD), which is a component of BMENA..In conclusion, Turkey is “Middle Power” so it has to keep good relationships with the United States to spread its influence toward International politics in the Post-Cold War era. However, the forms of cooperation have changed all the time by international affairs and structure. Now, “Transmission Middle Power” is the best form both America and Turkey.

著者

山田 満

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, no.116, pp.46-63,L8, 1997-10-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

50

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ASEAN will be composed of ten countries in the near future. The forms of government in the ASEAN countries is conceptualized as authoritarian regime for development. Authoritarian regimes in ASEAN take many forms such as military regime, single-party dictatorships, the ruling coalition, personalist autocracies, and absolute monarchies. They refuse the concept of Western democracy claiming that it does not bring stability and development for developing countries. The authoritarian characteristics of the Indonesian government and the Malaysian goverment are analyzed in this paper.The Suharto government is called the “New Order”. Suharto controlled the army, the bureaucracy, and the business community. He is supported by Golkar, which is a corporatist group that includes the entire bureaucracy, the armed forces, and the business sector. Golkar has won six elections overwhelmingly since the advent of the New Order. He promotes the economy for development in Indonesia based on the authoritarian system which is supported by the army, technocrats, and Golkar.The Mahathir government is supported by an UMNO-led coalition of parties representing the three ethic groups. The Malaysian government has promoted the New Economic Policy which eradicates poverty and channels more of the nation's wealth to the Malays during 1971-1990. Mahathir attempts to complete his developmental policies through some visions such as “Look East policy, ” “Malaysia Incorporated, ” and “Vision 2020.” The purpose of his authoritarian regime for development regime is to realize the ethic balance after the disturbance of 1969. His popularity becomes higher and higher because of his leaderships. This was seen in the overwhelming victory of the 1995 election.Finally, the middle class is growing in ASEAN. Do they contribute to democratization in their own countries? In the case of both countries, they are conservative generally because their consumptive lives depend on the developmental government. However, I conclude that the degree of democratization between the two becomes greater and greater because of the size of population, the characteristics of leaderships, the rise of the middle class, and the distribution of economic development.

著者

中見 立夫

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1980, no.66, pp.109-127,L5, 1980-11-05 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

69

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The purpose of this article is to clarify China and Russia's attitudes toward the Russo-Chinese negotiation concerning Mongolia in 1913.In 1911, the Mongols declared independence, and organized the Bogdo Khan government. Bogdo's Mongolia aimed to be a comlete independent state which united all Mongolians. However, Russia, just after the Mongol declaration of independence, aimed at creating an Autonomous Outer Mongolia. Opposed to these, China categorically opposed to the independence or autonomy of Outer Mongolia, but consented only to abolish the “New Policy” and reinstate the old Ch'ing administrative system in Mongolia.At first, Russia planned to mediate between Mongolia and China, but abandoned the plan because of China's over bigoted attitude. Then, Russia changed her attitude toward establishing a tentative diplomatic relations by concluding an agreement with Mongolia. Russian aim was to force China into negotiation with Russia.The Russo-Chinese negotiation concerning Mongolia, as Russia wished, was started in Reking in November 23, 1913, just after the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of November 3, in which Russian rights and interests in Outer Mongolia were widely recognized. In this negotiation, Russia, in exchange of her support of China's suzerainty over Mongolia, demanded China to recognize Outer Mongolia's autonomy and the validity of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement. China not only refused to recognize the Russo-Mongolian Agreement, but also demanded Russia to confirm China's sovereignty over Mongolia. Moreover, China wanted only to continue the old administrative system in Mongolia. The negotiation, once, was about to be settled. However, China's inordinate persistence to the reinstatement of the old system in Mongolia brought the rupture of the negotiation.Mongolia herself, kept an eye on the Russo-Chinese negotiation about her future status, and demanded Russia for Mongolia's participation in any negotiation which concern her fate.After an interruption, the Russo-Chinese negotiation was held again on September, 1913. Russia, at this negotiation, sought to establish only the principles to resolve the problems concerning Mongolia between China and Russia. The final settlement of the questions was to be entrusted to a future conference among Mongolia, Russia and China.In November 5, 1913, the Russo-Chinese Declaration was signed. The content of this declaration was that China gave up the reinstatement of the old regional system in Mongolia and confirmed the new one or the Autonomous Outer Mongolia under China's suzerainty. At th same time, the declaration also proclaimed the begining of the so-called Tripartite conference among Mongolia, Russia and China for the final settlement of the Mongol problems.

著者

石本 泰雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1959, no.10, pp.121-122, 1959-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

完倉 寿郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1959, no.9, pp.115-118, 1959-06-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

西野 照太郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1958, no.4, pp.85-96, 1958-02-05 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

28

著者

渡邊 武

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.158, pp.158_196-199, 2009-12-25 (Released:2012-02-20)

著者

芝崎 厚士

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.191, pp.191_143-191_156, 2018-03-28 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

15

著者

井関 正久

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.169-184,L19, 2001

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East and West Germany were in a turbulent period in the 1960s. On the one hand the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 determined the division of both German states and symbolized East-West tensions. On the other hand the first postwar generation that criticized the Nazi generation began protest actions against the establishment. &ldquo;1968&rdquo; was a symbolic date for the protest movements of the 1960s in both German states.<br>Today, &ldquo;1968&rdquo; is the focus of public attention again because the parties of the &ldquo;sixty-eighters&rdquo;, the &ldquo;Greens&rdquo;, have become the ruling parties as partners of the Social Democrats. The protagonists of &ldquo;1968&rdquo; seized the authority and are now on the side of the establishment. But some young people of the post cold war generation tend to look for an alternative to the &ldquo;sixty-eighters&rdquo; and call themselves the &ldquo;eighty-niners&rdquo;.<br>In the 1960s the generation conflict became a social phenomena and caused the student revolt in West Germany. Students pursued not only the reform of the universities but also the democratization of society as a whole. They were the main actors in the extra parliamentary opposition and sought out political coalitions with labor unions and pacifists to oppose the passing of the Emergency Law. The antiauthoritarian movement formed a new political public space in which everyday life was politicized. The sixty-eighters in West Germany were the main actors of the &ldquo;new social movements&rdquo; in the 1970s and initiators of the &ldquo;Greens&rdquo;. They brought the idea of grass-roots democracy, feminism and ecology to parliaments and constantly changed the political culture.<br>In East Germany there were also protest activities in the 1960s, in spite of suppression by the state. Under the influence of western subculture and student movements in West Germany the postwar generation opposed the cultural policies of the SED. During the &lsquo;Prague Spring&rsquo; in 1968, hopes of democratization of socialism rose in East Germany also. The Soviet repression of the Prague Spring brought about different protest activities, which were immediately put down by the police. The sixty-eighters in East Germany organized political alternative movements through the 1980s and formed several civic groups like New Forum in the autumn of 1989. They were also the initiators of Round Table as a dialogue forum, which symbolized the &ldquo;peaceful revolution&rdquo;.<br>The German protest movements in the 1960s contributed to forming the current democratic political culture. Since then public space has been made the place of political participation and social learning. Therefore, &ldquo;1968&rdquo; can be regarded as the beginning of the long democratization and emancipation process of German society.

著者

芝崎 厚士

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.156, pp.156_18-36, 2009-03-30 (Released:2011-09-10)

参考文献数

51

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This paper explores the life and thought of Tomonaga Sanjyuro (1871–1951) from historical and theoretical perspective, in order to find out formation of the epistemological base of understanding modern international relations in Japan. ‘Epistemological base’ is what all people in a certain time and place cannot help depend on or start from, when they try to conceive and explain the question, “What is International Relations?”, regardless of their theoretical or methodological or political standpoint. In other word, this paper aims at founding the proto-paradigm of IR/International Thoughts, or the episteme that made modern IR/International Thoughts possible before such paradigm or school or discipline emerged.First part of the paper deals with the importance of Tomonaga's Thought, which has been hidden by the presupposition of his historical role as merely an introducer or interpreter of history of modern Western Philosophy. Although his main academic work concentrating on introduction of Western philosophy, he wrote many articles about how Japan or Japanese should be-have as a civilized nation, when trying to receive Western customs, cultures, and way of thinking. He developed his argument by citing and applying his knowledge of the history of Western philosophy, sometimes almost going beyond rigid academic restraint. Tomonaga was not an ivory-tower scholar. Actually he was in a sense a critic of Japanese civilization. His concern is always what is the best philosophical position or attitude Japanese nation should import and incorporate, by amalgamating these western philosophy and traditional way of thinking.Second part analyzes his one of the two main works, Kant No Heiwa Ron (Study of Kant's discourse on Peace) (1922). Tomonaga always faced with twofold project. One is how to make Japan/Japanese philosophically independent and stable, by make them understanding the history of Western philosophy from his lectures in Kyoto University and his first main book, Kinsei Ni Okeru Ga No Jikaku Shi (Awakening the consciousness of Self in the history of modern Western philosophy) (1916). The other is how to construct the world that Japan/Japanese was stably founded in modern world, as a subject who has the same entitlement as other western states or nations. Kant No Heiwa Ron has been understood as an interpretation of Kant's Perpetual Peace (1795). However this book made a vital role of explaining how self (man), state, and international relations tightly connected by cross-reference structure. His main contention was not how Kant thought peace, but how to use and interpret Kant's argument in his unique way in order to construct the modern world. This paper concludes the validity of his constitution of ‘Self-State-International Relations’ after his death in 1951 and to the present.