著者

小森 宏美

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.142, pp.113-126,L14, 2005-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

37

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This paper deals with Russian-speakers in Narva, a city in the northeast of Estonia. Most of the city population (c. 95%) speaks Russian as a mother tongue, while Russian-speakers are minorities in Estonia as a whole (c. 30%).In this paper I consider whether Russian-speakers are “immigrants” or “national minorities” in the context of Estonia. W. Kymlicka points out that Russians did not see themselves as immigrants in any sense and Estonians rejected the idea that Russians should have the sorts of rights accorded to national minorities in the West. He also argues despite this major gap in perceptions, there is some evidence that the two sides are converging on something like the immigrant model of integration.The paper begins with an overview of the migration process in Narva during the Soviet era, which is divided into three periods. Immediately after WW, an influx of immigrants from other regions of Soviet Union began. Most of the people came to Narva as workers from neighboring areas, enticed by the Soviet central government in the 40's and 50's. In the 60's and 70's many people were recruited by factories and enterprises and there were also family reasons for their immigration to Estonia. Thus, it is difficult to say which factors most influenced the migration processes and to clarify the intention of the Soviet authorities.The second part of paper deals with language rights given by internal laws and international conventions. It is important to point out that the Estonian government ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities with the declaration that only citizens can be national minority members. This means that a part of the Russian-speaking population is not eligible for national minority status. However people actually use Russian not only in the private sphere, but also in the public sphere. In addition, the Estonian authorities do not control the situation so rigidly. They put an emphasis on enhancing knowledge of the Estonian language, while Russian-speakers are positive about learning Estonian.Though it is too early to make any conclusions about the minority issue in Estonia, the differences in perceptions between national minorities and immigrants are decreasing, which means that problems have been solved from pragmatic viewpoints. However there are still plenty of stateless permanent residents, who are not EU citizens.

著者

大山 梓

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1966, no.31, pp.52-66, 1966-10-16 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

20

著者

黄 昭堂

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1987, no.84, pp.62-79,L9, 1987-02-20 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

48

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Taiwan has a population of 19 million, ranking in the top one-third among the 168 countries of the world. Taiwan enjoys economic prosperity symbolized by outstanding world trade which was 17th among the nations of the world in 1985. In reality, the name of the nation which exists on Taiwan is the “Republic of China”; however, this government refuses to consider the island of Taiwan as its only territory and has been struggling with the Peoples' Republic of China, both claiming the opposite side's territory as its own. The war in search of legitimacy still seems to be underway; but the will of the Taiwanese, who comprise 85% of the population of Taiwan, has been ignored for a long time. This article, which is a prelude to a forthcoming article, “The People and the Nation of Taiwan-Trends After the Second World War, ” gives the historical background of Taiwan; furthermore, it describes what the Taiwanese think about the people and the nation to which they belong.Taiwan was ruled by the Dutch, the Spanish, the Koxinga Dynasty and the Manchurian Ching Dynasty of the seventeenth century. The latest governing power lasted until 1895, when Taiwan was ceded to Japan. The native inhabitants of Taiwan were Malayo-Polynesians; they were joined by the Han immigrants from the Chinese mainland. At the end of the Dutch era, these two populations were balanced at about 40, 000 each. However, at the end of the Ching era, because the Hans continued to immigrate to Taiwan, the natives were out-numbered. Relations between the two groups were very poor, and even the Hans themselves failed to establish an identity as “Taiwanese” until the Japanese occupation in 1895.A Taiwanese consciousness was established among the Han inhabitants during the early period of Japanese occupation, perhaps because of the following: (1) resistance by force from 1895 to 1915 helped the Hans to create a “weconsciousness, ” (2) economic construction by the Japanese Taiwan Governor-General government brought communication infra-structures to the inhabitants (i. e., telephones, lengthened and widened roads and railways), (3) Japanese language instruction offered the inhabitants a mutual language; before this time, even the Hans in Taiwan were divided into two language groups.In the second decade of the 20th century, the Taiwanese political movement took over the position of resistance by force against Japanese rule. It was then that the idea of nationalism was introduced to Taiwan through the Chinese Nationalist Revolution in China in 1911. Thereafter, Han political leaders considered the Taiwanese to be a branch of the Chinese people; however, the native aborigines were still excluded. Although Han political leaders consider the Taiwanese to be a branch of the Chinese people, their idea has failed to gain support from the Taiwanese masses who consider themselves to be “Taiwanese.” The Taiwanese Communist Party established in 1928 also failed to appeal to the masses. Their slogan “Taiwanese nationalism” was not accepted. Since all of the political movements in Taiwan were oppressed by the Japanese authorities around the time of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the Taiwanese consciousness failed to grow to form a “Taiwanese people.” The forced Japanization was accelerated until the Japanese surrender to the Allied Powers in 1945. The emergence of Taiwanese nationalism, in other words the formation of the “Taiwanese people, ” did not come about until their confrontation with the newly arrived ruler, the government of the Republic of China.

著者

西澤 泰彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.146, pp.39-53,L7, 2006-11-17 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

33

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This article considers some relationship between the home country and some colonies of the Empire of Japan with the viewpoint of the flow of Portland cement, Japanese architects and architectural information within the territory ruled by Japan in the first half of the twentieth century. I have mainly two reasons why I focus on the flow of them. The first one is that all of buildings by Japanese on any cities ruled or occupied by the Empire of Japan had been necessary for colonization. The second one is that I have already recognized a lot of Japanese architects to move into Japanese colonies and to work in the first half of twentieth century.On chapter 1 I try to analyze two matters, the one is to research some history of Portland cement factories in Japan and the Japanese colonies. In the Japanese colonies the first Portland cement factory is the Dairen branch factory of Onoda Portland Cement Co. Ltd., established in 1909 in Dalny, in the Kwantung Leased Territory, in the Manchuria. Not only it had supplied any Portland cement to the Kwantung Government General and the South Manchuria Railway Company, but also it had shipped to the Japanese colony Chosen until 1916 and exported to China. The other is to make analysis some statistics of output of Portland cement, to make it clear that a lot of Portland cement made in Japan and the Japanese colonies had been exported to China, Hong Kong, Java, Philippine, Malaya, Indo-China, Thailand and India, etc.On chapter 2 I research each transfer of some Japanese colonial architects who were the first chief architect of each architectural office on colonial government or the South Manchuria Railway Company Limited. All of them had experienced building activity on the Japanese colony before becoming a chief architect of architectural office. Then transfers of them were not via Japan, but they moved directly one colony to another.On chapter 3, I try to analyze some architectural magazines published in the Japanese colonies from 1920's to 1930's. I find out that all of them had carried any information on new buildings not on each Japanese colony, but on other territory in the East Asia or whole of the world. By reading them, Japanese architects on the Japanese colonial territory had gained latest design and theory of architecture in the world, and they had put the information to their building activity.In conclusion, the territory ruled by the Empire of Japan was the place where Japanese architects had experience to get some new information and to product new works.

著者

東野 篤子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.144, pp.163-166, 2006-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

臼井 久和

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.41, pp.162-168, 1970

著者

山本 元

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.147, pp.132-148,L14, 2007-01-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

43

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After the end of the Cold war era, domestic conflicts became a key issue facing international society. However, there exist cases actually left untouched for several years. Theorists of international politics also have not paid much attention to such cases as the subject of their research, with the result that we have not accumulated knowledge about “pretermitted conflicts” and the dynamics of the peace negotiation.The purpose of this paper is to explain the sudden change in the behavior of a government in a peace negotiation even though international society sits still and watches. As Gurr points out, however, domestic conflicts have also occurred in quasi-states. This institutional character makes international intervention difficult and justifies the non-intervention of international society.Making a point of being a quasi-state, the author characterizes the government as a player that tries to maximize public support. Inside the government organization, however, the army, which keeps the capability to overturn the peace agreement between the government and the proindependence militant, exists and opposes a move to the peace agreement. People not directly concerned with the domestic conflict determine support (or nonsupport) for their government after observing the will for peace and the ability to control the armed forces (civil-military relations). But the reality of civil-military relations is the private information of the government. Based upon this setting, the model on a peace negotiation was formulated as an incomplete information game.After analyzing this model, the author derives two kinds of equilibrium paths to reach a peace agreement. One is a separating equilibrium, in which the government H aving control over the national military (H) proposes the peace plan, but the government Lacking control over it (L) does not when the militant's belief that the government is H is high, and the militant will accept it. The other is a pooling equilibrium that both H and L propose when the belief is low and the militants will reject it. The first is a trivial outcome. However, L can propose it because L can appeal to the people's will for peace without exposing the low ascendancy of L on the separating equilibrium.Finally, the author explains the dynamics of peace negotiations in Indonesia and the Philippines and points out that civil-military relations could be a useful explanatory variable. And as they are also policy implications for avoiding further humanitarian crisis, international society should not castigate L for a passive stance on the separating equilibrium, and it should notcastigate separates for it in regards to the pooling equilibrium. In this way, by seeing the effect of civil-military relations on the dynamics of a peace process, the optimal reply of international society to the government's and the militant's behavior must be changed to effect a prompt and appropriate response to avoid further massacre or the violation of human rights.

著者

中村 文子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.152, pp.132-152,L15, 2008

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This paper attempts to develop a new model for analyzing the reasons behind trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons in the form of sexual exploitation therefore is caused by differentials in power between sex, the rich and the poor, and citizen and non-citizen. From power differentials evolves discrimination, and discrimination is justified by power. Moreover, the paper suggests possibilities for constructing a social structure that is able to address the problem of discrimination.<br>By analyzing the trafficking of victims' throughout the world, based on the information provided by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), we recognize specific geographic aspects of human trafficking. Mostly, victims come from developing countries such as those in Eastern Europe or Asia, and their final destinations are developed countries such as Japan, the USA, or Italy. By scrutinizing the conditions for human trafficking based on the modern world-system theory we learn that "core" areas exploit "semi-periphery" areas. This finding applied to the problem of trafficking in persons then means that the "core" exploits the "periphery" <i>physically.</i>.<br>However, modern world-system theory's explanation for the causes of this crime is insufficient. The existing deep discrimination between men and women or the rich, the poor, and citizen and non-citizen brings to light the relation of power between those who discriminate and those discriminated. In this sense, sex discrimination is caused by "nation states" politics, which is strongly patriarchal. Therefore, this politics forces women to be "peripheral", i. e. to serve as assistants for men in society. Further, discrimination against foreigners is also strongly related with "nation states'" politics, which excludes "others". Carrying this explanation further, we can argue that economic discrimination promotes people with power while discriminating "others". The modern world-system structure ties agents' action, thus it is hard to solve the problem of discrimination. On the other hand, there are certain possibilities that agents' action can influence the structure of this world system.<br>The victims of trafficking in persons are forced to the bottom of the hierarchy structured by power differentials with discrimination and thus to fate of being the slave, whose human dignity is ravished by sexual exploitation. Thus it is essential to remove the consciousness of discrimination, which justifies power differentials between sex, the rich and the poor, and citizen and non-citizen. It is here, where cooperation with international organizations and NGOs serves our purpose.<br>Firstly, it is necessary to raise consciousness among those who 'buy' women, that their action is a "crime". Secondly, it is important to enhance women's consciousness of being a victim. And finally, it is essential to bring the issue of trafficking in persons to the consciousness of the ordinary people, and encourage them to help the victims.

著者

細谷 千博

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1978, no.58, pp.69-85,L4, 1978-03-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

69

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The essay is aimed at exploring, on the basis of the British archives at Public Record Office, as well as of the Japanese Foreign Office archives, an attempt for improving Anglo-Japanese relations in 1934 in the form of the Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact.Whereas the development of talks concerning the Anglo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact is examined, an emphasis is placed upon an analysis of domestic political processes in both countries in which their foreign policies of restoring old friendly ties were pursued.The essay finds its another feature in employing an analytical framework of looking into interaction processes of three countries-Japan, Britain and the U. S. —at that time.

著者

戸部 良一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.71, pp.124-140,L11, 1982

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The aim of this paper is to examine SHIRATORI Toshio's views and thoughts on Japan's foreign relations, as one of the typical advocates of Kodo Diplomacy in the 1930's. The main reason why his diplomatic thought should be the subject of careful study lies in the fact that he was regarded as a "philosopher" of Japanese diplomacy by the younger bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry and he influenced their thoughts and behaviors.<br>With the impact of the Manchurian Incident, SHIRATORI began to declare that Japan should return to Asia. He attacked the evils of Western Civilization and denounced the Washington Treaty System as an international order in the Far East which symbolized the interests of the Occidental (especially Anglo-Saxon) powers, though he had not challenged it in the 1920's. Then he sought an ideological basis to guide Japanese diplomacy, and tried to construct a conceptual framework of a New World Order based upon Japanese morals and interests.<br>At first he looked upon Soviet Russia as the arch enemy whose influences had to be driven out of the Far East. But, as Japan had been bogged down in a war of attrition with China since 1937, he refrained from saying that Russia was the enemy of Japan and the other peoples of Asia. He stressed the global confrontation between the "have" countries, which championed the Popular Front, and the "have not" countries, whose ideological basis was totalitarianism. His search for a new moral world order was joined with Nazi Germany's world view. He began to advocate the tripartite alliance among Germany, Italy and Japan, and then a quadruple one between these three powers and Russia. Britain, which he had regarded earlier as a partner of Japan in driving out Russia from the Far East, became his (and Japan's, in his view) arch enemy. At last he emphasized the wickedness of Jewish financial capitalism which ruled the Anglo-Saxon powers, and in the spring of 1941 he predicted that a war between Japan and the United States would be inevitable, though he was suffering from mental ill health at that time.<br>Did his attempt and effort to seek an ideological or moral basis for Japanese diplomacy achieve satisfactory results? This question is answered in the conclusion of this paper.

著者

進藤 榮一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.85, pp.55-72,L9, 1987

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The recent conservative trend in political science has been accompanied by the emergence of conservative interpretations of the occupation period. Among these revised views, the most conspicuous one is the high appraisal of Yoshida Shigeru, which elucidates Yoshida's politics as mainstream within the postwar Japanese conservative party. Yoshida is now seen as a main figure who contributed to the postwar political stability and economic prosperity of Japan.<br>My close examinations of the first-hand historical materials of the postwar occupation period, such as the diaries of Ashida Hitoshi, however, have led me to question the validity of this conservative interpretation. Moreover, that interpretation contains the following theoretical defects. First, it has somewhat ignored the systemic approach of history. That is to say, this interpretation has underestimated the significance of discontinuity between prewar and postwar Japanese society. Consequently, feudalistic aspects of prewar Japanese society as well as the significance of the democratization of postwar Japanese society have been neglected. Naturally enough, this has led to the neglect of Yoshida's feudalistic values and a tendency to evaluate Yoshida as a liberal-conservative. The conservative interpretation has ignored the fact that Yoshida regarded the USSR as an expansionist state and his anti-communist stance has been somehow ignored.<br>These interpretations have brought about, on the other hand, an oversimplified appraisal of Ashida as an "ultra-nationalist." Accordingly, the importance of the Katayama-Ashida coalition government between the Japanese Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Party has not been emphasized adequately in these evaluations of the occupation period. The objective of this article is to attempt a reappraisal of the occupation period, particularly in the period of the coalition government as well as the politics and diplomacy of Ashida. This article is closely based upon the diaries of Ashida Hitoshi, which I recenty co-edited in seven volumes.<br>The article contains the following major points:<br>1. The conservative trend in interpretations of postwar history<br>2. Continuity and discontinuity: the meaning of democratization in the postwar period<br>3. Historian's interpretations of the "Konoye Memorial"<br>4. Ashida's views on world affairs prior to the surrender of Japan<br>5. The complexities of the Japanese constitution-making process<br>6. The rise and fall of the coalition government<br>7. The unknown battle over reform of the Imperial Household<br>8. The partisan struggle for national control of the coal industry<br>9. Economic recovery and the democratization of Japanese society<br>10. A gap in Japanese historiography: A dilemma within Japanese liberalism

著者

菅原 健志

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.168, pp.168_44-57, 2012

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After the Great War broke out, Japan's naval and military assistance was an important concern for the British government. Arthur Balfour was the only politician involved in this matter from the beginning to the end of the war. Until he became Foreign Secretary he had little expectation of Japan's assistance. However, the difficult circumstances of the war forced him to review his opinion about the value of Japan's help, as Britain was suffering badly from a shortage of manpower and munitions. As Foreign Secretary he had high hopes of Japan's assistance and did not hesitate to launch negotiations to secure her aid.<br>Balfour sought Japan's naval assistance and eventually succeeded in inducing her to despatch her destroyers to the Mediterranean. The price for this, namely guaranteeing Japanese rights in Shantung and the Pacific islands, was regarded as a permissible concession. The Japanese government, however, expressed disapproval at his request that they sell battle-cruisers to Britain. Balfour promptly put forward a new proposal to borrow the battlecruisers instead, based on his assumption that lending them would be more agreeable to Japan than selling them. He could not conceal his disappointment and dissatisfaction with the Japanese government's refusal to fulfil this modified request. He was not convinced by the reasons the Japanese government presented and criticised Japan's reluctance to help Britain.<br>In seeking Japan's military assistance, Balfour faced two obstacles. One was the difficulty of transporting Japanese troops to the European field. Many troopships would be needed to carry a large number of Japanese soldiers to the western or Salonica front. Britain and the Allied Powers, however, could not afford to allocate so many ships as they had a severe deficit of tonnage. The other obstacle was the need to harmonise the Japanese military campaign with the political interests of Britain and the Allied Powers. Russia did not want to receive Japanese soldiers on the eastern front due to her fear of massive territorial concessions to Japan. Although Balfour considered that Mesopotamia was the most promising theatre from which to deploy Japanese troops, he was obliged to renounce this idea due to strong opposition from the India Office and the Government of India. He continued to seek a location where transportation difficulties could be overcome and which was compatible with the interests of the other powers, and saw Siberia as the most favourable field. Henceforth Japan's military assistance was regarded as the Siberian Intervention, and Balfour continued to tackle this subject.

著者

池本 大輔

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.173, pp.173_84-173_97, 2013

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This article argues that we cannot explain the UK's changing stance on European integration without reference to the international monetary strategies pursued by successive British governments. The UK's European policy after the Second World War can be divided into three distinct phases. Immediately after the War, the UK stood aside when the ECSC and EEC were established in 1952 and in 1958 respectively, since maintenance of both the British Empire and the 'special relationship' with the US was regarded as the priority. In the second phase, by making a formal application to the EEC in 1961, the UK turned away from the Empire and drew closer to Europe; by the 1970s, the special relationship appeared to have disappeared. The UK's entry into the EEC in 1973, however, did not lead to her policy being aligned with that of the other member-states. To this day, the UK remains an awkward partner in the integration project, a fact most clearly evidenced by her opt-out from the single currency, the euro. Moreover, the special relationship with the US appeared to revive once Margaret Thatcher took office in 1979; and all recent British governments, regardless of their political composition, have claimed to serve as a bridge between the US and Europe.<br>These twists and turns in the UK's European policy can be at least partly explained by her changing strategy in international monetary affairs. After the War, the British government set out initially to restore the international status of the pound sterling worldwide, a policy that precluded participation in a scheme like the EEC, whose main purpose was trade liberalisation within Europe. Once this strategy ended in failure with the devaluation of the pound in 1967, the<b> </b>British government was faced with a choice. It could, within the framework of European monetary integration, end the reserve currency status of the pound, which was hampering the UK's economic growth and leaving her financially dependent on the US. If successful, this strategy would have obviated both the legacy of Empire and financial dependence on the US at one go, and made the UK very much a 'part of Europe'. The alternative was to sustain the international status of the US dollar and American hegemony in international finance by encouraging the development of the so-called Euro-dollar market in London. Both the Heath and Callaghan governments pursued the first strategy in the 1970s, but to no avail, due to a lack of domestic support. The Thatcher government subsequently chose the second route and restored a close partnership with the US; this strategy, however, precluded the UK's participation in the process of European monetary integration.

著者

西村 邦行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_34-47, 2012

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Political scientists have usually considered E. H. Carr as a pioneer of the academic field of International Relations (IR). Given this understanding is tenable, in which historical context did he establish a new discipline?<br>In the early twentieth century, Max Weber discerned in the emergence of bureaucratic institutions an idiosyncratic phase of modern instrumental rationalism. The currently acknowledged form of academic divisions was at best contestable when Carr wrote his monumental <i>The Twenty Years' Crisis</i> (1939). Indeed, Carr was a multifaceted scholar: sometimes, he was an advocate of political realism; other times, he was the author of the controversial historical studies on Soviet Russia; yet other times, he was a biographer of nineteenth century thinkers. It is a grave mistake to recognize Carr exclusively either as historian, political scientist, or biographer.<br>The chief objective of the present article is to situate Carr in the context of the emergence of professional intellectuals, and thus clarify the meaning of the popular understanding that he was one of the pioneering figures of IR. This author focuses on his early works: <i>Dostoevsky</i> (1931), <i>The Romantic Exiles</i> (1933), <i>Karl Marx</i> (1934) and <i>Michael Bakunin</i> (1937). Compared with his texts in the two decades around the middle of the twentieth century, these works have not occasioned much scholarly interest among IR researchers. One of the main reasons of this ignorance is probably their apparent irrelevance to the study of international relations. As I see it, however, Carr's inquiry into international relations was a continuation of his project he advanced in his biographical works. Through his exposure to the untraditional thoughts of nineteenth-century Russian (and Russia-related) intellectuals, Carr obtained a historical view that the modern western world was in radical transformation. On the other hand, Carr discerned various European elements within the apparently unfamiliar Russian thoughts. Carr's project was ultimately a remedial self-critique of Europe. Carr's search for alternative cultural value ended up reattaching him to his familiar liberal world.<br>By suggesting these points, the present article aims to add another contribution to the recent reinterpretations of Carr. It also directs our attentions to the issue of contexts in general for further advancing our knowledge about the history of international studies as well as Carr's relevance to the contemporary world.

著者

稲生 典太郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.26, pp.72-87, 1964

著者

波多野 澄雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.166, pp.166_156-159, 2011

著者

石田 勇治

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.96, pp.51-68,L9, 1991

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The election of an avowed monarchist, seventy-seven-years old Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as the president of the Weimar Republic in April 1925 symbolizes the remarkable continuity in political attitude of the Germans from the time of empire to the republic. Many of them were uncritically attached to the old "Kaiserreich".<br>In spite of the total defeat and the revolution 1918-19 the aims and roles of imperial German policy in the outbreak of the World War had not yet been clarified. Every government during the Weimar period blocked full disclosure of the empire's war aims and engaged in a political cover up.<br>It was the Independent Socialist Kurt Eisner, head of the revolutionary government in Munich, who released special reports in November 1918 showing the responsibility of the German Empire for the beginning of the World War. Eisner wished to discredit the old regime and persisted in purging the representatives of the "Kaiserreich".<br>Threatened by Eisner's revelation the foreign ministry insisted that such a free debate about the war guilt question would make the peace negotiations unfavorable to Germany. The new foreign minister Urlich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau decided to take the lead and refute any charges that Germany had made preparations for the war in 1914 and was responsible for it. He was determined to exonerate the imperial German policy.<br>After the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty in June 1919 the foreign ministry planned an antiwar-guilt campaign. With the purpose of revising the treaty the foreign ministry mobilized the Germans beyond all classes and parties and lead a national movement ("Volksbewegung") against the Allies' verdict on Germany's war guilt. A War Guilt Section ("Schuldreferat") was established in the ministry which should direct research and discussion about this question at home and abroad in favour of German foreign policy.<br>The purpose of this paper is firstly to describe how the war guilt question was dealt with in the German foreign ministry at the first stage of the Weimar Republic. It will show the process how the antiwar-guilt campaign was formed and developed.<br>The second purpose is to analyze the meaning of this campaign for the Weimar political culture. Its influence on the radical-right thoughts and movements such as Nazism will be also discussed.

著者

川村 陶子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.168, pp.168_74-87, 2012

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In Germany it is often said that cultural policy is the third pillar of foreign policy. That means culture, together with security and trade, constitutes an essential part of international relations. This concept was formulated during the Cold War period, mainly by Dieter Sattler, director of the Cultural Department of the Foreign Office (1959–66), and Willy Brandt, foreign minister of the Kiesinger administration (1966–69).<br>When the Federal Republic was founded, its government was reluctant of pursuing international cultural policy on its own. It was in the latter half of the 1950s that foreign policymakers, in the face of cultural offensive by the Eastern Bloc, thought they need a systematic cultural policy. Some cultural attachés, such as Sattler in Rome and Bruno E. Werner in Washington D.C., insisted that cultural policy must indeed be placed at the core of West German diplomacy.<br>Sattler regarded cultural policy as a tool of managing transnational relations in the contemporary world of interdependence. As a head of the Cultural Department in Bonn, he insisted that culture is the "third stage" of foreign policy, and strived to establish the organizational, financial, and conceptual bases of foreign cultural policy.<br>The thesis "culture is the third pillar of foreign policy" was formulated by Brandt, who headed the Foreign Office under the grand coalition. When the Cold War was locked in a stalemate, he thought that cultural policy was a suitable means to maintain the unity of German nation without legally admitting the existence of two German states. Though his plan of "all-German foreign cultural policy" was not realized, Brandt repeatedly stated in public that culture is one of the main pillars of foreign policy. The popular foreign minister regarded cultural policy as essential for making Germany a peacepursuing nation.<br>Sattler's "third-stage" argument and Brandt's "third-pillar" argument both see culture as an important field of international relations. The two theses differ, however, in time scope and worldview. While the "third-stage" argument is based on rather liberal vision focusing on interdependence and long-time, structural transformation of the nation-state system, the "thirdpillar" argument is more realistic, stressing the integrity and prosperity of the nation.<br>While the "third-pillar" argument became a cliché, German foreign policymakers could neither establish a firm principle nor execute consistent policy in the field of culture. Rather, foreign cultural policy got increasingly negative attention from politicians and the media, who thought that tax was not used in a proper form. The "third-pillar" argument could actually have created complications, since it did not clarify the content of "culture" while placing cultural policy as a priority.

著者

岩間 陽子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.174, pp.174_125-174_138, 2013

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The central role NATO played by ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan was exceptional in its scope and intensity. The first steps of NATO into peacebuilding operations were in post Cold War Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In these two cases, NATO remained in the role of keeping the secure environment and did not step in to the administrative and reformative roles. These were done mainly by the UN and EU.<br>NATO took up its role in Afghanistan, partly in order to save the alliance from its biggest crisis. Initially, ISAF's area of responsibility was limited to Kabul and its surroundings and its task was understood to be providing security. It soon had to take up reconstruction as local governments proved unable to provide basic services.<br>The Taliban reassembled itself within Pakistani northern territory and started to fight back from late 2005, causing severe damage. This led to the geographical and functional extension of ISAF operations. It expanded to cover the whole of Afghanistan in four stages, and its functions expanded. From the beginning,the PRTs (provincial reconstruction teams) contained inherent contradictions in that it brought together soldiers, diplomats and development specialists together, who had never before worked as a team. In many cases, soldiers and development specialists had different priorities and different time planning. The soldiers tended to opt for short term concrete projects which could "win the hearts and minds" of local people, whereas the development specialists preferred more long term sustainable projects which may not yield quick returns.<br>As the Tallibans regained control of southern Afghanistan, the security missions of ISAF started to include high-intensity fighting with insurgency. This led to a severe crisis of alliance relationships in that some countries were very reluctant to take up the fighting roles and even those who did, had to work under intense pressure of domestic politics in their home country. Canada and the Netherlands both tried to reconcile domestic politics and what it perceived to be alliance and international responsibilities. In the end they both had to bring back combat forces home earlier than the end of ISAF mission. What remained in the end for NATO were relatively low-intensity police and military personnel training mission.<br>The ISAF experience gives important lessons for future cases where international community will be asked to reconstruct states in the absence of general stability. We need to develop better insight into who can do which job best, and to respect each others' logic and make room for different actors.

著者

森井 裕一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_88-101, 2012

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Germany ceased conscription for its military, the Bundeswehr, in July 2011. Ever since the establishment of the Bundeswehr, the system of conscription had played a key role in connecting the Bundeswehr and German society. The concept of "Staatsbürger in Uniform" (citizen in uniform) was a guarantee to keep the Bundeswehr as a military for peace. This paper discusses why Germany stopped conscription, even though it had long been regarded as a vital component of Germany's postwar security culture.<br>In the first section of this paper, historical developments in the German security culture and the role of the Bundeswehr are discussed. During the process of German rearmament in the 1950s, a new military was established in a way that would prevent it from being able to become an independent and undemocratic institution outside society—as it did in the days leading up to World War II. The Bundeswehr gained respect from society and became one of the most successful institutions in postwar Germany.<br>In the second section, the changing role and the military transformation of the Bundeswehr after the end of the Cold War are examined. The changing international security environment forced Germany to reconsider the role of its military. During the period up until the end of the Cold War, the use of Germany's military was restricted to the defense of its own and its allies' territories. However, this previously respected self-imposed restriction became an obstacle in the new international environment. The 1994 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) made the deployment of the Bundeswehr outside NATO areas legally possible, although the FCC at the same time gave more power to the Bundestag, the German parliament, to control the deployment of the Bundeswehr. In the 1990s, the new military role for international crisis management demanded the military transformation of the Bundeswehr. Since the mid-1990s, many proposals were made to reform and reorganize the Bundeswehr, but they were not totally successful, because the domestic political discourse did not change as rapidly as the technical needs had changed. In addition, constraints upon the state budget made the reform even more difficult. After more than ten years of discussion, conscription was finally suspended under the strong leadership of the politically popular defense minister, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. According to zu Guttenberg's reform, the Bundeswehr would be an effective, efficient and flexible military for international crisis management.<br>The final section analyzes the implications of the reform of the Bundeswehr on Germany's security culture and foreign policy. Germany's security policy defined in multilateralism, i.e. within NATO and the EU, would stay unchanged. However, the new security environment might change the domestic understanding of Germany's military, and thus Germany's security culture in the future.