著者

福島 啓之

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.4, pp.40-57, 2017-03-31 (Released:2022-04-01)

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_75-195_91, 2019-03-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

70

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This article re-examines the historical process of framing Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, which is called Renunciation of War Clause, and focuses on its function as reassurance by the loser. Dealing with the function, this research explains the reason why postwar Japan-U. S. relationship could dramatically progress conflict resolution from the total war to the restoration of peace from both theoretical and historical standpoints.To answer the question mentioned above, this article argues that, in terms of a theory of reassurance by the loser, Postwar Japan intended to treat the victor’s anxiety on its challenge by relying on the normative self-restraint of Article 9 of the Constitution. The argument regards the provision of the Article as a signal justified by an appropriate norm. While the U. S. was concerned about Japan’s challenge and intended to make it impossible by prohibiting armament, Japan dealt with the fear of the U. S. by reassuring its own intention. Japan sent a normative signal of reassurance, which bound itself by denying war and armament. Therefore, it is appropriate to understand that, in essence, Article 9 of the Constitution had practical meaning as a signal of reassurance in order to let the U.S. and other countries know Japan’s peaceful intention, rather than an abstract norm derived from the idea of pacifism, which came from regret for the war.Tracing the historical process of framing Article 9 of the constitution reveals that it worked as the loser’s reassurance. The process was the opposite direction of the order of the completed text. The U. S. home government decided to disarm Japan at first, and the local commander MacArthur followed the policy. On the other hand, as Japanese leader, Prime Minister Shidehara proposed renunciation of war to MacArthur. However, it was just an ideal promise regarding peaceful intention, and lacked reassurance in terms of the capability. The Japanese government hoped to maintain the provision of armament in the constitution. It was unacceptable for the U.S., so it prepared a draft of the constitution which included renunciation of war proposed by Shidehara as well as the prohibition of arms. The U.S. presented the draft to Japan in order to confirm its peaceful intention. The draft imposed the cost of the prohibition of arms, while it mitigated the impression of burden by referring to the normative legitimacy of renunciation of war. The draft as the U.S. screening set up a hurdle that Japan should clear. Japan reassured the U.S. and other members of the international society by sending a signal which became costly due to the democratic institutional constraint of diet deliberations. It made Renunciation of War Clause a national pledge.

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_109-170_124, 2012

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This paper examines how Postwar Japan's initiatives of material assistance and verbal apology promoted reconciliation with Asian neighbors; I address the topic in terms of the interplay of theories and history. After World War II, Japan sought to improve relationships with Asian neighbors,such as South Korea and China, on which it had inflicted suffering through war and colonization. Historical case studies reveal the details of the process of moving toward the normalization of diplomatic relations, and I can find theoretical studies that support these historical descriptions.<br>However, it is not easy to provide consistent, congruent explanations that account for all of the historical studies. Careful analysis supports a mixture of the view that an economic approach to diplomacy has contributed to reconciliation with neighbors, and the criticism that Japan's atonement for the past was not enough. The limited inferences that can be drawn from international relations theories make the situation more confusing. I should transcend the fragmented accounts provided by both history and theories by fusing the two. To achieve this, I can re-examine history by introducing the scientific knowledge of cognitive psychology, as applied to the decision-makers of the parties concerned. This approach sheds light on the fact that perceptions of the historical past, which were products of nationalism, greatly affected the diplomatic positions of Japan and its neighbors, and were relevant to the progress or lack thereof in reconciliation.<br>Based on this perspective, I provide a theoretical framework of diplomacy that focuses on the cognitive psychology of decision-makers in order to reconstruct relationships between the history of Postwar Japan's reconciliation diplomacy and nationalism. I pay attention to both the intentions of offenders who offer reconciliation and the perceptions held by victims.<br>By comparing different Postwar Japanese administrations' efforts at reconciliation with South Korea and China, I can find interactions between an offender's diplomatic options and the influence of nationalism on a victim's diachronic perceptions. The offender's choice between assistance and apology interacts with the victim's relative interests in the past and future, and thereby has effects on the progress of reconciliation. Depending on the perceptions of victims, both assistance and apology can be effective signals, or counterproductive. While assistance is a useful tool for reconciliation with future-oriented victims, apology is an effective signal for nationalistic, pastoriented victims. This suggests that symbolic words and material goods are complementary to each other in international politics, and that their functioning is profoundly related to the characteristics of the perceptions of human beings.

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.109-113, 2010-09-30 (Released:2022-04-14)

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.206, pp.206_67-206_83, 2022-03-25 (Released:2022-03-31)

参考文献数

86

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This article explains historical transition of the U.S.-Japan Alliance by applying theoretical frameworks which combine the distribution of power in the world and the degree of threat. The explanation reveals the evolution of Japan’s alliance policy as a minor ally. It suggests that the minor ally’s adaptable behavior in order to respond to the threat and unite with the major ally contributes to the maintenance of the asymmetric alliance. This argument provides an implication to answer why the U.S.-Japan alliance has been maintained although it had unfair or unequal relationship for each ally.Theoretical frameworks to examine the asymmetric alliance rearrange four basic forms of the minor ally’s alliance policy. They are reflex balancing, buck-passing, hedging, and complementary cooperation. Reflex balancing is to counter a threat and to rely on a major ally. Buck-passing is to make a major ally accept the burden of an alliance. Hedging is to approach a target country while cooperation with a major ally is maintained. Complementary cooperation is to counter a threat and to assist a major ally.I argue that the combination of the distribution of power and the degree of threat affects the minor ally’s alliance policy as the member of the asymmetric alliance. Their causal relationships have following four patterns. First, if the distribution of power is decentralized and the degree of threat is high, a minor ally chooses reflex balancing. Second, if the distribution of power is decentralized and the degree of threat is low, a minor ally chooses buck-passing. Third, if the distribution of power is concentrated and the degree of threat is low, a minor ally chooses hedging. Fourth, if the distribution of power is concentrated and the degree of threat is high, a minor ally chooses complementary cooperation.Applying theoretical frameworks of balance of power and threat, I explain four basic forms of Japan’s alliance policy which were adopted by succesive administrations except for three short-lived ones. When war and confrontation were observed in the Cold War period, Japan relied on the U.S. and balanced against the Communist camp’s threat. When leaders’ talks and tension reduction were observed in the Cold War period, Japan depended on the U.S. When the sole superpower U.S. pursued unilateralism and exhausted in the Post-Cold War period, Japan cooperated with the U.S. as the ally while it approached China and Russia. When Senkaku islands problem fell into a territorial dispute in the Post-Cold War period, Japan decided to start collective self-defense with the U.S. Therefore, the implication of this article suggests that the adaptable nature of Japan’s alliance policy to the changes of international environment sustained the U.S.-Japan alliance.

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.195, pp.195_75-195_91, 2019

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<p>This article re-examines the historical process of framing Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, which is called Renunciation of War Clause, and focuses on its function as reassurance by the loser. Dealing with the function, this research explains the reason why postwar Japan-U. S. relationship could dramatically progress conflict resolution from the total war to the restoration of peace from both theoretical and historical standpoints.</p><p>To answer the question mentioned above, this article argues that, in terms of a theory of reassurance by the loser, Postwar Japan intended to treat the victor's anxiety on its challenge by relying on the normative self-restraint of Article 9 of the Constitution. The argument regards the provision of the Article as a signal justified by an appropriate norm. While the U. S. was concerned about Japan's challenge and intended to make it impossible by prohibiting armament, Japan dealt with the fear of the U. S. by reassuring its own intention. Japan sent a normative signal of reassurance, which bound itself by denying war and armament. Therefore, it is appropriate to understand that, in essence, Article 9 of the Constitution had practical meaning as a signal of reassurance in order to let the U.S. and other countries know Japan's peaceful intention, rather than an abstract norm derived from the idea of pacifism, which came from regret for the war.</p><p>Tracing the historical process of framing Article 9 of the constitution reveals that it worked as the loser's reassurance. The process was the opposite direction of the order of the completed text. The U. S. home government decided to disarm Japan at first, and the local commander MacArthur followed the policy. On the other hand, as Japanese leader, Prime Minister Shidehara proposed renunciation of war to MacArthur. However, it was just an ideal promise regarding peaceful intention, and lacked reassurance in terms of the capability. The Japanese government hoped to maintain the provision of armament in the constitution. It was unacceptable for the U.S., so it prepared a draft of the constitution which included renunciation of war proposed by Shidehara as well as the prohibition of arms. The U.S. presented the draft to Japan in order to confirm its peaceful intention. The draft imposed the cost of the prohibition of arms, while it mitigated the impression of burden by referring to the normative legitimacy of renunciation of war. The draft as the U.S. screening set up a hurdle that Japan should clear. Japan reassured the U.S. and other members of the international society by sending a signal which became costly due to the democratic institutional constraint of diet deliberations. It made Renunciation of War Clause a national pledge.</p>

著者

大矢根 聡 宮城 大蔵 佐々木 卓也 村井 良太 井上 正也 多湖 淳 石田 淳 葛谷 彩 福島 啓之 長久 明日香

出版者

同志社大学

雑誌

基盤研究(B)

巻号頁・発行日

2015-04-01

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日本の国際関係研究においては理論・歴史間の対話が欠けており、相互刺激に基づく研究上の新たな展開は稀薄である。本研究では、過去および海外の対話状況を検討し、今日可能な理論・歴史対話の条件や方法を考察した。国際関係のマクロ理論の論争や合理的選択論の普及を背景に、理論・歴史対話は困難になっている。しかし日本やアメリカなどでは、理論を換骨奪胎しながらも利用し、歴史研究の対象や観念を転換した例がある。今日、理論的パラダイムを歴史研究に応用し、歴史から抽出したパターン自体を理論化するのは難しい。しかし理論上の基本的概念は、歴史的に吟味すべき課題を抱えており、また歴史的現象を再解釈する手がかりになる。

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

日本政治学会

雑誌

年報政治学 (ISSN:05494192)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.64, no.1, pp.1_340-1_359, 2013 (Released:2016-07-01)

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This paper examines how Postwar Japan chose a reconciliation partner, by focusing on cognitive psychological dynamics in multilateral diplomacy and domestic politics. The goal of this research is to re-examine the basic framework of Postwar Japan's reconciliation diplomacy systematically.   Despite the accumulation of previous studies, we do not understand much about the systematic patterns of choosing a reconciliation partner. This question is complicated since the patterns derive from the decision makers' synchronic perception of multilateral relationships among states and domestic politics.   To explain how Postwar Japan chose a reconciliation partner, this paper provides a reconciliation model, which is based on decision makers' cognitive psychology. Applying general principles of cognitive psychology to their perception and decision, I reorganize the history of Postwar Japan's reconciliation diplomacy from a theoretical standpoint. The model shows the conditions of reconciliation at the international system level, and at the domestic political level. As preliminary case studies, this paper compares the Yoshida administration's attempts to reconcile with Taiwan and China, with the Hatoyama administration's attempts to reconcile with South Korea and the Soviet Union in 1950s.

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

アメリカ学会

雑誌

アメリカ研究 = American review (ISSN:03872815)

巻号頁・発行日

no.50, pp.45-65, 2016

著者

福島 啓之

出版者

東京大学大学院総合文化研究科附属グローバル地域研究機構アメリカ太平洋地域研究センター

雑誌

アメリカ太平洋研究 (ISSN:13462989)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.12, pp.79-95, 2012-03

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