著者

秦野 貴光

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_12-193_28, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

84

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This article examines Lord Robert Cecil’s views on the League of Nations, with a focus on his thinking about state sovereignty, international public opinion and ‘peaceful change’, an idea devised during the interwar period to provide elasticity to the practice of collective security. Along with President Wilson, Cecil played a key role in the drafting of the Covenant of the League in his capacity as one of the British representatives on the League of Nations Commission set up as part of the Paris Peace Conference. The present article shows how and to what extent the League’s structures and powers were informed by Cecil’s thinking about the role of international organisations designed for the maintenance of international peace. In particular, it takes a close look at Cecil’s attempt to codify the idea of peaceful change in the Covenant, for it not only shaped the League and its Covenant, but also informed and set the stage for the ‘First Great Debate’ in IR.The first section traces how Cecil came to be involved in the establishment of the League during and in the wake of the First World War. The second section then moves on to examine Cecil’s conception of the League in relation to state sovereignty, showing that he did not think of the League as constituting interference with the principle of state sovereignty, and explaining how the Covenant ensured that the sovereignty of the League membership would not be curtailed by the proper working of the League. The third section considers why Cecil held that the League, based on the principle of state sovereignty, could still effectively guide the behaviour of sovereign states in practice, focusing on the expectations he put on the role international public opinion could play as an agency of law enforcement. Cecil’s thinking about the League was based on the assumption, true or false, that the negative impacts that state sovereignty might have on the working of the League could be alleviated by the agency of international public opinion. The fourth section shows that the same assumption ran through his thinking on peaceful revision or what later came to be called ‘peaceful change’. The section traces the process by which this idea was codified in the Covenant through Cecil’s effort, and demonstrates that the effectiveness of the League’s machinery for peaceful change also heavily depended on the agency of international public opinion. The final section discusses how the First Great Debate sprang from the problems posed by the weakness of the League’s machinery for peaceful change and by Cecil’s views underpinning it, establishing that Cecil’s views on peaceful change are of importance in understanding the development of early IR theory.

著者

伊東 かおり

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.192_29-192_43, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

75

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The Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU), founded in 1889 during the 19th Century anti-war pacific movement and still active today, has been an international institution at the center of diplomacy between parliamentarians from many countries. Since its founding, the IPU has been active in promoting parliamentarianism, and also worked to solve prewar crises such as demilitarization, racial equality, decolonization, and a system for international arbitration. Japan, having joined the IPU in 1908, has over 100 years of history with the organization. However, due to the IPU’s lack of binding political power, it has often been placed outside of the study of International Political History, and there has been little research undertaken on the subject.This article uses archival materials held by the IPU at its offices in Geneva, and places the organization in the context of the interwar internationalism movement, in order to study its relationship to Japan at this time. Until the First World War, the IPU was an organization that was conducted in the “salon” style of traditional diplomacy. However, after the First World War, with the creation of new countries in Eastern Europe, as well as the presence of newly joined countries from South America and so on, the IPU transformed into a truly international organization.Looking at the members of the Japanese delegation of parliamentarians, such as Aikitsu Tanakadate, Jigorō Kanō, and Kaju Nakamura, we can see how they used the IPU to address international issues, as well as including international questions into their own policies. This article looks at the example of Nakamura in particular, due to the ways in which his relationship with the IPU sheds light on the changing role and needs of parliamentarians during the increasingly international interwar period.Unlike Germany and Italy, whose relationship with the IPU ceased with the end of their parliamentary system, Japan’s relationship with the IPU continued until 1939, when the outbreak of war caused a halt to the institution’s activities. Looking at the crisis of parliamentarianism, issues over mandate territories, and other examples, this article studies the relationship between the IPU and League of Nations and with the Imperial Diet, and describes the state of the interwar system of international cooperation, from the perspective of “parliamentary politics”.

著者

山越 裕太

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.192_44-192_59, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

63

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This article analyzes how the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) constructed health governance.Regarding the globalizing world, health governance was primarily discussed after the Cold War and it was clarified that functional cooperation was one of its foundations. However, previous studies have not completely verified how functional cooperation evolved into health governance. Therefore, this article examines the interwar period according to the following questions: what is the significance of the co-existence of the LNHO and the Office International d’Hygiène Publique (OIHP) in establishing health governance; why did the field of health expand from addressing infectious diseases to various spheres; and how did the LNHO contend with the Great Depression.The first section of the article examines how functional cooperation in the field of health was established and why two international health organizations co-existed during the interwar period. The second section analyzes the driving force of the LNHO in seeking health governance. The third section examines how the LNHO constructed health governance through the Great Depression.The article concludes that the construction of health governance did not progress as effortlessly and linearly as reported in previous discussions. Although it certainly developed based on functional cooperation, during the process of the LNHO expanding its activities to various spheres, the states resisted, concerned about the erosion of sovereignty. However, these resistances were overcome by the logic of functional cooperation that promotes cooperation to the extent that can be agreed. For example, the spheres of standardization, interaction between experts, and medical statistics. Conversely, this process had exogenous opportunities. The LNHO was established under the influence of American foreign policy. Its activities were gradually incorporated because of the co-existence of the two international health organizations. The Great Depression—the turning point—served as an opportunity to reconsider the construction of health governance. It gradually became clear that recovery would be difficult by merely continuing LNHO’s activities as usual. Thus, observing the Great Depression’s widespread effect on economy and agriculture, the LNHO expanded its activities to cooperate with organizations in related fields in order to take unified action. The LNHO was no longer limited to anti-disease measures but was required to resolve new issues that had not been considered traditionally. This development was not caused by the extension of functional cooperation. The process from functional cooperation to health governance was characterized by flexibility and robustness. Therefore, health governance was constructed in the interwar period after several complicated circumstances.

著者

齋川 貴嗣

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.192_60-192_75, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

75

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This article examines the ideological transformation of intellectual co-operation in the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation (ICIC) of the League of Nations in the 1930s. Since its establishment in 1922 as a consultative body to the Council, the ICIC had carried out various projects in the name of intellectual co-operation, which were taken over by the UNESCO after the Second World War. Although growing attention has recently been paid to the ICIC as a pioneer international organization for cultural exchange, most of the historical studies have been confined to European perspectives. In this respect, this article argues that the ICIC’s idea of intellectual co-operation was fundamentally changed in association with the expansion of its activities to non-European countries, particularly China and Japan.When the ICIC was established in 1922, the work of intellectual co-operation was regarded as a transnational enterprise that should be based on the universality of Western civilization and undertaken by individual intellectuals. However, the original idea gradually transformed. This is shown in the two notable projects that the ICIC had enthusiastically undertaken in the 1930s: the Mission of Educational Experts to China and the Japanese Collection. The Mission of Educational Experts to China in 1931 was the ICIC’s first experience to assist a particular government, and in cooperation with the Chinese government it facilitated the reorganization of the Chinese educational system with considerable emphasis on the construction and preservation of Chinese national culture. In the project of the Japanese Collection that started in 1935, on the other hand, the ICIC introduced Japanese culture in the West with the assistance of the Japanese government. Through these projects, the ICIC became aware that intellectual co-operation should be based on the idea of particular national cultures and implemented by governments.As a result, the ICIC formed and presented its two-faced self-image in the 1930s. Firstly, the ICIC was envisaged by intellectuals like Paul Valéry as the ‘League of Minds’ that placed high hopes on the capacity of Western civilization to integrate different nations in the world from a universal point of view. The ‘League of Minds’ was conceptualized in terms of the idea of universal Western civilization as an extension and sophistication of the idea of intellectual co-operation that the ICIC had maintained since the early 1920s. On the other hand, the ICIC crafted another self-image, the ‘League of Cultures’ that Rabindranath Tagore envisioned as an ideal form of intellectual co-operation. While emphasizing not the universality of Western civilization but the individuality and particularity of national culture, Tagore argued that the ICIC should be an organization composed of different national cultures. In this way, the ICIC was fraught with the tension between these two opposing perspectives on intellectual co-operation in the 1930s.The ICIC thus shifted its emphasis in the idea of intellectual co-operation from Western civilization to national cultures as well as from individual intellectuals to governments in the 1930s. This shift can be characterized as the ideological transition from intellectual co-operation to international cultural exchange. Nevertheless, the antinomies that the ICIC embraced, the tensions between the university of Western civilization and the particularity of national cultures as well as between individual intellectuals and governments, have also been taken over by the present UNESCO.

著者

帶谷 俊輔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_76-193_91, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

64

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This article addresses debates about “Reform” of the League of Nations from the viewpoint of Britain and China. “Reform” of the League was one of the contentious issues among the statesman, diplomats and intellectuals in the 1930s. They focused on the pros and cons of collective security and Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations because the “failure” of the League to stop Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Italian invasion of Abyssinia threatened the collapse of the League. There were two major opinions in the debate, “the Coercive League” and “the Consultative League”. “The Coercive League” was the course to reinforce collective security to prevent further aggression. Conversely, “the Consultative League” argument was to weaken collective security and induce Germany, Italy, and Japan to cooperate with the League. Deliberations took place in both the Council, which was led by Great Powers, and the Assembly, in which Small Powers could have greater influence. Therefore, this article deals with Britain as an example of a Great Power and China as one of a Small power.The League was centered on the rapprochement rather than the enforcement in the late 1920s. Article 11 of the Covenant was more important than Article 16 in mediating disputes and reconciling belligerents. Britain administered the League Council through “the Concert of Europe,” which consisted of British, French and German Foreign Minister. The League Council was where the Powers consulted with each other. In contrast, China discovered the value of the Assembly as an arena of world opinion.Japanese invasion of Manchuria from 1931 to 1933 destroyed the credibility of collective security and cooperation between the Powers. Furthermore, the Small Powers were irritated by the indecisiveness of Great Powers, especially Britain. Some officials of British Foreign Office began to consider “reform” of the League for the purpose of weakening collective security and reestablishing the superiority of Great Powers over Small Powers after the Manchurian Incident.The Abyssinian Crisis from 1935 to 1936 accelerated this trend. The League of Nations voted for economic sanctions against Italy, but members including Britain didn’t carry out them fully. However, some Latin American members protested against the sanctions because they disrupted trade with Italy. The League Assembly set up a committee to study “the Application of the principle of the covenant of the League of Nations.” Even though Britain was pro-Consultative, she hesitated to revise the covenant. China was pro-Coercive and concerned about regionalizing collective security. The clash between two opinions left “reform” of the League deadlocked in the end.

著者

詫摩 佳代

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_108-193_122, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

72

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The United Nations (UN) system has many functional agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization (WHO), in contrast to the League of Nations, which only had about 10 technical agencies. Why does the UN system have so many functional agencies? This is partly owing to the Allies’ functional cooperation during the Second World War. By focusing on the interactions among the related actors, this article clarifies how food cooperation among the Allies was conducted, examines how that cooperation was influenced by the League’s food programme, and identifies its impact on the creation of the UN system.Examining the UN creation process by focusing on food cooperation leads us to the identification of two features of the UN system. The first is that the UN system was not necessarily the outcome of easy belief in international cooperation. Through the inter-war experience, the actors realized the cold reality of competition and confrontation in international politics as well as the necessity of military power for securing the post-war international order. At that time, however, it was quite difficult to come to an agreement on a post-war security scheme, which led them to focus intently on food cooperation as a lubricant.The Allies established the Combined Food Board for the purpose of managing food resources efficiently, through which they established cooperative relationships that formed the basis for the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture (UNCFA) in 1944, the first international conference among them. Behind the conference was the realistic calculation that functional cooperation regarding food would gradually lead to an agreement regarding security problems, and the former was much easier to establish than the latter. That expectation was proven correct when functional agencies, including UNESCO and WHO, were established in succession after the UNCFA, and the Allies finally agreed on a post-war security scheme at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. In this way, war-time food cooperation formed the basis for an agreement on the post-war security system, which was backed by a realistic school of thought.On that occasion, non-state actors such as academia or international bureaucrats played a crucial role, which is the second feature of the UN system. They had high expectations regarding functional cooperation as a breakwater for power politics and the basis for international peace and security. Those actors with similar post-war concepts formed a transnational network under which they materialized their ideas and appealed to Allied policymakers to have them realized. In current international politics, the transnational actors are also playing remarkable roles in such undertakings as the Mine Ban Treaty and the Paris Climate Accord, the beginnings of which can be found as early as the UN’s inception.

著者

藤井 篤

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_123-193_139, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

67

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This article examines how the International Committee of the Red Cross, (ICRC) struggled to perform its humanitarian mission in responding to the Algerian War, of 1954-1962. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 define rules concerning the protection of wounded and sick soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians in armed conflicts of an international character, and their Common Article 3 stipulates that these parties should be equally protected during armed conflicts not of an international character. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, it was not clear whether or how this measure could be applied to a colonial conflict, yet from the beginning of the conflict, the ICRC made efforts to offer its humanitarian services to all involved parties in the spirit of the Conventions, trying to preserve its principle of neutrality in the midst of antagonistic politics among parties with an extreme imbalance of power and resources. In order to achieve its mission on the battlefields of Algeria, the ICRC had to approach both the French government, which was determined to defend French Algeria, and the Front of National Liberation, (FLN), which sought the abolition of colonialism and Algerian independence. On the one hand, many Algerians suspected to be terrorists came to be arrested by police or were forced by local governors to live in “accommodation camps,” and with the consent of the French authorities, the ICRC was able to dispatch a total of 10 missions during the war to visit accommodation camps for Algerian prisoners of war and civilians, and investigate the living conditions and treatment of the detainees. As the result of the ICRC’s repeated investigations and reports, considerable improvements were made to the material aspects of living conditions of these facilities, although torture and other violence to Algerians continued in and out of the camps throughout of the conflict. However, the ICRC encountered extreme difficulties in offering the same service to the FLN, which was waging a guerrilla war and so lacked stable camps for French captives in Algeria, and the achievement of its mission to the FLN was therefore very limited compared with their services at the French facilities.

著者

芝崎 祐典

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.192, pp.192_138-192_141, 2018-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)

著者

古賀 慶

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.192, pp.192_141-192_144, 2018-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)

著者

松永 泰行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_191-193, 2012-03-25 (Released:2012-06-15)

著者

安達 亜紀

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_17-180_29, 2015-03-30 (Released:2016-05-12)

参考文献数

47

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Since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has been recognized as a leading actor in international environmental politics. In chemicals policy, REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals) regulation that came into force in 2007 captured global attention and was recognized as a paradigm shift in chemicals policy. For the most part, the thematically relevant scholarly literature has merely focused on the policy-making process at the EU level. However, one of the most significant features of the EU environmental policy implementation process is that it relies predominantly on member states and private actors within these.In the following article, I examine the process of shaping European chemicals policy by focusing on the relationship between the EU and a particular member state—Germany—regarding policymaking and implementation. Since Germany has the largest chemical industry in Europe, it is widely considered to play an important role in the implementation process. My analysis was based on a policy network approach, which allowed me to put forward the argument that the changes in the policy network since the late 1980s were significant and resulted in the further separation between the processes of policymaking and the prospects of operability in the implementation process.During the 1970s, Germany, which had traditionally featured heavily in cooperation and consultation with the chemical industry, had a highly influential position in shaping EU chemicals policy in accordance with German interests and requirements. To compensate for the government’s lack of expertise and power to formulate and implement policies without agreements from key industry groups, policy networks in which the latter participated were developed. However, the 1980s and 1990s saw the Europeanization of chemicals policy; pioneering states, such as Sweden, gained EU membership. As a result, the policy network of the EU chemicals policy was transformed from a “policy community” to an “issue network.” This prevented the leading actors of the former policy network from retaining the previous chemicals policy, where the priority was operability in the implementation process.This caused tangible tensions between Germany and the EU institutions during the REACH regulation negotiations. The precautionary principle is a guiding principle of environmental policy and often considered an important factor in the ambitious risk regulations of the EU. However, Germany, which had put forward the principle at the EU level, was deemed the main opponent during the REACH negotiation process.

著者

泉 淳

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_15-178_27, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)

参考文献数

32

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The recent peoples’ movements seeking democracy throughout the Middle East, often referred to as “The Arab Spring”, are a direct form of public protest against the authoritarian regimes in the region. Although the contexts of the movements differ among the countries, their spillover nature strongly implies that the protests are essentially challenging to the regional order, in which authoritarianism has been so prevalent for decades. The U.S., since the inception of the Cold War, has been deeply involved in regional politics by establishing patron-client relationships with local authoritarians to safeguard its own security and strategic interests in the region. This policy has often been conducted at the expense of democratic ideals and caused an accumulation of frustration among local people to this day. This conflict between America’s security norm and its democratic norm lies deep in the U.S. Middle East policy and has been the subject of academic debates. This paper, along with the most of the preceding analyses, supports the argument that the U.S. has prioritized the security norm in its Middle East policy, but pays legitimate attention to how the U.S. has been shaped by the democratic norm. A general preference for democracy could not be easily abandoned in U.S. political discourse, as it tries to maintain legitimacy and integrity in its policy towards the region. Employing a simple matrix chart, this paper presents a macro view of the relationship between U.S. policy preferences and the past regime transformation in the region, with particular reference to the U.S.-backed authoritarian regimes. Provided here is an assumption and its fulfillment that the U.S. has been unwilling to take strong measures to democratize friendly authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for fear that the regimes might lose their pro-U.S. orientation and the regional stability might be put at risk. At the same time, the U.S., mindful of sacrificing its democratic norm and the peoples’ aspiration for freedom, devised a policy of applying gradual reforms to friendly authoritarian regimes. This policy has two apparently opposing features with respect to the same friendly authoritarian clients: on one hand calling for reforms with new institutions (such as MEPI) and increased funding, and on the other, providing substantial military and economic aid or selling arms in huge quantities. This policy mix is effective in maintaining the security interests provided by the friendly authoritarians and, at the same time, satisfying the democratic ideal of the U.S. and the local people to a certain extent, thus giving the U.S. Middle East policy more legitimacy and integrity. This trend of U.S. policy is also noticeable in Obama administration, which is trying to avoid rapid revolution, especially in the pro-U.S. Gulf states. As a result, the democratic movements in the Middle East could not expect much support from the U.S. for transforming the current regional order in the foreseeable future.

著者

末近 浩太

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_1-178_14, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)

参考文献数

32

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This special issue, comprising nine research articles and one review article, focuses on ‘Political Changes in the Middle East’. The Middle East today is in a storm of political destabilization, which was triggered by the Arab Spring in late 2010. Regardless of its consequences, such as peaceful democratisation and bloody civil war, the Arab Spring has caused structural changes for both states and society in their domestic politics, which is seemingly leading to a blurring of the lines between regional and international politics. For example, the collapse of the Mubarak regime in Egypt brought about a realignment in inter-state relations between Egypt and other Arab states, as well as with the US. Thus, Middle Eastern politics and international politics are interconnected, as L. Carl Brown rightly argued thirty years ago. Nevertheless, social science seems to have failed for decades to effectively analyse the interconnections between the political dynamics of the Middle East and international politics. This is mainly because of ‘Middle Eastern exceptionalism’, which is deeply rooted in various research fields of social science. It claims that the region is culturally, socially, and historically so unique that it is hard to be studied or understood through general theories of social science, particularly comparative politics and IR; it is, thus, in turn,difficult to contribute to furthering the theoretical development of disciplinary social science, as well as Middle Eastern area studies. Some experts point out that this exceptionalism is due to an intellectual divide between two scholarly approaches—area studies and disciplinary social science. In addition, both approaches, though in a different manner, have a tendency to regard the region as if it is an exclusive ‘miniature garden’ that is insulated from the remainder of the world. As a result, two different approaches have developed separately, one focused within the region, the other, outside the region. In search for a new analytical perspective to bridge such a methodological gap, this special issue attempts to set up two working premises. First, while the Middle East possesses common properties and unifying themes, which ontologically generate its ‘regionness’, and thus can be considered independent and autonomous, it does not exist in a static and uniform way, but has a variable, fluid, and multi-layered presence. Second, the concept of ‘political change’ can be an analytical key to connect various levels of dynamics between domestic, regional, and international politics, as well as to overcome the intellectual divide between area studies and disciplinary social science. In this issue, ‘political change’ is loosely defined as the fluctuation or collapse of long-lasting power equilibrium, such as through democratisation, revolution, civil war, inter-state war, and economic crises. The nine contributions, briefly summarised at the end of this introduction, are all different from one another in terms of their research field, methodology, and case studies. Yet it is clear that all the papers in this issue share a common thesis concerning the above-mentioned problems of ‘Middle Eastern exceptionalism’ and the intellectual drive to tackle it. They also seek to take steps towards developing studies on Middle Eastern politics and international politics by focusing on ‘political changes’ in each case.

著者

鈴木 絢女

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.151, pp.176-179, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

増原 綾子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.142, pp.172-176, 2005-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

相沢 伸広

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.146, pp.156-171,L15, 2006-11-17 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

34

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The shift from Cultural Revolution to Reform and Open Door policy in China had a great impact on the general perception of overseas Chinese within Southeast Asia. It changed the image and value of the Overseas Chinese from “threat” to “entrepreneur.”This paper focuses on Indonesia-China relations. Indonesia has the largest number of Overseas Chinese population and implemented the harshest policies on the “Chinese Problem” among other Southeast Asian countries in this period. The fear of, and scramble for, overseas Chinese between the two countries were important features of both Chinese and Indonesian politics during the period before normalization of Indonesian diplomatic ties with China. The politics of China's Overseas Chinese policy and the Indonesian government's reaction is another crucial aspect of international relation between China and Southeast Asia.This paper argues that the crucial shift in perception happened twice both in China and Indonesia. The first shift dated from the Cultural Revolution in China in 1966, which coincided with the regime shift from Sukarno to Suharto in Indonesia. Activist Chinese youth in Indonesia agitating against Suharto, the “imperialist minion”, fueled the view that overseas Chinese were acting as the fifth column of China and were consequently a “threat”. Such a view resulted in severe restriction of their political and cultural rights in Indonesia as well as the abandoning of the diplomatic relationship.The second shift occurred when both countries began orienting their main agenda toward economic development. Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Open Door policy redefined the Overseas Chinese by transforming the erstwhile “enemies” of class revolution into “patriotic heroes”. The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office was established not only at the central level but also at the provincial and municipal levels, and worked together with hometown networks to attract Overseas Chinese investment to finance infrastructure building in those “hometown” regions (prominently in Fujian and Guangdong). In Indonesia, there were two reactions to this shift in China's policy. One was embodied by Indonesian Chinese capitalist Tong Djoe, who acted as negotiator in opening direct trade between the two countries. (No longer were military personnel appointed to oversee this issue.) The other, a consequence of the drastic fall in oil prices in 1982, underscored the importance of utilizing the Chinese capitalists in non-oil industries for the benefit of Indonesian economy.Economic development of Chinese “entrepreneur” thus provided opportunities for financing both the Indonesian economy as well as China's economy. This mutual benefit paved the way for the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries in August 1990.

著者

森井 裕一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.140, pp.1-18,L5, 2005-03-19 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

41

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Germany's foreign policy has been characterized by continuity since its fundamental course was defined by the Federal Republic's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Even unification in 1990 did not have much impact on the continuity of both foreign policy and European integration policy. The transatlantic alliance (NATO) and the European integration (EU) have remained the basic pillars of the Federal Republic's foreign policy. It was imperative that Germany embed itself in both NATO and the EU.With the end of the cold war the security environment in Europe drastically changed: the meaning of security changed from territorial defense to crisis management. Accordingly the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) of the EU developed rapidly in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The German federal government led by Chancellor Schröder and foreign minister Fischer continued its commitment to the transatlantic alliance and to the further development of European integration. Since the federal election of 2002, however, the Iraq war has overshadowed the German-U. S. relationship.This article analyzes the issue of continuity and change in German foreign policy within this new security environment. The first part of the article outlines the course of German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, focusing especially on the problem of using the defense force, the Bundeswehr. In the second part, using the case of the 2002 federal election, the entanglement of domestic politics and foreign policy is discussed. In the third part, the new characteristics of current foreign policy are discussed. The debates over the “German Way” and “Civilian Power” in foreign policy are examined in order to explain both continuity and change in the transatlantic relations. German policy toward the institutional development of the EU and European security policy is also discussed.The red-green government led by Schröder/Fischer introduced a new style to German foreign policy with its more direct and self-confident approach. Ongoing economic globalization and the developing EU are both generating change within German foreign policy. Nonetheless, the multilateralism of German foreign policy will not change. For Germany, the use of the UN, OSCE and EU remains the fundamental basis for its policy, even though Germany is increasingly asserting its own interests and preferred methods in those organizations. Germany's desire to promote world stability through civilian methods, for example, are well-suited to an approach that works through multilateral institutions. At the same time, even though the European security environment has changed, the U. S. A. remains the most important security partner for Germany. The transatlantic relationship remains inevitable for Germany's security and economy. Germany has to balance its key transatlantic relationship with the demands of European integration.

著者

戸澤 英典

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.149, pp.172-175, 2007-11-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

高安 健将

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.141, pp.86-100,L12, 2005-05-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

38

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This article examines the responses of the British government to the fourth Middle East conflict and the first oil crisis, both of which occurred coincidentally in October 1973. The British government led by Edward Heath recognised that Britain had ceased to be a Super Power and that it was experiencing a domestic crisis. It was therefore fully aware that it could not achieve settlements for the Middle East conflict and the oil crisis on its own. However, the differing interests and perceptions towards the crises made it extremely difficult for the British government to cooperate with the United States in particular and to a lesser extent with the European Community.The disagreements between Britain and the United States reflected their respective grasps of the Middle East conflict and their interests in securing oil supply from the Arab oil-producers. The Heath government was more sympathetic to the Arabs, who in fact launched the offensive against the Israelis in 1973. Its consistent understanding was that the Israelis had occupied Arab territories in 1967 and that the acquisition of territory by war was inadmissible. For the Heath government, the Arabs had not crossed an international border to commit aggression, but rather that the fighting was going on in territories that legally, and in the view of the United Nations, belonged to the Arabs. In contrast, the US government initially regarded as the baseline of a ceasefire the dividing line between the Arabs and the Israelis that had been created after the Israeli occupation in 1967. Domestically, the Heath government was facing a huge energy crisis, which was triggered by a ban by coal-miners on overtime work. It was vital for the British government to secure oil imports from the Arab oil-producers, a need not faced by the United States.The Heath government and the Nixon administration disagreed not only over the causes of the conflict, and over how to achieve first a ceasefire and then long-term settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis, but also over the perceptions of the actors involved-including Egypt and the Soviet Union -and particularly with regards oil security. While Heath in fact distrusted the intentions of the Nixon administration, which was confronting the Watergate affair, the US government suspected that the British government, by siding with the Arabs, was deliberately undermining its Middle East policy.This article argues that the British government sided with the Arabs in 1973 in order to secure oil supplies, despite generating acute tension with the United States and the European Community. Such discord, this paper argues, eventually deprived the British government of any significant role in settling the Middle East conflict and the oil crisis.

著者

山本 達也

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.141, pp.115-131,L14, 2005-05-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

41

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The purpose of this paper is to examine how the external environments of Middle Eastern governments, which require a serious commitment to the promotion of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), affect policies to control Internet information flow, and how it leads to a change in their domestic politics.Currently, we cannot confirm any leading hypotheses about the impacts of the Internet on authoritarian regimes that are widely accepted by political scientists. The main reasons for this is lack of statistical data, difficulties in obtaining sufficient material to discuss this theme, and the low Internet penetration rates in such countries.Of course, these hypotheses must surely exist in the Middle East and undoubtedly the relationship between Internet development and the political impacts on authoritarian regimes is an attractive research topic. However, the reasons mentioned above have caused certain limitations in carrying out such research. Therefore, this paper focuses on the regimes' Internet controlling policies, which is designed to block the free flow of information, and tries to expose the implications of political influences on authoritarian regimes by Internet development.When we focus on Internet controlling policies in authoritarian regimes, we should carefully assess the degree of governmental interference to the flow of information on the Internet. As figure 1 in my paper indicates, conceptually there are two different types of models regarding Internet controlling in authoritarian regimes. One model is that the government mediates and tries to control the flow of information on the Internet (model C), and the other model is that the government renounces Internet control completely (model D).There are two effective concepts to classify authoritarian regimes into model C or model D. The first concept is “network architecture, ” which is defined as the structural character of a network based on a code (software). The second concept is “network infrastructure architecture, ” which is defined as the physical structure of infrastructure to ensure data communication.As a result of my examination, most of the Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Egypt are categorized as model C, with only Jordan categorized as model D. The difference between Jordan and the other countries is explained by the engagement of US governmental organization on ICT strategy-making and revising processes, and the leadership of King Abdullah II, the head of the regime, who favors the introduction of policies that create competition in the ICT sector.The Jordanian decision to adopt model D leads a change in policymaking processes in the ICT field in Jordan, with transparency and accountability indubitably improved in this country. My paper concludes that the Jordanian case implies authoritarian regimes could adopt model D while keeping their authoritarian characters, and the perception and leadership of these regimes' heads would grasp the key for this change.