著者

中村 青志

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.3, pp.48-74,iii, 1980-12-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Founded by Okura Kihachiro in the early Meiji period, the Okura zaibatsu did business with the government and the military during the period, and accumulated wealth through its foreign trade activities. From late Meiji through the Taisho period, it carried out a vigorous policy of diversification. One area into which it moved was mining, it ran coal and metal mining operation both at home and overseas. It also invested in numerous activities in China, beginning with mining and forestry, and also lent funds to political authorities there. As, a result, the zaibatsu saw tremendous expansion in the Taisho period, particularly in its three major fields-trade, construction and mining. But with the recession in the early Showa period and with the chaotic political situation in China, Okura run up substantial losses. Faced with meager profits and a lack of investment capital, the zaibatsu was unable to invest in any new areas, including heavy industry. Growth for Okura was severely restricted and the gap between it and Mitsui and Mitsubishi widened considerably.

著者

麻島 昭一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.3, pp.75-88, 1980-12-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

廣山 謙介

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.3, pp.89-99, 1980-12-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

柴 孝夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.28-53,ii, 1980-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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From the second half of Taisho Era to the beginning of Showa Era, many firms loosely carried out strategies for expansion and for that reason they collapsed. Kawasaki Dockyard Co., Ltd. was a typical case of them.The company had acquired huge profit during the First World War. But its management became worse in the second half of Taisho Era, because the company excessively carried out strategies for expansion in the depression. Moreover, in the process, the company excessively depended on its main bank. This bank was Jugo Bank. Therefore, when Jugo Bank had collapsed in the Monetary Crisis in 1927, Kawasaki Shipkyard Co., Ltd. collapsed too. The process of this collapse of the company was a typical case of many management collapses in this age. However, the process of settlement of the company differed from those of other collapsed firms. Because the company had an important position in the Japanese national defense program, and Jugo Bank, the main bank of the company, too had special position in the Japanese financial circles.This article traces this process of the collapse and settlement in Kawasaki Shipyard Co., Ltd..

著者

宮本 又郎 廣山 謙介

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.54-80,iii, 1980-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The House of Konoike is known as one of the most powerful merchant houses of Tokugawa Japan. The history of the Konoike in the course of Japan's industrialization has been often compared with that of the Mitsui : the former as an unsuccessful case, and the latter as a successful one.This paper is an attempt to shed more light on the modern history of the Konoike, with special reference to the following questions. In what branch of economic activity was the accumlated capital of the Konoike invested, in response to changing scene of national economy during the Meiji-Showa Eras? What kinds of business policy were pursued during the period? What kinds of result did the investment and the policy bring on the Konoike and the Konoike Bank? How were the traditional House system and the managerial organization altered to adjust new environment? What kinds of role did the employed manager, such as Michio Doi, Hisashi Shimamura and Jiro Harada, play in the modernization of the Konoike? By examining these questions, the writers intend to make clear the causes of the Konoike's failure to be brought up as a first class zaibatsu.In conclusion, the business activities of the Konoike since the beginning of Meiji era can be divided into three phases. The first phase (1868-1896) can be explained as the periodd of diversification. The second (1897-1919) can be characterized as the period of specialization in banking. During this period, the Konoike Bank, which was established in 1900 in the form of unlimited parthership and wad reorganized in the form of corporation in 1919, became the only enterprise that the Konoike controlled directly. Conservative behavior under the leadership of Jiro Harada, an employed manager, was another characteristic feature in this period. In the third phase (1920-1933), a holding company, the Konoike Gomei, was established in 1921 and the Konoike Bank was separated from the Konoike family. The Konoike Gomei was more eager about diversification and about holding stocks of various companies in this period than in the preceding period. In this sense, one might reckon the establishment of the Konoike Gomei as an indicator which shows the formation of the Konoike zaibatsu. This is, however, an outward look. The timing of the shift from specialization policy to diversification one was too late and each share of stock held by the Konoike Gomei was generally too small to control the management of each company. Consequently, the Konoike failed to grow up as a first class zaibatsu and remained to be a mere wealthy family.

著者

千田 稔

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.81-110,iv, 1980-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence of “Hansai-shobun” (藩債処分, the adoption and rejection of feudal debts) upon the Osadas (長田家, a big merchant in Osaka), and to take a general view of the reasons why many big merchants in Osaka declined after the Meiji Restoration and why the Finance Ministry decreed “Kawasegata” (為替方, the semi official organ having charge of revenue and expenditure of the Government) to place mortgage equal to the Government money on deposit in the 7th year of Meiji. The author begins this analysis by considering the influence upon them of “Ginme-haishi” (銀目廃止, the abolition of the silver standard in Osaka), for it was the first policy overtaking the Osaka merchants.In spite of being many studies about the merchants who tided over the upheaval of the Meiji Restoration and afterward became “Zaibatsu” (財閥, the big financial combine), there have been so far few studies about the merchants who couldn't do so.The conclusions of this article are following.First. Some causes that made the Osadas decline are (1) “Ginme-haishi”, (2) “Haihan-chiken” (廃藩置県, the abolition of feudal clans and the establishment of prefectures), (3) the decree to repay the Government the money of pre- “Hans, ” (4) the decree to repay the Government its money on deposit, and (5) “Hansai-shobun” ((イ) freezing of credits, (ロ) rejection of feudal debts, and (ハ) the current price of “Shin-Kyu Kosai” [新旧公債, new and old national bonds] being below face value). It is sure that the Osadas succeeded in tiding over (1), (2), (3), and (イ) of (5), but the Osadas couldn't obtain the new base of profit by managing jointly “Horaisha” (蓬莱社, a kind of bank), not only because, of the way of tiding over them but because of (4) and (ロ), (ハ) of (5). As a result the Osadas were compelled to decline.Among them the greatest causes are (ロ), (ハ) of (5), for the Osadas, who had a great amount of “Hansai” and nearly the half of whose “Hansai” were rejected, had overcome the monetary stringency, looking forward to the delivery of all “Hansai”.From this analysis, the author would like to take the general view as to the big merchants in Osaka that they were at first divided into the declining group and enduring group because of (1), but the latter were divided again into such two groups according to the influence of (4) and (ロ), (ハ) of (5) upon them in proportion to the degree of holding and embezzling the Government money, the degree of borrowed money in “Hansai”, and the degree of the other borrowed money.Secondly. The policy of the Finance Ministry to do with the Osadas after (4) was remarkably generous notwithstanding the embezzlement of the Government money. The Finance Ministry gave the Osadas convenience to maintain the family name.This is not only owing to the sympathy for the old illustrious family, but also owing to the inevitable circumstance for the Government to require big merchants such as the Osadas as “Kawasegata”. The Government was also to blame for that embezzlement. And the great amount of the loss of the Government money embezzled by Yamashiroya (山城屋), the Mitanis (三谷家), and the Takagis (高木家) as well as the Osadas made the Finance Ministry decide the reformation of the loose connection between the Government finance and “Kawasegata”. Thus the Finance Ministry decreed to place mortgage equal to the Government money on deposit in the 7th year of Meiji.

著者

大東 英祐

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.111-120, 1980-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

森川 英正 湯沢 威

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.1, pp.121-130, 1980-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

藤田 貞一郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.2, pp.1-29,i, 1980-08-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This article describes the rise and fall of what might be termed a local zaibatsu which was founded by Terada Jinyomo (1853-1931). During the Tokugawa era, the Terada family manufactured sake just south of Osaka in the Kishiwada district of Senshu, where cotton spinning had long been practical as a subsidiary industry in agricultural households.During the Meiji period, Terada Jinyomo invested profits from sake manufacture in many new industries, such as spinning, banking, and railroad construction. In 1894, he established Kishiwada Cotton Spinning Co. Ltd., which was to become the most successful of his new ventures, especially in the rapidly expanding China market.Terada Jinyomo was born into a large family. He had six brothers and a sister, but all but one of these brothers, Motokichi, were step brothers born after Jinyomo's mother remarried following the death of the first husband. Significantly, Jinyomo excluded not only his step-brothers and their families but also his very talented and fullblooded brother, Motokichi, from the Terada Holding Company established in December 1920 after the spinning company had reaped unprecedented profits during world war One. Jinyomo allowed only members of his own nuclear family, that is himself, his wife, and their children, to become stockholders in the newly founded holding company. His brother, Motokichi, followed his lead by setting up his own holding company, the Sano Cotton Spinning Company, with his own nuclear family members as stockholders in the same month and year.Jinyomo's decision to separate himself from his more distant relatives and to not rely on lineage ties proved to be a fatal errors because although he had bought property in Shanghai in 1923 in the hope of establishing there, this plan was never realized. At home, he failed to make the switch to manufacturing newer products like rayon.Perhaps Jinyomo was more narrow-minded and conservative than he himself believed or understood.

著者

武田 晴人

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, no.2, pp.30-56,ii, 1980-08-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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In 1917, the Furukawa family established a family-dominated Konzern, consisting of Furukawa Gomei as the group's holding company, Furukawa Mining, Tokyo-Furukawa Bank and Furukawa Shoji in foreign trade. In the first two years of its operation, the Konzern expanded itself remarkably relying on bank loans. But in the spring of 1920, Furukawa Shoji went to bankruptcy, because it lost heavily in bean speculation in Dairen. In order to make up the loss of 26 million yen, Furukawa Gomei had to dispose of its assets, mainly stocks of its subsidiary companies. Moreover, Furukawa reduced its business and gave up foreign trade activities in 1922 and banking activities in 1931. Thus, the main business of Furukawa became nothing more than mining. As a result, the development of Furukawa-Zaibatsu was retarded and it lagged far behind the other major Konzerns such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi.

著者

内田 星美

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.2, pp.1-30, 1979-10-10 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Increasing employment of engineers who had graduated universities or technical colleges founded since 1880's meant for the private firms in the early phase of industrialization organizational growth, from relying upon a single all-round engineer through diversification of jobs to the hierarchy of engineers. Examining the statistical data concerning the distribution of engineers among industries as well as companies for the year 1900 and 1910, those three stages of organization are discernible in the firms which belonged to such industries as railroad, mining, cotton and electricity supply.

著者

田中 俊宏

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.2, pp.31-53, 1979-10-10 (Released:2009-11-06)

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French railway industry had the first boom years in the Monarchie de Juillet. But it is worthy to mention that in this period english capitalists also were interested in french railway construction and its exploitation. Their capital invested in french railway companies amounted to one-third of the total stock capital. Sometimes the french co-operated with the english and sometimes the french intended to exclude the english from the management of railway company. The object of this paper is to analize this english impact-french response relation. Firstly, the author extracts five main 'groups' which existed among french interests and english interests; the Laffitte & Blount group, the London Merchant Bankers group, the Haute banquiers group, the Talabot group and the Paris-Orléans group. Secondly, the author intends to clear the characteristics and behavior-pattern of each group. Thirdly, the author analizes which group acquired the predominant position in the board of directors. In the beginning, the board of directors ordinarily was composed of members of many different groups. But later, among directors, the comté de direction was formed, which include just a few members who belonged to the same group. And actually it took charge of management. Other director consequently were resigned to the feeble position. In this process, the english directors were often eliminated from the center of management.

著者

渡辺 尚

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.2, pp.54-66, 1979-10-10 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

渡辺 尚

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.1-33,i, 1980-02-29 (Released:2010-11-18)

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Although the origin and development of the chambers of industry and commerce in Germany is regionally different and chronologically complicated, they could be grouped into several types. One of them, Rhine-type, is characterized by closely cooperative relations under the chambers which reflect an interregional interdependence in one of the most industrialized parts of Germany.The chambers came here into existence at the beginning of the 19th century as auxiliary institutions of the Napoleonic central government in Aachen/Burtscheid, Crefeld, Stolberg, Trier, Eupen and Malmedy. Only Cologne made an exception because there had been in this city an organization of merchants already in the 18th century which was reorganized later as chamber of commerce.After Rhineland was annexed to Prussia as a result of the Vienna Congress the government in Berlin did not allow at first the foundation of new chambers. But in the 1820's it approved another form of merchant organization, “Kaufmännische Korporation”, in the eastern part of Prussia i.e. in Berlin, Stettin, Danzig, Memel, Konigsberg, Tilsit, Elbing and Magdeburg. The chambers which were founded at length in the 1830's in Rhineland i.e. in Elberfeld, Düsseldorf, Duisburg, Koblenz, M.-Gladbach, Wesel, Lennep, Mülheim a.d. Ruhr, Essen and Solingen, had to be now organized after the principle of the eastern institution, compulsory membership related to the minimum of the business tax.The new principle was applied also to the older Napoleonic chambers, which caused a serious confusion especially in the chamber of Cologne. Big merchants were opposed to a reorganization. Moreover this affair fell on the beginning of the steamship navigation on the Rhine since 1827 by Preussisch-Rheinische Dampfschiff-fahrts-Gesellschaft and the conclusion of the Rhine Navigation Act in 1831 which gave a fatal blow to the class of small sailboat owners. The both antagonistic parties struggled now for the membership and leadership of the chamber. Therefore the chamber could hardly function through the 1830's as an institution for local interests of different classes and sectors.In this process, however, the transition from the Napoleonic to the Rhine type of the chambers was performed and the leadership of the liberal big merchant class was in Cologne established which enabled the chamber now to represent the interest not only of the city but also of Rhineland as a whole because the merchants were most clearly aware of consequence of interregional relations with Holland and Belgium which were indispensable to build up the industrial structure of Rhineland in the era of traffic revolution.The both companies of Preußisch-Rheinische Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft and Rheinische Eisenbahn Gesellschaft were creations of the chamber of Cologne as entrepreneur on the initiative of leading merchants by this time as Merkens, Boisserée and Camphausen.

著者

鈴木 俊夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.34-69,iii, 1980-02-29 (Released:2010-11-18)

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This paper presents a business history of the Western Bank of Scotland (hereafter, cited as the WBS) during the period 1832 to 1857. The paper also attempts to compare the management of the WBS with that of other Scottish banks.A.W. Kerr attributed the cause of the failure to the WBS's manager's mismanagement leaving the bank with a shortage of reserves, in his “History of Banking in Scotland.” On the contrary, R.H. Campbell favoured the directors and manager and ascribed the failure to the hostile behaviour of the Edinburgh banks.Five Edinburgh Chartered banks (The Bank of Scotland, The Royal Bank of Scotland, The British Linen Co., The National Bank of Scotland, The Commercial Bank of Scotland) played a great part in Scotland. These banks still had a large amount of Government Securities (Consol or Exchequer Bill) which accounted for 1/4 to 1/3 of the total assets of the bank. In consequence, the Edinburgh banks had a very stable constitution making them apt to hesitate to advance money into the industry field.However in Glasgow, one of the centre of Anglo-american trade, many merchants and manufactures desired to establish a bank, financed trades. Under such a circumstances, the WBS was set up in 1832.It is obvious that the comparatively high demand for money in Glasgow accelerated the promotion of the WBS. However the WBS made the mistake of adopting a lending policy which was too financed a considerable amount of the railway investment in U.S.A. by means of letters of credit through an agency in New York, James Lee & Co.

著者

浅野 俊光

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.87-115, 1980-02-29 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

川辺 信雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.14, no.3, pp.116-124, 1980-02-29 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

川田 秀雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, no.3, pp.1-20, 1979-06-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

坂本 悼志

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, no.3, pp.21-40,ii, 1979-06-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The electical industry of Britain before world War I was relatively backward, stagnant and immature, in comparison with that of the United States or Germany. We can point out these features of the British electrical industry in several aspects : (1) the inactive trust movements, (2) the small sizes of business and the small scale of the industry as a whole, (3) the weakness in the international competition, (4) the industrial domination by foreign subsidiary enterprises and (5) the technological retardation.In these industrial circumstances, the General Electric Co. (GEC) had grown very rapidly to be one of the leading electrical manufactures by World War I, The direct ancestor of the company was the General Electric Apparatus Co. (GEA) which had been manly engages in selling electical goods. The basic strategy of GEC was the “generalization” that had been settles in the age of GEA. After is was organized and began to produce electical goods in 1889, GEC kept on developing rapidly and sometimes steadily by adopting a policy of “diversification” which formed a part of the “generalization”.From the viewpoint of the policy of “diversification”, the process of the development of GEC might be divided into two stages : (A) 1889-1900 and (B) 1900-1913. At the former stage, GEC produced many kinds of electrical goods which were, however, limited to those with less sophisticated technology. Among them, one of the key products was the incandescent electric lamp. At the later stage, GEC began to produce not only heavy electrical machinery but also other new electrical goods, responding to the changing structure of the market. Thus GEC developed to be a “general” electrical manufacturer by the outbreak of World War I.

著者

葭原 達之

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.13, no.3, pp.41-60, 1979-06-25 (Released:2010-11-18)