著者
大原 俊一郎
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_49-189_64, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
59

This paper argues that the German Historical School is the original main stream of thought in classical international political science in the West, and the methodology of this school makes research in international system through historical approach possible. In the 17th century, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Samuel von Pufendorf discussed international political issues. Subsequently early 19th century, A.H.L Heeren initiated the research of international system through historical approach. The German Historical School has ever afterward been interested in the establishment of “system” in the European international order of the period between the 18th to the early 19th century, namely the maturity of the European “states system,” because it acknowledges that the European “states system” that mainly matured in the 18th century has formed the core of the world order up to the present.The first research field in the area of international system through historical approach is history of thought on international politics as “intellectual history.” In the 18th century, the theoretical evolutions of international law in the German-speaking countries, including studies by noted philosophers Christian Wolff and Emer de Vattel, and the intellectual evolutions in the French-speaking countries, including studies by the noted political theorist and philosophers Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, formed the twin main streams of thought in this intellectual history. In addition, the intellectual evolutions in Britain included the studies of the noted philosopher. historian, and economist David Hume, which formed another stream of thought. They recognized and analyzed the formative process of “states system,” thereby influencing it.The second research field is investigation into the formative process of classical diplomacy called “diplomatic history.” In the middle of the 18th century, every great power reformed its own diplomacy, namely performing a “diplomatic revolution.” Then, in the second half of this century, international system of cooperation emerged as a multipolar system among great powers, preparing the way for the Concert of Europe beginning from Congress of Vienna in the early of the 19th century.The third research field is inquiry into the structural development of international system as “structural history”. The main subject of this “structural history” in the period between the 18th to the early 19th century is the transformation of the balance of power. The Machiavellian dynamic of balance of power of the early of the 18th century transformed the static and stable equilibrium in the second half of the 18th century. The above-mentioned intellectual and diplomatic evolutions contributed to this transformation for the European international order.In the maturing process of the European “states system,” thoughts and diplomacies transformed international structure through mutual interaction, resulting in the emergence of “system.” Therefore, the framework of the research of international system through historical approach is regulated by this formative process of “states system.” Every approach and research field relates to each other as the precondition of “states system.” Furthermore, the comprehension and the clarification of “states system” contributes to the understanding of the core function of the international system.
著者
小阪 真也
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_118-178_131, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)
参考文献数
49

This paper demonstrates the contribution of Morocco’s on-going comprehensive reparation for the gradual transition of Morocco from the authoritarian regime to the constitutional one after the end of the “Années de Plomb”. Previous researches tended to stress a lack of transitions of remained authoritarian regimes in Middle East including Morocco. However, this paper argues that, since 1990s, Morocco has been gradually developing its state system based on the idea of the constitutionalism that has been recently regarded as a source of the legitimacy of the sovereignty in international society. By referring to the broad concept of the reparation in the “Guideline” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005, this paper builds a theoretical framework based on the idea of the hierarchical structure of the rule of law which constitutes a core component of the constitutionalism. The idea of the rule of law can be divided into two parts: broad sense and narrow sense. The broad sense of the rule of law means universal value such as human rights which constitutes a fundamental principle and defines specific laws. On the other hand, the narrow sense of the rule of law, which constitutes low level rules, means specific laws that directly rules society. Sovereign states need to build both aspects of the rule of law in order to build a constitutional state system. Based on this understanding, this paper considers that states can build the broad sense of the rule of law through re-confirming human rights norms by providing compensation or restitution as principal activities of reparation. In addition, this paper argues that, in order to take measures for guarantee of non-repetition as a critical elements of the reparation in the “Guideline” in 2005, reparation is interrelated with the institution building that is another mechanism of transitional justice. From this standpoint, this paper considers that states can build the narrow sense of the rule of law through institution building to reform specific laws and legal institutions to prevent future atrocities. Under this framework, this paper argues that the comprehensive reparation in Morocco contributed for Morocco’s transition from the authoritarian regime to the constitutional one through re-building both aspects of the rule of law. For building the broad sense of the rule of law, Morocco re-confirmed human rights norms by implementing the reparation programs varied from the monetary compensation to the symbolic reparation under human rights laws. For building the narrow sense of the rule of law, Morocco implemented institution building, as a program for guarantee of non-repetition, to reform the constitution, penal code, and legal institutions. This paper concludes that, as a progress of transitional justice in Middle East, Morocco has been taking steps to a constitutional state through implementation of the on-going comprehensive reparation to build both aspects of the rule of law.
著者
秋元 美紀
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.192, pp.192_17-192_32, 2018-03-30 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
80

This paper examines Japan’s cultural exchange policy toward the Middle East through the Society for International Cultural Relations (KBS) and the Japan Foundation (JF) in the postwar years. Cultural exchanges are often used by countries as a foreign policy tool to make citizens of other nations to have favorable/sympathetic views about your own country, as well as to deepen mutual understanding.This article argues that the Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East in the postwar period has been conducted largely as an ad hoc manner. When crises happen in the Middle East and the Japanese image in the region deteriorates, Japan then initiates huge exchange programs for the Middle East to cope with the crises. Although the Middle East has not been given a high priority like the US and Southeast Asia in the Japanese cultural exchange program, it is important for Japan to maintain a friendly relationship with the Middle East for economic security reasons.Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East has been gradually developed by KBS and JF. Having obtained government aid, KBS launched the first original program for the Middle East in 1962. However, the contents were mainly the photo exhibition about the Japanese industry and the education. In the high growth period, Japan did not need to expand the cultural exchange with Middle Eastern countries because Japan’s relations with the Middle Eastern nations were never threatened or in jeopardy.Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East began to change in the 1970s and 80s as a result of such events like two oil crises and the Iran-Iraq War. JF, which took over KBS in 1972, embarked on large-scale projects to promote human exchanges between Japan and the Middle Eastern countries through sports including judo and soccer. It must be noted that the Persian Gulf War of 1991 did not have a big impact on Japan’s cultural exchange for the Middle East because it was the crisis in US-Japan relations sparked by the Gulf Crisis rather than the Gulf War itself that had greater effect on Japanese foreign policy. The percentage of JF’s projects for the Middle East were consistently lower than major areas like North America.In the 21st century, the September 11 attacks caused a war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Japan clearly strengthened the cultural exchange for the Middle East again. JF made a framework and tackled reinforced projects including intellectual exchanges to deepen mutual understanding and trust relationship. However, it ended in 2006. If crises and conflicts had not occurred in the Middle East, Japan would not have carried out enormous programs. This indicates Japan increases cultural exchange projects for the Middle East when crises happen and when these crises might badly influence the Japanese image.
著者
岩坂 将充
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_132-178_145, 2014-11-10 (Released:2015-11-30)
参考文献数
40

Under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), so-called “democratization”has been promoted on an unprecedented scale in Turkey. However, in a country where the military’s presence in politics has been very prominent, how far this democratization process has gone has not been fully investigated so far. In this article, I will seek to explain how democratization has been developed by analyzing the process of “civilianization”—which means the reducing of the military’s influence over politics—mainly under the JDP government. At the same time, by referring to the study by Ahmet T. Kuru, I will attempt to show that institution and ideology in civil-military relations have formed the background of democratization. The civilianization process in Turkey can be divided into three phases: (1) civilianization in institutions under the EU accession process; (2) the manifestation of civilianization in ideology; and (3) the civilianization of ideology through the judicial process. Before the JDP government emerged, the military developed institutions and an ideology to keep itself in power following the 1980 coup and the 1982 Constitution, which I call the “1982 regime” here. In the first phase, although the “1982 regime” had strongly consolidated itself, it could not resist the EU accession process that started at the end of 1999. The regime’s institutions were reformed to move the country toward EU membership because the regime’s ideology was open to joining the EU. In the second phase, such changes in institutions weakened the political influence of the military, and, in contrast, many civilian organizations that had been under the military’s influence strengthened their autonomy. For example, as observed in the “Republic Meeting” in April 2007, civic organizations that were considered to have the same ideology as the military acted autonomously. Moreover, the Constitutional Court dismissed the closure case for the JDP and judged, in its decision of July 2008, that the party’s reform had been effective for EU accession. In the last phase, the coup plan in 2003, which seemed to involve some retired military personnel, was judged in the courts, and it damaged the military’s prestige. In this understanding, it can be said that democratization, which has shown significant progress under the JDP government, has been realized by the military’s loss of its monopoly over ideology through the civilianization of the institutions of the “1982 regime” and the emphasis on EU values, such as freedom and liberal democracy, which had been neglected for a long time. Furthermore, it also can be said that ideology still has legitimacy in a different form and context from the “1982 regime.” Such changes in ideology and legitimacy will affect the further progress of democratization and the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.
著者
澤田 眞治
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_62-194_78, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)
参考文献数
86

In 2011, in the aftermath of the collapse of Gaddafi regime in Libya promoted by the aerial bombardment of NATO, President Rousseff of Brazil proposed “Responsibility while Protecting” (RWP) in UN General Assembly. Brazil submitted the detailed concept note of RWP constituted of numerous proposals that are to complement “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P): among them, to place the three pillars of R2P under the strict political subordination and chronological sequencing, to impose strict conditions on the use of force, and to establish a proactive mechanism of monitoring and evaluation of military activities by Security Council so as to assure accountability.The principles of “non-interference” and “non-use of force” had been long-held diplomatic traditions of Brazil as they were in other Latin American countries. However, in the 21th century, under Lula da Silva’s administration, Brazil expressed a new attitude of “non-indifference” in addition to the traditional non-interference and participated in United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), with the view to promote its presence as a candidate of new permanent member of Security Council. Nonetheless, Brazil was skeptical about R2P, assuming it as a new form of right of interference and maintaining traditional idea of “sovereignty as shield”. RWP was the way to reconcile the traditional idea and Brazil’s new role in UN as an emerging power.Brazilian proposal of RWP had major repercussions in international community because the overthrow of Libyan government had caused considerable concerns about R2P among emerging powers and developing countries. They concern for possible “misuse” of R2P as a tool to achieve regime change with armed force reflecting particular interest of the West. The implementation of R2P became the focus of controversy between the supportive West and skeptical South. While the West criticized RWP preferring to keep operational flexibility of military activities in implementing R2P, the emerging powers, especially South Africa and India, and some developing countries supported RWP to prevent selective invocation of R2P and misuse of the mandate. Failing to reach consensus, Brazil virtually withdrew RWP proposal.Almost as if to inherit this proposal, in 2012 China proposed “Responsible Protection” (RP) similar to RWP. However, in contrast to Brazilian RWP invented to bridge the gap between the supporters and the skeptics of R2P, Chinese RP is like a “long wall” or seawall to guard the cohesion of skeptical countries against R2P from the erosion by global tides of the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’.RWP was an important attempt where non-Western country had played a significant role as a norm-shaper in international norm-making process in which the West had been dominant. Brazilian efforts to bridge the global gap would continue to give instructions in global norm-making on humanitarian issues and intervention.
著者
佐藤 章
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_79-194_94, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)
参考文献数
45

In the 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa encountered many armed conflicts and, consequently, experienced several regime changes resulting from military victories or the elections following the ratification of peace accords. In this series of events, major international actors, such as the United Nations and developed countries, intervened in Africa under the guise of peace building and promoting democracy to further their own interests in pursuing a new world order during the post-Cold War era. In such a situation, many African countries had to simultaneously accomplish numerous difficult tasks related to aspects such as security, recovery, reconciliation, and democracy. As a result, whereas some countries were successful in these tasks, others failed and had to encounter escalating political instability.Approximately 20 years have passed since then; today, one of the most important changes that one can find in Africa is the significant enhancement of the region’s political and military capacity to respond to conflicts. This paper focuses on this capacity notably exercised by several regional organizations in Africa and discusses two observations regarding this development. First, this enhancement is an outcome of fulfilling the transition toward realizing “African Solutions to Africa’s Problems,” an idea that has received international acclaim since the 1990s. Second, the cooperative task sharing that is implemented between African countries and actors outside Africa, such as the United Nations, has enhanced the region’s capacity to respond to conflicts.Further, this paper examines the unintended outcomes of this enhancement in Africa’s capacity to respond to conflicts. In recent years, several African countries have engaged in active military operations against armed Islamist groups, whose activities, on their part, have escalated the violence occurring in the region. It is true that such operations are the result of autonomous efforts by African countries to satisfy their own security interests. However, in the current global context, their activities imply that they are participating in the “war on terror” led by developed countries. In addition, the recent initiatives for conflict resolution in Côte d’Ivoire and the Gambia by a regional organization in West Africa reveal that some African countries are so confident of their military capacity that they have a radical conviction that military intervention by these countries in other African counties is justified if the purpose is to secure or stabilize democracy in the latter. These unintended outcomes of capacity enhancement can be clearly described as both an ambiguity and a paradox of finding “African Solutions to Africa’s Problems.” By highlighting this aspect, this paper portrays the relationship between the new world order, regime changes, and violence in twenty-first-century Africa.
著者
古内 洋平
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_95-194_110, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)
参考文献数
59

Any government that emerges from repression or conflict faces challenges related to transitional justice. In recent years, the focus of studies on transitional justice has shifted from the prosecution of perpetrators to reparations for victims. For a government that has just emerged from repression or conflict, granting reparations to victims is a major burden in terms of finances and capabilities. There are many examples of governments that have refused to compensate victims or that have discontinued payments after a short time. Yet, an increasing number of governments have continued to grant reparations to victims since the 2000s. What is the reason for such growth? Researchers in several past studies have analyzed the processes by which transitional justice mechanisms are diffused across national boundaries, though most of the studies have focused on the spread of trials against perpetrators and trials associated with truth commissions. Only a small number of studies have addressed the spread of reparations for victims.This paper provides an analysis of the causes for the increase in governments that are granting reparations to victims, with a special focus on the 2000s. I make use of Jelena Subotic’s framework of hijacked justice to explain interactions between international actors and domestic political elites. In the 2000s, domestic political elites appeared, making strategic use of reparations to victims as a means for achieving economic growth and national security. They employed terms like collective reparation and community reparation. Moreover, international actors, including international NGOs and international organizations, began collecting information about countries that were implementing collective and community reparations, suggesting that reparation for victims could be integrated into development projects. In this paper, I refer to this idea as development-centered reparation. Once this idea came to have international influence, it allowed domestic political elites to justify their use of reparations to initiate other policies. The result was an increase in governments granting compensation to victims as a transitional justice mechanism.To ascertain processes such as the one described above, I use primary sources from international organizations and NGOs to investigate international actors’ perceptions of reparation as well as changes in their perceptions. In this paper, I examine Morocco and Colombia as examples of countries that continuously grant reparations to victims and investigate the interactions between international actors and domestic political elites in both countries.
著者
古澤 嘉朗
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_111-194_124, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)
参考文献数
65

A quarter century has passed since the release of the Agenda for Peace in 1992, which, retrospectively, can be marked as the beginning of recent surge in peacebuilding research and practice. The institutionalization of the term “peacebuilding” appears to be a success, as many organizations around the globe incorporated the term framing their own activities in post-conflict and transitional countries. This can be symbolically represented by the establishment of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office in 2005. On peacebuilding research, major publishers have released books such as Palgrave Advance in Peacebuilding and Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, published in 2010 and 2013 respectively, and the peer-reviewed journal entitled Peacebuilding was launched in 2013. So-called “liberal” peacebuilding debate is also taking place between two camps: policy-oriented research and critical research. While former seeks effectiveness of peacebuilding practices, while the latter seeks a quality of peace built as a result of peacebuilding practices. Taking these developments into account, this article will analyze a strategy of peacebuilding policy by looking into terms such as “rule of law” and “legal pluralism.” In this process, the article will look into the police reform and chiefdom police reform in Sierra Leone. The first section of the paper will explain how “rule of law” fits into peacebuilding policy by examining the police reform in Sierra Leone (1998–2005). The second section will explain how “legal pluralism” fits into peacebuilding policy by examining the chiefdom police reform in Sierra Leone (2008–2017). The paper points out that a difference between the two approaches—rule of law and legal pluralism—results from a different conception of the term “policing.” The former is based on the narrow understanding of policing, while the latter is based on the broader understanding. The paper raises following three points. First, the intent of this article is to make a point that revising peacebuilding strategy is necessary in order to improve quality of peace built via peacebuilding practices. Second, the paper argues that, instead of making peacebuilding policy and research into a normative framework and a standard set of assumptions about how post-conflict and transitional countries should be reformed, peacebuilding policy and research need to be context-based. Third, paper also points out that whether peacebuilding policy will be context-based or not will largely be affected by politics surrounding actors engaged in peacebuilding in each case.
著者
下谷内 奈緒
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_125-194_140, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)
参考文献数
51

This article examines the nature of the rule of law in international criminal justice through a critical evaluation of deterrent theory, the most widely accepted argument supporting international criminal tribunals today. Contrary to the assumptions of deterrent theory, the premise of which is centralized enforcement of international law, it argues that the rule of law in international criminal justice is decentralized in two ways. First, it requires the consent of sovereign states to establish jurisdiction and the cooperation of states to enforce international criminal law. Second, beyond the direct execution of international criminal law, the legal norm embodied by international criminal courts to end impunity for the perpetrators of grave human rights abuses encourages states to conduct human rights trials in their domestic courts.The article begins by reviewing the logic of deterrence. Deterrent theory has become prominent as an increasing number of international prosecutions are directed at the perpetrators of ongoing violence. It is assumed that the threat of punishment will deter the perpetrators from further criminal acts and, thus, prevent the escalation of conflict. In this instance, deterrent effects are viewed as conveyed in a manner that applies domestic deterrent theory of punishment at an international level. While this domestic analogy tends to emphasize the coercive power of law, this article demonstrates that the power of international tribunals to constrain the conduct of sovereign states and individuals has been weakening. While the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were executed on the strength of the victors’ overwhelming power, today, international tribunals as exemplified in the ICC and hybrid courts basically require the consent of states.The article then investigates the normative aspect of international criminal justice. It has a high level of legitimacy—it is recognized as legitimate by a majority of states in the world. This fact encourages voluntary compliance of international criminal justice at a national level. However, the problem is what to do with the remaining countries. Grave human rights abuses are committed in a minority of undemocratic states whose levels of political liberties are extremely low. These countries tend to remain outside the international criminal system. It is difficult to prosecute atrocious state leaders without regime change, but international criminal justice as it is implemented now merely “complements” the functions of sovereign states. It has neither the power to coerce regime change nor the normative power to encourage voluntary human rights trials in national courts.
著者
クロス 京子
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_141-194_156, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)
参考文献数
70

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 adopted in 2000, which is regarded as a landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security, recognized that men and women experience conflict differently, and that women play an integral role in conflict prevention, resolution, and recovery. It urged Member States to increase women’s participation in all aspects of peace and security processes and incorporate gender perspectives into all post-conflict efforts. It also called upon all parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence in situations of armed conflict. This Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda developed into a comprehensive normative framework, followed by seven subsequent UNSCRs.The strengthening of the WPS norms and its spread, however, are not necessarily linked to concrete actions and results promoting gender equality in conflict-affected societies. Indeed, even though in Liberia the first female African president was elected with the strong support from women’s organizations and the United Nations PKO explicitly mandated WPS agenda was deployed, there has been no major improvement in the women’s political, economic and social situation. Women are still left in a state of insecurity even after the conflict is over. The question that comes up here is how the WPS agenda is translated and introduced into post-conflict peace-building policies and how they affect the domestic society.This paper utilizes the concept of ‘hybridity’ which is promoted by the critical peace-building scholars to explain the interaction of power between local and international actors in the post-conflict settings. It analyzes what kind of hybridity was created in a case study of gendered security sector reform (SSR) in Liberia from two perspectives, firstly from the perspective of international and local actors, and secondly considering the gender approach. Through the analysis of hybridity, this paper identifies factors that promote or impede the acceptance and implementation of international norms, that is, the power structure inherent in international/local as well as gender that causes gaps in women’s security needs.One of the key significances of this research is that it sheds light on women’s grassroots activities in promoting ‘everyday peace’ by using the WPS agenda as informal SSR activities that mainly deviates from the formal SSR framework. Most people in developing countries depend upon informal security providers such as elders and chiefs for the maintenance of order. Thus, the reform of formal security sectors such as police, military, judiciary do not necessarily directly lead to the security of women living in post-conflict societies. This research, which regards local female activists as agents in the positive creation of hybridity, aims to present a new perspective to bridge hybrid peace study and gender/feminism study.
著者
山口 正大
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_157-193_172, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
49

Collective security originally evolved as a normative framework in the international community to maintain peace and security after the two consecutive World Wars. It was institutionalized largely through the United Nations (UN) Charter and the Security Council. However, it was not until the end of the Cold War that the institutional arrangement became operational. In order to respond sudden increase of internal conflicts after the Cold War, the international community has applied collective security to intrastate warfare by invoking Chapter 7 of the Charter. This brought about the establishment of various UN peacekeeping operations since the 1990s. At the same time, regional organizations took their own initiatives to conduct intervention and conflict resolution in some of the internal conflicts, based on Chapter 8 of the Charter.In Africa, it was not the regional organization, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), but sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, that were initially involved in resolution and mediation of internal conflicts. This was partly because of the OAU’s reluctance, overshadowed by its ‘non-interference’ policy, and, at times, a lack of political will for intervention through the UN at the international level. However, the situation has changed significantly since the establishment of the African Union (AU). Unlike its predecessor, the AU positions itself to play much more active role in collective security in the continent, as reflected in its Constitutive Act. It establishes institutional arrangements and procedures to take collective action by the AU and sub-regional organizations through the African Peace and Security Architecture.This article examined the evolution of a collective security regime in Africa. Based on two case studies in Somalia and Mali, it is argued that a three-layered regime of collective security is being established in the continent, consisting of the UN, the AU and sub-regional organizations. The case studies highlighted that peace operations and political missions led by different actors operate in a country at a single point in time, in order to respond to the complex nature of contemporary security environment where internal conflict and asymmetric threat posed by terrorist armed groups coexist. It is further argued that based on their comparative advantages, there are both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ divisions of roles among various actors in realizing collective security by those actors in the continent. This symbolizes changing characteristics of the collective security regime in Africa from the one largely centralized by the UN Security Council with utilizing UN peacekeeping operations to a mutlilayered one consisting of the UN, regional and sub-regional organizations with a combined effort of collective actions by multiple actors.
著者
土佐 弘之
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_1-194_13, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)
参考文献数
45

This special issue is the attempt to scrutinize the current transition process of the regimes at the domestic or regional level as well as the global level. Its title ‘Regime Transition and Violence’ reminds us of the democratic peace theory. Following the end of the Cold War, there had been some optimistic prospect that the waves of democratization would transform the world order into more peaceful one, which the democratic peace theory suggested.However the use of force for the regime change brought about more violent situations, which we could notice in the case of Iraq. In addition, the liberal democracies themselves as well as the liberal international order began to face serious crisis, which questions the plausibility of “the end of history” argument.In other words, the rise of illiberalism and the consolidation of competitive authoritarianism seem to rebuke the liberal view of progressive history, which presupposes the inevitable transition toward the liberal democracy. Unlike the prospect of the democratic peace theory, the real world order seems to be rearranged in accordance with the deepening crisis of liberal order. Articles in this special issue argue about the problems with way in which the post-liberal world order (the post-liberal peace) as well as the domestic order is reconfigured each other.
著者
山尾 大
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_29-194_45, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)
参考文献数
24

U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought about not only distortion of state building, but also the problems that affected political turmoil in the Middle East as well as international politics. This paper aims to argue the impacts that the U.S. invasion of Iraq had toward the process of Iraqi state building and toward regional politic in the Middle East, by focusing first on external factors brought about by this invasion, and second on internal factors caused by political rivalry among Iraqi political elites.This paper makes three main findings. First, the new regime had no choice but relying on cooptation policy to local leaders in order to stabilize its government, which was quite similar to the mechanism of rule by the former authoritarian Baʻthist regime. The reason of this similarity can be found in the fact that the regime change was brought about by the foreign invasion, and thus new regime had to be constructed by former-exile political elites who did not have any support bases of constituencies within local community. In addition, the introduction of the Western democratic system that political representation should be equal according to population of ethnic and sectarian groups resulted in manifestation of sectarian difference. These external factors caused problems in the building of political institutions.Second, Iraqi internal actors deconstructed democratic institutions brought in from outside and began to utilize them according to their own interests. The fact that democratization was proceeded without the establishment of state institutions made it possible for Iraqi actors to use these democratic institutions for their own political purpose. Thus, the new regime had no choice than becoming authoritarian in order to stabilize its government. Moreover, it was unavoidable for international society to ignore this authoritarian regime as it prioritized stability of Iraq.Third, this tendency, however, resulted in the spread of opposition movements within Iraq and subsequent loss of control of opposition-led areas. It was these areas where so-called Islamic State penetrated in and agitated sectarian conflicts among Iraqis.Hence, it can be said that sectarian conflicts spread inside and outside Iraq as a result of the interaction of the fact that U.S. invasion brought about problems in democratic institutions and the fact that Iraqi internal actors utilized these institutions for their own interests. In other words, when the problems that were brought about by external factors are used as political tools of internal actors, specific problems to the country become manifest, which results in spreading to regional politics in a very violent manner.
著者
篠原 初枝
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_1-193_11, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
31

One of the most salient and distinctive features in history of international relations is the increasing number of International Organizations such as Inter-governmental Organizations (IGO) and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO or NGO). In contrast to their rising numbers and importance in the actual management of inter-state affairs, the history of International Organizations has not been fully developed as an academic field. This could be in part ascribed to the view that the League of Nations failed to prevent the outbreak of World War II, or to the negative view of the United Nations being dominated by great powers.Engaging in historical exploration and examination of the organizations, we can deepen our understanding not only of the organizations themselves, but also of the essential and transforming nature of international relations as a whole. Historical works can deeply delve into the particular issues that IGOs and NGOs faced and dealt with. For instance, during the League period, several forms of cooperation in technical affairs such as public health developed, and most of them were carried over into the UN. Additionally, exploration of the aims and activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can illustrate the fact that their activities faced difficulties in some countries.In addition to in-depth analysis of each organization, historical works can provide answers to big questions concerning international organizations and affairs, because history is endowed and privileged with a special mission and competency to present a long-term and broad overview. Why were those organizations established, why do states and civil society create organizations, and if and how has the nature of international society changed? Historical examination of organizations can aptly give us a clue to these questions. If such academic endeavor can draw a broad picture of transformation in international society, we can further consider if, thanks to those organizations, we have become better off and more civilized in the conduct of international affairs.In this special issue, the concrete subjects of analysis are IGOs and NGOs. One can define their essential nature as concrete entities and bodies which have their own headquarters, and enjoy a degree of autonomy and neutrality. Even though the UN has been criticized for the dominance of great powers, one cannot completely deny the existence of numerous exemplary UN programs that stand as examples of autonomy. With the increase of their numbers and widening the range of their activities, it is not too much to say that international organizations have firmly established their positions in world affairs and that they have become indispensable actors in building a peaceful international order.