著者

パトリック フリーデンソン

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, no.3, pp.55-65, 1993-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

参考文献数

20

著者

老川 慶喜

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.3, pp.48-61, 1988-10-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

三島 康雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, no.2, pp.23-51,ii, 1983-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The origin of Yamaguchi Zaibatsu was opened by Kichirobei Yamaguchi (first) as a draper at Osaka in 1824. Kichirobei (second) changed his business to money-changer in 1863. After the Meiji Restoration, Yamaguchi family established 148th National Bank in 1879, and this bank changed to private. Yamaguchi Bank in 1898. Thereafter, Yamaguchi family invested to Nihon Seimei (life insurance), Osaka Chochiku Ginko (savings bank), Kansai Shintaku (trust company), Kyodo Kasai Kaijo (fire and marin insurance) and so on. Yamaguchi family established Yamaguchi Limited Partnership (¥10, 000, 000) as holding company in 1920 and formed Yamaguchi Zaibatsu. It had developed as a middle-scale financial Zaibatsu untill the end of second World War. The reasons of development were : 1. delegations of management power to able managers, 2. good selections of investments to stable financial and insurance companies, 3. effective utilizing of capitals by reducing the percentage of investment to 10-50% in all capitals of these companies. After the second World War, Yamaguchi Zaibatsu was not designated to Zaibatsu holding company by the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, but it was going way of dissolution by the huge property tax, and the decreasing of values of holding stocks. Yamaguchi Limited Partnership closed its 30 years history in 1950.

著者

中瀬 寿一

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, no.3, pp.28-55,i, 1966-12-20 (Released:2009-11-11)

被引用文献数

10

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No previous analysis has been made of Japanese advertising (advertising industry and capital) from a social scientific point of view. The study of the history of advertising has also been limited to discussions of custom and fashion.This paper outlines the history of Japanese advertising in relation to the growth, development and crises of Japanese capitalism, by considering the functions of advertising in several periods of history. It also shows how and when the advertising agency came about and has continued to develop in Japan.

著者

佐藤 達男

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, no.3, pp.26-51, 2015

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<p>This study aims to investigate Nakajima Aircraft Company's airframe business and its production efficiency during WW II in comparison with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.</p><p>During the Pacific War, Japanese aircraft production was essentially based on job shop system for parts fabrication and sub-assembly. Nakajima Aircraft Company the largest aircraft manufacturer of war-time Japan and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries the second largest utilized both job shop and production line systems for their airframe final assembly lines depending on each plant situations. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey reports evaluated that Nakajima's airframe production system was more developed than that of Mitsubishi, which adhered to original, old-fashioned job shop system. This was substantiated from the fact that Nakajima expanded its production by 1944 to more than eight times of its 1941 production, and Mitsubishi produced only three times for the same period.</p><p>However, in production efficiency measured by airframe weight produced per month per employee, Mitsubishi was predominant until August to October 1944. A positive correlation was observed between production efficiency and monthly number of airframe production. Mitsubishi's improvement degree of production efficiency agreed well with the estimation by learning curve theory, but Nakajima's improvement of production efficiency far exceeded the estimation. This is considered to be the effect that Nakajima's labor utilization rate, which was approximately half of that of Mitsubishi in September 1943, might have increased rapidly as the monthly airframe production increased. The difference of the final assembly line did not have decisive influence on the production efficiency, but the increase in the number of monthly airframe production was influential.</p><p>The production efficiency continuously increased as the monthly airframe production increased, and then dropped sharply from the end of 1944 and after due to the rapid decline of monthly production, which was caused by shortages of essential materials and engines, US air raids from November 1944 and after, factory evacuation, and labor shortage.</p>

著者

中林 真幸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.1-29, 2000-06-25 (Released:2010-02-19)

参考文献数

48

被引用文献数

1 1

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Until the beginning of the 1880s, most Japanese silk exports were to France. The French silk market, however, shrank after the French Panic of 1882, while the U.S. market expanded during the 1880s. In the United States, power looms were widely used in the silk industry, so the demand for even-quality silk was rising. Japanese manufacturers had to produce uniform filatures (machine-reeled silk) for export to the United States. Kaimeisha, which was the leading association of silk manufacturers in Suwa district, Nagano prefecture, had been producing silk for the French market and had relied on wholesale merchants in Yokohama for quality control. After the French Panic, Kaimeisha introduced the production system which offered incentives for the re-reeling and inspection of silk, thus succeeding in the production of uniform filatures, which it labeled with its own Kaimeisha trademark. In order to expand business, Kaimeisha obtained financing from wholesale merchants and local banks, which were relatively modern financial institutions.Another silk manufacturers association, Kairyosha, followed suit and introduced a production system similar to Kaimeisha's. This second organization, however, was financed by traditional financial institutions and was managed by a rural moneylender. The moneylender's participation in management was detrimental to meeting the rising level of quality control required in the U.S. market. The moneylender demanded an increase in deliveries of silk by hiring new association members as he profited by lending them money to purchase cocoons and receiving discounts on members' deliveries. The situation was particularly disfavorable to quality control because membership to the association was not steady.

著者

前田 和利

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.1, pp.52-66, 1988-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

栂井 義雄

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, no.1, pp.72-105, 1968-03-15 (Released:2009-11-11)

著者

井澤 龍

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.3-24, 2016 (Released:2019-03-30)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The aim of this study is to clarify the historical premises of the establishment of the tax treaty between the UK and the US in 1945. Particularly, the UK-US treaty to prevent the international double taxation made an economic and political impact on the UK multinationals and the government. It was the first time that the UK government concluded a general tax treaty with elsewhere in the British Empire.The problem of international double taxation on business income between UK and US occurred since the First World War. However, the UK government did not introduce a foreign tax relief for foreign investment to the US until 1945 because the government persisted to abhor reduction of the tax revenue. Thus, the tax issue became one of the causes that the British investment to the US had been sluggish. In addition, not a few UK multinationals were forced to change their organization alongside the tax environment during the period, raising cries of protest through some employer's associations such as the Federation of British Industries. The organizational changes like Phelps Dodge or Courtaulds sometimes influenced corporate long term investment strategy. Finally, the introduction of the American dividend tax in 1936 and the outbreak of the Second World War pushed the UK multinationals into further tax planning to alleviate the tax burden. The corporate behaviors and complaints of those firms made the UK government reconsider the tax regime of the interwar period. As a result, the general tax treaty between the UK and the US was concluded in 1945, a prototype of tax treaty of not only both countries but many countries in the Post Second World War.

著者

鈴木 敦子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.29, no.2, pp.27-56, 1994-07-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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Researches on honai-shonin have been made on the assumption that they were za-shonin living in villages (sonraku-za-shonin). One of the issues that these researches have pointed out is that their assertion about monopoly changed in the sixteenth century from the monopoly of transaction (ichi-za-ken) to that of trade routes. In this paper we have inquired into this change from the viewpoint that this was the change of their organization and creed of business. The main points we have clarified are as follows : First, they asserted their monopoly of trade routes upon being recognized as a corporation. We have reached this conclusion as a result of the elucidation of the process of their getting out of the control of shoen-ryoshu (sanmon), and of the above-mentioned recognized by shugo-Rokkaku-shi.Secondly, the reason of their assertion is that the goods they dealt in increased in amount. They no longer were able to assert the monopoly with the sales method relying upon za. So they were forced to assert the monopoly of trade routes connecting suppliers and retailers. This change in the form of business was in correspondence with the emergence of a local economy on the eastern coast of Lake Biwa in Omi-no-kuni.Thirdly, the reason why they could change the form of business is that their policy was in accordance with that of shugo-Rokkaku-shiFinally, having passed through the process mentioned above, honai-shonin transformed themselves from medieval za-shonin to a new type of merchants which adapted themselves to the local economy in the sixteenth century, namely, shingi-shonin.

著者

市原 博

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.4, pp.3-26, 2007-03-25 (Released:2010-02-25)

参考文献数

54

著者

満薗 勇

出版者

Business History Society of Japan

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.44, no.1, pp.1_31-1_57, 2009 (Released:2012-03-23)

被引用文献数

3

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The purpose of this article is to examine the business model of the mail order of the department store during the prewar period in Japan. With the maintenance of postal services, the major kimono retailers which were changing to department store began the mail order business in 1890-1900s. They considered it to be central means to go into the local market. It was intended for people of the wealthy groups and continued developing until the beginning in 1920s.The business model of it was characterized by a choosing agent. That is to say, a salesclerk of the mail order section considered an appointed price and a taste of each customer and chose goods in place of the customer. This model was obliged to be started because it took too much a cost to make the catalogue which contained all items. It was a cause to raise the cost that Japanese consumption markets were various complicatedly. However, considering that people in the countryside did not have enough information about urban goods because of the undeveloped media, this model had convenience and rationality. For the purpose of choosing the suitable goods, the salesclerk sometimes went on a business trip to do sales and tried to grasp the characteristic of local markets and the taste of customers. In addition, each department store raised the brand image of the store by an advertisement and guaranteed returning or exchanging goods.After the latter half of 1920s, the sales of the mail order business did not expand because a popularization strategy did not succeed in contrast with store - based sales. The catalogue which contained all items was not made after all; consequently orders from the people of the middle groups, who got enough information from ladies' magazines and liked to choose goods by oneself, did not increase.

著者

中西 聡

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.3, pp.26-37, 2019 (Released:2021-12-30)

著者

工藤 章

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.22, no.1, pp.1-29,I, 1987-04-30 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This paper aims at clarifying reasons why IG Farben failed in selling the lisence of the IG method for synthetic oil through an analysis of documents held BASF Archive and other documents. In the middle of 1930 es IG Farben changed its starategy and decided to sell the lisence of the IG method for synthetic oil abroad as well as in Germany. Its first target was Japanese market. In those years it dominated in Japan a boom for synthetic oil industry. IG Farben made every effort and approached to South Manchurian Railway Company, Mitsubishi Mining Co., Ogura petroleum Co. and other 10 companies or projects. It could not, however, succeed in concluding any contract with them. There can be three hypotheses to explain IG's failure : (1) The International Hydrogeneration Engineering and Chemical Co., which was established by four big enterprises incuding IG and held the hydrogeneration patent, restrained IG's effort; (2) Strict conditions presented by IG Farben discouraged Japanese companies which intended to introduce the IG method; (3) Japanese Navy, which was trying to develop socalled Navy method for itself, opposed against introducing the IG method strongly. My analysis reveals : (1) In spite of IHEC's negative attitude IG had chances to conclude contracts with some Japanese companies till 1939; (2) There were some cases where Japanese side did not take presented conditions too strict; and (3) The Navy hindered effectively projects of some companies such as South Manchurian Railway Company and Ogura Petroleum Co. Results of my analysis abandon former two hypotheses, but do not abandon the last one.

著者

岡田 有功

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.1, pp.1-27, 2002-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to describe the development of Kosaka Silver Mine in the 1880s in terms of the relationship between the running of the mine and regional environment.In 1861, the operation of Kosaka Silver Mine started in earnest. Moreover, it was placed under the government management in 1869. Some changes in silver refining were effected by the introduction of various technologies and brought about improvement in mining. Since Ziervogel's process, which Curt A. Netto adopted in 1877, resulted in large charcoal consumption, trees were cut down for the use in the mine. As a result, only a few trees were left in the surroundings of the mine.Kosaka Mine operated on a loss. The change in refining technologies from Ziervogel's process to Augustine's process in 1881 lowered the costs and brought profits and success to the management. The conversion of the refining process was initiated by Ohshima Takatou. In 1884, the government disposed of Kosaka Silver Mine by selling it to Fujita Gumi & Co., under which business management policy changed and cut expenditures in the mine.Kosaka Silver Mine became the principal silver mine in Japan. Development of the mine returned profits to Kosaka's society by creating employment opportunities. In the 1880s, the development of the mine resulted in a population explosion in Kosaka village and improvements in the regional infrastructure, such as the building of an elementary school, post office, police substation, and many stores. The mine thus donated to the village and contributed to the community.The mine was able to produce a large volume of silver and changed the regional environment as the living spaces of the inhabitants into those that depended on the mine. The sustainable management in turn required the continuation of the regional environment.

著者

沢井 実

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.54, no.3, pp.3-25, 2019 (Released:2021-12-30)

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Before Japan became a major exporter of home appliances and automobiles, there was an age of light-machine production in the 1950s and 1960s that included items such as cameras, home sewing machines, binoculars, etc. There were three types of home sewing machine manufacturers in the 1950s: the integration type that manufactured arms, beds, and other parts of the sewing machines entirely in the plant; the assembling type that assembled outsourced parts into finished products; and the mixed type that both manufactured and assembled parts.Large companies such as Janome Sewing Machine, Riccar, and Brother Industries formed the integration type, while small- and medium-sized companies that were largely located in Osaka formed the assembling type. Large home sewing machine companies went through an era of rapid growth in the domestic market. The export of home sewing machines was led by the small businesses, i.e., the assembling manufacturers.However, the competition to dominate the U.S. market—led mainly by assembling manufacturers—was so harsh that the export prices decreased due to market forces. The MITI introduced the minimum export price system (the supposed check price) to respond to this situation. Japanese sewing machines manufactured by the assembling manufacturers were often called Karasu (crow) machines, because they were completely black and did have no brand labels. In 1954, in the wake of the depression after the Korean War, integration manufacturers started making an effort to export products. By the 1960s, the distinction between the large manufacturers of Tokyo and Nagoya in the domestic market and the small business of Osaka in the export market had collapsed. The situation was symbolized by Janome’s acquisition of Sanko Sewing Machine Co., a medium-sized manufacturer that began as an assembler in Osaka in October 1959.One advantage that large integration manufacturers possessed over assembling manufacturers was that they could establish their own sales networks in the U.S. market. For assembling manufacturers of Karasu home sewing machines, the sales network behind the U.S. distributors was a black box, while the large integration manufacturers tried to establish their own sales networks in the U.S. market.

著者

稲吉 晃

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.4, pp.48-54, 2018 (Released:2021-03-30)

著者

山崎 広明

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.41, no.2, pp.3-26,95, 2006-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this article is to analyze the development of entrepreneurial activities of the Youemon Sasaki family at Shin'ichi in Bingo region which is located in the eastern part of Hiroshima Prefecture during the period after the Showa panic (1930-31) until the wartime (July, 1937-August, 1945). The author utilized such various materials as the oral history, the printed matters and the Sasaki archives to accomplish the above purpose.Youemon Sasaki, successful local wholesale merchant, were seriously hit by the Showa panic, and thereafter, the restructuring by the young leader, Gi'ichi Sasaki, became unavoidable. Gi'ichi closed the weaving factories established in 1915, began sewing business, came to sell new commodities such as wide cloths and garments to the local areas and continued seeking such gains as dividends and rents of land and houses.At the wartime Gi'ichi greatly committed himself to sewing business and kept the wealthy local businessman by becoming a salaried manager in Bingo Tokumen Kasuri Moto Haikyu Kabusiki Kaisha (Bingo Kasuri Distribution Company) and Huhaku Seihin Chuo Seizo Haikyu Tosei Kabushiki Kaisha (Cloth Goods Central Manufacturing Distribution Company). He also earned lots of money through dividends of shares during wartime.In recent years many economic and business historians in Japan are making great efforts to describe the local entrepreneurial activities in the prewar years, and this article is also included in such an academic trend.

著者

籠谷 直人 韓 載香 曳野 孝

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.40, no.3, pp.52-59, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

藤井 信幸

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.1-29, 2002-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In Japan after World War I, the population of the big cities increased with the growth of the heavy and chemical industries in urban areas, resulting in a widening of gaps in regional development. During the 1930s, the government urged factories to relocate from the cities in order to narrow the gaps. Moreover, the government assisted in the evacuation of munitions factories, above all the strategically important machine shops, to avoid air strikes during the Pacific War.Although not as many machine shops dispersed geographically as the government had anticipated, the agglomeration of small-to-medium-sized machine shops did accelerate, and the experience of learning by making various types of machines was acquired by many local cities as a result. Machine production increased remarkably in these local cities after World War II, enabling regional small-to-medium-sized shops to contribute substantially to the Era of the High-Speed Growth in the 1960s.