著者

阿部 悠貴

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_73-172_86, 2013

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Constructivist scholarship has contended that social norms constitute appropriate state policy. Given this premise, nevertheless, because there are various norms within a society, it is conceivable that some of them are mutually incompatible and hence will clash with each other on occasions. How do state decision makers react when they are confronted simultaneously by contrasting norms? This paper investigates this question through analysis of Germany's involvement in the war in Bosnia, wherein policy was influenced by three different normative claims: to address the humanitarian tragedy in the Balkans; to refrain from the use of force; and to maintain international cooperation with its European partners in their joint military operations. In other words, it was exposed to a "clash of norms" emanating from humanitarianism, anti-militarism and multilateralism.<br>This paper argues that the clash of norms propels state leaders to develop international organizations as the existence of well-developed international mechanisms for effective crisis management enables contingencies to be dealt with swiftly: before the situation deteriorates and before norms clash each other. Specifically, this argument is examined by analyzing why the German decision makers, in the light of their experience with Bosnia, came to argue for the reinvigoration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the purpose of addressing "foreign" contingencies, despite the neorealist prediction of its dissolution after the demise of the Soviet Union.<br>The theoretical implications of this paper are discussed against the backdrop of the constructivist studies. The conventional knowledge of constructivism tells us that a new state preference, as well as a new appropriate posture of an international organization, is formed as a certain norm becomes dominant and diffused among decision makers. Thus, "changes" in state policy hinge on the "changes" in normative contexts. Meanwhile, the paper proffers an alternative perspective that because various norms are working simultaneously, state leaders (re)create international organizations so that they can avoid the conflict of norms and live up to different normative claims. Germany, in its response to the situation in Bosnia, deemed it appropriate not only to halt the violence on humanitarian grounds, but also to maintain its foreign policy stance of anti-militarism and multilateralism. That is to say, because the abiding norms remain "unchanged", they reconstitute the structures of international organizations, as discussions of reforms to NATO within the German decision making circle were informed by this crisis. This paper is intended to advance constructivist understandings on the development of international institutions.

著者

植村 秀樹

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2013, no.172, pp.172_172-172_175, 2013

著者

島崎 貞彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.28, pp.101-116, 1965

著者

神川 彦松

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.2, pp.1-20, 1957

著者

五月女 律子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.128, pp.100-114,L12, 2001

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In studies of international politics, foreign policy decision-making has been one of the important research areas. However, domestic politics in which policy decision-making is done has not received much attention in traditional studies, even though foreign policy is a point of contact between international relations and domestic politics. With the progress of international economic interdependence, theories that focus on a decision-making process in domestic politics have become important to investigate a foreign policy. In this article, theories of foreign policy decision-making are reexamined.<br>There are several approaches to theorize foreign policy decision-making. Traditional and orthodox analysis of foreign policy in studies of international politics saw domestic politics as a "black box" and explained nation's policy at the level of international system. Next attempt of theorization was to grasp a whole foreign policy-making process as a system. Then Allison's second and third model, which analyzed decision-making process in domestic politics, got attention by many scholars in the 1970s. After that, cognition of policy-maker was focused on in the academic circle of international politics. In the 1980s, importance of "idea" in foreign policy decision-making was pointed out in several studies and the "two-level games" model was proposed as another framework.<br>In the study of international political economy, domestic politics attracted scholars' attention as an important factor to analyze decision-making of foreign economic policy in the late 1980s. There are two types of studies. One focuses on preference or power resource distribution of societal actors in domestic politics. The other sees socioeconomic and/or political institutions as an important factor in policy decision-making.<br>There is another approach that makes models of decision-making and applies them to foreign policies of developed democratic countries in various issue areas. Goldmann's study investigates Sweden's foreign policies and tries to find relations between democracy and foreign policy. It examines and compares foreign policy decision-making in four issue areas (defense, internationalist, foreign economic, diplomatic security) using three criteria (representation, participation, information). Other study by Goldmann presents nine models of decision-making and applies them to Swedish foreign policies in several issue areas. These studies indicate that the analysis of domestic politics is important for foreign policy study and that plural models based on policy areas will be useful.<br>For better understanding on foreign policy decision-making, it is not sufficient to analyze foreign policy only at the level of international system or of individual decision-maker in domestic politics. We need to investigate domestic political process with the consideration to the influence of international relation on domestic politics. Therefore, approaches and methods of the study of international relations and comparative politics should be utilized and merged for analysis of foreign policy.

著者

服部 龍二

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.122, pp.54-68,L9, 1999

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The general evaluation of the Beijing government's treaty revision diplomacy is not high because the Beijing Special Tariff Conference from 1925 to 1926 resulted in a barren result. However, the fact is that the Beijing government built an important cornerstone towards the revision of unequal treaties. It was not accidental that political estrangement was caused between Japan, America, and Britain; and that a better environment for Chinese treaty revision was created.<br>What has been emphasized on this point conventionally was the materialization of the Kellogg-Johnson line as a pro-Chinese line. This should be, at least partly, interpreted as the result of Chinese treaty revision diplomacy. In particular, the formation of the pro-Chinese line in the Department of State was, to a large extent, the response to the plan which the Beijing government instigated. Chinese Foreign Minister Shen Ruilin esteemed relationships with America to ensure diplomatic support from Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, while the activity of Chinese Minister to America Alfred Sze satisfied the expectation of the Beijing government Foreign Ministry. Considering the political process of the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference, that situation was rather an exceptional success in Chinese diplomacy history.<br>British diplomacy, whose mediation between America and Japan had been effective in the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conference in the past, did not work this time. This, again, was the result of what the Beijing government had planned. The Chinese side differentiated their attitude towards Britain from their policy towards America and Japan, because of the fact that Britain had shown the severest attitude at the beginning. When British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs J. Austen Chamberlain approached America in order to convert his previous policy, Japanese Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro's stiffened economism was revealed. In this sense, the isolation of Shidehara diplomacy could be understood in context as a result of Chinese treaty revision diplomacy towards America and Britain.

著者

麻田 貞雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.36, pp.142-146, 1968

著者

木畑 洋一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.122, pp.1-7, 1999

著者

木畑 洋一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.151, pp.180-183, 2008

著者

平良 好利

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_122-136, 2012-03-25 (Released:2012-06-15)

参考文献数

50

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By Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in September 1951, the U.S. could continue to rule over Okinawa and have the exclusive right to maintain military bases there. After the ratification of the treaty in April 1952, people of Okinawa voiced opposition in regard to the use of land by the U.S. military. In June 1956, the U.S. authorities in Okinawa released a Report of the Price Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee (hereinafter called the Price Report) that supported the land policy proposed by the U.S. military. The Price Report recommended lump sum payments for fee title and accepted to the planned acquisition of additional land. However, the release of the report inflamed the opposition movement of the people of Okinawa.The purpose of this paper is to analyze the political process over the Price Report in 1956 by focusing on the attitudes of the Japanese Foreign Office and the U.S. Department of State.After the release of the Price Report, Okinawans requested that the Japanese Foreign Office negotiate with the U.S. government to solve the land dispute. During June and July of 1956, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu requested the U.S. Ambassador John Allison to abandon lump sum payments and to reduce the acquisition of additional land.Following the recommendation of the U.S. Embassy in Japan, the U.S. State Department carefully reexamined the Price Report in regard to the possibility of abandoning lump sum payments in order to improve U.S.-Japan relations. However, shortly before the State Department was due to hold a conference with the Department of Defense (which supported the Price Report), the issue of abandoning lump sum payments was dropped, because the U.S. Consul General in Okinawa strongly recommended that the State Department not retreat from the Price Report. However, the State Department did ask the Pentagon to make some modifications, such as abandoning the acquisition of the fee title, in view of possible damage to U.S.-Japan relations.After this political process revealed the importance of taking into consideration the involvement of the Japanese Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department, it was clear that the U.S. military was not capable of ruling Okinawa on its own. Thereafter, U.S. military control over Okinawa was always considered in the context of Japan-U.S. relations. Therefore, the political process over the Price Report in 1956 marked the start of Japanese Foreign Office and U.S. State Department involvement in U.S. military control of Okinawa. Concomitantly, it also was the starting point of recognizing that the role of the U.S. military in Okinawa was an issue affecting Japan-U.S. relations.

著者

須田 祐子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.161, pp.161_161-164, 2010

著者

武田 康裕

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.125, pp.162-179,L20, 2000

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The purpose of this paper is twofold: to make a frame of reference for understanding the causal mechanisms that regime transitions tend to associate with external use of force, and to examine within this framework the military operations of China after reforms and opening-up.<br>Conflict initiation is a product of interaction between motivational factors in the state level and opportunity-related factors in the systemic level. In order to explore mutual relationship between the domestic dynamics and the international environment, this paper adopted the analytic approach of comparative politics and international politics combined. By focusing upon the political struggle within the ruling bloc, it approaches to the knotting points between the systemic level and the state level.<br>The key theoretical argument consists of two points: (1) The modality of divisions within the ruling bloc are motivational factors in determining whether the transitional regime succumbs to the temptation of a diversionary use of force; (2) The structural uncertainties of international system are opportunity-related factors which convert a potential for diversionary use of force into reality. Then the proposition is stated as follows: the probability of a transitional regime engaging in a hostile military action increases in two following conditions: (1) The ruling bloc is vertically divided between conservatives and reformers who are roughly equal in power; (2) The level of regional order is low in the multipolar system of relatively equal states.<br>China embarked on military operations in the Spratly Islands and Taiwan Straits in 1988, 1992, and 1995 while holding up <i>independent peace diplomacy</i> toward neighboring countries. Neither rational choice model nor organizational process model has successfully explained the reasons for a discrepancy between conflict behavior and cooperative diplomacy. While the former overestimates internal cohesion within the party leadership in the period of regime transition, the later underestimates party control over the military in the Leninist state. This paper concludes that Chinese military operations were diversionary actions for the state leaders to restore party unity.<br>In 1988 and 1992, Deng Xioping initiated naval operations over the Spratly Islands claimed by Vietnam to win the military's support, and then to beat off conservatives' challenge to the reform policy. In 1995, Jiang Zemin stood firm with the Philippines and Taiwan to let the military stay away from the intraparty struggle for leadership succession. The difference in subjectivity between two leaders was derived from changing nature of party-army relations associated with professionalism in the military. While Deng could maneuver potential rivalries between the professional officers and political commissars, Jiang had to be responsive to demands by the professional military. Both state leaders were risk-acceptant in that they recognized the structural uncertainties of regional system as an opportunity of provoking militarized actions.

著者

古城 佳子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.115, pp.94-109,L13, 1997

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The purpose of this article is to examine what kind of logic was behind the demand of defense burden-sharing toward Japan by the United States in the late 1950s and 1960s. This article presents the following viewpoints. First, US demand of defense burden-sharing was colsely related to the problem of US balance of payments deficit from the late 1950s. Second, in order to better understand the problem of US-Japan defense burden-sharing in the late 1950s and 1960s, it should be analyzed in the context of US policy towards the allied nations, rather than just in the context of bilateral relations.<br>In the late 1950s, in the face of gold outflow the Eisenhower administration began to realize that the balance of payment deficit would impose serious problem on the United States. This administration created the scheme of burden-sharing among the allied nations. This scheme was reinforced by Kennedy administration, which claimed that the US balance of payments deficit would restrain US policy of protecting "the Free World, " thus harm not only the United States but also the allied nations.<br>In this context, the US administrations tried to defend dollar position by focusing on two points expanding US export to increase trade surplus, and reducing external spending, in particular, foreign aid and military expenditure. The US administrations asked the allied nations to share the cost of US foreign aid and military spending. This is the origin of the burdensharing scheme. In other words, since the late 1950s the allied nations were asked to increase foreign aid and military spending. For evaluating which country should share the burden, the US applied two economic measurements; balance of payments surplus and sufficent foreign exchange reserves.<br>West Germany was the main target of the US demand of defense burdensharing because of the large US military presence in West Germany and its rapid recovery of economy in terms of balance of payment surplus and large foreign exchange reserves. The United States started to ask West Germany to share the defense cost as early as in the late 1950s. The negotiation of offset payment agreement between Germany and the US shows the US tough policy towards West Germany.<br>In contrast, the US did not put much pressure on Japan to share the defense cost until the mid-1960s. This US lenient attitude toward Japan compared to policy towands West Germany was partly because of Japan's domestic political instability relating to the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 and partly because of Japan's economic indices which were short of US criteria; balance of payment deficit and small foreign exchange reserves.<br>However, in the mid-1960s, the US demand of defense burden-sharing toward Japan increased because Japan's economic situation had improved. The demand was intensified by the US increased involvement in the Vietnam War. Japan, as well as West Germany, was asked to buy US arms and US Treasury bill to contribute to improve US balance of payment. Since this period, the US claim that the United States provided "public goods" for "the Free World" became problematic for the allied nations.

著者

藤原 帰一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.125, pp.147-161,L18, 2000

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Much has been made of the claim that democracies do not fight each other. This claim met more skeptical eyes outside the United States, if only because the argument shared an annoying similarity with another argument once shared by supporters of communist parties: communists do not fight each other. So much for wishful thinking and self-deceit.<br>Peace, after all, has been observed among autocracies as well as by democracies; that does not mean, however, that regime-types do not matter. Regime-types, with distinctive characters in their decision making process, may cast influence over political decisions in international relations, even when they fail to dictate black-and-white outcomes such as the absence of war. If both autocracies and democracies may sustain 'peace' at given points, then, how are they different?<br>This leads to the question of this paper: can we distinguish significant patterns of behavior between autocratic peace and democratic peace? In this paper, I make an attempt to answer this question by comparing two most salient examples of autocratic peace, the Congress of Vienna and ASEAN. The former is important because it provided a model of balance of power to the realist school, while actually sustained by the threat of domestic upheaval; the latter is interesting because, among regimes that were undemocratic to say the least, a certain status quo has been somehow maintained.<br>Differences between early 19th century Europe and late 20th century Southeast Asia should be only too apparent. The Congress of Vienna and ASEAN, however, do share some institutional characteristics. Both were formed under the specter of revolution, the revival of the French revolution and the spillover of the Chinese revolution respectively. It was the fear of domestic challenges to political power, rather than the simple fear of overseas aggression, that held both regimes intact.<br>Both were sustained by a group of regional elites who were under little influence from domestic interests or public opinions. In Vienna, it was the Kings and the Nobles of each country who were all part of an extended family due to centuries of inter-marriage: an international society was more real than civil societies in the days of Vienna. ASEAN leaders lacked such kin relationship, but were all bound by secular interests that stemmed from a common agenda, that is, a non-communist and authoritarian path to state-formation.<br>Both regimes aimed at policy coordination of secular interests, disregarding transcendent norms or beliefs. Vienna aimed for the Concert of Europe with little religious beliefs or legal institutions; ASEAN, composed of Islamic, Buddhist, and Catholic societies, worked on a harmony of secular interests devoid of religion or political ideology. And both regimes imposed minimum constraints on the policy pursuit of individual states, non-intervention as the golden rule.<br>In spite of the lack of institutional norms and sanctions, or any clear and present foe to ally against, both regimes successfully preserved peace in the region for over three decades. An impressive achievement, but challenges emanated from within.<br>The Congress of Vienna ended with the revolutions of 1848 and the flight of Metternich. ASEAN nations have gone through a wave of democratic revolutions that shattered authoritarian rule in the Philippines (1986), Thailand (1992), and Indonesia (1998). The paper claims that such domestic changes have put the more secular and elitist policy coordination of ASEAN in limbo at the moment, with ominous signs for the future.

著者

安田 淳

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.128, pp.231-235, 2001

著者

伊藤 剛

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.145, pp.141-154,L15, 2006

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This paper addresses the changing nature of power (or influence) in the study of Chinese politics and diplomacy, and seeks to clarify the extent to which theoretical approaches in academia can be useful for a fuller understanding of China.<br>The discussion has three parts. The first deals with the part of foreign policy, and argues that China's application of the "New Conception of Security" or "Peaceful Rise" has created more stable relationships not only with the United States but with neighboring countries. More specifically, in order to sustain economic development since the 1990's, the creation and the development of "soft power" has produced more benefits to China's interests.<br>The second part addresses China's domestic politics. Since the 1949 revolution, the Chinese Communist Party has maintained the "party state, " and even after the economic growth started in the early 1990's, the CCP, with its society so far pluralized, has sought to keep its power under control. The emergence of various societal groups, which leads to the application of "corporatism, " will be addressed.<br>The third part seeks to combine both arguments of foreign policy and domestic politics. It argues that, in the face of the rapidly changing politics and society within China that has also affected its foreign policy, various theoretical frameworks such as "second image" and "reversed second-image" could be useful. The Chinese government, trying to maintain its power not only over its society but also vis-à-vis other countries, has created more complicated means to maintain its authority and legitimacy.<br>The paper concludes by slightly touching on the brief history of Japan's study on Chinese studies. There, more positive methods and approaches toward the "real" Chinese politics and diplomacy should be examined.

著者

臼井 勝美

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.116, pp.181-183, 1997

著者

大島 美穂

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.110, pp.39-54,L7, 1995

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In this paper 1 consider the process and meanings by which the Nordic countries, in face of their identity crisis, inclined toward Baltic Sea cooperation as a new framework of regional cooperation.<br>After the Cold War, paradoxically the Nordic countries seemed to lose their superiority in Europe, because it became clear that their stability and unity, whose characteristics are a lower tension area with no nuclear weapons and no foreign troops, and a welfare society, was dependent on the fact that they kept their distance from East-West confrontation. In today's Europe, distance from Central Europe and the EU means away from the centre of Europe's new dynamism, and the Nordic countries changed into the periphery. In this threat to their existence the Nordic countries tried to seek another way of regional cooperation and committed themselves to Baltic Sea cooperation.<br>Apart from self-containment Nordic cooperation, Baltic Sea cooperation because of its location, is not only open to East-West relations, but also can contribute to smooth relations between "the developed West" and "the developing East".<br>Besides the emergence of sub-regional cooperation, such as Baltic Sea cooperation, has something to do with the changes of the qualitative and territorial meanings of security in Europe. The qualitative change is from the old security that meant only military affairs in a limited sense. This has lost meaning and instead means security in a broad sense, including refugee and minority problems, societal insecurity, and ecological problems. Thus security is related to the whole of society, so called human security. Baltic Sea cooperation based on Nordic multiple cooperation, that is in the social, legal, cultural and communication fields, can cope with security in a broad sense, and bring security to the region.<br>On the other hand, as the Treaty of Maastricht shows, the EU has moved into common diplomacy and security policies which nation-states previously monopolized, and the meanings of state and territory are being eroded by the EU. The rearrangements of the EU's role and each nation's role gives new significance to sub-regional cooperation. particulary Baltic Sea cooperation, between East and West.<br>In these senses, even though Baltic Sea cooperation is a very young and small attempt, it can be an important sub-regional approach to European security, as the nation-state system enters a new stage.

著者

山添 博史

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

no.139, pp.13-28,L6, 2004

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This paper will examine Russo-Japanese diplomacy in the late 18th and the mid 19th centuries in order to understand the Japanese view of international order before being assimilated into the western international order.<br>As the Russians were approaching Ezo, now the northern islands of Japan, the Japanese recognised that Russia might capture Ezo and insisted on protecting it, whether the method was by trade with Russia or naval defence. Russia was an object to be examined as a counterpart, not an inferior barbarian under hierarchy in 'the Chinese World Order.' Matsudaira Sadanobu, the chancellor in 1787-93, regarded foreign countries as equal to Japan, and maintained that idea in order to understand them as potential enemies against Japan. When Russian envoy Laxman arrived at Ezo in 1792, Sadanobu dealt with his demand for direct communication to Edo and commerce, according to "politeness and rules", at the same time leading him to Nagasaki, which could avoid a Russian intrigue against Japan, and preparing the defence. Sadanobu paid attention to the potential threat posed by Russia and other states, coping with that threat by satisfying them and rejecting them according to law, as a means both practical and moral. In the Japanese view of international order, hierarchy was not a basis in the sense that Japan ruled the surrounding order. Rather nations were equal and tended to expand without moral constraints. In Sadanobu's case, the common language was politeness and rules, and the Chinese order and Western order were also recognised as separate international systems in the same world. In this sense, the Japanese view of international order was already "modernised" in advance of intense interactions with the West, and also had developed as a unique one of the Japanese origin.<br>Reflecting the appearance of western ships and the Opium War, the Japanese recognised that the Western threat was strong enough to assimilate China and Japan. This threat intensified the emphasis on competitive aspects of the Japanese view of international order, thus splitting sharply arguments for trade and those for exclusion. Even in views of <i>Jo-i</i> exclusionists, the international order consisted not of hierarchy with Japan on the top, but of warring equal states. Kawaji Toshiakira, negotiating the border with the Russian envoy Putiatin in 1853, also regarded European states as equal enemies to be studied in order to oppose. In his view of international order, though the evil intentions of European states were emphasised in comparison with the views in the 18th century, the "modernised" aspects such as equality among nations and rational thinking without moral restraints were inherited.

著者

多湖 淳

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.132, pp.90-103,L10, 2003-02-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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The monumental works by Inis Claude Jr. have led many scholars of International Relations to regard collective legitimization as one of the most important mechanism for the institutionalization of international relations. This paper explores the enhancement of international institutions by focusing on the US collective legitimization in the Dominican intervention (1965) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).This paper argues that collective legitimization enhances institutionalization of international relations in two different ways: constraining the US decision about its military actions, and expanding the roles and functions of the formal international organizations. In the case of the Dominican intervention in 1965, due to opposition by other countries in the region, the US failed to continue deployment of its troops, especially the Army and Air Force, as it wished. The US also reluctantly accepted a Brazilian general for the commander of the Inter-American Peace Forces even though it wanted an American commander. In addition to these constraints, as a result of creation of Inter-American Peace Forces, the roles and functions of the OAS were expanded into peace-keeping operations and humanitarian military operations, neither of which was within the scope of the Charter of the OAS.A comparison of the Dominican Intervention in 1965 with the Cuban Missile Crisis shows there are two strategies of collective legitimization: assertive (offensive) legitimization and negative (defensive) legitimization. Assertive legitimization is a strategy whereby the United States tries to show the legality and justice of its military actions by gaining formal support from international institutions. Negative legitimization is a strategy whereby the United States tries to show the legality and justice of its military actions by denying the claim of an enemy or counterpart such as Cuba or the USSR. In the Dominican Intervention, the United States utilized assertive legitimization. The OAS, which legitimized the US position, was institutionalized considerably; but the UN, which was bypassed by the US, was not institutionalized. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, on the other hand, the United States chose negative legitimization. Neither the UN, nor the OAS was institutionalized. From these empirical analyses, this paper provides a new hypothesis that assertive legitimization by the United States enhances institutionalization of international relations more than negative legitimization.