著者

恩田 睦

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.3, pp.3_3-3_30, 2010

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The aim of this paper is to present the entrepreneurial activities of local enterprises during the pre-war period by analyzing the fund raising approach of Chichibu Railway Co., Ltd. between the early 1900s and mid 1920s. The funds raised were instrumental in the railway company's success in large-scale capital investments like the electrification and electric actuation of their train carriages in a short period of time. In conclusion, it was evident that the 2nd generation manager, Sadakichi Kakihara was not only able to expand business activities in the local areas, but also actively do so in Tokyo and raised funds with highly favorable standings.<br>For the funds raised between 1900 and 1907, it was necessary to have collaterals for small sums of money borrowed at high interest rates for a short period from small-scale local banks situated along the railway lines that were concurrently run by the board of directors. The board of directors had to use their own securities or the company's stocks as collaterals. However, by relying solely on the local banks, it was unable to provide sufficient funds for the railway construction. It was during 1907, when Kakihara became the manager that he took the initiative to approach Tokyo's Eiichi Shibusawa for loan financing and the two entered into an agreement. The debt financing terms of Shibusawa, who had connections with banks in Tokyo, were such that there was sufficient funding with low-interest rate for the construction of the railways. In addition, the loan was for the long term.<br>Subsequently, with regards to financing for the electrification works of the railway, Kakihara then raised funds from Bushu Bank which had been inaugurated as an external board. Although Chichibu Railway Co., Ltd. was able to increase profits, retained earnings for the company were reduced because of the increase in corporate dividend ratio. Due to Kakihara's business activities making inroads into Tokyo, success in large-scale capital investment with the funds raised was made possible.

著者

脇村 義太郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, no.3, pp.1-27,i, 1966-12-20 (Released:2009-11-11)

参考文献数

46

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The Sumitomo Zaibatsu, one of the biggest business groups in Japan, has frown uninterruptedly since the Meiji Restoration. The key factor of its growth may be found in its unique leaders-recruitment policy.This paper introduces many of its leaders and analyzes the recruitment and personnel policy of the Zaibatsu.

著者

宝利 ひとみ

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.4, pp.3-29, 2018 (Released:2020-03-30)

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This paper attempts to contribute to find the key of firm growth by analyzing business of a specific firm, using a management dataset from the business report of the long-lived firm that was in Fukui prefecture in the first half of the twentieth century.The name of the firm that examined in this paper was Katsuyama Kigyo Kaytey Goshi Gaisya (Katsuyama Textile Brother's Joint-stock Company). In the mid-1920s, Kaytey was on the verge of bankruptcy due to a halt in financing from Katsuyama Bank. Katsuyama Bank was the main financing bank of Kaytey. That event triggered a change in the way of funding. After that, Kaytey increased the rate of raising money from company members instead of borrowings from a bank. By raising capital adequacy ratio, Kaytey could lower the rate of bankruptcy.Furthermore, it is found that Kaytey worked together with an iron factory in Kanazawa prefecture to development new products. In 1930s, Kaytey could sell many rayon and silk crepe. It was the fruit of product development by crossover cooperation in 1920s. This finding indicates how important the continuous product development was. Management stability also supported this continuous product development and made successful result in 1930s.

著者

桂 芳男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, no.1, pp.34-65, 1973-08-25 (Released:2009-10-14)

参考文献数

6

著者

矢作 正

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.3, pp.1-24, 2001-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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1. The first point at issue is whether Chisso considered Minamata Disease as well as economic factors when it decided to expand into petrochemicals.The only period during which Minamata Disease could have possibly influenced Chisso's petrochemical plan was from July 1959 to December 1959. During this period, Chisso's executives would not admit that Minamata factory was the cause of Minamata Disease, so they did not take any appropriate measures. There was no scheme to scrap the acetaldehyde plant in Minamata at that time.Chisso continued to operate the old plant although the petrochemical plants were completed.To conclude, Chisso's changeover to petrochemicals was promoted independent of Minamata Disease and only based on economic considerations.2. The second point at issue is whether Chisso increased its acetaldehyde production by obtaining a license.In Japan's second petrochemical plan, the main product was polypropylene and acetaldehyde was secondary. In January 1961, four companys' plans were presented to the government authorities, and all four plans were approved. Chisso was the top company in the acetaldehyde industry, which justified approval of its plan.

著者

吉田 幸司 岡室 博之

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.4, pp.3-26, 2016 (Released:2018-03-30)

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Using longitudinal micro data for Mitsubishi Shipbuilding employees from 1918 to 1946, this paper quantitatively analyzes the promotion and selection process for white-collar workers during the prewar period. Previous studies on the postwar period have mostly examined this career pattern quantitatively, while historical studies focusing on the prewar period are mostly qualitative. Moreover, even the few quantitative studies on the prewar period do not employ such methods as career trees and event history analysis, which are generally used in the studies focusing on the postwar period. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to investigate the career pattern of white-collar employees in prewar Japan in a quantitative way comparable with studies focusing on postwar Japan.We target two cohorts of white-collar workers—those who joined Mitsubishi Shipbuilding in 1918 and 1921—and track their careers (section and position) until 1946 by matching three internal data sources, including lists of personnel. We first draw up the career trees of new white-collar employees in both cohorts to illustrate the characteristics of their career patterns. Next, we employ event history analysis to test the differences in the career patterns between sub-groups, such as clerks and engineers. Finally, we estimate a logit model to determine the factors of their “survival” until 1939. We find that (1) the speed of promotion differs considerably across white-collar workers in the same cohort, (2) “return match” is observed not only in promotion to section manager positions but also in promotion to division manager positions, (3) despite a high ratio of resignation, most remaining white-collar workers are promoted to division managers, and (4) engineers are more likely than clerks to stay with the company for more than 20 years. Findings (1) to (3) are common to the career patterns of white-collar workers in the prewar core banks of Zaibatsu groups but contrast with those of large postwar firms.

著者

宇田 正

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, no.1, pp.124-139, 1971-10-20 (Released:2009-10-14)

著者

大久保 いづみ

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.4, pp.4_25-4_51, 2015

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<p>This paper examines the influence of foreign alliances on competitive advantage in the Japanese record industry prior to World War Ⅱ. In pre-war Japan, the main industry competitors were Nihon Chikuonki Shokai (NCS), Nihon Victor Chikuonki (NVC), Nihon Polidor Chikuonki (NPC), King Record (King), Teikoku Chikuonki (Teikoku), and Dainihon Chikuonki (Dainihon). NCS and NVC had alliances with companies in the United Kingdom and the United States, while NPC and King partnered with German record companies. In contrast, Teikoku and Dainihon remained purely Japanese companies, without foreign affiliations.</p><p>What benefits did the record companies receive from their foreign partnerships? And, how did the alliances influence the strategies of their counterparts?</p><p>As concerns Western music recordings, the companies with foreign alliances maintained a formidable competitive advantage throughout the pre-war period. On the other hand, for recordings of Japanese music, technological disparity between firms with foreign alliances and solely Japanese firms were essntially erased, and the latter rose to competiveness with the former, especially in the so-called "ryukoka" (Japanese popular songs) market. Thus, the foreign-allied-companies were forced to focus on Japanese music more than ever, this in turn accelerated the expansion of the Japanese music records market. In this context, foreign-partnered companies, such as NCS and NVC, made important contributions to "the golden age of ryukoka".</p><p>Until the beginning of the 1930s, the keys to competitive advantage in the Japanese record industry involved the introduction of new technologies and the sale of Western music records, based on alliances with foreign companies. After the mid-1930s, however, the capability to produce and sell records of Japanese music played a larger role in determining competitive advantage within the industry.</p>

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.47, no.3, pp.3_58-3_89, 2012 (Released:2016-01-27)

著者

渡邉 恵一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.3, pp.47-74, 1996-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

鈴木 良隆

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.5, no.2, pp.23-45,ii, 1971-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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This thesis deals with two aspects of labour management of the Lancashire cotton industry during the first half of the 1830's; 1) organization within workshops and 2) the efficient use of labour. The main difficulties of these two aspects as faced by mill-owners during the Industrial Revolution Era has been repeatedly pointed out by Andrew Ure.1) As regards organization within workshops: as a conclusion of the author's study of that “Indirect Employment by the Master”, the intervention by the mill-owner in the matter of the management is clearly seen in several points. On the other hand, under “Direct Employment by the Masters”, the centralized management by mill-owners can be seen but even in that case there was no completed organization of management from the first. The work of the overseer was differenciated because of the division of processes, due to the expansion of the mills, and the regulation of the organization of operation.2) As regards the efficient use of labour: though attention was paid to the appropriate placement of the labour and the skill, the maintenance of factory discipline was the most significant. For the maintaining of discipline the use of fines and threat importance was attached to educating for the purpose of moral improvement.

著者

黒澤 隆文

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.1, pp.1_23-1_50, 2014 (Released:2017-11-10)

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.3, pp.46-75, 2018 (Released:2020-12-30)

著者

永江 眞夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, no.4, pp.36-65,ii, 1985-01-30 (Released:2010-11-18)

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The purpose of this paper is a examination of the correlation between a local spinning company and Zaibatsu (financial group) during the period of capitalism establishment by utilizing the data about Kyushu Spinning Company and Mitsui.Kyushu Spinning Company was established by consolidation of three companies, or Miike, Kurume and Kumamoto spinning company, in 1899. This company had about 50, 000 spindles and was a big company at that time as a local one. But its business results was aggravated by an effect of the post Sino-Japanese war depression. Futhermore, the speculation that Matazo Moriyama, the manager of Osaka branch of Kyushu Spinning Company, put into operation to cover above aggravation resulted into failure. Then, managers of this company tried to reform the business by calling up un-paid capital, but this plan did not be realized because a capacity in raising capital of local stockholders was very limited.Consequently, reformation of this company was left to Mitsui accompanied by stockholders' loss from capital reduction. Mitsui obtained the managerial rights of this company, on the other hand it improved a financial position of this company with its large ability in raising capital. And it made efforts to increase the profit through a reduction in interest payment and a utilization of sales ability that Mitsui-bussan (trading company) had.Thus, supported by the recovery of business conditions, Mitsui accomplished managerial reformation of Kyushu Spinning Company with its synthetic ability as a Zaibatsu. And then, Kyushu Spinning Company was absorbed by Kanegafuchi Spinning Company, a company that was a member of the Mitsui Zaibatsu, in 1902.

著者

渡邉 恵一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.24-45, 2017 (Released:2019-06-30)

被引用文献数

1

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This paper seeks to shed new light on the process by which the modern cane sugar industry in Taiwan came into being and how it became established under Japanese colonial rule. While doing so, the study focusses on the issues involved in shipping raw sugarcane.Taiwan Sugar Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which had developed as a colonial enterprise, planned to become self-sufficient in sugarcane through the use of an extensive company-held plantation. However, in actuality, it continued to rely on purchases from local farmers. Sugarcane is bulky and requires great effort to transport, and the ability to rapidly transport large volumes of sugarcane is critical because the sugar content drops over time after it has been harvested. Hauling sugarcane from farmers in carts pulled by water buffalo to the factory posed a bottleneck for large-scale, continuous production—a characteristic feature of the modern sugar industry.The use of a private steam-powered railway that began operating at the end of 1907 was a goal of TSMC, which, since its founding, had made efforts to gradually improve its sugarcane logistics. These proprietary rail lines integrated the sugarcane production process from harvesting to milling and also contributed to greater profits by improving sugar yields.After the Russo-Japanese War, TSMC continued building its own proprietary rail lines so that it would be able to continue dealing with the problem of rapidly transporting sugarcane from the fields to the factories. The company also successfully undertook the building of an inter-linking transport network among its factories, thus becoming able to adjust sugarcane supply and demand beyond the limitations of the raw-material acquisition zones. TSMC's construction and enhancement of its ground-breaking raw material transport system became a business model for the modern cane sugar industry in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule, thus stimulating growth in the industry overall as other sugar manufacturers copied them.

著者

工藤 章

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.24, no.3, pp.1-26, 1989-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Generally, the international transfer of technology occurs from a country posessing a high level of technology to one of a lower level. Prior to the Second World War many German technologies were introduced into Japan. There was, however, at least one case where they tried to transfer Japanese technology to Germany. It was the case of Ostasiatische Lurgi-Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung located in Berlin.The company, Ost Lurgi, was established in March 1926 as a joint venture of Mitsubishi Goshi, Metallgesellschaft and Degussa. The initiator of the establishing Ost Lurgi was Fritz Haber, inventer of the Haber Bosch process, who visited Japan in 1924, thought highly of the standard of Japanese technology and originated a number of proposals for technico-industrial cooperation between Germany and Japan. One of his idealistic proposals gave rise to the establishment contract of Ost Lurgi.The purpose of Ost Lurgi was to transfer Japanese technology to Germany. The Shimazdu process for manufacturing battery cells and ship hull paint owned by Shimazdu Works was the only actual proposal as to Japanese technology. Degussa showed an initial interest, but reached a negative conclusion on this. Metallgesellschaft's dissatisfaction with the contract also deepened. As a result, Ost Lurgi was liquidated in December 1931, when the contract was invalidated. Ironically, in June 1932, the patent right for the Shimazdu process was established in the United States, followed by its transfer in France and Great Britain as well as in the United States, but not in Germany. In the light of the present context of booming Japanese direct investment in West Germany, this failed attempt, however, can be seen as a pioneering technico-industrial endevour, from which there is much still to learn.

著者

幸田 亮一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.27, no.2, pp.31-62,ii, 1992-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This study intends to analyze the initiation of mass production technology and its influence on the machine tool industry in Germany at the end of the 19th century.It is still believed, that at the end of the 19th century, mechanical engineering industry in Germany was technologically far behind as compared with the standard of the USA. The “American system of manufacturing” was often used to emphasize the above notion to prejudge the German machine tool industry. However, it is a question to assess whether the development of the German machine tool industry was far behind than that of America.Even in the USA, the sewing machine, one of the typical product of the “American system, ” was made as a hand-made one at the beginning. Sewing machine builders in the USA introduced its mass production upon interchangeable parts in 1870s, after few years of this change, German also began to intoroduce this system. This pattern was also true for industries like bicycle, fire arm and typewriter.In order to make parts for the above machines, it was inevitable to use new kind of machine tools like milling machine or turret lathe. Although these machines were developed by American engineers in the middle of the 19th century, their commercial production commenced even in the USA in the middle of 1860s. After few years later German machine tool builders also started to copy and improve them.In the stage of developing process of the mass production, the machine tool industry played a “convergent” roll not only in the USA but also in Germany. At the beginning of the 20th century, the German machine tool technologies had been developed significantly in order to compete with the American builders in the world market.

著者

幸田 亮一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.4, pp.1-24_1, 1999-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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Factory systems changed drastically around the turn of the 19th to 20th century in the Western countries. In the United States many researchers have analyzed the rise of the new factory system, but in Europe on the contrary there are many issues still unsolved. Not a few researchers still believe that the German factory system at that time was far behind that of America. Actually, however, many contemporary scientists and engineers devoted themselves to solving problems related to machinery, industrial psychology, management and so on. In this paper the historical change of the classic factory system to the new one will be examined in the German machine building industry.The first section deals with the new factory system from the view points of architecture, machinery and administration focusing on the great rolls of engineers. Through their activities traditional workshop management was substituted by a kind of “scientific management”. The second section describes the reduction tendency of working hours from the middle of the 19th century to WW1 and then points out the importance of new time management through introducing the American time-recorder. The third section analyzes the relations between the mass production system and the reduction of working hours by using two survey reports of the German metal workers union in 1911 and 1912. Results of these surveys suggest that there were intimate relations between the two.Factory science was well developed in Germany at that time, and it is reasonable enough to consider those engineers who led efforts before WW1 as forerunners of the German rationalization movement of the 1920s.

著者

岡室 博之

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.59-83, 2003-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the development of the manufacturer-supplier relationship in the German automotive industry from the 1920s to the 1960s and to examine the continuity (or discontinuity) between the prewar and postwar periods. There has been no detailed historical research on this topic, though the German experience forms an interesting contrast to the American and the Japanese cases.Using original documents mainly from the DaimlerChrysler Archive and focusing on Daimler-Benz, I found that the postwar manufacturer-supplier relationship is quite different from that of the prewar period. While an arm's-length relationship was dominant in the prewar period, with frequent replacement of suppliers and little cooperation on the part of manufacturers, though often concentrating a whole order for a part on a sole supplier, the postwar relationship is more stable and characterized by intensive mutual commitment, with a clear trend to the two-vendor policy.An important turning point in the evolution of the manufacturer-supplier relationship can be found in the wartime economy. Under serious pressures of economic regulation and military production, Daimler-Benz provided suppliers with continuous support and instruction and introduced cooperative product design with selected suppliers. There are reasons to believe that these wartime experiences are related to the postwar development.However, a more direct reason for the postwar changes lies in the new economic environment and experiences in the postwar period, especially the serious shortage of production materials as well as delivery and quality problems of suppliers, combined with the drastic increase in demand for cars. Carmakers had to secure a sufficient parts supply and required the suppliers to keep a large production capacity with enormous capital investment for a longer term, which led necessarily to a stable manufacturer-supplier relationship with mutual commitment.

著者

石崎 亜美

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.3, pp.3-25, 2015 (Released:2018-03-30)

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This paper aims to examine the brand marks of the soy sauce shipped to Edo city by the Takanashi family (now known as Kikkoman Corporation) in Noda town, and clarify aspects of the Takanashi family's soy sauce brands.The Yamasa Corporation had basically two brand marks during the Edo, Meiji, and Taisho eras. It seems other soy sauce breweries also had few brand marks. Therefore, there has been no study that focuses on brand marks. Meanwhile, the investigation into the Takanashi family clarified they shipped more than ten brand marks for a year during the late Edo era, and shipped 66 brand marks for a year during the Tenpou era. Few soy sauce breweries had as many brand marks as the Takanashi and Mogi families (the Mogi family is related to the Takanashi family). It seems the large number of brand marks is one of their characteristics. Therefore, we identify the differences in their brand marks and explain the reasons for the many brand marks.The prices of the Takanashi family's brands were classified into between three and five categories; the differences in price denoted the quality of raw materials, mixture proportion and quality of unrefined soy sauce. Particularly, they blended unrefined soy sauces that had different ripeness characteristics. This led to the Takanashi family having many brands. Moreover, there were brand marks called tezirushi (hand marks). Tezirushi were sold individually to wholesalers; they were wholesalers' possessive marks. Tezirushi were made by request for wholesalers, and there were instances where different tezirushi contained the same contents. The reason the wholesalers requested tezirushi was that they wanted to differentiate their sauce from other wholesalers. In conclusion, the many brands of the Takanashi family were an expression of their business policy they tried to meet customer needs, which was one of the factors they had maintained, and increase sales in Edo city market.