- 著者
- 林 誓雄
- 出版者
- 西日本哲学会
- 雑誌
- 西日本哲学年報 (ISSN:09197982)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.26, pp.95, 2018 (Released:2020-04-06)
3 0 0 0 OA <研究報告>徳倫理学の最前線(1): ロザリンド・ハーストハウスの徳倫理学
- 著者
- 林 誓雄
- 出版者
- 京都倫理学会
- 雑誌
- 実践哲学研究 (ISSN:02876582)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.36, pp.73-152, 2013-10-31
2 0 0 0 OA 「欲求」の捉え方 : 「ヒューム主義」に関する一考察
- 著者
- 林 誓雄
- 出版者
- 京都倫理学会
- 雑誌
- 実践哲学研究 (ISSN:02876582)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.35, pp.75-94, 2012-11
1 0 0 0 OA 大会報告
1 0 0 0 OA 書評
1 0 0 0 OA 書評
1 0 0 0 OA 共感と倫理 : マイケル・スロートのエンパシー論の検討
- 著者
- 林 誓雄 Hayashi Seiyu
- 出版者
- 福岡大学研究推進部
- 雑誌
- 福岡大学人文論叢 = Fukuoka University Review of Literature & Humanities (ISSN:02852764)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.49, no.3, pp.713-736, 2017-12
1 0 0 0 IR 共感と倫理 : マイケル・スロートのエンパシー論の検討
- 著者
- 林 誓雄 Hayashi Seiyu
- 出版者
- 福岡大学研究推進部
- 雑誌
- 福岡大學人文論叢 = Fukuoka University review of literature & humanities (ISSN:02852764)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.49, no.3, pp.713-736, 2017-12
1 0 0 0 OA ヒュームにおける社交・会話と人間性の増幅 ―自然的徳論に関する一考察―
- 著者
- 林 誓雄
- 出版者
- 日本イギリス哲学会
- 雑誌
- イギリス哲学研究 (ISSN:03877450)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.33, pp.35-50, 2010-03-20 (Released:2018-03-30)
On Humeʼs account, the scope of the natural virtues(generosity or humanity) is limited to a personʼs family and friends(“narrow circle”). Elsewhere, however, Hume admits that the scope of the natural virtues extends beyond the “narrow circle” to strangers. How, then, does the scope of the natural virtues extend beyond the “narrow circle”? In this paper, I will inquire what expands the scope of the natural virtues, and argue that the scope of the natural virtues is expanded because not only of the principle of sympathy, but also of the “society” and “conversation” in which the humanity of a person is increased and cultivated.
1 0 0 0 書評
- 著者
- 林 誓雄
- 出版者
- 西日本哲学会
- 雑誌
- 西日本哲学年報 (ISSN:09197982)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.26, 2018
1 0 0 0 IR ヒュームと「徳倫理学」
- 著者
- 林 誓雄 ハヤシ セイユウ Hayashi Seiyu
- 出版者
- 熊本大学
- 雑誌
- 先端倫理研究 : 熊本大学倫理学研究室紀要 (ISSN:18807879)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- no.12, pp.44-64, 2018-03
In my book (Virtue in rugs, 2015), I insisted that Hume's moral theory could be read as a kind of virtue ethics. But, that might be an insufficient interpretation, because, at that time, I didn't have the exact criterion or definition of virtue ethics, so it can be thought that Hume's theory is included not within "virtue ethics" but within "virtue theory". Which category should be Hume's theory included within? Or what kind of virtue ethics (theory) is Hume's theory? In this paper, I explore and consider the criterion or definition of virtue ethics in some (neo-Aristotelian) virtue ethics. In the course of it, I try to make it clear that it is important to shed light on the conception of virtue, in order to answer those questions.
1 0 0 0 IR 「欲求」の捉え方 : 「ヒューム主義」に関する一考察
- 著者
- 林 誓雄
- 出版者
- 京都倫理学会
- 雑誌
- 実践哲学研究 (ISSN:02876582)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- no.35, pp.75-94, 2012-11
1 0 0 0 IR ロザリンド・ハーストハウスの徳倫理学 (徳倫理学の最前線(1))
- 著者
- 林 誓雄
- 出版者
- 京都倫理学会
- 雑誌
- 実践哲学研究 = Studies for practical philosophy (ISSN:02876582)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- no.36, pp.73-152, 2013-10
1 0 0 0 OA ヒューム正義論における利益、効用、そして社会
- 著者
- 林 誓雄
- 出版者
- 日本哲学会
- 雑誌
- 哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.2012, no.63, pp.249-263_L14, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)
- 参考文献数
- 16
Hume insists that the rules of justice are established by a convention, that is, ‘a general sense of common interest’, not by our ‘promise’ or ‘consent’ as the social contract theory advocates. Nonetheless, Hume's theory is sometimes regarded as a kind of social contract theory. Furthermore, Hume is often interpreted as a kind of utilitarian, since he says that utility is the chief foundation of justice. One of the reasons why such interpretations arise, in my view, is that Hume uses the words ‘interest’ or ‘utility’ very ambiguously in his arguments. Because of this ambiguous usage, it is difficult for us to understand clearly the specific contents of such phrases as ‘common interest’, ‘public interest’, and ‘public utility’. As the result, the readers of Hume's works are put into confusion. In this paper, I attempt to clarify what Hume means by these terms in order to resolve this problem. First, considering the relation of ‘common interest’ and ‘public interest’, I maintain that they are different kinds of interest. Second, I turn to consider what Hume means by ‘public interest’. In considering ‘public interest’, I draw attention to the distinction of societies which Hume makes: the distinction between a small society (such as the family) and a large one. Given this distinction, we will see that there are two kinds of ‘public interest’: one applicable to a small society and the other to a large one. Finally, I show that what Hume means by ‘public utility’ is not ‘public interest’ but ‘the common interest’ by which we human beings establish the rules of justice.
1 0 0 0 IR ヒューム道徳哲学における認識論的基礎
- 著者
- 林 誓雄
- 出版者
- 実践哲学研究会
- 雑誌
- 実践哲学研究 (ISSN:02876582)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- no.29, pp.25-45, 2006-11