著者
松川 克彦
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1991, no.96, pp.35-50,L7, 1991-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
69

Poland's struggle to build up her independence after the Armistice, had a strong influence on her own foreign policy making process during the interwar period.This struggle was against the common aim of Soviet Russia and Germany to undermine the existence of Poland, as set up under the Versailles Treaty. The armed strife on the east and west borders of Poland was closely interconnected. There was direct Russo-German military and economic co-operation which also extended to Lithuania. As the latter also had territorial differences with Poland, Lithuania chose to act, as an intermediary between Soviet Russia and Germany which had no common borders.Czechoslovakia played a similar role to Lithuania on the Polish southern border. Czechoslovakia kept good relations with Russia and Ukraine which was offered a base to prepare an anti-Polish campaign over East Galicia. Thus if Poland were to antagonize Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, it would upset Russo-German co-operation.Poland tried to establish closer relations with Latvia and Estonia to diminish Lithuanian influence as well as maintaining good relations with Hungary and Rumania in opposition to Czechoslovakia. Although all of these countries were created after the world war and were in a similar situation, they were unable to form a common front against the growing menaces from east and west. The struggle between Poland on one side and Lithuania and Czechoslovakia on the other, continued through the interwar period.In addition, Poland was offended by the Entente, especially by the U. K. which not only refused to help Poland during her war with Soviet Russia but also compelled Poland to accept harsh Russian ceasefire terms. Britain wished to conclude a commercial agreement with Russia to be followed by British recognition of the state of Russia. For this reason, Britain tried to stop the war between Poland and Soviet Russia and to confine Poland's border to the so-called Curzon Line, which was the predecessor of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. As France gradually leaned towards the British view point, Poland lost confidence in both countries.Lastly, this international situation widened the differences between the two main Polish political groups. Pilsudski, a leader of one of the groups, wanted to make Poland independent of foreign influence and regarded himself as the successor to traditional Polish patriots such as Mickiewicz and Kosciuszko. The leader of the second group, Dmowski, wanted to establish good relations with the U. K., France, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia in order to confront the German menace.When Dmowski's foreign policy, which was grounded on the Polish-French Alliance, lost credibility through lack of French support and the effects of the Geneva and Locarno conferences, which seriously threatened Polish security, Pilsudski took the emergency step of a coup d'état in May 1926. He had decisive influence on military and foreign affairs and his aims were pursued by the “colonel group” after his death.
著者
中島 岳志
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2006, no.146, pp.54-69,L8, 2006-11-17 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
46

Raja Mahendra Pratap (1886-1979) was born the third son of the Mursan royal family of Uttar Pradesh in India, and received his education under strong Muslim influence in Aligarh. At the age of 21, young Raja traveled around the world through Europe, the United States, Japan, and to China.The next year (1908), having become aware of the finiteness of material wealth, Pratap established the “Prem Mahavidyalya (University of Love)” in Vrindavan.With the outbreak of World War I, Pratap went to Europe hoping to gain the support of Germany for the cause of liberating India from British rule. He joined in secret maneuvers with Germany and Turkey, and in 1915 went to Afghanistan as part of a delegation for both nations to ask the royal king to enter the war against England. The negotiations failed, and he established the Provisional Government of India in Kabul.In 1918 Pratap rushed to the post-revolutionary Soviet Union, and had a meeting with Trotsky. Since he could not continue carrying out activities in Germany because of WWI, he fled to Budapest in Hungary, and there, established the religious organization “Religion of Love.” He began to appear for the idea of “World Federalism” based on the spirit of “love.”In 1922 Pratap went to Japan in order to strengthen sympathies for the Indian independence movement in East Asia, at which time he also began to associate with R. B. Bose. His goal of visiting various nations gradually shifted to one of propagating his ideas regarding the “Religion of Love” and “World Federalism”, and to this end he published many articles while in Japan. In September 1929 he founded the “World Federation” magazine in Berlin. Moving from the United States to Japan to Manchu-kuo, he continued to publish a total of 100 issues until March 1942. His unique notion of religious ontology influenced many Japanese Pan-Asianists and produced various linkages among their ideas.Pratap settled down in Japan in November 1930, and became involved in anti-British maneuvers in Manchu-kuo. The results of these activities however did not turn out well. His social position drastically declined in the mid-1930s and he gradually lost the influence he once had in Japan. Nonetheless, Pratap kept a wide range of personal connections all over the world, and managed to maintain certain ideological associations by means of correspondence with people of different races, nations, and religions.This paper focuses on the process of how the World Federation movement, which Pratap developed, inspired connections with Japanese Pan-Asianists, and how it was used as propaganda to expand Japanese Imperialism. The relations between Pan-Asianism and both anti-colonial and religious networks that allowed Pratap to travel the globe are also discussed in this paper.
著者
平間 洋一
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1993, no.102, pp.39-54,L7, 1993-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
84

In May 1890, Little Brown Co. of Boston presented to the public the first edition of The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783. In this book Mahan introduced not only a sound rationale of sea power in time of war, but a rationale of sea power in the time of peace, which was “welcomed by the rising nationalists, the armament manufacturers, the ship builders, military men hoping to enlarge their careers, bankers looking for foreign investment, and merchants interested in colonial markets, -who might find a big program of naval building and an aggressive foreign policy to their advantage.” His theory was especially welcomed by nationalists, like Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and Theodore Roosevelt “who believed where there is no force behind it the diplomat is the servant.” It is also said that this book changed not only the American navy, but also America itself. Hereafter, “the United States to make his works the bible and himself the prophet of American navalism.”The object of this paper is to examine how Mahan's image of Japan changed, including his personal feelings of a Japanese threat. Then I would like to review how he changed his attitudes towards Japan and why he changed his attitudes from curiosity-antipathy-admiration-antipathy. In his first magazine article, entitled “The United States Looking Outward, ” published in the August 1890 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he noted that “the United States is woefully unready” and argued for U. S. naval expansion to meet the threat. And he warned that no foreign state should henceforth acquire “a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Franciso, -a distance which includes the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands, and the coast of Central America.” Then in January 1893, after American residents in Honolulu had overthrown Queen Liluokalani and established a republic, he addressed a letter to the New York Times advocating U. S. annexation of “the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii)” against the day when China “expand her barriers eastward” in “a wave of barbaric invasion.” Four years later, in May 1897, he implored Roosevelt, McKinley's new assistant Secretary of the Navy, to speedily strengthen the Pacific Squadron and “your best admiral needs to be in the Pacific”. He instructed “much more initiative may be thrown on him than can on the Atlantic man”. Then in September, he wrote article “A Twentieth Century Outlook”, in Harper's Magazine, where he also adverted to the “Yellow Peril.” But before 1898, except for reference to unexplained commercial opportunities awaiting Americans in East Asia, Mahan's imperialistic vision went no farther than the Caribbean, the Central American Isthmus, and the Hawaiian Islands. The target of the “Yellow Peril” was not Japan but China.However, after the Sino-Japanese War, while Secretary of State John Hay was circulating his Open Door notes, Mahan's attitude towards Japan changed greatly and he was extremely conscious of the steady rise of Japanese naval power. The target of the “Yellow Peril” changed from China to Japan. But after the Russian southern advance into Manchuria began, he changed his attitude towards Japan again. When the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China, he wrote “The Problem of Asia.” In this article, he saw the most pressing “problem” as Russia, whose expansionist aims in Eastern Asia had yet to be checkmated by Japan, and-he suggested a coalition of sorts among the four “Maritime States” of Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the United Staes. He felt appropriate saying something pleasant about the Japanese as he blandly conferred Teutonism upon Japan. Mahan noted that
著者
上原 史子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2009, no.157, pp.157_99-114, 2009-09-30 (Released:2011-11-30)
参考文献数
56

This article covers the development of the Austrian foreign policy shift from permanent neutrality to a strong European Engagement after World War II. After World War II, the Allies (USA, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France) divided Austria into four zones. Neutrality was reached in long and difficult negotiations between the Austrian and the Soviet governments, granting Austrian independence on October, 26, 1955. Neutrality can be seen as the prize Austria had to pay for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Austrian territory after ten years of occupation. With neutrality, Austria declared not to join military alliances and would not allow military bases from foreign countries on its territory.From the beginning, Austria's neutrality has been accompanied by an active and independent foreign policy. Unlike Switzerland, Austria joined the United Nations and has played an active part on many UN commissions and committees, in addition to providing troops for several UN peacekeeping operations since 1960.Participation in the economic integration of Western Europe has hardly ever been seen by Austrian politicians to be in conflict with their country's neutrality, so in the 1960s, there were further discussions concerning membership of the European Community. But Austria's neutrality proved to be an obstacle when these discussions were abandoned in the face of strong opposition from the Soviet leadership, which at that time saw the EC as an extension of NATO.The free trade agreements concluded between Austria and the EC in 1972 were regarded as a sufficient basis for economic cooperation with the EC over the next 15 years. It was towards the end of the 1980's that the question of joining the EC was again raised by the Austrian government, with a view to participating in the EC's Single Market.While Austria prepared for membership, the question was to be answered if such a step would be compatible with the status of permanent neutrality being the core of the State Treaty (“Staatsvertrag”) from 1955.In 1988, the Soviet foreign minister, Shevardnadse, was strongly against the EC membership of neutral Austria, but in 1989 its tone was softened and Soviet Union recognized Austria's right to choose its own integration policy. On 17 July 1989, Austrian foreign minister, Mock, handed in Austria's application for EC membership in Brussels.In the aide-memoire from the Austrian government to the EC in 1990, the aim of accession was confirmed: Austria was in the heart of Europe and wished to assume all the rights and obligations of a Community member. Neutrality, it went on, was Austria's “specific contribution to the preservation of peace and security in Europe”. Thus Neutrality has been redefined in order to enable Austria to conduct a policy of European solidarity.
著者
西谷 真規子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2001, no.128, pp.115-129,L13, 2001-10-22 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
61

In what situation does a chief of government regard international public opinion as important, and how does he use it?Like U. S. foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis/War, when a country forms an international coalition to threaten an enemy in a coercive way, the chief of government of that country has to rally international public opinion among coalition partners to unite the coalition. This serves to bolster the credibility of the coalition's will and capability to use coercive measures against the enemy.One way to lead international public opinion can be referred to as “symbolic appeal strategy”, which is basically the same concept as “reverberation tactics” in the logic of two-level games. This stratagem allows one to use political symbols to appeal directly to domestic public opinion in coalition countries in order to pressure coalition governments to maintain their coalition policy. During the Gulf Crisis/War, the United States-the leader of the anti-Iraqi coalition-used the United Nations Security Council, Syria's participation in the anti-Iraqi coalition and so on, as symbols to appeal to public opinion in coalition countries, particularly in the Arab world, Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan.Decision-makers' perception of international public opinion and public opinion in foreign countries is the basis for influencing international sentiment toward a given cause. Decision-makers tend to recognize the international situation based on their own stereotypes and conceptual lenses, and under high uncertainty they tend to be oversensitive to potential changes in the international community. During the Gulf Crisis/War, partly out of fear that Arab nationalists would unite and pressure Arab governments to split from the coalition, U. S. decision-makers were eager to directly engage the Arab public with political symbols and rhetoric to rally Arab opinion in support of U. S military intervention against Iraq.
著者
新垣 拓
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2011, no.163, pp.163_68-80, 2011-01-20 (Released:2013-05-10)
参考文献数
47

The U.S. nuclear sharing policy for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started in the late 1950s. The policy's initial objective was to enhance the NATO's defense capability and its readiness by providing the nonnuclear allies with military training for the use of nuclear weapons which were to be transferred from the U.S. custody in case of emergency. However, after the Soviet Union's successful launch of Sputnik, the nuclear sharing was also beginning to be recognized as an effective nuclear nonproliferation measure for the European allies since Washington anticipated that it could provide further reassurance for the allies and allay their concerns about the reliability of the U.S. extended deterrence. In this context, located at “the front line” and sensitive about the credibility and reliability of the US extended deterrence, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) had become the most important allies that affected the nuclear sharing policy during the Cold War period.For the US government, allowing the Germans too much “access” to its nuclear weapons through the nuclear sharing arrangement might cause serious concerns of other major allies, such as the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Therefore, finding a West Germany's fair “share” in the NATO nuclear defense and, at the same time, avoiding other allies to raise concerns against it was the critical requirement for the success of the nuclear sharing policy. From the latter half of the 1950's to the late 1960s, U.S. government tackled this NATO's nuclear problem by exploring the two different approaches: “hardware solution” or “collective nuclear force approach” and “consultation approach”.The Johnson years were the critical time because the decision was made to adopt the consultation approach, which led to the creation of NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1966. By focusing on the decision-making process and using newly declassified documents, this article will explain that the three deferent processes had affected the decision: the stagnation process of the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal, the process of gaining acceptance of the consultation approach, and the process of growing momentum to materialize the approach.
著者
井上 貴子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
no.127, pp.169-184,L18, 2001

Television viewing has become a part of everyday life in India since the early 1990s. The development of mass media has made new patriotism pervasive in the popular culture of India. It is quite usual that political parties appropriate popular culture for legitimizing their ideology. I especially focus on the video clip shot by G. Bharat, a commercial film producer for the album <i>Vande Mataram</i> (Mother, I salute you) by A. R. Rahman, a popular musician, released in 1997 to celebrate India's fifty years of independence.<br><i>Vande Mataram</i> composed by a Bengali poet, Bankimchandra Chatterjee was first set to music and sung by Rabindranath Tagore at the 1896 session of the Indian National Congress. The song became a symbol of patriotism during the Swadeshi movement opposed to the partition of Bengal in 1905, though it caused the communal tension between Hindus and Muslims during the freedom struggle, as it was anti-Muslim in its content and context.<br>The video clip of <i>Vande Mataram</i> revived in a new version made patriotism the popular boom in spite of heavy criticism. Patriotism described in the video clip is love of Mother India, a country of "Unity in Diversity", where the diverse people live happily and tradition and modernity coexist. This concept totally agrees with the program code of laws relating to broadcasting, which made the video clip possible to be broadcast widely.<br>Bharatiya Janata Party appropriated this boom. The Uttar Pradesh Government tried to make the singing of <i>Vande Mataram</i> in schools, the meetings for mourning victims of Kargil War were held all over the country, and the Millennium Vande Mataram Campaign was launched for arousing patriotism among the youth. These events reminded them of the national enthusiasm for calling for freedom though it caused communal tension and was criticized bitterly.<br>Those who belong to the urban middle class of Chennai in Tamil Nadu, Rahman and Bharat's native city, have well accepted the new patriotism according to my survey. The result shows that the difference of social background little affects their perception. Though caste and gender difference cannnot be recognized, the elder generation, non-Hindu and non-Tamil, are somewhat more critical of the new patriotism. Tamil Hindus seem no longer to be satisfied with Tamil Nationalism propelled by regional parties but to identify themselves with the Nation of India.<br>This phenomenon is a reaction to globalization. Both anti-globalization and yeaning for American culture in producers' mind crystallized as a new patriotic music. Though its description of India suggests no border and enemy, anti-globalization is often expressed by the hostility to neighbors. That is why BJP can easily appropriate this boom for legitimizing their ideology and policy based on anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim themes.
著者
平間 洋一
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
no.102, pp.39-54,L7, 1993

In May 1890, Little Brown Co. of Boston presented to the public the first edition of The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783. In this book Mahan introduced not only a sound rationale of sea power in time of war, but a rationale of sea power in the time of peace, which was "welcomed by the rising nationalists, the armament manufacturers, the ship builders, military men hoping to enlarge their careers, bankers looking for foreign investment, and merchants interested in colonial markets, -who might find a big program of naval building and an aggressive foreign policy to their advantage." His theory was especially welcomed by nationalists, like Henry Cabot Lodge, John Hay, and Theodore Roosevelt "who believed where there is no force behind it the diplomat is the servant." It is also said that this book changed not only the American navy, but also America itself. Hereafter, "the United States to make his works the bible and himself the prophet of American navalism."<br>The object of this paper is to examine how Mahan's image of Japan changed, including his personal feelings of a Japanese threat. Then I would like to review how he changed his attitudes towards Japan and why he changed his attitudes from curiosity-antipathy-admiration-antipathy. In his first magazine article, entitled "The United States Looking Outward, " published in the August 1890 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, he noted that "the United States is woefully unready" and argued for U. S. naval expansion to meet the threat. And he warned that no foreign state should henceforth acquire "a coaling position within three thousand miles of San Franciso, -a distance which includes the Hawaiian and Galapagos islands, and the coast of Central America." Then in January 1893, after American residents in Honolulu had overthrown Queen Liluokalani and established a republic, he addressed a letter to the New York Times advocating U. S. annexation of "the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii)" against the day when China "expand her barriers eastward" in "a wave of barbaric invasion." Four years later, in May 1897, he implored Roosevelt, McKinley's new assistant Secretary of the Navy, to speedily strengthen the Pacific Squadron and "your best admiral needs to be in the Pacific". He instructed "much more initiative may be thrown on him than can on the Atlantic man". Then in September, he wrote article "A Twentieth Century Outlook", in Harper's Magazine, where he also adverted to the "Yellow Peril." But before 1898, except for reference to unexplained commercial opportunities awaiting Americans in East Asia, Mahan's imperialistic vision went no farther than the Caribbean, the Central American Isthmus, and the Hawaiian Islands. The target of the "Yellow Peril" was not Japan but China.<br>However, after the Sino-Japanese War, while Secretary of State John Hay was circulating his Open Door notes, Mahan's attitude towards Japan changed greatly and he was extremely conscious of the steady rise of Japanese naval power. The target of the "Yellow Peril" changed from China to Japan. But after the Russian southern advance into Manchuria began, he changed his attitude towards Japan again. When the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China, he wrote "The Problem of Asia." In this article, he saw the most pressing "problem" as Russia, whose expansionist aims in Eastern Asia had yet to be checkmated by Japan, and-he suggested a coalition of sorts among the four "Maritime States" of Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the United Staes. He felt appropriate saying something pleasant about the Japanese as he blandly conferred Teutonism upon Japan. Mahan noted that