著者

岩本 和久

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.59-68, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Zoshchenko, like many other Russian writers during the 1920s, was interested in psychoanalysis. Zoshchenko criticized Freud in his novel, Before Sunrise, when the Soviet government blamed psychoanalysis in Stalinist Russia. Some scholars suspected that his criticism was merely an excuse for pursuing his interest in psychoanalysis and that the novel was condemned specifically because of references to Freud. After the era of “perestroika”, many biographical materials have been documented and published. As a result, now we can discuss Zoshchenko's interest in psychoanalysis more accurately.In Before Sunrise Zoshchenko analyses his dreams in an attempt to recognize his earliest experiences, which he has forgotten. He intends to find stimuli, which cause his melancholy, in his past. This idea is based on the physiological psychology theories of Pavlov, but Zoshchenko's search of trauma in his life and his symbolic interpretation of dreams are more reminiscent of Freudian theory.Zoshchenko's interest in psychoanalysis and physiology is consistent with the literature at that time. His interest shows his belief in reason; which was emphasized in the Stalin era. Such an emphasis on science can be seen in newer literary genres: Science Fiction and Socialist Realism. Psychoanalysis, however, influences the style of Before Sunrise as well as its philosophy: symbolism of psychoanalysis penetrates not only the interpretation of dreams, but also the description of real life.Various biographical materials show that Before Sunrise was condemned not because of references to Freud, but because of its support of individualism and deviations from the canon of the Socialist Realism, both of which were consistent with psychoanalysis.

著者

久保 慶一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.69-79, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

9

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In Montenegro, there has been a deep divide between those who seek the independence of Montenegro and those who oppose it and seek the maintenance of the Yugoslav federation or the union with Serbia. It is well known that there is a correlation between the ethnic identity and the attitude towards this issue, particularly among ethnic minorities such as Albanians, Muslims (Bosnjaks) and Serbs. While one tends to assume that the ethnic identity is an independent variable that affects the behaviour towards the issue of statehood, I would argue that this assumption does not hold for Serbs. To do so, I firstly examine the correlation between the ethnic identity and the behaviour towards the issue of statehood. Secondly, by examining the census data of 1991 and 2003 in Montenegro, I point out that there seems to have been a significant scale of re-definition of the ethnic identity. In particular, a significant number of those who now regard themselves as “Serb” did not indeed do so only 12 years ago. This suggests that the assumption discussed above is wrong and the causal relations run in the opposite direction: they re-defined themselves as “Serb” because they support the maintenance of the union with Serbia. Thirdly, I briefly examine some factors that might possibly have affected the decisions made by those who regarded themselves as “Montenegrins” in 1991 to support or oppose the independence of Montenegro.

著者

土田 久美子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.80-90, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

27

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the Russian translation of Murasaki Shikibu's The Tale of Genji, focusing on mono no aware. Mono no aware has been regarded as the key concept of this literary classic, ever since it was first proposed by Motoori Norinaga.N.I. Konrad's Russian translation of the third chapter (Utsusemi) was done in 1924, prior to the English translation by Arthur Waley. However, thereafter Konrad translated only the first, second, and fourth chapters. The complete Russian translation was carried out by T.L. Sokolova-Deliusina, and was published in 1991-1993. It is this complete translation that forms the principal basis for our study.According to Norinaga, aware is originally an exclamation, and as a noun and an adjective verb, it expresses deep, heartfelt emotion, including not only sorrow but also joy and amusement. Moreover, mono no aware is the emotion of aware that is aroused when one intuits “the heart of mono - things”: Ohnishi Yoshinori defined aware as the aesthetic category that was formed under the influence of thoughts about the evanescence of life. Ivan Morris noted, “Aware is one of the many untranslatable words that are used to define Japanese aesthetics”: Mono no aware is known in English as “the pathos of things” (translated by Ivan Morris), or as “pity of things” (translated by Royall Tyler) .With regard to Russian translations of the story, Konrad, in his paper titled Murasaki Shikibu's novel, translated mono no aware as “chary veshchei” (lure of things) . He further explained that it was the Japanese aesthetic principle of the need to comprehend the “ocharovanie” (charm) that is inherent in various things. In the preface of the complete Russian translation of Genji, Sokolova-Deliusina translated the concept as “pechal'noe ocharovanie veshchei” (sorrowful charm of things), and wrote that it connected the attractive beauty of the material world with thoughts about its transience and fragility.It is commonly understood by both the Russian and English translators that mono no aware comprises elements of sadness, sorrow, and thoughts on evanescence. However, it could be said that Russian translators regard this concept as involving the element of “charm”.This was supplemented by Sokolova-Deliusina in her explanation that by sensing aware, the essence of things can be comprehended. Therefore, mono no aware is aspiration of the soul to attain the eternal sources of things, and its desire to capture their elusive meaning.For certain sections of the story, Sokolova-Deliusina translated aware or mono no aware as “sorrowful charm”, and “to comprehend the heart of things, their secret meanings”, all based on her above explanation of this concept. It is also worth taking into account that for the very same sections, none of the English translators of The Tale of Genji interpreted aware or mono no aware in the same manner as that of Sokolova-Deliusina.A book review of Sokolova-Deliusina's Russian translation of The Tale of Genji describes it as “unique in aesthetic value”. As we have examined, due to her profound understanding of mono no aware, such an evaluation is well deserved.

著者

中林 啓修

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.33, pp.91-105, 2004 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper aims to examine the standpoints of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) in the field of Justice and Home Affaires; especially the field of police cooperation in the context of European Enlargement today.This paper, mainly, focuses on the European Union's assistance policies of Justice and Home Affaires for Candidate countries.These EU assistance policies are divided into two broad categories. One category is policy as the part of pre-accession assistance called PHARE. And the other category is called specific assistance policies including GROTIUS, STOP, OCTOPUS, OISIN, ODYSSEUS, and FALCONE.The purpose of the former policy is to make candidate countries join the EU successfully with the twinning approach (training programs for assistance) . On the other hand, the purpose of the latter policies are implementing the ability of law enforcement of assisted countries in each specific field such as combating human trafficking, Criminal Justice and so on.Before 5th EU enlargement, CEECs as candidate countries, received assistance policies of both categories from the EU and EU member countries.However, on the way to achieving full membership in the EU, CEECs standpoints were changing gradually from their candidate positions.After finishing 5th EU enlargement successfully, EUROPOL (European Police office: Main institution for police cooperation at the European level) has launched “EUROPOL Enlargement Project” for coordinating the accession process of CEECs on behalf of EUROPOL successfully.In this context, the standpoint of CEECs is a likely candidate country assisted by EU and former member states of EU. But at the same time, CEECs start to assist new candidate countries of the EU (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey) with their political and administrative experience and successful accession process to the EU through By-and Multi- lateral cooperation with these candidate countries.For instance, in 2002, the Hungarian Government offered to assist the Croatian government reform the government institutions of Croatia for joining the EU. It is specifically mentioned that this offer is earlier than the European Commission's proposal for applying the experience of new member states.These two aspects show that CEECs have been partially assisted countries, at least in the field of EUROPOL cooperation, but at the same time, have tried to make the best use of their experience of accession as the assistance tool for new candidate countries.In other words from the context of European integration (Deepening and Enlargement of the EU), CEECs have kept a nearly assisted position in the deepening phase while trying to achieve an assisting position in the phase of enlargement.The result of the examination is that CEECs are now on their way to changing their standpoint from assisted countries to mediation countries between the EU and new candidate countries in the field of police cooperation.

著者

六鹿 茂夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.48-62, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Income inequality has greatly increased in the Republic of Moldova since its independence in 1991. This is partly because only a small number of its people became rich through the illegal and unfair redistribution of the national wealth in the process of regime transformation, and partly because the majority of the people were reduced to poverty by the bankruptcy of the national economy. As a result, serious poverty has spread widely in small towns and rural areas, especially among unskilled workers, farmers, agricultural employees, pensioners, those with no primary education and the illiterate, households with many children, children and old people. Poverty has caused a sharp decline in fertility and the migration abroad of 600 thousand to one million workers. While their remittances to their families have prevented a worsening of the economic and social situation in Moldova, this labour emigration has given rise to a brain drain and to human trafficking. This in turn contributed to the great victory of the Communist party in the 2001 elections. Whether these issues of social and economic inequality and mass labour migration will be eased by the EU's ‘European Neighbourhood Policy, ’ which is based on a carrot and stick approach, remains to be seen.

著者

石田 信一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.63-75, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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In this article, the author investigates the Croatian problem in Istria during the interwar period, focusing on the minority policy by the Italian government and the situation of the Croatian minority there.The Slavic inhabitants in Istria, the Croats in particular, were not given a right as minority at all during the interwar period. They were exposed to the Italianization by the forced transformation of the Slavic place names and family names and by the prohibition of the Slavic language in school education and publication activity under the fascist rule.While the Slavic cultural and political societies were forced to dissolve, the secret societies as the TIGR were organized. They developed resistance movement against the fascists, and they also contributed much to the preservation of the Slavic national identity through their activities.About 100, 000 of the Slavic inhabitants in Istria emigrated during the interwar period because of the long-term economic difficulty and social discrimination including purge from public service or the land requisition. Most of them immigrated to Yugoslavia and advocated the annexation of Istria with Yugoslavia, but were not able to obtain satisfactory results.The Croatian problem in Istria could be settled only within a broader framework of international relationship, as this problem had its origin in World War I. However, the significance of persistent resistance by the Istrian people should not be underestimated, especially for the improvement of their status during and after World War II.

著者

乾 一宇

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.76-90, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Similar to many other countries after the Cold War, Russia has adopted a concept of “National Security” that has a broader meaning than the concept of “national defense”, and combines diplomacy and economy with national defense in order to ensure the national security.Organizations for decision making on national security policy in Russia have been legally and systematically established, as shown by the following.In March 1992 the Security Law was enacted, and in June 1992 the Security Council was established; at the same time provisions were passed for the creation of the Security Council.The Security Council is a consultative body that helps the President in decision making in the realm of the national security.Important matters that are discussed and decided in the Security Council are made public as presidential edicts.The Security Council consists of two kinds of members: permanent members who have authority to make decisions and members who only participate in the deliberatinos. The chairman, a post held by the President, heads up the council. The Secretary of the Security Council is one of the permanent members; he makes preparations for council meetings and puts matters on the agenda. The remaining permanent members are the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of Federal Security Bureau.Under the Putin Administration, many agenda items have been discussed, such as new concepts of national security, military doctrine, foreign policies, informational national security doctrine, and so on, and been successively promulgated as presidential edicts.The Security Council has one Secretariat and eight Directorates under the Council Secretariat, which reports to the Secretary of the Security Council. The Council Secretariat and its Directorate are well-formed organizations and have many members with considerable policy planning capabilities.In order to cope with the broad concepts and missions of “national security”, there are now 11 interadministration committees among government agencies that discuss and coordinate agendas in various fields.The existence of interadministration committee on military security is relaxing the military's monopoly in this regard. However, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff Office remain as powerful as they were in the Soviet period. For example, the military takes the initiative in drafting military doctrine.

著者

後藤 富士男

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.91-104, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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It is well known that North Korea has been suffering from acute economic crises since the 1990's. Although the country's food shortage was revealed in 1995, North Korea had already been confronted with economic difficulties by then. The difficulties appear to have been chiefly caused by three changes in external trade patterns of North Korea. Firstly, at the beginning of the 1990's, North Korea's imports from Russia largely decreased in comparison with that from the Soviet Union in the 1980's, which had been the most important source of obtaining materials for North Korea. Imports from Russia continued to decrease in the 1990's. Secondly, from 1994 to 1996, the physical volume of cereals annually imported by North Korea from foreign countries was remarkably small, compared with that imported until 1993. Thirdly, in the latter half of the 1990's, North Korea's imports of energy from China, which has been the largest obtainable energy source for North Korea from abroad since the beginning of the 1990's, fell significantly. These changes in turn appear to have seriously damaged the North Korean economy.North Korea has been expected to carry out economic reforms in order to improve its economic condition. Since July 2002, this country has introduced new economic polices. Although they have market-oriented features, we are not able to regard them as economic reforms. They are only improvement measures taken in the planned economic system. North Korean leaders, including Kim Jong Il, appear not to be able to execute fundamental economic reforms, even if they understand that the reforms are indispensable for improving their economy. This is most likely because having witnessed the experiences of China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1980's, they fear that the execution of economic reforms might enhance the risk of causing a democratic movement in politics and the destruction of the present regime.Hereafter, it appears North Korea will take one of the following three tacks. First, it might preserve the present“planned-economy divided from the South”, with the accompanying question of how long it can be sustained. The second possibility is that the North Korean economy might gradually transfer to the “market economy divided from the South” as the result of executing economic reforms, though that might be the “market economy unified with the South” in the long run. Finally, it might be possible that this “unified market economy” is suddenly realized as the result of a military attack by the United States or an inside coup d'état.

著者

徳永 昌弘

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.105-118, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper examines Russian enterprise reforms in the context of urban transition.The first part gives an overview of the industrial location structure unique to Russia in comparatively isolated regions, traditionally called “mono-profiling towns” (monoprofil'nye goroda) or “town-building enterprises” (gradoobrazuiushchie predpriiatiia), and depicts the case of Baikal'sk Cellulose and Paper Plant (BCPP) as a typical town-building enterprise. The author documents how the uniqueness of this type of enterprise causes the delay of the restructuring process for both private enterprises and public institutions. Nevertheless, It concludes by suggesting that the relation-ship between enterprise and its community, which were constructed in a symbiotic way, has changed. This is also the case for the “elite cites”, often called closed cities, including academic towns, and secret cities in Russian history. In the last decade, they had lost their stature and many privileges due to financial pressure resulting from changes in economic and social circumstances. It was inevitable for the state in the post-So-viet era to reduce and/or eliminate guaranteed social services.The second part focuses on the impact of urban infrastructure on enterprise reforms. Due to a lack of investments in Russia, existing fixed capital faces obsoles-cence. Municipalization of enterprise-owned urban infrastructure poses further threat to the situation. Therefore, many Russian enterprises keep some social assets (catering services, housing, medical services, sports and recreational facilities, kindergarten etc.) at hand. Although this may serve to mitigate impacts of economic reforms in some respects, “urban infrastructure hoarding”, the other side of“labor hoarding” characteristic of Russian enterprises, may lead to more serious social problems such as dilapidated housing (which had existed since the mid 90s in Russia and ruined blocks in the U.S. metropolis after the oil-shock) . No investment in urban infrastructure, its “mercy killing”, can be realized as part of enterprise restructuring. In light of all these, it is no doubt enterprises need to do the final decision-making.

著者

松本 かおり

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.131-144, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper aims to compare students in Vladivostok and Moscow, Russia and examine the differences between desirability of occupation and occupational prestige by analyzing answers to questionnaires.At present, it is very difficult for Russian youths to find employment. After the demise of the Soviet Union, it became difficult for them to acquire even basic skills and gain experience through on-the-job training, the traditional way of acquiring know-how for Soviet workers. Even if they do find jobs, these are often unrelated to their majors and/or specialties in the higher education institutions. It should also be noted that premature death rate of youths has escalated in recent years. Therefore, it is wrong to assume that the social life condition of Russian youths is significantly better than others. It is in this context that this research on occupational evaluations is conducted.The result of our comparative research demonstrates some differences in occupational evaluations between Vladivostok and Moscow. In terms of desirability of occupation, Vladivostok youths consider job attractiveness, income, school education, knowledge and skills, while Moscow youths are interested in job attractiveness, creativity, and pride. Meanwhile, occupational prestige is characterized in terms of higher income, stable social life, school education, knowledge, skills and social network in Vladivostok, and higher income, stable social life, and influence on society in Moscow. It concludes by suggesting that Vladivostok is a kind of “education-conscious society” where students value diligence, while Moscow is a kind of “authority-oriented society”, where knack and intelligence are more important than Vladivostok.The research also reveals that students in both cities values job attractiveness most, not easy jobs and long leisure time. As mentioned above, however, there is little chance in reality to find jobs that satisfy them. It is obvious that there is a structural gap in the Russian labor market resulting from inefficient vocational education in the higher education institutions and the so-called “educational inflation”, a situation where even higher degrees will not guarantee these jobs. Taking all things into consideration, we have to analyze the Russian labor market further with respect to various changes taking place in this country.

著者

森岡 真史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.162-174, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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Boris Brutzkus is well-known for his pioneering and penetrating criticism against the Socialist economy. However, relatively less known is the fact that he defended the social role of government to protect the interest of the people. The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct and appreciate his vision of economic development underlying such a unique standpoint.For this purpose Brutzkus's following two important contributions will be investigated: i) his report “Economic Precondition for the Reconstruction of Agriculture” made at the All Russian Congress of Agronomists held in March 1922; ii) his paper “Agrarian Overpopulation and Agrarian Institution” published in the organ of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture in June/July 1922. Both of them include profound insight into the causes of catastrophic destruction of Russian agriculture after the October Revolution as well as several important policy proposals for its restoration.Brutzkus attributes the root cause of agrarian catastrophe to the “black redistribution” and emphasizes that it is not only the Soviet government but also all of the intellectuals and the people who must free themselves from the illusionary idea that the agrarian problem can be solved by nationwide land redistribution. Fully recognizing the limits of NEP as partial liberalization under the Communist dictatorship, he supports the basic direction of NEP for the reason that it serves the interest of Russian national economy.In his schema of national economy, the dynamic agro-industrial linkage, especially the smooth flow of labor from agriculture to urban industry constitutes one of the essential factors in the process of economic development. Coupled with slowness of industrialization, Russian land community hindered this flow of population and became the hotbed of agrarian overpopulation. Agrarian policies and agrarian institutions must be favorable for such a flow and at the same time soften the pain attendant on it. From this follows the necessity of guaranteeing peasants the right to dispose of their land freely. Owing to some fundamental differences between agriculture and industry, this right brings not the victory of agrarian capitalism but promotes the growth of peasant economies and their adaptation to the market environment.For Brutzkus, the national economy is a huge social framework giving its members economic and cultural wealth that they cannot produce alone. Flowering of individual freedom needs development of the national economy. The reason he affirms capitalism and rejects Marxian Socialism is that he firmly believes that the development of national economy in the industrialization era is possible only under capitalism and that individual freedom is inseparable from the private ownership of the means of production. However, as is shown in his argument of the relative advantage of peasant economy in agriculture, dominance of capitalism is neither exclusive nor unconditional even in the market. His vision of the desirable national economy can be characterized by it compositeness and variety created by the mixture both of capitalist institutions playing the leading part and of various kinds of non-capitalist institutions playing secondary but often essential roles.The above-described Brutzkus's vision is highly suggestive in its rare combination of economic logic and due attention to historical factors. Understanding of this vision will be of considerable help in an in-depth appraisal of his critical analysis on the Soviet economy.

著者

辻本 政雄

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.146-163, 2002 (Released:2010-10-27)

参考文献数

52

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The thesis based on the so-called Harvard SCP Theory deals with the mechanism and the implication of the development of the regulatory reform in the natural gas industry in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland by showing how the market structure of the industry has been reformed and how the performances in terms of social welfare have been improved. Moreover, the thesis shows the reform marks an epoch-making achievement in that it has given the industry new responsibility to support international society and that the regulatory policy has been elaborated from the stage of deregulation and pro-privatization to the more comprehensive stage of pro-competitive policy by adopting the vertical separation of the industry as well as by ensuring reliable supply and fare competition in the transitional economies.

著者

藤森 信吉

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.164-180, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

24

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This paper aims to analyze the development of parliamentary systems in Ukraine.Since independence, Ukraine held parliamentary elections three times (1994, 1998, 2002) .There are many articles which analyzed these elections. Their approaches were characterized by two. First of all, they were using the left-right ideology scale to analyze them. For instance, parliamentary camps would be classified by this scale. The Communist party of Ukraine was located on the left edge, on the other hand Ukraine nationalists parties were located on the opposite side. Secondly, the political party was their central analysis unit in these studies.However, these approaches have two problems. First, ideology issues are not the central matter of current political arena. It is insignificant to use this scale to classify today's the political parties. Second, political parties are less important actors during the elections and the session of the parliament. As for elections, independent candidates and the electoral blocks are dominant. Also, parliamentary procedures are ran by the fractions, which are the compositions of independents, parties and blocks. There is little coincidence between the three. This is especially for independents who are less ideologized and frequently change their belongings. Once those deputies form their own parties or fractions, few of them are alive by the time of the next elections. Third, these less ideologized deputies, called “Centrist, ” become more important within the current political arena. We should consider these forces as a main unit of our research.The Centrists begin their career as a high rank bureaucrat or directors of large state industries. Since each of them individually retained certain political resources, they did not form any organization such as political party. The rise of the Super-Presidentilaism and the large scale economic reform as well as the introduction of proportional representation, all had an impact on these Centrists. New counter-elites emerged from the privatization and diversification of economic interests, confront old elites. This drove old and new elites to organize each political structure to compete against each other. Also, they had a interest to support the president not to revive old communist regime.Last year's elections proved the above mentioned tendency. The ideologized parties lost their momentum. On the other hand, the Centrists' parties gained more seats than the previous elections. Furthermore, we observed that the Centrists' split into pro and anti presidential camps within the parliament. This will be the strong evidence of how Ukrainian parliament works well.

著者

柳原 剛司

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.219-237, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

26

被引用文献数

1 2

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In 1998, Hungary started a pension reform, which involved partial privatisation of the system and partial introduction of the fully funded (FF) scheme. The reform aimed to improve the financial sustainability, the incentive structure, and the transparency of the system. It also aimed to achieve the system's fairness by separating the principles of“social solidarity”and“social insurance”.But, after the FIDESZ-led government came to power, the pension reform was not carried out as scheduled. The FIDESZ-led government made some institutional changes that partially reversed the 1998-reform.This article examines the original reform plan and institutional changes under the FIDESZ-led government from three viewpoints: 1) financial sustainability of the pension system; 2) incentive structure and the system's transparency; and 3) the system's fairness. We also evaluate pension reforms carried out since mid-1990s in relation to the processes of system transformation and EU accession.By investigating institutional changes in detail, we show the 1998 pension reform was inadequate to its three purposes mentioned above, because it incorporated measures softening the shocks expected from the original reform plan. Although there is no doubt that the 1998 pension reform was a drastic one, actors had to make numerous compromises during in the agreement formation process and the legislation process. Consequently, the system maintained a larger scale of redistribution than originally proposed by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Welfare and the PIF (Pension Insurance Fund) self-government.We also show that the changes made by the FIDESZ-led government resulted not from differences in thinking about pension systems but from populist politics that was imposed heavier burden on both contributors and pensioners.We conclude by pointing out there are many unsolved problems, opacities and uncertainties regarding the future course of Hungary's pension system reform.

著者

上野 俊彦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.239-241, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1 1

著者

溝端 佐登史

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.3-18, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

40

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After the Russian financial crisis of 1998 issues such as the sustainability of economic growth, economic inequality and poverty have become points of contention both in Russia and in the world. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate economic disparity and inequality and their influence over market transition in Russia, and to consider how people behave under conditions of economic inequality.First of all, globalisation and the market transition in Russia has brought about increased international disparity. As a result of the investment gap, the real disparity in economic power is greater than it seems. At the same time, domestic economic disparities in Russia have expanded during market transition. There is a striking contrast among industries. There are growing sectors like exports, resources and energy, average sectors and stagnating sectors such as light industry and machine assembly. Equipment age structure and investment capacity also gives an account of industrial disparities. In addition, regional differentiation is striking with Russia's economy often referred to as “one metropolis capitalism”. We can observe an increase in regional disparities in unemployment rate and in the share of loss-making enterprises, which suggest different levels of adaptability to the market.Is Russia egalitarian in relation to income and assets? Considering the Gini coef-ficient, inequality increased in Russia during the transition process. It is important to appreciate that changes in inequality were very large and occurred during the early years of transition. Income and expenditure of households indicate such changes. Revenue from business activities and property income are increasing, while wage differentials have maintained their influence. Among expenditures, the share of savings is increasing. Consumption differentiation can be observed among non-basic goods like consumer durables. These phenomena suggest the existence of a segmented market. The redistribution effects of social transfer, however, have been preserved and we cannot neglect them under the flat income tax system. Thus, empirical evidence suggests heightened inequality and social stratification has accompanied government failure.However, the population of Russia has not always reacted destructively regarding inequality and poverty. The nature of industrial disputes also suggests weak resistance and low levels of dissatisfaction. First, economic inequality has led to the exit of losers who have sought additional revenue in the informal sector. Second, families have enlarged their economic activity, which compensates for income shortages. Third, there is a gray area between the official labour market and unemployment. According to the new investigation, the informal employment includes more than 15% workers. Fourth, elasticity of wages is strong and stimulates the second job. Finally, Russian enterprises have kept their social function in the transition period. The above re-sponses are based on the legacy of the former system and they have the twofold effect of both easing and intensifying inequality. Economic inequality and the specific reactions to it to a large extent reflect the peculiarities of the Russian market.

著者

保坂 哲郎

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.19-36, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This paper attempts to analyze changes in the Russian local population movement from the viewpoint of social differences in this area. First, peoples returning from outside the country principally move to the Russian European districts due to un-stable living conditions. Second, the tendency towards over-centralization in Moscow's population is highlighted conspicuously. Third, an another side, population outflows from cities and farm villages under the jurisdiction of Siberia, Far East districts are intense. Fourth, increased urban decay is common except in some of the resourceexploitation areas, and this paper suggests that the Propiska system would speed up this trend.Furthermore, natural population dynamics are studied. First, this study looks at the development of the aging of Russian European village populations and intense population decrease. Second, geriatric and chronic diseases in the Central districts are serious and are particularly related to alcohol consumption. Third, a high death rate from infectious diseases can be seen in Siberia and the southern districts, a phenomenon common to many“developing countries”. This may be due to the large range in Russian inland social levels.Changes in the population dynamics in this period are magnified by these varying social differences. In addition, the Propiska system has strengthened limitations on the movement, and the division of a unified labor market between cities and farm vil-lages has not yet been overcome.The main reason for Moscow's over-centralization could be explained by its economic role (mainly, enlargement of financial systems and the service trade) . However, the Propiska system seems to strengthen it. Thus, Moscow's over-centralization tendency is accelerated while, at the same time, including a policy which is aimed to contradict it. The aging population, a lack of a sufficient work force, and increases in illegal immigrants are worsening, while Moscow is enjoying“saecial privileges”.The above-mentioned population movements have weak“pull factors”, and“push factors”such as social and economic crises are powerful. Moreover, this movement itself is unstable. However, in the long term, the enlargement of Moscow, its ever increasing economic and social dominance, and increasing differences in society will continue to be problematic.Therefore, a policy that aims at general development in the Far East district, city inflow regulation problems (eg. actions to stem the farm village problem), a decrease in the death rate and a rise in birth rates (social stability and measures to protect geriatric and chronic diseases) would become necessary in the future in order for the Russian Federation to maintain its character as a unified nation.

著者

吉井 昌彦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.37-47, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The economic disparities in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) consist of three levels. The first one is a domestic one, that is, disparities among central and peripheral regions in one country. The second one is among central and peripheral countries in CEECs. And the third one is among EU 15 countries and CEECs, that is, among central and peripheral countries in Europe.In this paper, we have considered why these disparities have occurred, whether they will disappear or be magnified, and how to diminish them.The main conclusions are:—The economic disparities have caused by the initial conditions and transition policies in CEECs.—They will not diminish, at least in the short period.—CEECs, especially Southern and Eastern countries, have to enhance their efforts to close the gaps and to accomplish the task “Return to Europe”.—External factors such as aids from the EU are also important for attaining the aims.

著者

兵頭 慎治

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.30, pp.171-174, 2001 (Released:2010-05-31)

著者

角田 安正

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.20-37, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

22

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The Maskhadov regime relied on Islam to resolve feuds among major leaders in Chechnya after the first Chechen war ended in 1996. Taking advantage of the situation, the Wahhabi expanded their influence in the republic. The Wahhabi were comprised mainly of Arabic political Islamists, who had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and come to Chechnya to participate in the first Chechen war.In the summer of 1998, Osama Bin Laden, a new sponsor of the Wahhabi in Chechnya, began to establish a close relationship with anti-Maskhadov leaders (field commanders) attracting them by his abundant funds and his idea of establishing a unified Islamic republic in the north Caucasus. Encouraged by Bin Laden, Chechen armed forces attempted to invade the Russian republic of Dagestan in August 1999.As Moscow lost no time in launching a counter attack, another Chechen war commenced. The Chechen conflict posed a threat to Russia in that it might not have only undermined Russia's territorial integrity, but could have also become a pretext for western countries, including the United States, to meddle in Russia's domestic affairs. Russia tried in vain to persuade Washington that Chechen separatists were disguised international terrorists and that Russia suffered from the same terrorism as the U.S. had during 1998 with American embassy attacks in Africa. The United States continued to attach importance to the human-rights aspects of the Chechen issue. President Vladimir Putin, taking office in 2000, was not able to make the U.S. change its attitude toward the Chechen problem as his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had likewise found impossible.In Russia, moreover, some forces, especially the military elite, were opposed to cooperation with the United States. They alleged that none other than the U.S. had played a role in stirring up the situation in the north Caucasus. Thus, there would be no cooperation between the two countries for an anti-terrorist struggle.The situation abruptly changed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. U.S.-Russian relations as concerned terrorism seemed to take a 180 degree turnabout. Close analysis of the relationship, however, would show that Russia gave way more in the U.S. direction than vice versa. President Putin allowed Central Asian countries to accept U.S. military presence two weeks after the terrorist attacks, with the Republic of Georgia to follow suit during the spring of 2002 in defiance of the resistance of the political and military elite in Russia. He expected to ease their frustrations by successfully suppressing Chechen armed forces as a result of promoting cooperation between Russia and the United States. He also expected that Washington would admit Russia's war in Chechnya to be a war on terrorism. Such expectations, however, were not met.The political forces in Russia, therefore, having assumed a negative attitude toward cooperation with the U.S., grew more frustrated. President Putin was forced to take steps to soothe their feelings. When he implied that he was ready to dispatch Russian troops to the Pankisskoye Gorge in the Republic of Georgia to eradicate Chechen fighters during September 2002, he intended to assuage the political and military elite which had not welcomed the U.S. military presence in Georgia from its inception.