著者

新垣 拓

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.163, pp.163_68-80, 2011-01-20 (Released:2013-05-10)

参考文献数

47

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The U.S. nuclear sharing policy for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started in the late 1950s. The policy's initial objective was to enhance the NATO's defense capability and its readiness by providing the nonnuclear allies with military training for the use of nuclear weapons which were to be transferred from the U.S. custody in case of emergency. However, after the Soviet Union's successful launch of Sputnik, the nuclear sharing was also beginning to be recognized as an effective nuclear nonproliferation measure for the European allies since Washington anticipated that it could provide further reassurance for the allies and allay their concerns about the reliability of the U.S. extended deterrence. In this context, located at “the front line” and sensitive about the credibility and reliability of the US extended deterrence, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) had become the most important allies that affected the nuclear sharing policy during the Cold War period.For the US government, allowing the Germans too much “access” to its nuclear weapons through the nuclear sharing arrangement might cause serious concerns of other major allies, such as the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Therefore, finding a West Germany's fair “share” in the NATO nuclear defense and, at the same time, avoiding other allies to raise concerns against it was the critical requirement for the success of the nuclear sharing policy. From the latter half of the 1950's to the late 1960s, U.S. government tackled this NATO's nuclear problem by exploring the two different approaches: “hardware solution” or “collective nuclear force approach” and “consultation approach”.The Johnson years were the critical time because the decision was made to adopt the consultation approach, which led to the creation of NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1966. By focusing on the decision-making process and using newly declassified documents, this article will explain that the three deferent processes had affected the decision: the stagnation process of the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal, the process of gaining acceptance of the consultation approach, and the process of growing momentum to materialize the approach.

著者

松川 克彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.96, pp.35-50,L7, 1991

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Poland's struggle to build up her independence after the Armistice, had a strong influence on her own foreign policy making process during the interwar period.<br>This struggle was against the common aim of Soviet Russia and Germany to undermine the existence of Poland, as set up under the Versailles Treaty. The armed strife on the east and west borders of Poland was closely interconnected. There was direct Russo-German military and economic co-operation which also extended to Lithuania. As the latter also had territorial differences with Poland, Lithuania chose to act, as an intermediary between Soviet Russia and Germany which had no common borders.<br>Czechoslovakia played a similar role to Lithuania on the Polish southern border. Czechoslovakia kept good relations with Russia and Ukraine which was offered a base to prepare an anti-Polish campaign over East Galicia. Thus if Poland were to antagonize Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, it would upset Russo-German co-operation.<br>Poland tried to establish closer relations with Latvia and Estonia to diminish Lithuanian influence as well as maintaining good relations with Hungary and Rumania in opposition to Czechoslovakia. Although all of these countries were created after the world war and were in a similar situation, they were unable to form a common front against the growing menaces from east and west. The struggle between Poland on one side and Lithuania and Czechoslovakia on the other, continued through the interwar period.<br>In addition, Poland was offended by the Entente, especially by the U. K. which not only refused to help Poland during her war with Soviet Russia but also compelled Poland to accept harsh Russian ceasefire terms. Britain wished to conclude a commercial agreement with Russia to be followed by British recognition of the state of Russia. For this reason, Britain tried to stop the war between Poland and Soviet Russia and to confine Poland's border to the so-called Curzon Line, which was the predecessor of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. As France gradually leaned towards the British view point, Poland lost confidence in both countries.<br>Lastly, this international situation widened the differences between the two main Polish political groups. Pilsudski, a leader of one of the groups, wanted to make Poland independent of foreign influence and regarded himself as the successor to traditional Polish patriots such as Mickiewicz and Kosciuszko. The leader of the second group, Dmowski, wanted to establish good relations with the U. K., France, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia in order to confront the German menace.<br>When Dmowski's foreign policy, which was grounded on the Polish-French Alliance, lost credibility through lack of French support and the effects of the Geneva and Locarno conferences, which seriously threatened Polish security, Pilsudski took the emergency step of a <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> in May 1926. He had decisive influence on military and foreign affairs and his aims were pursued by the &ldquo;colonel group&rdquo; after his death.

著者

三宅 正樹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1969, no.38, pp.105-133, 1969

著者

本多 美樹

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_161-175_164, 2014

著者

山口 一之

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1968, no.37, pp.41-53, 1968

著者

岡本 宏

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1970, no.43, pp.100-118, 1970-12-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

47

著者

クラップ P.

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1975, no.52, pp.L5-L41,L3, 1975

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米国政府が琉球列島に対する統治権に固執する立場をとったことは, 多くの面で, 現実を時勢に遅れることなく認知することができなかったことを示す典型的な例である。この立場の擁護論は, もともと1940年代末に打ち出され, 1950年代の冷戦によって補強された。そのさい, 米国の文民及び軍部の指導者たちはともに沖繩を, アジアにおいて朝鮮からフィリピンにつながる米軍の前進基地の要とみなすようになっていた。もちろんそのさい, この前進基地体系は米国の防衛能力の軸をなすものと考えられていた。米国政府内には, すでに1960年代の初期において, 外国の領土の軍事占領を無期限に続けることに対して快よく思わない人も多くいたけれども, 沖繩の軍事的価値を再検討することによって現状の変更を求める協力態勢は1966年までみられなかった。<br>アメリカの考え方が変ったのは1966年から1969年にかけてであるが, それは主として, 琉球列島の統治から得られる特定の軍事的価値と, 日本及び沖繩において増大しつつあった米統治に対する深刻な政治的圧力が取引によって処理可能であるということを慎重に明確化した結果であった。これについての論理的な説明を体系的に求めていく過程で明らかになったのは, 日本の統治下においても沖繩基地の主要な軍事的価値が維持されうるということだけではなく, さらに重要なことに, それが現行の日米安保条約の下で可能であるということであった。沖繩の返還によって失われるのは沖繩における核兵器の貯蔵または展開の権利だけであり, この損失について十分に対処することができた。また, 基地の効用は, 結局は基地が現地住民によって受けいれられるかどうかによって決まることも明らかにされた。さらに, もし返還問題が1970年までに最終的に解決されないのであれば, 日本との安保条約が脅かされる恐れがあった。<br>アメリカにおける沖繩返還論議は, 殆ど政府官僚に限られ, 安全保障上の機密のベールによっておいかくされていた。ニュースとして公表されたのはきわめて少なく, 一般大衆は関心が薄く, 議会から強い圧力がかかったわけでもない。したがって, 論議への主な参加者は返還問題に直接の利害を有する官僚であった。すなわち, 国務省の極東担当局, 駐日米大使, 国防総省の国際安全保障局, 陸軍省, 統合参謀本部であり, 最終的には大統領が加わった。明らかに返還問題は二次的な比重しかしめていなかったのであり, 意見の相違は政府の中級レベルの官僚間で調整された。1969年に, とくに大統領の決定にゆだねられたのは, 核兵器の撤去に対する日本の要求を尊重するという決定だけであった。その時までにこのような決定に対しては, とくに日本との強固な友好関係を維持していくため大統領が自らの責任で行なった決定であっただけに, 軍部からの反対は殆どなかった。

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1965, no.28, pp.72-86, 1965

著者

寺阪 精二

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1962, no.20, pp.111-129, 1962-10-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

21

著者

荒 哲

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.120, pp.210-229,L19, 1999

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General Artemio Ricarte, &ldquo;Vibora, &rdquo; is said to be one of the most stubborn Filipino heroes in Philippine history. He never swore allegiance to the United States after he was arrested by the American authorities in February 1899 during the Philippine-American War. Most Filipino historians have not paid much attention to his role in Philippine history because some of them are still suspicious of his nationalistic heroism. His collaboration with the Japanese Army during the Japanese occupation in the Philippines still causes doubt as to whether he was nationalistic or not. This paper is trying to discover if his anti-Americanism was still based on his hopes for Philippine independence by examining the time period between 1915 when he made his personal exile to Japan and 1945 when he died in the Philippines.<br>Having read his correspondences written in Tagalog (one of the Filipino languages) with his friend in the Philippines, Jose P. Santos, the distinguished Filipino historian, and having examined his political statements regarding the issue of Philippine independence from 1915 to 1941, the author finds that the &ldquo;stubborness&rdquo; in his nationalism against the United States changed noticeably over time. It is observed that it changed with times of persons to whom he talked and met. For example, in 1917 when the Jones Act (Philippine Independence Act) was approved by the US Congress, he became sympathetic to the political scene in the United States and praised the political elites of the Philippines such as Manuel I. Quezon of Sergio Osme&ntilde;a. However, he again became anti-American when he talked to Japanese officials or Japanese police authorities in Yokohama where he lived at that time. Indeed, he supported the anti-American movement in Luzon led by Benigno Ramos, the so-called &ldquo;Sakdal Movement&rdquo; in the nineteen thirties. But, even though Ricarte and Ramos held the same position for &ldquo;immediate, absolute, and complete&rdquo; independence of the Philippines, he was nevertheless ultimately a &ldquo;Quzonista&rdquo; in the sense that he was never opposed the way in which the independence movement led by the Filipino elites such as Quezon was waged. That is, even though he was originally opposed to the ten-year probational independence term, the so-called Commonwealth, he finally came to accept the Commonwealth idea, and government, led by Quezon.<br>During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, he again became anti-American. He was not satisfied with a principle policy of the Japanese authorities in which most members of the former Philippine Commonwealth government were again put in important positions in the Philippine Executive Commission governed directly by the Japanese Military Administration. This situation awakened his political aspiration of becoming a dictator. With some Filipino collaborators led by Benigno Ramos and Ganap, Ricarte tried to make a coup attempt against the Laurel government in 1943. But he realized that the government was so stable that they could not do anything against its authority.<br>Unlike Benigno Ramos, Ricarte was not aggressive in the movement for Philippine independence, where Ramos still had political aspirations to become the new leader. To the end of the war, he was still not satisfied with the political situation where many, so-called, &ldquo;pro-American&rdquo; cabinet memebers occupied the Laurel government. But Ricarte did not like to cooperate with Ramos in, for example, the Makapili movement in 1944. Instead, Ricarte organized his own army, the &ldquo;Peace Army&rdquo;, for the defense of the Philippine government against the United States.

著者

若月 秀和

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.197-217,L23, 2000

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The purpose of this essay is, firstly, to analyze how the Japanese government coped with the international situation before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced and how the government aimed at a continuation of d&eacute;tente and secondly, to evaluate the essence and significance of the doctrine, with a greater focus on Mr. Fukuda's diplomatic idea, namely omnidirectional-peace diplomacy. The doctrine was announced during his visit to Southeast Asia in August 1977. The basic principles are (1) to reject the role of a major military power, (2) to establish reliable relationships with Southeast Asian countries, and (3) to contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia by cooperating with ASEAN and its member countries in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina.<br>The essay consists of five sections. In the first section, I review the international circumstances surrounding the Fukuda Doctrine, where so-called &ldquo;d&eacute;tente&rdquo; and unstable international relations were mixed. In the second section, I review the omni-directional-peace diplomacy which Mr. Fukuda advocated. Based on the US-Japan relationship, this policy was intended for friendly relationships with all countries, refusing to be a major military power. And this idea was a major influential factor in making the basic nature of the doctrine. Japan's intention to overcome the structure of the cold war was also another influential factor for the doctrine. In the third and fourth sections, I explain concretely how relationships with ASEAN and the countries of Indochina were established before the Fukuda Doctrine was announced. Mr. Fukuda's insight and leadership, together with the accumulation of steady contacts with those countries by officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, enabled the announcement of such diplomatic policies for Southeast Asia. In the fifth section, I review the essence and significance of the Fukuda Doctrine. The doctrine stabilized international relations directly after the Vietnam War. It consolidated the foundation of Japan's diplomacy for Southeast Asia and strengthened the feeling of togetherness among free nations. Though Japan could not prevent the diffusion of Soviet-China enmity to Indochina and the new cold war in 1980s, the doctrine left a legacy for Japan's diplomacy and international society after the cold war

著者

宮里 政玄 増田 弘

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1981, no.69, pp.171-173, 1981-10-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

井上 貴子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.127, pp.169-184,L18, 2001

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Television viewing has become a part of everyday life in India since the early 1990s. The development of mass media has made new patriotism pervasive in the popular culture of India. It is quite usual that political parties appropriate popular culture for legitimizing their ideology. I especially focus on the video clip shot by G. Bharat, a commercial film producer for the album <i>Vande Mataram</i> (Mother, I salute you) by A. R. Rahman, a popular musician, released in 1997 to celebrate India's fifty years of independence.<br><i>Vande Mataram</i> composed by a Bengali poet, Bankimchandra Chatterjee was first set to music and sung by Rabindranath Tagore at the 1896 session of the Indian National Congress. The song became a symbol of patriotism during the Swadeshi movement opposed to the partition of Bengal in 1905, though it caused the communal tension between Hindus and Muslims during the freedom struggle, as it was anti-Muslim in its content and context.<br>The video clip of <i>Vande Mataram</i> revived in a new version made patriotism the popular boom in spite of heavy criticism. Patriotism described in the video clip is love of Mother India, a country of "Unity in Diversity", where the diverse people live happily and tradition and modernity coexist. This concept totally agrees with the program code of laws relating to broadcasting, which made the video clip possible to be broadcast widely.<br>Bharatiya Janata Party appropriated this boom. The Uttar Pradesh Government tried to make the singing of <i>Vande Mataram</i> in schools, the meetings for mourning victims of Kargil War were held all over the country, and the Millennium Vande Mataram Campaign was launched for arousing patriotism among the youth. These events reminded them of the national enthusiasm for calling for freedom though it caused communal tension and was criticized bitterly.<br>Those who belong to the urban middle class of Chennai in Tamil Nadu, Rahman and Bharat's native city, have well accepted the new patriotism according to my survey. The result shows that the difference of social background little affects their perception. Though caste and gender difference cannnot be recognized, the elder generation, non-Hindu and non-Tamil, are somewhat more critical of the new patriotism. Tamil Hindus seem no longer to be satisfied with Tamil Nationalism propelled by regional parties but to identify themselves with the Nation of India.<br>This phenomenon is a reaction to globalization. Both anti-globalization and yeaning for American culture in producers' mind crystallized as a new patriotic music. Though its description of India suggests no border and enemy, anti-globalization is often expressed by the hostility to neighbors. That is why BJP can easily appropriate this boom for legitimizing their ideology and policy based on anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim themes.

著者

松岡 完

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.130, pp.160-174,L15, 2002-05-31 (Released:2010-09-01)

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The Vietnam War had hardly ended when intensive efforts to “correct” the war narratives were commenced within the United States. The challenge to the once seemingly established fact that the United States had suffered a humiliating defeat came to its peak in the middle of the 1980s. Revisionists such as the former and incumbent Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan aimed to cure the Americans of the Vietnam syndrome, and to help them regain their self-confidence and a sense of national integrity.The withdrawal of American troops, the revisionists insisted, should never be portrayed as a surrender, instead merely as an American unilateral decision to leave Vietnam. The defeated, if any, were the South Vietnamese, not the Americans. The United States was actually a winner there, for it helped the anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam survive for two decades so that other nations in Southeast Asia could develop their economic and political strength. Moreover, American soldiers were always victorious in any encounter with the Communist guerrilla or regular forces.The revisionists believed that the United States could have won at an earlier stage if only it had used its military power in an overwhelming way. The United States was on the verge of triumph by the end of 1972, almost forcing the leaders in Hanoi to accept American terms in peace talks through its massive bombing attacks in central North Vietnam. Then, suddenly, the revisionists argue, the U. S. Congress, intimidated by an unjustified fear of United States inability to win the war, threw in the towel.Political leaders in Washington came under the attack of the revisionists. The United States lost this war for several reasons, namely because the government was unable to offer the American people a definite war objective, placed exceedingly unnecessary restrictions upon the military, failed to demonstrate sufficient will to win, and was unsuccessful in fully mobilizing the public behind the war effort.American mass media, including television, was another target. The correspondents were criticized for being too young and too inexperienced to grasp the reality of battleground and sometimes too naive to shelter themselves from the influence of the Communists' propaganda. Hence, their reporting across the Pacific contributed to serious increases in anti-war sentiment back home, which in turn caused extreme damage to the American war strategy.The majority of the American people were, however, far from being persuaded by such revisionist arguments. They knew that they had never fulfilled their objective of building a strong and viable anti-Communist regime in Vietnam, that they had been responsible for the South Vietnamese deficiencies, that winning in a shooting war had been irrelevant to the political future of the country, that the results of truce negotiations could hardly have been American triumph, and that blaming politicians and reporters merely was a means to protect the military from further criticism. That is why, to the regret of the revisionists, the memory of defeat in Vietnam still haunts the American people.

著者

小此木 政夫

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.92, pp.1-16,L5, 1989

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The ratification of the December 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty established formal diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Seoul. In terms of diplomatic negotiation process, on the one hand, it did nothing more than confirm the relationship between Japan and the Korean Peninsula which was already in existence following the Korean War; on the orther hand, it also announced the birth of a new international system among three countries, Japan-US-South Korea. The conclusion of the Japan-South Korea treaty itself, was Japan's first diplomatic initiative since the end of war and the first act of Japan-US burden-sharing. However, it didn't deny the existence of another government in the Korean Peninsula i. e. North Korea nor did it put constraints on future relations with it. The Japanese leaders clearly limited the treaty's scope of application to the southern half of the Peninsula; subsequent relations with North Korea would be entrusted to the international situation in the future.<br>From that point of view, the 1972 U. S. detente with the Soviet Union and China, and the opening of the North-South Dialogue, brought a new perspective to Japan's relations with the Korean Peninsula. In fact, after Kissinger's July, 1971 China visit, in response to North Korea's invitation, Japanese-North Korean exchanges in the fields of sports, culture, and economy, rapidly developed. Furthermore, not only journalists, but also ruling and opposition Diet members began to visit to Pyongyang and hold discussions with Kim Il Sung. The Japanese government also clarified its policy on enlarging exchanges in nonpolitical fields. However, the North Korean side demanded establishing official diplomatic relations with Japan, which in essence, signified breaking relations with South Korea. In other words, North Korea would accept &ldquo;coexistence with Japan&rdquo; but would not permit &ldquo;coexistence with South Korea.&rdquo; With North Korea's announcement of suspending the North-South Dialogue, Japanese-North Korean relations took a turn to the worst.<br>However, with the start of the Roh Tae Woo administration, when South Korea announced abandoning its policy of isolation with North Korea, in July of 1988, an atmosphere of improved relations prevailed once again. Interestingly enough, this time, it was the Japanese side that demanded contact between the two governments. Also, both countries did not, nor do they, seek the establishment of diplomatic relations in the near future. The North Korea side fears setting the spark to the issue of cross-recongnition if it were to establish diplomatic relations with Japan. Nor does the Japanese side believe cross-recongnition is possible. In other words, Tokyo-Pyongyang relations cannot go beyond the level of Moscow-Seoul relations. It is possible however, that after &ldquo;squaring up&rdquo; issues from the &ldquo;unfortunate past, &rdquo; &ldquo;limited coexistence&rdquo; short of diplomatic recongnition, would comprise no more than cooperative economic relations. The resilience of this relationship i. e. Japan and North Korea, will be tested by whether or not it will be able to withstand the Tokyo-Seoul-Pyongyang &ldquo;game of diplomacy&rdquo; with all its complexity.

著者

高橋 知子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.197, pp.197_120-197_135, 2019-09-25 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

51

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This paper explores its research question on the behavior of China upon its participation in the creation of an international law, where institutions of different issue areas intersect. It establishes a starting point for theoretical research on the relation between the fluidity of international institutions and their effect on states’ interests.As to its potential contribution, firstly, since earlier studies that focus on the institutions’ “evolutions” treat states as homogeneous entities, it is valuable to provide the view from states, who utilize the institutions to pursue their own interests. Secondly, while earlier research on China and international institutions concentrates on the socialization of China in the “western” institutions, this paper highlights institutional fluidity and complexity, and the aspect of China utilizing them from their side. China is a country worth taking up, since it is a state with increasing importance in world order.Methodologically, this research takes up the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which regulates maritime order, and the related international negotiations in establishing an environmental institution on “Marine Biodiversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ)” under UNCLOS. Qualitative analysis is conducted on the international and Chinese arguments by looking into related minutes, statements and analyses. Related institutions, organizations and international law arguments are also referred to.Having traced international and Chinese arguments on BBNJ initiation, the conclusion is as follows; firstly, they all attempted to preserve their status quo maritime order as the norm, which I labeled as the “first trend”. Meanwhile, there was a “second trend” that aimed at restricting sovereignty by the international institution, which began as an exceptional argument on environmental control over areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ). However, when it was time the regulation details be specified, it became clear that they had to agree on concrete points, making it difficult to keep the norm intact. The clash between the two trends is ongoing in the international arena, as can be seen in the discussion on the creation of Area-Based Management Tools, and the specification of Marine Genetic Resources.China was reluctant in undertaking the “second trend” idea at the outset, but gradually committed to its elaboration, as the “third trend” argument on sheer environmental protection also transformed to an issue of maritime order, which questioned whether upholding sovereignty serves as the primary way to maximize state interests. The Chinese interest and the BBNJ process should be further examined by looking at its domestic decision-making process, and the impact of its traditional maritime disputes with surrounding neighbors. Further longitudinal studies should also serve to show how the rising power faces international institutions. However, overall, the “three trends” perspective serve as a heuristic tool to probe the relation of the change in international institutions and state interests.

著者

平間 洋一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.102, pp.39-54,L7, 1993

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In May 1890, Little Brown Co. of Boston presented to the public the first edition of The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783. In this book Mahan introduced not only a sound rationale of sea power in time of war, but a rationale of sea power in the time of peace, which was "welcomed by the rising nationalists, the armament manufacturers, the ship builders, military men hoping to enlarge their careers, bankers looking for foreign investment, and merchants interested in colonial markets, -who might find a big program of naval building and an aggressive foreign policy to their advantage." His theory was especially welcomed by nationalists, like Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and Theodore Roosevelt "who believed where there is no force behind it the diplomat is the servant." It is also said that this book changed not only the American navy, but also America itself. Hereafter, "the United States to make his works the bible and himself the prophet of American navalism."<br>The object of this paper is to examine how Mahan's image of Japan changed, including his personal feelings of a Japanese threat. Then I would like to review how he changed his attitudes towards Japan and why he changed his attitudes from curiosity-antipathy-admiration-antipathy. In his first magazine article, entitled "The United States Looking Outward, " published in the August 1890 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he noted that "the United States is woefully unready" and argued for U. S. naval expansion to meet the threat. And he warned that no foreign state should henceforth acquire "a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Franciso, -a distance which includes the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands, and the coast of Central America." Then in January 1893, after American residents in Honolulu had overthrown Queen Liluokalani and established a republic, he addressed a letter to the New York Times advocating U. S. annexation of "the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii)" against the day when China "expand her barriers eastward" in "a wave of barbaric invasion." Four years later, in May 1897, he implored Roosevelt, McKinley's new assistant Secretary of the Navy, to speedily strengthen the Pacific Squadron and "your best admiral needs to be in the Pacific". He instructed "much more initiative may be thrown on him than can on the Atlantic man". Then in September, he wrote article "A Twentieth Century Outlook", in Harper's Magazine, where he also adverted to the "Yellow Peril." But before 1898, except for reference to unexplained commercial opportunities awaiting Americans in East Asia, Mahan's imperialistic vision went no farther than the Caribbean, the Central American Isthmus, and the Hawaiian Islands. The target of the "Yellow Peril" was not Japan but China.<br>However, after the Sino-Japanese War, while Secretary of State John Hay was circulating his Open Door notes, Mahan's attitude towards Japan changed greatly and he was extremely conscious of the steady rise of Japanese naval power. The target of the "Yellow Peril" changed from China to Japan. But after the Russian southern advance into Manchuria began, he changed his attitude towards Japan again. When the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China, he wrote "The Problem of Asia." In this article, he saw the most pressing "problem" as Russia, whose expansionist aims in Eastern Asia had yet to be checkmated by Japan, and-he suggested a coalition of sorts among the four "Maritime States" of Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the United Staes. He felt appropriate saying something pleasant about the Japanese as he blandly conferred Teutonism upon Japan. Mahan noted that

著者

馬場 優

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.198, pp.198_15-198_31, 2020

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<p>The Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed at the end of the First World War. It is said that the cause of collapse was the anti-Habsburg nationalities that inhabited in the Empire and wanted to be independent from the Empire made use of the right of the self-determination that the American president, Woodrow Wilson, declared in his "Fourteen Points" speech in January 8th 1918. But in the article of 10 of the Fourteen Points he insisted that "The peoples of Austria-Hungary should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development". There was not the word "self-determination". What does the word "autonomous" mean for the policy-makers of the Empire and the nationalities? This article examines how the policy-makers of the Empire, specially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, understood and utilized Wilson's principles after the speech of the Fourteen Points in order to rescue their Empire from the crisis of dissolution.</p><p>The Fourteen Points seemed to them a tool for the rescue the Empire. So the then Foreign Minister, Count Czernin, made a speech in support of the Fourteen Points at the end of January. In February the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note in the name of the emperor Charles via Spain to Wilson that the emperor could agree the Wilson's principles in order to bring a peace to Europe. There was a good situation that a negotiated peace would be carried. But in the spring 1918 the United States changed her course and determined to collapsed the Empire. And the German Empire started the military offensive in the Western Front in March. Moreover the meeting between the leaders of the German Empire and the Austria-Hungary in May seemed to the United States that the emperor of the Austria-Hungary became a vassal. When the German offensive failed in August, the Austria-Hungary planned an armistice and peace-talks with the United States on the basis of the Fourteen Points. The policy-makers of the Empire understood that it is important to solve the South-Slav Question to persuade Wilson.</p><p>But in September the United States have already recognized that 1) a state of belligerency exit between the Czecho-Slovaks and Austria-Hungary and 2) the Czecho-Slovaks National Council is a de facto belligerent government. When the Austria-Hungary formally proposed the armistice and peace at the beginning of October, the United States rejected it. The United States insisted that the Fourteen Points was no longer relevant to the future of the Empire. Nevertheless the Austria-Hungary tried to appeal. She declared that she would approve Wilson's opinion about the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs. At last she determined to abandon her Allied, German Empire, and to propose a separate peace to the United States. But in the around of Empire the nationalities had declared the independence from the Empire on the ground of the self-determination.</p><p>On 3^rd November 1918 the army of the Empire concluded the armistice with the Entente and the war ended. This was also the end of the Empire.</p>

著者

内記 香子

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.200, pp.200_135-200_150, 2020-03-31 (Released:2020-04-16)

参考文献数

84

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The aim of this paper is to explore interdisciplinary international relations (IR) and international law (IL) research on the study of international courts. After the “legalization” theory, the study of international norms or regime complex has received much attention in the IR literature. However, the study of international courts has received less attention. The study of international courts is one of promised areas for research collaboration between IR and IL scholars. In particular, given that we have seen many instances of “backlash” against international courts, such an interdisciplinary approach is clearly needed.This paper provides insights for explaining the relationships between states and international courts. In particular, it addresses how control mechanisms that states impose on the independence of international courts actually operate. There are two existing IR frameworks relevant for the analysis on international courts. One is the legalization concept (and the compliance theory as an effectiveness of legalization) and the other is the principal-agent theory. However, both theories are incomplete to explain the relationships between states and courts. Drawn upon recent work of Dunoff/Pollack and Creamer/Godzimirska, this paper highlights the importance of two insights for analyzing the interactions between states and courts: one is institutional design choices for creating courts and the other is standards for assessing the legitimacy of courts.This paper takes up a recent case of the WTO dispute settlement system in crisis in order to explain why these two insights are important for studying international courts. This paper is not intended to directly address the recent issue of the selection process of the WTO Appellate Body’s members. Rather, this paper attempts to explain how the consideration of court design and standards of legitimacy can help understanding the current crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system.

著者

ゴールドスタイン ジョシュア・S 梅本 哲也

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.85, pp.151-192, 1987