著者

安部 博純

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.51, pp.109-128, 1974

著者

川本 謙一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1970, no.43, pp.1-24, 1970

著者

高橋 伸夫

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1990, no.95, pp.63-78,L9, 1990

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The purpose of this paper is to review the changing patterns of Chinese communist perception of the world during the 1950s, focusing on the rise and fall of the theory of intermediate zone. The theory was first articulated by chairman Mao Zedong in an interview with an American journalist Anna Louise Strong in August 1946. The intermediate zone means the vast area lying between the United States and the Soviet Union. The theory contended that not the East-West conflict but the conflict between the American imperialism and the oppressed people of the world formed the main contradiction in the present situation. This view was accompanied by a characteristic notion of international security. According to Mao, it was the bold struggle against imperialism that would promote &ldquo;peace&rdquo; among world great powers. Such a notion marked a contrast with the Soviet attitude which saw &ldquo;The Great Alliance&rdquo; as essential in securing world peace.<br>With the increasing pressure from Moscow to unify ideology within the socialist camp, the term &ldquo;intermediate zone&rdquo; vanished from the Chinese documents since late 1948. But the logic of the theory still influenced the perception of the Chinase leaders until 1952.<br>There were remarkable changes in the framework of Chinase world view after 1953. Firstly, the notion of peaceful coexistence was introduced into the Chinese policy papers. Secondly, the evaluation of neutralism was adjusted. Thirdly, the demarkation of the socialist camp was redefined. These changes altogether modified the previous notion of international security underlying the theory of intermediate zone. Namely, the idea that people's bold struggle against imperialism in the intermediate zone would reduce the probability of world war was replaced by the notion that consultation among the great powers was indispensable for promoting world peace. With this notion on international security, Chinese communist theory proceeded to the diplomacy of peaceful coexistence.<br>In 1958 the theory of intermediate zone was revived. While it emphasized the necessity of daring anti-imperialist struggle in the intermediate zone as it did in the late 1940s, it did not discard the idea that the coordinated effort between the communist nations and the Asian nationalist regimes was effective in eradicating the influence of American imperialism from Asia.<br>The revival of the theory of intermediate zone brought about a discrepancy with regard to the notion of peaceful coexistence between the Chinese and Russians. Although such a discrepancy was relative in character, it was destined to deepen by the transformation of the world system in the late 1950s.

著者

前田 慶穂

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1980, no.65, pp.1-23,L1, 1980-11-05 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

47

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It cannot be neglected that the total population of Muslims in Russia has amounted to 18 millions before the Russian Revelution. Among others, the nationalism and movement (‘Jadid’ movement) directed by Muslim intelligentsia in Volga-Tartar region who had received Russian education, shows itself as Muslim cultural renaissance. They opposed to Zarist policy of conversion and assimilation, and insisted on their autonomy within the framework of socialism in the midst of the Revolution. Bolsheviks, especially Stalin who had been in charge of national problems, denied Muslim nationalism completely and integrated them into USSR by strict means.But Muslim communists, as is the case with Sultangaliev, rightly, evaluated national potentials of Russian Muslims indicated in ‘Jadid’ movement paid attention to the influence of the Russian Revolution to the East, and criticized the Russian Revolution itself which was based on Western ideas. Although they were purged and vanished, Muslim communists, represented by Sultangaliev, deserve to be reappraised now.

著者

松永 泰行

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.141, pp.1-9,L5, 2005

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This issue, comprising of eight research articles and one review article, is focused on &ldquo;the Middle East in International Relations&rdquo; and comes in the midst of another structural change in the international environment of the Middle East. The previous change resulted from the collapse of the Cold War structure on the global level. Although the change affected globally, the Middle East was one of the first to experience its impact through the way the transregional actors reacted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The current structural change, however, is more specific to the region and relates to the latter's relationship with the only remaining superpower, the United States. This time, the change followed the 9/11 attack, which is said to have forced the U. S. policy-makers to fundamentally reconsider the relationship between the U. S. and the Middle Eastern states and societies. How this change in international relations will affect the Middle East as a whole and a multitude of state and subnational actors in the region remains to be seen. Yet the transformative processes apparently have already been under way.<br>The articles assembled here differ from one another in their perspective on the Middle East. Some examine recent developments; others focus on historical relations. For the purpose of this introduction, three different perspectives can be identified.<br>The first perspective concerns the relations between the only superpower and actors in the Middle East. The United States, as a transregional actor, stands out in its resources and capacity and is capable of entering into relations with a host of state and subnational actors in the region. Sakai's article adopts this perspective and examines the mutually collaborative relationships between the U. S. Government and a number of anti-Hussein Iraqi groups before and after the U. S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.<br>The second perspective concerns some types of intra-regional dynamics and developments. Tateyama examines the post-Oslo Accord Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Matsumoto assesses the state of democratization in the region by comparing the party systems in ten Arab states. Yamamoto examines nine Arab states in terms of their policies on controlling internet connections. Kashima's review article examines four theoretically-informed monographs on regional intra-state relations.<br>The third perspective concerns the Middle East as a foreign policy issue. Three articles by Hanzawa, Takayasu, and Okuda, examine British foreign policy historically during separate time periods. All, however, focus on England's dealings with another foreign power of the time on the matters relating to the greater Middle East.

著者

松永 泰行

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_42-56, 2012

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Why has Iran been refusing to comply with the binding U.N. Security Council resolutions and to halt its uranium enrichment program? Why has the apparent cost that it incurs by defying the international community not deterred Iran from furthering its nuclear program? Why has postrevolutionary Iran been opposing the U.S.-led peace processes between Israel and the Palestinians and made it a rule to counter any U.S. influence in the region?<br>In this article, I posit that postrevolutionary Iran's principled opposition to the U.S. is not just rhetoric or an ideologically-driven self-image, but that it may well be considered its self-constructed strategic cultural proclivity. While mindful not to fall into the trap of essentialist or cultural determinist arguments, I find the concept of strategic culture as a context useful. Following scholars such as Stuart Poore, I posit that decision makers perceive and interpret their strategic environment culturally, while what may be considered their constituted strategic culture give meaning to material factors.<br>As a first step toward identifying postrevolutionary Iran's strategic culture, I examine the views of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the paramount leader of the Islamic revolutionary movement and the first head of the postrevolutionary Islamist state, as regards contemporary international relations and the roles of the superpowers therein. Convinced that part of the mission of the Islamic revelation was about providing salvation against oppression and fighting injustice, Khomeini went on to construct postrevolutionary Iran's dominant strategic discourse anchored in the perceived obligation to avoid and counter earthly hegemony or domination. Khomeini preached that Iran must resist the &ldquo;satanic&rdquo; moves of the both superpowers and find only sanctuary under the banner of Islam. While finding it logical and necessary to build and maintain good neighborly and mutually respectful relations among states, Khomeini ruled out submitting to any international hegemon.<br>Iran in its post-Khomeini period continued to maintain its counterhegemonic stance. Ayatollah Khamenei, the successor to Khomeini as the head of the Islamic state of Iran, cultivated its counter-hegemonic strategic culture in part to secure his own authority and build his power base. The strategic alliance constructed between Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved to perpetuate post-Khomeini-era Iran's anti-American strategic culture.<br>In conclusion, I argue that Iran may be best regarded as a counterhegemon, not an aspiring hegemon and that the kind of power that postrevolutionary Iran has found necessary to possess is not the power for hegemony and domination, but the power to resist and persevere. This proclivity helps explain why Iran has continued its nuclear program despite the cost it incurs by defying the U.N. Security Council resolutions. It also helps explain why it has maintained its principled anti-U.S. stance for the last three decades. It does not, however, seem logical to conclude that Iran's apparent pursuit of the deterrent capabilities through its nuclear or other programs is directly influenced by its counter-hegemonic strategic culture. The argument, nonetheless, supports a view that Iran's strategic posture is almost exclusively defensive and that its apparent pursuit of the means of deterrence should not necessarily be considered posing a threat to the region or the international community.

著者

佐藤 栄一

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1985, no.80, pp.31-46,L8, 1985

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This article attempts to examine the present situation of the strategic nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The analysis starts with the SALT I agreement signed in May 1972, because it is this agreement that provided with the framework of the ongoing U. S. -Soviet arms race.<br>First, section 1 examines the significance of the SALT I agreement, which fixed the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers. In so doing, special attention will be given to how the agreement relates to the concept of &ldquo;assured destruction.&rdquo; Then, we look at the fact that the Soviet efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces by deploying MIRV-ed heavy missiles within the ceiling of SALT I led to the signing of the SALT II agreement; it was signed in July 1979 and set quantitative limits on MIRV-ed ICBM's.<br>Next, section 2 analyzes the evolution of the U. S. strategic theories from Robert S. MacNamara's &ldquo;flexible response strategy&rdquo; to Richard Nixon's &ldquo;realistic deterrence strategy&rdquo;; each of them proposed the way to utilize MIRV-ed delivery systems in practice, the focal point of the U. S. -Soviet nuclear arms race in the 1970s. The close examination of each year's <i>Report of the Secretary of Defense</i> published during the 1970s will reveal how the United States gradually revised its strategic doctrine to adjust it to the new MIRV technology. First it introduced the concept of &ldquo;strategic sufficiency, &rdquo; then &ldquo;targeting system, &rdquo; and lastly completed its doctrinal revision by adopting &ldquo;countervailing strategy.&rdquo;<br>Finally, section 3, taking up the concept of &ldquo;damage limitation, &rdquo; another major element in SALT I, shows what ideas brought about the agreement restricting the deployment of ABM's. Based upon this analysis, we also discuss the implication of President Ronald Reagan's initiative, i. e., the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) program.

著者

毛利 敏彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1974, no.51, pp.25-42, 1974-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

38

著者

宮岡 勲

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.179, pp.179_69-179_82, 2015-02-15 (Released:2016-01-23)

参考文献数

76

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Since the Gulf War, the United States has built up a joint information system, which is interoperable among the military services--the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The application of information technology to the military system has contributed to maintain the prominent position of the United States in international politics. According to Kenneth Waltz’s theory, however, the United States cannot sit on its laurels. His balance-of-power theory leads us to expect states to emulate the successful policies of others. João Resende-Santos has developed a “neorealist theory of emulation.” This theory contains two noteworthy points. First, the timing, speed, and scale of military emulation vary in accordance with the level of threat in the surrounding security environment. Second, when the option of relying on the capabilities of other states through alliance formation (external balancing) is available, the perception of reduced threat weakens the timing, speed, and scale of military emulation. In other words, emulation, as well as innovation, is regarded as one form of arms buildup relying on one’s own capabilities (internal balancing). However, is the level of threat in the surrounding security environment a really decisive factor of emulation? Do the timing, speed, and scale of military imitation vary with the region of the world? Moreover,don’t states emulate others for the formation and strengthening of an alliance? By verifying these questions,it is possible to contribute theoretically to research on the international diffusion of military technology and ideas, especially the diffusion of information revolution in military affairs, on which little research has been conducted. This article attempts to refute Resende-Santos’ arguments, by analyzing the diffusion of the joint information system of the U.S. Armed Forces to two allies, the United Kingdom and Japan. As a result of this analysis, I make two points. First, even in regions where the levels of threat in the surrounding security environment are different, the military emulation of similar timing, speed, and scale may occur. Second, states emulate others not only for their own military buildup but also for the enhancement of their alliance through ensuring interoperability. The body of this article is divided into three sections. First, I describe the development of the joint information systems in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan during the post-Cold War period. Second, I suggest the diffusion of the joint information system from the United States to the other two countries and present a framework for analyzing emulation, a concept that is similar to but different from diffusion. Third, I consider the emulation of the U.S. military system by the United Kingdom and Japan in more detail.

著者

山尾 大

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_29-194_45, 2018

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<p>U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought about not only distortion of state building, but also the problems that affected political turmoil in the Middle East as well as international politics. This paper aims to argue the impacts that the U.S. invasion of Iraq had toward the process of Iraqi state building and toward regional politic in the Middle East, by focusing first on external factors brought about by this invasion, and second on internal factors caused by political rivalry among Iraqi political elites.</p><p>This paper makes three main findings. First, the new regime had no choice but relying on cooptation policy to local leaders in order to stabilize its government, which was quite similar to the mechanism of rule by the former authoritarian Baʻthist regime. The reason of this similarity can be found in the fact that the regime change was brought about by the foreign invasion, and thus new regime had to be constructed by former-exile political elites who did not have any support bases of constituencies within local community. In addition, the introduction of the Western democratic system that political representation should be equal according to population of ethnic and sectarian groups resulted in manifestation of sectarian difference. These external factors caused problems in the building of political institutions.</p><p>Second, Iraqi internal actors deconstructed democratic institutions brought in from outside and began to utilize them according to their own interests. The fact that democratization was proceeded without the establishment of state institutions made it possible for Iraqi actors to use these democratic institutions for their own political purpose. Thus, the new regime had no choice than becoming authoritarian in order to stabilize its government. Moreover, it was unavoidable for international society to ignore this authoritarian regime as it prioritized stability of Iraq.</p><p>Third, this tendency, however, resulted in the spread of opposition movements within Iraq and subsequent loss of control of opposition-led areas. It was these areas where so-called Islamic State penetrated in and agitated sectarian conflicts among Iraqis.</p><p>Hence, it can be said that sectarian conflicts spread inside and outside Iraq as a result of the interaction of the fact that U.S. invasion brought about problems in democratic institutions and the fact that Iraqi internal actors utilized these institutions for their own interests. In other words, when the problems that were brought about by external factors are used as political tools of internal actors, specific problems to the country become manifest, which results in spreading to regional politics in a very violent manner.</p>

著者

青野 博昭

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1961, no.16, pp.86-96, 1961

著者

真鍋 俊二

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1975, no.53, pp.30-53,L2, 1975-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

66

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When one reconsiders the “Cold War”, a reassessment of the Yalta Diplomacy, especially co-operation between the USA and the USSR, is one of the great problems which we cannot neglect, because it marks the beginning of the Cold War.In the reassessment of the Yalta Diplomacy, this work takes as its starting point the following traditional basic points of view: (1) power politics and personal diplomacy (J. Snell); (2) the limits of power (G. Kolko), and; (3) the dynamism in Great Power conferences (D. Clemens). After due consideration of these points, we should now totally reassess the Yalta Diplomacy by making clear the efficacy and limitations of each basic point of view. At the same time we should pay attention to the “reformism” of the foreign policy of F. D. R.Generally speaking, co-operation between the USA and the USSR characterized the international political history of that time. If, however, we reassess it at each of the following levels: (1) American policy towards the Big Three Conference (especially “Conference diplomacy”); (2) American policy towards each country or area on the agenda and else, and; (3) American postwar planning (in its role as a Great Power), we should add these limitations to the degree of the characterization. We should also remember that these limitations result from the tendency of power politics and the reformism in the foreign policy of F. D. R.

著者

高山 巖

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.101, pp.10-31,L6, 1992-10-24 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

110

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When the new-born modern State, in an attempt to overcome the resistance of the medieval social forces that stood in its way, adopted the concept of Sovereignty as a symbol of its territorial supremacy, it was immediately caught in a heated controversy which revolved round the issue: wherein should this supreme power ultimately reside, that is, in the ruling Monarch or in the People?Out of this polemic emerged two schools of thought which exerted an immense influence on the development of international relations theory. One was the Grotiusian school or model which, leaving untouched the Monarch vs. People polemic, declared instead the State to be sovereign, thus preparing the ground for the concept of State Sovereignty that won wide acceptance in later years. The other school can be linked to Rousseau who, having derived sovereignty fron the General will of the People, went further to identify Nation and People, so that the long dormant role of Nationality was finally transformed into a radically active one in politics. The origin of modern nationalism can rightly be traced to Rousseau. To this must be added the role played by the doctrine of the Reason of State, which was initially developed by Machiavelli and Hobbes, and was later completed by Hegel with his deified concept of “State as an absolute goal in itself”. Such was the historical setting in which the myth of the Nation-State as a sacrosanct entity of unquestionable supremacy was born and nurtured.The crisis of 20th century international relations, however, has evoked an acute awareness of the need for a new paradigm in the conceptual relations of Nation, State, and Man. The World Community model, which takes the global community of mankind as a point of reference, as contrasted with the Grotiusian model of sovereign States, deserves special attention in this regard, although its viability amidst the harsk realities of State-oriented international relations can never be taken for granted. The future of the Nation-State and of State Sovereignty may be said to depend on the extent to which mankind will successfully maintain a dialogue between the old and new models in such a way that the focus of man's national sentiment as a member of the State can eventually be made compatible with his identity as a member of the community of a higher order, known as the Global Human Community.

著者

阿部 光蔵

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1966, no.31, pp.30-51, 1966-10-16 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

55

著者

横手 慎二

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.23-36,L6, 2001

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In this paper I will analyze the domestic aspects of Khrushchev's foreign policy with a special attention to the Far Eastern states: Communist China, North Korea and to some extent Japan. (I am preparing a more detailed study on the post-W. W. II Japan-Soviet relations in another form.)<br>Many scholars including G. Richter pointed out the existence of the different opinions among the Soviet leaders in the post-Stalin years. However, these studies are overly concerned with the doctrine of peaceful coexistence and less attentive to the impact on the Soviet leaders of the other new line which Khrushchev forwarded forcefully, the denunciation of Stalin and his policy. It was the July 1955 plenum of the CC of the KPSS where Foreign Minister Molotov and the First Party Secretary Khrushchev collided over the problem for the first time. Molotov asserted that the Soviet delegation led by Khrushchev should not have accepted the argument of the Yugoslavia party that it was no other than Stalin who was responsible for the rupture of the relations between the two countries. Khrushchev was skillful enough not to make a direct criticism against Stalin at this time only by making long citations from Lenin's writings and ascribing Molotov's objection to his face saving deeds. After Khrushchev's secret speech on the cult of Stalin at the 20th KPSS congress in 1956, Molotov, clearly realizing that both the Chinese and the Korean party leader-ships were bitterly critical against Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist position, was determined together with Malenkov and Kaganovich to relieve Khrushchev of his post of the First Party Secretary. But again Khrushchev displayed great shrewdness by convening the CC plenum and sweepingly dismissing them from their posts as the anti&mdash;party group in June 1957.<br>The important point is that Molotov, having faithfully supported the Soviet-China collaboration policy during the past years, claimed at this plenum that Khrushchev's foreign policy of putting the first priority on the US-Soviet Relations would make the policy of the cohesion of the communist camp difficult. The deterioration of relations between the USSR and the two communist countries of North East Asia, which clearly contrasted with the gradual progress in the US-USSR relations in the following years, fully demonstrated the sharpness of Molotov's argument. By the end of the 1950s, Communist China grew far apart from the USSR. At the same time, North Korea, though moving to conclude its alliance treaty with the USSR, went its separate way with its own unique ideology. (And Japan started to strengthen its security relations with the US.) With these developments in the background, some of the party leaders, who were discontented with Khrushchev's policy, came to realize the validity of Molotov's arguments. We know now that Polianskii, who took the lead in pushing Khrushchev out from the top of the party in the October plenum in 1964, made a party report to the effect that the Khrushchev's US-first policy did damage to the policy of cohesion of the communist camp: especially, to Soviet-China relations. Some of the naive politicians in Moscow thought that they could make use of the dismissal of Khrushchev in order to repair the relations with Communist China. Polianskii, Shelepin, Trapeznikov and others faithful to the communist ideology strongly supported the policy of rapprochement with China. But they met vehement opposition from Andropov, Zymyanin and others who were in charge of the foreign affairs in the CC departments and the Foreign Ministry. These opponents were concerned with the negative effects on the peaceful coexistence policy by adopting the policy of collaboration with Mao Ze-tong, who looked fanatically anti-capitalist in their eyes<br>Thus, Moscow's foreign policy choices in the 1960s were constrained as either a detente policy with the US or that of collaboration with China because of the domestic ideological situation created after

著者

島田 俊彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1967, no.34, pp.106-109, 1967

著者

臼杵 陽

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1988, no.89, pp.180-184, 1988

著者

臼杵 陽

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.121, pp.95-107,L11, 1999

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This article focuses on one of the most controversial questions of politics and religion in Israel, that is to say, on the controversial dispute about conversions to Judaism. These is controversy between Orthodox Jews, who have monopolized such Jewish religious matters as conversions and marriage ceremonies in Israel, and Reform and Conservative Jews who have not been officially authorized to carry out conversions and perform weddings in Israel. While Reform and Conservative Jews are the majority among Diaspora Jewry, especially in the United State, they are a minority among Israeli Jews. Reform and Conservative Jews in the United State are entitled to immigrate to Israel as Jews in accordance with the Law of Return, but they are not recognized as &ldquo;true Jews&rdquo; by Orthodox Jews in Israel. The Reform and Conservative Jews are forced to convert again to Orthodox Judaism if they are to enjoy their religious life as equals to the Orthodox brethren in Israel.<br>In January 1998, Israeli premier Benjamin Netanyahu appointed then Finance Minister Yaakov Ne'eman as chairman of a committee to try and seek a compromise solution among the three major denominations of Judaism (Orthodox, Reform and Conservative) on the question of conversions of Jews and on other religious matters in Israel. The debate of the Ne'eman committee, which was composed of representatives of the three denominations, poured oil on fire with regard to this decisive question of &ldquo;Who is a Jew?&rdquo;, that is to say, who has authority over the question of the definition of a Jew in Israel.<br>First, this paper analyzes the monopoly enjoyed by Orthodox Jews in official religious institutions such as Ministry of Religion, the Chief Rabbinate, Rabbi Courts, and Local Religious Councils in light of the relationship between state and religion. Second, the paper discusses, in the context of the relationship between religion and politics, the political roles of a Sephardi orthodox religious party, &ldquo;Shas (Sephardi Torah Guardians)&rdquo;, which has tried to propose legislation establishing a conversion law and a local council law to the Israeli Parliament (Knesset). Third, the paper examines the recommendation of the Ne'eman committee and its repercussion among the concerned parties in Israel and the United States. A preliminary unsigned copy of the commitee's recommendation in November 1998 proposed to set up a joint institute for conversion studies at which Orthodox, Conservative and Reform rabbis would all teach, but actual conversions would be performed only by Orthodox rabbinical courts.<br>In conclusion, since the recommendation of the Ne'eman committee was vehemently refused by the Orthodox-controlled Chief Rabbinate Council, despite the approval of the recommendation by the Knesset, Reform and Conservative movements continued to struggle for the plurality of Judaism in Israel and against the Orthodox monopoly. They petitioned the High Court of Justice to instruct the appointment of Reform and Conservative rabbis in Local Religious Councils.

著者

戸田 真紀子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.159, pp.159_27-40, 2010

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Recently the scholars studying conflict theories or peace building in Africa have tended to neglect the historical perspective of Africa. Without knowing the history of traditional kingdoms and chiefdoms, including slave trade, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, we cannot accurately understand serious problems with which African people are now confronted.<br>Coups d'etat are common in Africa. Nigeria in particular, an oil-rich African giant, has experienced the military rule for about twenty-nine years since its independence. Why did the Nigerian officers decide to seize the power? Why did they desire to keep the power for such a period of time? And, why don't they intend to withdraw from the political arena? To answer these questions, we should consider the impact of British rule in Nigeria.<br>The Nigerian army was originally established to conquer the native kingdoms and chiefdoms under the policy of British colonization. British rulers sometimes undermined the &ldquo;rule of law.&rdquo; Later the Nigerian army became the tool for traditional rulers, who started to work for the British rule in order to suppress their own people. New rulers of independent Nigeria learned how to use the military to defend their vested interests during 1960 through 1966. Therefore, it is the negative legacy of British rule that civilian and military regimes had not maintained &ldquo;law and order&rdquo; to save the lives of Nigerian people. So many civilians, being involved in armed conflict between Nigerian army and rebellions, were killed by the army.<br>Samuel Huntington showed two conditions to avoid military intervention. According to him, the civil-military relation may be destroyed if the governments would not be able to promote &ldquo;economic development&rdquo; and to maintain &ldquo;law and order&rdquo; and if civilian politicians would desire to use the military power for their own political ambitions.<br>As to the &ldquo;economic development,&rdquo; approximately 80% of Nigerian people suffer from poverty, whereas the retired generals enjoy their political power as well as financial business with a plenty of money. As mentioned above, the aspect of &ldquo;law and order&rdquo; has been also neglected by the regimes. After independence, civilian regimes used the military for their political interests and led the army officials into the political arena.<br>Therefore, as suggested by Huntington, military intervention may be caused in Nigeria again if the Fourth Republic would neglect the importance of promoting &ldquo;economic development&rdquo; and of maintaining &ldquo;law and order.&rdquo; The Fourth Republic also needs to keep the army out of politics and the politics out of the army to avoid military intervention. Actually it is difficult to meet these conditions, because the group of retired generals still has strong influence over political and economical arenas.

著者

武田 知己

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_7-200_22, 2020

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<p>Japanese diplomacy is often regarded as a diplomacy without grand strategy. This paper doesn't see it that way. The paper finds Japanese diplomacy rich in strategies. In general, a strategy is to make through the interaction between the international perception and identity. The paper focuses on the idea of Japanese Bridge-Building Diplomacy among many and discusses how the idea was coined and shows it had undergone various vicissitudes until the 1950s.</p><p>An early 20th century version of Bridge-Building strategy was coined by Shigenobu Okuma under the name of Fusion of East and West Civilizations. In his theory the Western civilization reached the United States and the Eastern civilization reached Japan and these two civilizations came into contact with the Perry's arrival to Yokohama Bay in the middle of 19^th century. The Japanese with this miraculous encounter, in Okuma's theory, had a vocation to bring Western superior civilization to the East. This idea was translated into Japanese China policy and inherited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and such leaders of the ministry as Shigeru Yoshida and Mamoru Shigemitsu. Although the idea was fully performed neither in the early 20^th century and in the 1950s, this paper shows the possibilities of the revival of the strategy in the coming era of the US-China confrontation in the 21th century and argues the value of inheriting the idea of Bridge Building Strategy as "unfinished self-portrait" of Japanese Diplomacy is eminent.</p>