著者

山極 潔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1968, no.35, pp.17-35, 1968

著者

石川 一雄

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.86, pp.1-17,L5, 1987

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Ethnic differences are used to be the single most important source of conflict within states, and they are frequently instrumental in arousing critical situations between countries as well. In present day world, the increase of ethnic diasporas and of antagonistic confrontations between or among politicized ethnic groups in most parts of the world, is changing the social and political milieu of the intra- and international relations more than expected. But, the international and, in particular, the trans-state activities of those ethnic groups, have hardly been addressed by students of comparative politics, or international relations. So that the demand for new scholarly efforts to understand their dynamics to find the peaceful and effective management of conflict become urgent.<br>This paper, responding to the demand, is concerned about the political and social configurations of states as serving units to create or sustain systemic ethnic disadvantages and inequalities. And to convey a sense of the generality of ethnic conflicts and to indicate the necessity of the reorientating basic conceptualizations, simultaneously, such concepts as state, nation, integration, and the formation of institutional arrangements are re-examined.<br>Firstly, using the compact illustration of the configuration of ethnic demands and governmental responses, various policy alternatives are relocated and reviewed on the continuum between complete autonomy and complete assimilation. The illustration tells us that ethnic conflicts cannot be expected to be resolved as long as we coexist with different ethnic groups in a single state, and also international frameworks won't be the final alternative to resolve the conflicts. The complete autonomy of ethnically self-conscious groups and their assimilation into the larger social setting in which they find themselves are both no real resolution of the conflicts. The best way of regulating ethnic conflicts has to be found somewhere in a domestic political arena.<br>Secondly, arguing the impracticability of social and cultural unification model both in segmented societies and in international regional systems, the necessity of pluralistic conceptualization of political integration is discussed.

著者

番定 賢治

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.198, pp.198_111-198_126, 2020-01-25 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

47

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This article focuses on activities of Japanese officials who worked for the Secretariat of the League of Nations (LN), and their influences in the Secretariat as a whole. Not only two Under Secretary-Generals (Inazo Nitobe, and Yotaro Sugimura) were appointed from Japan, but also many young officers (Ken Harada, Tetsuro Furugaki, and others) worked for the LN Secretariat. However, the number of Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat and the variation of the sections in which Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat engaged was evidently smaller than those of officers from any other permanent council member States. As for Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat, expertise in policy making is not so much important as ability to adapt themselves to Eurocentric environment of the LN Secretariat, and the main missions of Japanese officers in the LN Secretariat were liaison work between the LN Secretariat and Japanese government or Japanese press, and propagation of information about the work of the LN towards Japanese public. However, some Japanese officers were engaged in more various works, such as drafting communiques in some committees of the Assembly, and liaison work between the LN and other Asian nations. Moreover, during their temporary visits of Japan, Japanese officers in the LN secretariat went on lecture trips to promote understanding of the activities of the LN, and Nitobe’s lecture trip from 1924 to 1925 led to the creation of Tokyo branch of the LN Secretariat Information Section, which enhanced propagation of specific information about the work of LN. When the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) invited the LN Secretariat to its conference, Nitobe insisted that this institute and Pan-Pacific movement would be helpful to support the activities of the LN, and Sugimura and other Japanese officers in the LN Secretariats repeatedly insisted the significance of IPR for the LN. In 1927, two officers of the LN Secretariat (One of them was Setsuichi Aoki, the head of Tokyo branch of the LN Secretariat) was sent to the second biannual conference of IPR. In 1929, when the third biannual conference of IPR was held at Kyoto, Sugimura himself attended the conference. However, at the time of this conference, Sugimura tried to invite the LN representative in the conference to Manchuria and Korea, which indicates Sugimura’s intention to lead the LN Secretariat to support the political interest of his home country.

著者

湯川 拓

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.176, pp.176_126-176_139, 2014

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The balance of power has always been conceived as being closely connected with realism, in the conventional International Relations literature. In particular, realists believe that the balance of power is the result of alliances being formed within the international system, by nations in their pursuit of self-interest.<br>In contrast to the conventional literature, this paper emphasizes the role of the balance of power as a behavioral norm, within the international society. To be more specific, it sheds light on the fact that the balance of power provides moral and obligatory standards for the members of international society to adhere to. At the same time, it has also contributed to public interest within international society. Although the normative balance of power first made its appearance in the 18th century, the current balance of power (observed in contemporary international society) does not bear the role of a behavioral standard. Two relevant questions which we should consider then, is (1) at what point in time exactly, and (2) in what way exactly, the balance of power norm waned in terms of influence. This paper aims to answer these two questions.<br>Its main finding is as follows. This paper stresses on the legitimacy of the balance of power norm (within international society) as being key to answering the two research questions above. In the 18th century the balance of power referred to the need to maintain an equal distribution of physical military power, as a norm that was necessary for ensuring stability in the international society. Some necessary conditions for the balance of power to exist as a norm in the 18th century were the absence of disputes over legitimacy, and the recognition (or achievement) of a certain degree of homogeneity amongst the members of international society. When the balance of power came to be established as a norm in the earlier half of the 19th century, it was perceived as contributing to homogeneity in international society. It referred to the maintenance of equilibrium in the international society, vis-a-vis the sustenance of a particular regime, rather than the balancing of physical power. It finally lost its appeal as a norm during the latter half of the 19th century and after the First World War, when new principles of legitimacy such as nationalism and democracy appeared.<br>The various different meanings implied by the term 'balance of power' tell us multitudes about the type of world order which was deemed desirable by the international society, under different situations.

著者

具島 兼三郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1972, no.47, pp.1-16, 1972-12-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

尾上 正男

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1960, no.12, pp.40-52, 1960

著者

木戸 蓊

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1979, no.63, pp.6-21,L1, 1979-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

14

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After the Czechoslovak Crisis in 1968, Yugoslavia has adopted the plan of “General People's defense, ” which has brought about a fundamental change in her defense policy. According to that plan, a Territorial Defense Force is organized besides the Yugoslav People's Army (the conventional force). In case of a massive blitz attack by an overwhelmingly superior big power, the role of the Yugoslav People's Army would be to delay enemy penetration sufficiently for the country to carry out total mobilization. Then, the Army and the Territorial Defense Force would wage a total resistance war against the invader. The aim of the General People's Defense is, thus, to divert a big power from his intention of aggression against Yugoslavia, by demonstrating that a blitz attack would fail and would be turned into a bog of prolonged war.A lot of obstacles would appear in the way of implementation of the General People's Defense. For example, the process of urbanization in postwar Yugoslavia has radically changed the conditions of partisan war which had formerly been fought mainly in villages. Furthermore, transformation of the value basis of younger generation caused by social mobilization, as well as decline of the authority of Partisan myth, will influence the conditions of defense. Nationality conflicts in multinational Yugoslavia may also constitute an obstacle to the function of the General People's Defense. For all these problems, the idea of General People's Defense offers us a very valuable example of defense conception in both political and military sense.

著者

川端 正久

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1977, no.57, pp.120-144,L6, 1977

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From the outbreak of World War II to the present time, people in no fewer than 50 countries have resorted to guerrilla warfare or to other forms of popular armed struggle. The guerrilla liberation struggles were begun in Africa in the 1960's, which provide some of the best examples of national liberation movement. The people of &lsquo;Portuguese&rsquo; Guin&eacute; took up arms to free their country from colonial domination in 1963 under the leadership of the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independ&ecirc;ncia da Guin&eacute; e Cabo Verde), led by Amilcar Cabral, its founder and secretary-general.<br>Amilcar Cabral is gradually gaining recognition as the most original and significant African revolutionary thinker to appear since the death of Franz Fanon and Kwame Nkrumah. This reputation is strengthened by the independence of Guin&eacute;-Bissau. Not only did he make notable theoretical contributions to analyzing the reality of his country in the context of national liberation movements, but he also did so in the area of revolutionary practice. The thought of Amilcar Cabral is of primary importance to the people of Africa in the struggles against colonialism and neo-colonialism now going on across the continent. And further, his theories have a great deal of significance for the people and revolutionaries of the three continents. This paper provides a brief assessment of the thought and behavior of Amilcar Cabral. The first part surveys books and articles on the study of Amilcar Cabral. The second part delineates the chronological summary of Amilcar Cabral. The third part traces in outline the thought and activities of Amilcar Cabral.

著者

スガナミ H

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.199-210, 2001-02-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

57

著者

五野井 郁夫

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_168-200_171, 2020

著者

宮岡 勲

出版者

日本国際政治学会 ; 1957-

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.179, pp.69-82, 2015-02

著者

土山 實男

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1986, no.82, pp.163-181, 1986-05-17 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

41

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_75-195_91, 2019

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<p>This article re-examines the historical process of framing Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, which is called Renunciation of War Clause, and focuses on its function as reassurance by the loser. Dealing with the function, this research explains the reason why postwar Japan-U. S. relationship could dramatically progress conflict resolution from the total war to the restoration of peace from both theoretical and historical standpoints.</p><p>To answer the question mentioned above, this article argues that, in terms of a theory of reassurance by the loser, Postwar Japan intended to treat the victor's anxiety on its challenge by relying on the normative self-restraint of Article 9 of the Constitution. The argument regards the provision of the Article as a signal justified by an appropriate norm. While the U. S. was concerned about Japan's challenge and intended to make it impossible by prohibiting armament, Japan dealt with the fear of the U. S. by reassuring its own intention. Japan sent a normative signal of reassurance, which bound itself by denying war and armament. Therefore, it is appropriate to understand that, in essence, Article 9 of the Constitution had practical meaning as a signal of reassurance in order to let the U.S. and other countries know Japan's peaceful intention, rather than an abstract norm derived from the idea of pacifism, which came from regret for the war.</p><p>Tracing the historical process of framing Article 9 of the constitution reveals that it worked as the loser's reassurance. The process was the opposite direction of the order of the completed text. The U. S. home government decided to disarm Japan at first, and the local commander MacArthur followed the policy. On the other hand, as Japanese leader, Prime Minister Shidehara proposed renunciation of war to MacArthur. However, it was just an ideal promise regarding peaceful intention, and lacked reassurance in terms of the capability. The Japanese government hoped to maintain the provision of armament in the constitution. It was unacceptable for the U.S., so it prepared a draft of the constitution which included renunciation of war proposed by Shidehara as well as the prohibition of arms. The U.S. presented the draft to Japan in order to confirm its peaceful intention. The draft imposed the cost of the prohibition of arms, while it mitigated the impression of burden by referring to the normative legitimacy of renunciation of war. The draft as the U.S. screening set up a hurdle that Japan should clear. Japan reassured the U.S. and other members of the international society by sending a signal which became costly due to the democratic institutional constraint of diet deliberations. It made Renunciation of War Clause a national pledge.</p>

著者

千々和 泰明

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_59-195_74, 2019

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<p>Termination of war is a "bridge" between war and peace. However, comparing with other research topics of the International Relations (IR) discipline, the subject of the end of war remains highly understudied in both qualitative and quantities terms. In fact "restoration" of interstate relationship presupposes "collapse" of them. War termination phenomena deserves more scholarly attentions if understanding the transition process from the collapse to restoration of interstate relations goes at the heart of the entire IR discipline.</p><p>This paper purports to answer the question of how wars end. It presents the concept of "the dilemmas between the compromised peace and the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict" and argues that costs, future risks, and relative importance of them are an independent variable that shape the equilibrium point to solve these dilemmas. These are often malleable as an outcome of interactive processes among the belligerents. In order to advance this argument, the paper takes the following steps.</p><p>First, in reviewing the existing theoretical literature on war termination, this paper categorizes them into four approaches as: power politics; rational choice; domestic politics; and cognitive psychology, and reviews them systematically.</p><p>Second, it claims that the analytical frameworks of war termination as power politics and rational choice approach offer more useful analytical leverage than domestic politics and cognitive psychology approach. As such this article focuses on the relations between compromise and fundamental elimination of cause of conflict, on the top of power. Although the winning belligerent can eliminate fundamental cause of conflict in order to eradicate the root of future trouble by imposing unconditional surrender on its hostiles, entailed costs will increase. On the other hand, if it chooses the compromised peace to avoid increasing its warfighting costs, there would be a problem that it only postpones the rise of an unavoidable battle in the future. So this article presents the following hypotheses: (1) in the case that the level of warfighting cost is high and future risk will be low for winning side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the compromised peace; (2) in the case of the level of costs is low and future risk will be high for prevailing side, the form of war termination would tend to attain the fundamental settlement of cause of conflict; (3) in the case of the level of costs and future risk in ascendant side are balanced, the form of war termination would be indeterminate and strategic interactions among the belligerents would decide the equilibrium point to overcome this dilemmas.</p><p>Third, this article provides the illustration of the above hypotheses through actual historical case studies such as termination of the Gulf War in 1991, the Iraq War in 2003, and the Pacific War in 1945.</p>

著者

土佐 弘之

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.168, pp.168_131-145, 2012-02-29 (Released:2014-03-31)

参考文献数

52

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Marx-Leninism had justified its proletariats' dictatorship and had suppressed anarchism under the pretext of promoting emancipation from the oppression and exploitation of capitalism. Anarchism gradually re-emerged while oppression by Stalinism became conspicuous. Following the collapse of state socialism, neo-liberalism became hegemonic and rapid de-regulation brought in social polarization, which foregrounded the crisis of the electoral representative democracy as well as contradictions of capitalism. Responding to the crisis of the competitive democracy and neoliberal capitalism, new anarchism began to emerge including Zapatista insurgency (1994) and direct actions in Seattle (1999) or in New York (2011). Although some scholars also begin to examine its implications of new anarchism in the global politics, it is still remain marginalized in IR.This article will explore the politics of new anarchism in the context of global democratization beyond the territorial sovereignty system. First we critically examine the intricate relation between Hobbesian realism and anarchy by focusing upon the marginality of anarchism in the mainstream IR. Second we probe the current crisis of competitive representative democracy and emerging new anarchist movements by examining the incompatibility between the territorial state sovereignty and deepening of democracy. Third we probe implications of democracy against the state, savage democracy, by re-examining an argument on society against the state in the political anthropology. Last we examine the (im-)possibilities that anarchism would play a role of ‘democracy as a movement’ to promote ‘democracy as an institution’ such as electoral representative democracy beyond the limits of state sovereignty.As the global financial crisis indicates, the states cannot control a flow of powers effectively and tend to be shaken by its excess liquidity. While a growing flow of powers aggravates the crisis of the representative democracy based upon the territorial sovereignty, new anarchism begins to constitute a part of globalization from below by aiming to minimize domination. It is certain that the history of anarchism has continued to be a history of losers except a few cases of temporal autonomous zones such as the Paris commune (1871). However it is also certain that philosophical anarchism provides a valuable foundation for promoting global democracy by activating savage democracy.

著者

朴 宗根

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1963, no.22, pp.50-68,L4, 1963-07-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

113

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The Kapo Reform of 1894 occupies a significant place, in various ways, in the modern history of Korea. It has warranted differring interpreations regarding its historical importance. As a prerequisite for the proper evaluation of the Kapo Reform, the author, focusing his view point on the Kunguk Kimuch'o, analized historical changes involving that office along with the pivotal role it played in carrying out the reform program.In the fall of 1894, the Japanese troops in Seoul engineered a palace coup, and after occupying the palace they brought the Taewongun into power, hoping to over-throw the anti-Japanese Min faction and to provoke the Chinese into a war. The Taewongun, though anti-Min at heart, demonstrated his anti-Japanese attitude. The purpose of the establishment of the Kunguk Kimuch'o, therefore, was to check the power of the Taewongun and to carry out Japanese plans in Korea. Key roles were played by the members of the Japanese Legation in the establishment of that office, and the administration of its functionswas in the hands of the members of the pro-Japanese reform faction along with a few neutralists and those Taewongun faction members who were outside the Min faction.The Kunguk Kimuch'o was delegated a broad power to administer national affairs through a majority vote of its members. Although the theory of majority rule was applied, in reality, the main purpose of voting was to deprive the Taewongun of power through concentrated manipulation of the strength of the pro-Japanese faction.Following the establishment of the Kunguk Kimuch'o, hostility between the Taewongun and that office grew bitter, and as a result, most of the reform programs adopted by that office became either nullified or ineffective. Instability within the government and the stagnant state of Japanese policies in Korea resulted in the extremely disadvantageous diplomatic position of Japan. Her war with China also made her standing diplomatically unfavorable.The Japanese Government, finding itself in an uneasy and embarrassing situation, dispatched Inoue Kaoru, one of the most influential and able statesmen, to Korea as Minister, instructing him to purge the Taewongun and abolish the Kunguk Kimuch'o. His coming to Seoul was followed by the restoration of political power to Uijongbu, the Council of State, as before.From the foregoing analysis it can be concluded that the Kunguk Kimuch'o deserves no positive credit as an autonomous reform organ. Furthermore, although partial success resulted during the Kapo Reform under that office, it made rather negative contributions when one considers the broader aspects of the modernization attempts made in Korea since then. In other words, the Koreans after 1894 came to regard “modernistic” reform as “alien aggression” and resisted any such process. Moreover, the Kapo Reform lacked legitimacy either in its techniques or in its methods, and consequently failed to transform the people's energies into justifiable historical advancement and development.

著者

古城 佳子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.119, pp.217-220, 1998

著者

鈴木 絢女

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.185, pp.185_66-185_81, 2016-10-25 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

30

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Malaysia used to be categorized as one of the “High Performing Asian Economies” for its track record of high economic growth and macro-economic stability, among others. However, recent debates on the Malaysian economy point to slowing growth, being caught in a middle-income trap, persisting income inequality, budget deficit, and increasing government debt after the Asian Financial Crisis. To overcome these problems, the Malaysian government launched an economic-fiscal-distributive reform package called the New Economic Model (NEM) in 2010. However, the implementation of the NEM has been faced with a series of compromises and deadlocks. This is surprising given the prior characterization of Malaysia as a “strong state.”This paper aims to reveal the weakness of the state of Malaysia by shedding light on the persisting budget deficit. Based on federal budget documents, the paper argues that the expanding public expenditure is attributed to the increase in the following: (i) redistributive programs, such as subsidy for gas and oil and cash transfers to the lower-income group as a means to earn electoral support; and (ii) particularistic distributive programs that are often allocated by the Prime Minister, benefit Bumiputera businesses and cronies of the dominant governing party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), and consolidate the intra-party power basis. In addition, the Government’s failure to strengthen the revenue base given the fear of losing votes can be regarded as another driver of the persisting fiscal deficit.In spite of the NEM’s target of a balanced budget by 2020, the Malaysian government has been failing to implement fiscal reforms. The paper argues that this is a result of the lack of autonomy of the Prime Minister vis-a-vis the voters and the intra-party constituency. Malaysia’s leadership has been increasingly sensitive to the demands of its broad and internal constituents owing to increasing electoral competition since the Asian Financial Crisis, glaringly manifested in the 1999, 2008 and the 2013 General Elections. Such a weak state is a historical by-product of a strong state in the 1990s that marginalized intra-UMNO opposition and laborers in order to implement development policies, and eventually brought about a face-off between the governing party that keeps cohesion through distribution of rents, on one hand, and opposition that expanded its support by exploiting the issues of lack of transparency, freedom and equality, on the other.To regain fiscal balance, the Malaysian government is faced with a dilemma. Decreasing budgetary allocation for the lower income group or the intra-UMNO interests will further weaken the government. Likewise, tax raise will turn away voters who are skeptical about the way their money is used. While the promise of fiscal accountability may persuade some of the skeptical taxpayers, vested interest groups would continue to resist such moves.

著者

増原 綾子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2016, no.185, pp.185_82-185_97, 2016-10-25 (Released:2016-11-22)

参考文献数

47

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Regarding viewpoints on threat perception and civil-military relations, theoretical analyses have generally concluded that under a high internal threat, civil-military relations are unstable and that a high external threat and low internal threat brings about stable civil-military relations. However, Indonesia’s experiences do not support these analyses. During the war of independence era, under the high external security environment, Indonesia’s civil-military relations were unstable because of the disagreements between the government and military concerning negotiations and the guerrilla warfare against the Netherlands. During the Suharto regime, high internal threats caused stable civil-military relations because the threat perception of the military coincided with that of the government.This paper hypothesizes that it is not external threats and internal threats that influence the stability of civil-military relations but whether or not the government and military share the same point-of-view on threat perception. I will prove this hypothesis by analyzing the threat perception of the government and military in Indonesia during the democratization era.After the decline of the Suharto regime, the military officers resigned from political and administrative posts and abolished business activities during the democratization process. The government and military met with domestic threats (e.g., separatist movements, terrorism, and communal violence). While the government tried to solve separatist movements peacefully, the military urged the government to suppress them forcefully. As a result, the difference in the threat perception between the government and military deteriorated the civil-military relations.However, domestic threats almost ended by 2005, and Indonesia began to deal with external threats. One of them was a territorial dispute with Malaysia. In 2002, Indonesia lost two small islands near the border of Malaysia based on the decision of a judge from the International Court of Justice. After the court decision, Malaysia attempted to expand its claim over the oil-rich sea area, which included the Ambalat block near the islands. The Indonesian government as well as many Indonesian citizens resented the expansion and began to view Malaysia’s territorial claim as an external threat. The military also shifted their threat perception focus from domestic conflicts to the defense and management of the border areas. Another external threat that Indonesia has had to deal with is the territorial conflict over the South China Sea. Since 2008, Chinese fishing boats have often entered the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Indonesia around the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea; in 2010, Chinese military ships threatened Indonesian patrol ships that had captured Chinese fishing boats and ordered the Indonesian patrol ships to release the fishing boats.In the latter half of the 2000s, the government and military came to share viewpoints on and perceptions of the external threat to Indonesia’s territorial integrity concerning the territorial dispute with Malaysia and the South China Sea conflict. This contributed to an increase in the military budget and stabilized the civil-military relations in Indonesia.

著者

毛里 和子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.182, pp.182_146-182_149, 2015-11-05 (Released:2016-08-04)