著者

植原 亮

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.105-1, 2021-09-30 (Released:2021-09-30)

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.108-1, 2021-09-30 (Released:2021-09-30)

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.111-1, 2021-09-30 (Released:2021-09-30)

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.2, pp.2-1, 2022-03-31 (Released:2022-03-31)

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.336-340, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

著者

大石 敏広

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.51-1, 2021-09-30 (Released:2021-09-30)

参考文献数

22

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The following statements represent an example of external world skepticism: (1) I know that I have hands only if I know that I am not a brain in a vat. (2) I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat. (3) Therefore, I do not know that I have hands. The first premise implies the closure principle. So, anti-skeptics argue that external world skepticism is false, as there are several counterexamples of the closure principle. This study aims to examine these counterexamples, contend their invalidity, and argue that external world skepticism is an attempt to transcend the everyday world, showing that its statements are not necessarily nonsense or false in terms of analogy and metaphor.

著者

竹内 泉

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.1, pp.73-1, 2021-09-30 (Released:2021-09-30)

参考文献数

7

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This study discusses the usages of independent and dependent variables. Independent variables are used in two ways: to denote the input to a function and to define a function. Correspondingly, dependent variables are used to hold the output of a function and to describe the relationship between the inputs and outputs of a function. When translating independent variables and dependent variables of mathematics into predicate logic, mathematical variables are mapped onto both variables and function symbols of predicate logic.

著者

古谷 公彦

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.239-257, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

29

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The world of perception has the structural feature which we name the foreground influence. The influence clarifies the relation between the damages of brains and the conditions of the patients. Furthermore, the foreground influence explains the relation between the condition of the non-damaged brain and the looks of the world of perception. The foreground influence, which is not causal relation, makes landscape appear directly without representation. The information processing in brain operates as the foreground influence like many kinds of glasses. We will be able to realize the naturalization of mind only after we can clarify the physical nature of information and the virtual dimension which information processing produces.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.295-316, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

13

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This is a review essay on Daisuke Kachi's Agents: Contemporary Substance Ontology (sic. Shunjusha, 2018). The book develops and partially defends an ontology that takes the category of substance as the most fundamental one. The author provides in it a new perspective on substance, which consists in characterizing substances as bearers of what he calls “substance modalities” (of which there are four kinds, that stem from the factors of essence, power, past persistence, and future persistence respectively). The first part of this review essay gives an extended overview of Kachi's book while the second discusses some problems it may face.

著者

峯島 宏次

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.321-323, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

著者

谷川 卓

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.328-330, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

著者

伊藤 遼

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.25-44, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

27

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A standard interpretation of Bertrand Russell’s early work on logic revolves around the doctrine of the unrestricted variable—the idea that the genuine variable of logic must range over all the objects in the universe. Those who endorse this interpretation view the doctrine as ‘the centerpiece’ of The Principles of Mathematics. My aim in this essay is to examine some of the given and possible grounds for this view. I attempt to show that Russell in that book does not endorse the doctrine as it stands but the idea that there are no objects that cannot, in principle, be fully described—the idea that there is no logical bar to making simply true judgments about objects.

著者

Jean-Baptiste Joinet Thomas Seiller

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.65-93, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

38

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At the end of the 19th century, the Peano School elaborated its famous theory of “definitions by abstraction”. Two decades later,Hermann Weyl elaborated a generalization of the former, termed “creative definitions”, capable of covering various cases of ideal elements (Peano’s abstracta being among them). If the Peano School proposal eventually appeared to be based on the nowadays standard classificatory process of quotienting a set by an equivalence, Weyl’s proposal still lacks a set-theoretical, classificatory interpretation. In this paper,we define and investigate the notion of relational indiscernibility (upon which Weyl’s creative definitions are based) and show that a bridge from the concept of indiscernibility to the notion of type (sets closed by bi-orthogonal) may be built from the observation that individuals are indiscernible exactly when they belong to exactly the same types. In the last part, we investigate some philosophical consequences of those observations concerning the theory of abstraction.

著者

鈴木 貴之

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.151-167, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

24

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Artificial intelligence research has made impressive progress in the last ten years with the development of new methodologies such as deep learning. There are several implications of the progress both for philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of artificial intelligence, but none are conclusive. Though its success seems to support connectionism in cognitive science, there are several features of human cognition that remain to be explained. Also, though it is often said that deep learning is the key to build artificial general intelligence, deep neural networks we now have are specialized ones and it's not clear how we can build a general artificial intelligence from such specialized networks.

著者

佐金 武

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.191-213, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

54

被引用文献数

1

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The issue of (in)compatibility between presentism and time travel has intrigued many philosophers for the last few decades. Keller and Nelson [2001] have argued that, if presentism is a feasible theory of time that applies to ordinary (non-time travel) cases, then it should be compatible with time travel. Bigelow [2001] and Sider [2005], on the other hand, have independently argued that the idea of time travel contradicts the presentist conception of time because it involves the ʻspatialisation of timeʼ (in a metaphysical sense), which is something that presentists should resist. In support of the latter claim, I offer a new argument via a different route. More specifically, I clarify basic components of the view that I take as ʻorthodoxʼ presentism by examining how presentists have considered temporal notions of the existence of things and their property possession. It is because of these notions that presentists can sensibly maintain a dynamic theory of time and should not believe in time travel.

著者

岡田 光弘

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.1, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

被引用文献数

1

著者

佐藤 雅彦

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.3-23, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

35

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In this paper, we analyze the historical process of emergence of proof assistants, and acceptance of proof assistants by the community of mathematicians. Our analysis is done by reflecting on how the notion of proof deepened through the proposal of formalism by Hilbert, formalization of the notion of computability, and especially development of type theory. In this analysis, we view mathematics as human linguistic activity where proofs are produced and communicated by means of both natural languages and formal languages. The complete acceptance of proof assistants by mathematicians is yet to be achieved, but we argue that it should and would happen by properly designing and implmenting a meta proof assistant which can talk and reason about any formal systems.

著者

金子 裕介

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.215-238, 2021-03-31 (Released:2021-03-31)

参考文献数

34

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This article handles a series of articles written by Suzuki (2016a; 2016b; 2018), in which he put forward the anti-psychologism, a new standpoint of action theory. This standpoint, however, has lost the path Anscombe originally opened up, seemingly. Anscombe's point (called “Anscombe's motif” in this article) was: the agent him/herself responds, by revealing his/her original motive, to the question “Why did/do you do…?” Leaving this ground, in modern theories, one sees an unfamiliar idea like a normative reason flow into the debate on human action. We review this academic environment critically in terms of Kaneko (2017), whom Suzuki criticized in one of his papers (2018).

著者

松王 政浩

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.79-83, 2018-07-31 (Released:2019-05-02)

著者

鈴木 真 佐金 武 田中 泉吏 網谷 祐一

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.129-143, 2017-12-20 (Released:2019-05-02)