著者

呂 寅満

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.4, pp.25-51, 2002-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1 1

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Until the 1950s, the three-wheel truck, primarily used for transporting small goods, constituted the largest sector in the Japanese automobile industry. The long-term and large-scale production of this vehicle can be regarded as a Japan-specific character in the history of the world automobile industry. The object of this paper is to delineate the reasons for the growth of three wheelers through an analysis of the factors in the market situation and technology and managerial strategy of manufacturers.Until the mid-1950s, the largest demand for vehicles was the truck, especially with a carrying capacity of from 1-ton to 2-tons. However, the four-wheel truck primarily produced at that time had a 4-ton carrying capacity. Therefore, three wheelers that had produced 0.75-ton carrying trucks since the 1930s enlarged the models to fit such a demand. Furthermore, the three-wheel truck was so cheap that small businesses could purchase it, and production of three wheelers rapidly increased.In the late 1950s, four-wheel 1-ton carrying trucks also began to be produced and were competitive with three-wheel trucks in price. The technological disadvantage in the driving comfort of the three-wheel truck and the narrow price gap between the three-wheel and four-wheel trucks resulted in the decline of the three-wheel truck during this phase.However, in order to overcome this situation, three-wheeler manufacturers developed a light truck with a 0.5-ton carrying capacity, intending to explore a new market. Because this strategy was a great success, and three wheelers' financial performance improved, the top three-wheeler manufacturers, Mazda and Daihatsu, were able to change to four-wheeler production in the 1960s.

著者

加藤 健太

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.4, pp.52-75, 2002-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this paper is to make clear the effects of a nonfinancial corporation's intervention in a firm that fell into a management crisis during the high-growth period.In this paper, we first examine the change in a failed firm's stockholding structure and the board of directors. A nonfinancial corporation takes over a failed firm's stocks to become its largest stockholder and dispatches executives with skills and experience in management or production. The dispatch of directors is not to discipline poor management but to provide human resources.Second, in order to examine the motives and effects of a nonfinancial corporation's intervention, this paper focuses on three cases.In the case of Nihon Suiso, Mitsubishi Chemical Industries took over Nihon Suiso's stock in 1960 to acquire the firm's equipment for the production of chemical fertilizer. To cope with Nihon Suiso's financial difficulties, Mitsubishi Chemical helped the firm advance into a new business and to change its products by consigned production and technical guidance.In the case of Tokyo Hatsudoki (Tohatsu), Fuji Denki Seizo intervened with the object of continued selling of their products in the early 1960s. Although Fuji Denki provided a new low-interest loan of 17 billion yen, Tohatsu filed for bankruptcy under the Corporate Reorganization Law in 1965.In the case of Kurita Industrial, C. Ito, which entered into tie-up agreement with the firm in 1965, played an important role in Kurita's reconstruction process. C. Ito's motive was to secure the commercial rights to sell the firm's products in both the domestic and foreign markets. They were not only in charge of supplying a short-term loan to Kurita, they also guaranteed long-term loans that the firm borrowed from regional and trust banks.

著者

遠藤 元

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.28-59, 2001-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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As the consumption market expanded in local cities in Thailand in the 1980s, some leading provincial retailers diversified their business rapidly and became “local retail zaibatsu.” Tantraphan Group in Chiangmai city is a typical example.There are two main factors that lead the Tantraphan Group to the rapid expansion and diversification of its retail business. The first factor concerned the character of the local consumption market. Although local markets were expanding, the geographical extent was limited to urban areas. Moreover, big distribution companies from Bangkok as well as local companies entered the limited market, while finance companies expanded their lending business in local cities. Under such market conditions, the Tantraphan Group did not specialize in a specific field of retail business but chose to diversify. The second factor was the characteristic of the family business of the Tantraphan Group. The ownership and management of the group companies were concentrated in the group leader. The group leader could, therefore, make prompt decisions in expanding and diversifying the business.As excessive competition in the local market was obvious in the 1990s, the Tantraphan Group faced a financial crisis and finally decided to sell its department store and shopping center section at a loss to the CRC Group of Bangkok. At the same time, the Tantraphan Group decided to establish a holding company consisting of only the founder's family members and reinforced ownership and control of its subsidiary companies. This behavioral pattern indicates that the group intended to preserve the family property by all means. In this respect the group clearly demonstrated its characteristic as a family business and zaibatsu.At the same time, the Tantraphan Group, to some extent, transferred the authority of its practical business affairs to professional managers. Although it is not clear yet in what forms local zaibatsu will exist in the future, it is surely very difficult for them to expand their business in the unchanged form of family business. The case of the Tantraphan Group shows that local zaibatsu must carry out some kind of reform in their business management, just as the big zaibatsu in Bangkok did.

著者

平尾 毅

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.60-83, 2001-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This paper explores the role of industrial welfare in industrial relations, internal labour markets, and the management thought at Cadbury in early twentieth-century England.Welfare provisions by British employers have been hitherto regarded as an expression of philanthropy or gentlemanship in nineteenth-century England, which despised the mammonism. It has been also said that there was no labour management because of craft regulations in British industries. Industrial welfare, therefore, has been considered the only managerial authority of the employers, who could not manage production processes directly.In this paper, industrial welfare is dealt with as a labour strategy. British employers intended to avoid industrial conflict and increase efficiency of work through the various labour policies, such as overseeing, deskilling, piece-wages, and welfare provisions. In these respects, industrial welfare was useful as one means to modify conflicts in employment relations that could not be solved by the cash nexus and to win the loyalty of employees.The case of Cadbury indicates that industrial welfare contributed to reconstructing industrial relations system in the new managerial structure; that the company provisions, including health care and education of employees, provided a solution to recruitment, training, and promotion problems at the company-level; and that industrial welfare contributed to the humanising of labour. The human factor of labour management was emphasised by the employer, who used industrial welfare as a labour strategy at a time, when Taylorism was discussed in England.Finally, industrial welfare at Cadbury was used as one means of labour management based on the physical and mental control of the employees by the employers, who retained traditional authority under a bureaucratic organisation.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.104-114, 2001-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

川分 圭子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.1-26, 2001-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Merchant bankers and the modern trading system emerged between the 1830s and 1850s. Before these changes, it was commission merchants that were engaged in both trade and finance. They bought or sold goods on others' accounts and advanced from one half to three-fourths of the total amount of goods to the consignors. This financing system, the advance on consignments, was developed in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century and introduced to Great Britain in the end of the eighteenth century. Aside from selling and buying on consignment and trade finance, some commission merchants sold insurance and dealt with securities and sometimes speculated on their own accounts.To study the business of commission merchants, therefore, would contribute to understanding how international commerce and finance were managed, as well as the early insurance business and stock transactions before the modern system was established. But the business of commission merchants has never been seriously researched. The case studies of merchant bankers, which are relatively abundant, include few remarks about their activities in the earlier days when they were still commission merchants rather than merchant bankers.The author has been researching George Philips & Co., London, intending to complete one case study of a commission merchant house. The business records of this firm exist for a very short period, from 1801 to 1803, but its activities extend widely, from serving as an agency for import and export, trade finance, banking, to broking of marine insurance. In this essay, the author provides an overview of its transactions first and later elaborates on its marine insurance business.

著者

青地 正史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.27-47, 2001-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In 1947, immediately after World War II, twelve Japanese life insurance companies reorganized themselves from stock concerns into mutual concerns. For example, in 1945 there were sixteen life insurance companies, of which thirteen were stock concerns and only three mutual concerns. Japanese life insurance companies converted their organizational structures into mutual concerns simultaneously after the war.Why did major life insurance companies reorganize themselves into mutual concerns? One reason is the democratic influence of GHQ, which caused the reorganization. It is the purpose of this article to seek a more critical and fundamental reason.The conclusions of this article can be summarized as follows : the corporate governance structure in Japan of the times caused them to reorganize. That is, in the chaos of the Japanese economy, (1) the power of the stockholders became weaker, (2) there was growing anxiety of strong labor movement, and (3) the new managements wanted to strengthen their positions. The life insurance companies tried to adapt themselves to such situations within the corporate governance structure of Japanese companies, and consequently they chose to reorganize as mutual concern. Moreover the Japanese government set a deadline (March, 1948) for reorganization under the Financial Institutions Reconstruction and Reorganization Law. That is why all the companies reorganized simultaneously in 1947.This article finds that the democratic influence of GHQ accelerated the Japanese life insurance companies' decision to reorganize as mutual concerns, and they had already started their reorganization under the new corporate governance structure.

著者

成田 一江

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.71-96, 2001-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Gunze Silk Mfg. Co., Ltd. was established in Kyoto prefecture in 1896 and produced high-quality silk. The products were reeled in a factory by young female workers from rural areas who had appropriate skills and experience. After World War I, an expansion in the business caused a shortage of workers at the factory. In response, the management innovated a system for the employment of rural girls.This paper studies the formation of the recruitment system and analyzes how it was implemented by Gunze between 1925 and 1930. The management strategy was to select their employees carefully. First, they refused applications from girls under age in spite of the labor shortage. Only girls aged fifteen and over could get a job and enter the training program. Moreover, they included testing of the candidate's aptitude in the employment examination. Thanks to this, the training period was reduced from six to four months, and the number of trained workers increased.They also considered recruiting highly skilled workers from other factories and areas. This, however, would require reeducation of the workers, and they therefore did not develop this method of employment.In conclusion, the original recruitment system was a precondition for the systematization of the personnel training within industry, which made a contribution to the strict quality control.

著者

金 容度

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.3, pp.27-51, 2000-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

参考文献数

62

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This paper analyzes the growth process in the Japanese IC (Integrated Circuit) industry during the 1960s and 1970s and focuses on the interfirm relations (specifically, the relations between IC firms and NTT) and intrafirm relations in the development process of ICs for usein communication equipment.The Electrical Communication Laboratory (ECL) of NTT and several semiconductor firms, so to speak “DEN-DEN Families” that have supplied NTT with communication equipment continuously, frequently collaborated in the development of advanced ICs, and ECL initiated the development of advanced ICs that use the “admission principle.” In addition, ECL transferred the state-of-the-art technologies of ICs to DEN-DEN Families. Different from the Division of Defense in the United States, which primarily ignored cost issues in the procurement of ICs, NTT perceived the importance of cost-down activities. Moreover, DEN-DEN Families had competed and cooperated with each other for a long time. The interaction between IC engineers and communication equipment engineers within each firm has been important.In comparison to the 1960s, in the 1970s NTT collaborated more actively with member firms and used technology levels appropriate to each. NTT was thereby able to alleviate the strict in testing standards for the ICs. Also, NTT was able to realize low costs more effectively.The rise of the composition of exports in the communication equipment market led to more intensive interaction between IC engineers and communication equipment engineers within Japanese semiconductor firms. Moreover, even in the development of ICs for use in communication equipment, Japanese firms realized the importance of lowering costs.

著者

西村 成弘

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.3, pp.52-79, 2000-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In 1952, General Electric Co. (GE) absorbed their completely owned subsidiary, International General Electric Co., Inc. (IGEC) and made IGEC a division of the company. This article explores the reason for this absorption from the viewpoint of GE's export trading. If we limit ourselves to only some indicators of international cartel and foreign direct investment, we cannot fully examine GE's international business history.During the interwar period, GE had led international cartels, the Phoebus Agreement in the electric lamp field, and the International Notification and Compensation Agreement in the electrical apparatus field to protect the American market and to compete in the export market. Because of the segregation of the domestic market from the foreign market and the different way in which business was conducted, the structure of IGEC was appropriate for its international strategy.But World War II changed the export market. First, the war cut off the relationship between IGEC and the London-based cartels. Second, the German and Japanese industries dropped out of the international market. And, after the war, the general demand for electrical apparatus and appliance rose significantly.In this favorable environment, GE decided to strengthen its export effort. It, however, met with stiff competition from Westinghouse Corporation (WH). In order to compete with WH, GE needed to adapt its own manufacturing facilities to the exporting business. GE then absorbed IGEC and changed its managing structure into a multidivisional one.

著者

生田 隆慈

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.4, pp.1-27, 2001-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

被引用文献数

1

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The American small-business policy in the 1930s was intended to protect small business, which was believed to be disappearing and much weaker than big business. There were two types of small business, as only a few researchers have noticed. One type had a competitive character, while the other had an anti-competitive character that accorded with the activities of trade associations and had common interests with big business. This difference in behavior between the two arose from the change in the industrial structure that brought about the decline of old capital-goods industries and the growth of new consumer-goods industries. The aim of this paper is to examine that true purpose of American small business policy by looking at the small-business problems and policy in the 1930s from the viewpoint of the two types of small business.The NIRA (National Industrial Recovery Act) Code system prevented many small businesses from failing by organizing the market on the initiative of trade associations, which implied a protective policy for anti-competitive small business. However, the code system aggravated the business conditions of competitive small business, preventing new businesses from joining the market, so that many complaints from small business poured into the administration. After the NIRA Code system ended, the policy for small business totally changed. The administration undertook a policy to correct the concentration of economic power, since anti-monopolists, who believed such an anti-monopoly policy would save small business from withdrawing American economy, persuaded President Franklin D. Roosevelt to do so.In spite of the change in policy for small business, complaints from small businesses did not stop. That was because the two types of small business existed. Then Roosevelt convened a small business conference in Washington in order to ask small businessmen what their problems were. The conference produced a resolution that consisted of contradictory recommendations. The contradiction was derived from the two types of small business : the competitive recommending financing and establishment of an organization for small business by the government, the anti-competitive a balanced budget and no intervention in business by the government.With all the contradictory recommendations in the resolution, the administration undertook a small-business policy based on recommendations of the competitive small business. The policy was to be established as the small-business policy in World War II and the post-World War II period. Thus, it dawns on us that the American small-business policy is not to protect weak small business but to ensure fair conditions of competition where small business can compete with big business as well as with each other.

著者

北澤 満

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.4, pp.28-56, 2001-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the development of Mitsui Zaibatsu's affiliated companies in the coal-mining industry in Hokkaido after World War I, and intercompany relations between the direct-line companies, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha and Mitsui Mining Company, and the collateral-line company, Hokkaido Coal & Steamship Company (HCSC).In the 1910s, Mitsui Zaibatsu entered the Hokkaido coal-mining industry since it controlled HCSC. In order to sell coal, these three companies (HCSC, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, and Mitsui Mining Company) established a common sales organization named Sansha Baitanbu. At first, HCSC could not sell and transport the coal by itself, and Mitsui Bussan interfered in these duties because direct-line companies were concerned that HCSC would withdraw from Mitsui Zaibatsu. In the latter half of the 1910s, however, Mitsui Mining increased holding stocks in HCSC, and direct-line companies sent staff to the executive board and middle management of HCSC, thus giving Mitsui Zaibatsu stronger control over HCSC than before. Consequently, the concerns about HCSC decreased, and at the same time HCSC was able to carry out its duties autonomously.In the 1920s, when Sekitan Kogyo Rengokai tried to control the shipment of the coal, both HCSC and Mitsui Mining increased their market shares. Mitsui Mining increased its production because it actively invested its capital and often exceeded the quantity stipulated by Sekitan Kogyo Rengokai. On the other hand, HCSC almost always kept within the stipulated quantity, and Mitsui Zaibatsu regulated its capital investment. Its gradual growth of production controlled the shipment of the coal in Hokkaido and had supported the growth of Mitsui Mining in Hokkaido.Thus, HCSC was located within Mitsui Zaibatsu in the 1920s, though some restrictions still remained, and the relationship between HCSC and Mitsui Mining became more meaningful.

著者

欒 玉璽

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.4, pp.57-81, 2001-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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A huge capital investment by Japanese cotton-spinning companies in Qingdao gave incentive to the development of modern industries in this region. Qingdao became well-known as a cotton industrial region and one of the most prosperous cities in China from the 1920s to the 1930s. With respect to the textile industry, the favorable regional condition of Qingdao-an abundant supply of raw cotton, cheap coal and labor, facilities for transportation, and a large market for consumption-provided the foundation for a cotton-spinning industry. The composition of the labor force in Qingdao and the labor management of Japanese companies, for instance the availability of male laborers and the training system within the companies, played an especially significant role in the development of the cotton-spinning industry in Qingdao. With the rapid growth of Japanese cotton-spinning companies, technically skilled workers and a rational labor management system became widespread in the region, and other industries also grew, and the economic and social conditions in Qingdao improved.

著者

服部 哲郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.4, pp.82-106, 2001-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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Although a great deal of effort has been made to apply the “scientific management” devised by Frederick W. Taylor, little attention has been given to the “scientific office management” of William Henry Leffingwell. The purpose of this paper is to examine early phases of scientific office management in the life insurance industry during the interwar period, and to indicate its effects on the relationship between “office management” and “personnel management.” As the first step in my analysis, the scheme of scientific office management needs to be examined in detail. Scientific office management was the first unified theory of office management and clearly copied “scientific management, ” that is, a total system initially designed for industrial applications. Its essence was reflected in the Examination and Rating Plan proposed by Leffingwell in 1923 to evaluate, as justly and accurately as possible, the efficiency of any office.In the following pages, to test the validity of its claim, I explore the impact of the examination and rating plan on the life insurance industry through a certain association's activities. The Life Office Management Association (LOMA) was an international association of life insurance companies founded in 1924 and also one of the leading office management associations that eagerly promoted such schemes for offices in the years before World War II.In conclusion, the following three points were reached. First, it may be presumed that there is a gradual stage from “office management” to “personnel management.” Second, there might be some correlation between “office management” and “personnel management.” Third, the first two hypotheses remain topics to be discussed further on the grounds that it is difficult to apply them to other industries. Further study should provide more evidence for these hypotheses.

著者

石井 聡

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.1-27, 2001-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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It is generally accepted that the technological level of the former planned economies was lower than that of market economies. Technologies differ, however, from industry to industry and develop over time. Therefore, it is necessary to study the technologies of each industry separately. This paper focuses on the shipbuilding industry of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the first half of the 1950s and thus examines the technological level of the most rapidly growing industry of the GDR during the period 1945 to 1955.In terms of product quality, the GDR's shipbuilding industry was capable of building ships that had as high a capacity as ships built in West Germany. But not all the ships had such high capacities; only some did.The research and development obtained, on the one hand, had good results because of the engineers concentrated in the central bureau of R&D. On the other hand, there were many problems : difficulty with the technology imported from western countries, delayed completion, and poor quality of structural designs, etc.In the early 1950s new technologies-structural welding and section building-were introduced to the GDR's shipyards by other shipbuilding countries. These innovations modified the shipbuilding industry into a line-production system for the first time. But the shortage of skilled workers, defects in production planning, delays in delivery of supplies, inferior quality of materials, and unstable electric power supplies, all of which were part of a day's work in planned economies, caused ineffective use of these new technologies.Because of these problems, the productivity of the GDR's shipbuilding industry ranged between one-third and one-tenth of those of the top-rank shipbuilding countries in 1953. As a result, the GDR's shipbuilding industry did not have sufficient international competitiveness.

著者

天野 雅敏 中林 真幸 木山 実 塩地 洋

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.55-83, 2000-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

木下 順 中本 和秀 柳 敦 山田 徹雄 中村 みゆき

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.84-111, 2000-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

原 輝史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.1-21_1, 2000-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The foreign activities of sogo shosha (general trading companies) like Mitsubishi-Shoji have been little researched. This article seeks to clarify one of the oversea's activities of Mitsubishi-Shoji. The history of the Paris branch is analyzed and described based on internal documents of the branch kept at the Archives du Monde du Travail in Roubaix and the Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute in Tokyo.The History of the Société Anonyme Française Mitsubishi (S.A.F.M.) can be divided into four periods : first period, 1924-1927; second period, 1928-1932; third period, 1933-1938, and fourth period, 1939-1944.During the first period, S.A.F.M. invested in the Dewoitine Aircraft company, but this French company failed in 1926.During the second period, S.A.F.M. attempted diversification of goods for import and export. It left the aircraft industry and succeeded in dealing in agricultural products and other foods. During this period, in order to pay off the deficit caused by the failure of investment in Dewoitine Aircraft, S.A.F.M. pursued a policy of rationalization.It was during the third period that the efforts of saving and rationalization reached a peak. Many employees were discharged, and the Casablanca Office closed. Documents show that during this period S.A.F.M. was interested in Manchurian affairs.During the last period, 1939-1944, the occupation of France by the German army brought about the final decision. S.A.F.M. was closed in permanently in 1944. And in 1960, the newly organized Mitsubishi-Shoji was opened, but this in another history.An English translation of this article will be published in Japanese Year Book on Business History in 2001.

著者

白鳥 圭志

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.46-74, 2000-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This article aims at analyzing the financial crises in the Fukushima region, especially remedy-loan dealings between the 107 Bank and the Fukushima branch of the Bank of Japan (BOJ).Following the 1920 crisis, the BOJ branch gave relief to 107 Bank in the form of remedy loans. But it aimed at helping the silk-reeling and sericulture industries rather than the bank.In addition, it ascribed risks to 107 by securing a guarantee from its owner-managers. By using 107, BOJ checked and screened silk-reeling and sericulture companies. Through these procedures, BOJ was able to guarantee its loan-withdrawals. In 1923, the great Kanto earthquake occurred, and the finance of Fukushima region was also damaged. Thus 107 Bank and silk-reeling and sericulture industries asked BOJ for assistance. It once again helped those same industries. But it ascribed risks to 107 and warehouse companies more stringently than in 1920.A management crisis apparently occurred when the 1927 financial crises spread to Fukushima. BOJ was afraid of a widespread financial crisis throughout the region and helped it without avoiding risks by implementing the government compensation law to avoid the collapse of Fukushima's financial system. A feature of BOJ's assistance was high-speed remedies without screening. Thus we see how eager BOJ was to avoid 107's bankruptcy and a bank-run there, although this wish was in vain.In looking at the 1920s financial crises and the Fukushima branch of BOJ, we note how BOJ was caught between providing assistance and maintaining its credibility. But step by step it came to believe that assistance was more important and consequently sacrificed its credibility. However, it considered loan-withdrawals important too and was eager to guarantee withdrawals to avoid a decline in its credibility-its banknotes-as much as possible.

著者

並河 永

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.4, pp.29-55, 2000-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

参考文献数

27

被引用文献数

1

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This paper provides a qualitative analysis of the retail service for home electronic apparatus, focusing on TV sets, which were once by far the most widely handled product. In the late 1950s, Japanese TV manufacturers encouraged independent small service shops to join their keiretsu retail groups to provide local repair and maintenance services for their products and promote the sale of their goods to neighborhood customers.In order to support their retailers, manufacturers set up their own service station networks in the 1960s and invested a great deal in keeping their keiretsu retailers informed of new technologies. On the one hand, however, the advent of the transistor color TV in 1968 decreased the frequency of malfunctions and raised the need for equipment and technical knowledge once repairs were required. On the other hand, year by year, manufacturers produced new models that were increasingly maintenance-and adjustment-free.In the 1970s, many retailers tried to survive by door-to-door sales, but after the color TV market had matured by the mid-1970s, there were no longer any products suitable for door-to-door sales. With the severe shortage in the labor force, retailers encouraged their employees to set up their own shops. But by the late 1970s, with a matured market and the growing number of retailers, it became difficult to launch and maintain new stores at profit.It would have been beneficial for the Japanese home electronics manufacturers to retain friendly ties with retailer groups in the era of rapid technical progress, but dealers had to deal with the problem of reallocation of labor forces outside the manufacturer companies.