著者

森井 裕一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.140, pp.1-18,L5, 2005-03-19 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

41

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Germany's foreign policy has been characterized by continuity since its fundamental course was defined by the Federal Republic's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Even unification in 1990 did not have much impact on the continuity of both foreign policy and European integration policy. The transatlantic alliance (NATO) and the European integration (EU) have remained the basic pillars of the Federal Republic's foreign policy. It was imperative that Germany embed itself in both NATO and the EU.With the end of the cold war the security environment in Europe drastically changed: the meaning of security changed from territorial defense to crisis management. Accordingly the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) of the EU developed rapidly in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The German federal government led by Chancellor Schröder and foreign minister Fischer continued its commitment to the transatlantic alliance and to the further development of European integration. Since the federal election of 2002, however, the Iraq war has overshadowed the German-U. S. relationship.This article analyzes the issue of continuity and change in German foreign policy within this new security environment. The first part of the article outlines the course of German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, focusing especially on the problem of using the defense force, the Bundeswehr. In the second part, using the case of the 2002 federal election, the entanglement of domestic politics and foreign policy is discussed. In the third part, the new characteristics of current foreign policy are discussed. The debates over the “German Way” and “Civilian Power” in foreign policy are examined in order to explain both continuity and change in the transatlantic relations. German policy toward the institutional development of the EU and European security policy is also discussed.The red-green government led by Schröder/Fischer introduced a new style to German foreign policy with its more direct and self-confident approach. Ongoing economic globalization and the developing EU are both generating change within German foreign policy. Nonetheless, the multilateralism of German foreign policy will not change. For Germany, the use of the UN, OSCE and EU remains the fundamental basis for its policy, even though Germany is increasingly asserting its own interests and preferred methods in those organizations. Germany's desire to promote world stability through civilian methods, for example, are well-suited to an approach that works through multilateral institutions. At the same time, even though the European security environment has changed, the U. S. A. remains the most important security partner for Germany. The transatlantic relationship remains inevitable for Germany's security and economy. Germany has to balance its key transatlantic relationship with the demands of European integration.

著者

戸澤 英典

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.149, pp.172-175, 2007-11-28 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

高安 健将

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.141, pp.86-100,L12, 2005-05-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

38

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This article examines the responses of the British government to the fourth Middle East conflict and the first oil crisis, both of which occurred coincidentally in October 1973. The British government led by Edward Heath recognised that Britain had ceased to be a Super Power and that it was experiencing a domestic crisis. It was therefore fully aware that it could not achieve settlements for the Middle East conflict and the oil crisis on its own. However, the differing interests and perceptions towards the crises made it extremely difficult for the British government to cooperate with the United States in particular and to a lesser extent with the European Community.The disagreements between Britain and the United States reflected their respective grasps of the Middle East conflict and their interests in securing oil supply from the Arab oil-producers. The Heath government was more sympathetic to the Arabs, who in fact launched the offensive against the Israelis in 1973. Its consistent understanding was that the Israelis had occupied Arab territories in 1967 and that the acquisition of territory by war was inadmissible. For the Heath government, the Arabs had not crossed an international border to commit aggression, but rather that the fighting was going on in territories that legally, and in the view of the United Nations, belonged to the Arabs. In contrast, the US government initially regarded as the baseline of a ceasefire the dividing line between the Arabs and the Israelis that had been created after the Israeli occupation in 1967. Domestically, the Heath government was facing a huge energy crisis, which was triggered by a ban by coal-miners on overtime work. It was vital for the British government to secure oil imports from the Arab oil-producers, a need not faced by the United States.The Heath government and the Nixon administration disagreed not only over the causes of the conflict, and over how to achieve first a ceasefire and then long-term settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis, but also over the perceptions of the actors involved-including Egypt and the Soviet Union -and particularly with regards oil security. While Heath in fact distrusted the intentions of the Nixon administration, which was confronting the Watergate affair, the US government suspected that the British government, by siding with the Arabs, was deliberately undermining its Middle East policy.This article argues that the British government sided with the Arabs in 1973 in order to secure oil supplies, despite generating acute tension with the United States and the European Community. Such discord, this paper argues, eventually deprived the British government of any significant role in settling the Middle East conflict and the oil crisis.

著者

山本 達也

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.141, pp.115-131,L14, 2005-05-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

41

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The purpose of this paper is to examine how the external environments of Middle Eastern governments, which require a serious commitment to the promotion of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), affect policies to control Internet information flow, and how it leads to a change in their domestic politics.Currently, we cannot confirm any leading hypotheses about the impacts of the Internet on authoritarian regimes that are widely accepted by political scientists. The main reasons for this is lack of statistical data, difficulties in obtaining sufficient material to discuss this theme, and the low Internet penetration rates in such countries.Of course, these hypotheses must surely exist in the Middle East and undoubtedly the relationship between Internet development and the political impacts on authoritarian regimes is an attractive research topic. However, the reasons mentioned above have caused certain limitations in carrying out such research. Therefore, this paper focuses on the regimes' Internet controlling policies, which is designed to block the free flow of information, and tries to expose the implications of political influences on authoritarian regimes by Internet development.When we focus on Internet controlling policies in authoritarian regimes, we should carefully assess the degree of governmental interference to the flow of information on the Internet. As figure 1 in my paper indicates, conceptually there are two different types of models regarding Internet controlling in authoritarian regimes. One model is that the government mediates and tries to control the flow of information on the Internet (model C), and the other model is that the government renounces Internet control completely (model D).There are two effective concepts to classify authoritarian regimes into model C or model D. The first concept is “network architecture, ” which is defined as the structural character of a network based on a code (software). The second concept is “network infrastructure architecture, ” which is defined as the physical structure of infrastructure to ensure data communication.As a result of my examination, most of the Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Egypt are categorized as model C, with only Jordan categorized as model D. The difference between Jordan and the other countries is explained by the engagement of US governmental organization on ICT strategy-making and revising processes, and the leadership of King Abdullah II, the head of the regime, who favors the introduction of policies that create competition in the ICT sector.The Jordanian decision to adopt model D leads a change in policymaking processes in the ICT field in Jordan, with transparency and accountability indubitably improved in this country. My paper concludes that the Jordanian case implies authoritarian regimes could adopt model D while keeping their authoritarian characters, and the perception and leadership of these regimes' heads would grasp the key for this change.

著者

浜中 新吾

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.148, pp.43-58,L8, 2007-03-08 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

37

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A lot of dictatorship have collapsed and made a transition to democratic regimes late the Cold War. However, Middle Eastern states were never experienced with democratization wave. So that, there are scarcely any comparative democratization studies dealt with them. Today, we can understand some peculiar topics or indigenous logic of the Arab politics, because of being recently made advances in area studies of the Middle East. But we tend to think that comparative political research methods are not effective in understanding politics in the Middle East and do not help us to become familiar with it.Lipset's thesis is revaluated and the most popular one that goes with relationship between economic development and democracy after Huntington's democratic third wave. Adam Przeworski and his collaborators tried to renew a modernization theory, then their works help restore confidence of general and comparative theory. However, there is still a paradox that even rich countries do not catch on the path of democratic transition in the Middle East.The rentier state theory is used to explain this paradox why were not Middle Eastern countries democratized. This theory pays attention how much rent, natural resources like oil, natural gas, minerals with which states are able to ensure financial well being, gets support from many political economists. The rent also contains worker's remittance as well as official development assistance from foreign countries. So, a regime without resources may be categorized as a rentier state. A government with affluent rent does not have an incentive to liberalize own politics and societies because it needs not to impose a tax on its people, so the regime is easy to repress dissidents.In this study, I formalize a model of the rentier state theory from Boix-Stokes Modernization model, and then attempt quantitative analyses. My formalized rentier model has a scope of rent seeking activity of governments with fertile natural resources. So the purpose of this research is to shed light on a general effectiveness of the theory as well as to deal with democratic transitions as time passed or not, the Large N Studies is adopt as my research design. The method of quantitative analysis is the Dynamic Probit Model, which Adam Przeworski developed.The result of my study shows that enormous fuel rent tends to suppress democratic transition and promote stability of a dictatorship. But other natural resources and remittance rent have little to do with political transformation. The official development assistance dose not play a role of rent, seems to have a same effect of economic growth for democratization.

著者

鹿島 正裕

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.141, pp.132-148,L15, 2005-05-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

16

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To be sure, there has been a rather impressive accumulation of research into the regional politics of the Middle East, centering on the Arab-Israeli conflicts, Gulf wars and the involvement of the super-powers therein. However, most of the monographs are more “descriptive” than “theoretical-analytical, ” whether they are historical studies or report on current affairs. While it is perhaps not an exaggeration to claim that most of the related works in Arabic and Japanese are such, some among those in English are theoretical-analytical works, reflecting the heightened demand, especially in the United States, for more social scientific approaches within area studies.A typical work in this genre is Steven Walt's The Origins of Alliances (1987), which may be said to have used area studies to establish a social scientific theory, rather than introduced social scientific approaches to area studies. Works that are more based on area studies include Michael Barnette's Dialogues in Arab Politics (1998) and Raymond Hinnebusch's The International Politics of the Middle East (2003). Barnette's work discusses the politics among Arab states, the core of the Middle East states, as does Avraham Sela's The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict published in the same year, although not particularly in a theoretical-analytical way. Both works should be considered as studies in the regional politics of the Middle East, as the conflict with Israel has been strongly tied with the various rivalries among Arab states. Walt's and Hinnebusch's works discuss the regional politics in the Middle East, which involve, in addition to Arab states and Israel, Iran and the great powers.In terms of their theoretical tenets, Walt's and Sela's are (neo-) realist and Barnette's constructivist, while Hinnebusch's is liberal, incorporating not only realist frameworks but also constructivist and pluralist (liberal-institutionalist) concepts and even (neo-Marxist) structuralist perspectives. I describe these basic theoretical arguments and delineations of historical phases found in each work, finding Hinnebusch's argument most comprehensive and persuasive.Moreover, I look at some other books and articles, among which is Paul Noble's “Systemic Approaches Do Matter, But…” (2004) In this article, Noble tries to apply systemic approaches to the study of the Middle East system and offers a set of regional and sub-regional systemic factors in addition to global systemic factors as explanatory variables. I take up his argument of the global systemic factor change in the post-Cold War period and raise some issues to be explored concerning this on-going period, such as democratization, privatization, and regionalization in Muslim and “rentier” states of the region, especially after the Iraq War (2003).

著者

吉武 信彦

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.128, pp.66-83,L9, 2001-10-22 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

36

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The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Danish-EU relations, paying attention to domestic politics in Denmark, and to show developments of the interaction between domestic and international politics in European integration.Denmark is only a small country in the EU, but, when her successive governments coordinated their policy towards the EU with sceptical sentiments of the people, they faced many difficulties, which sometimes resulted in crises of domestic politics and of the EU itself, for example, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93. This is based on the political system in Denmark, which makes it possible to give impacts to European integration, i. e., democratic control of the government's policy towards the EU by the Danish parliament, especially the European Committee (Europaudvalget), and by referendum, which has been held seven times on European integration since 1972. This democratic control helps political parties and the people to participate in the European integration process.There are two important cases in the Danish-EU relations to examine the interaction between domestic and international politics. They are the political processes of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in 1992-93 and of joining the single currency “Euro” in 2000. The outcomes of the referendums, which were held in June 1992 and in September 2000, were “No” in both cases, but the impacts on the EU contrasted sharply. The former resulted in delaying the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty for 10 months. In this process, domestic politics was closely connected with negotiations between the Danish government on the one hand and other member states and the EC Commission on the other hand. However, the latter did not give rise to any serious problem for the EU, because the referendum in 2000 decided whether Denmark would join the single currency or not, which had been started by most of the member states since 1999. Denmark was not eligible to exercise the veto over this project. This concept of promoting integration is called “variable geometry” or “multi-speed integration.” It is stipulated in the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999, as “closer cooperation” and “the principle of flexibility.” The Nice Treaty, which was signed in 2001, also emphasizes this concept and it is aiming to change the weighting of votes for a “qualified majority” in the Council of Ministers, with the result that small member states like Denmark might diminish their power in the EU decision-making.The concept of “variable geometry” could lead to two groups of member states in the EU: a group which is willing to accelerate integration and the other group which is reluctant to do so because of domestic problems. In this case, domestic politics of the reluctant group cannot have a great influence on the EU decision-making. However, each member state even in the willing group has difficulties with a perception gap between the elite and the people. This might deteriorate rapidly by further integration and domestic politics of member states could change to a stumbling block to integration. Therefore, it is indispensable to pay attention to domestic politics of member states in the EU.

著者

八谷 まち子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.142, pp.79-94,L11, 2005-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

42

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The Brussels European Council in December 2004 finally concluded to start the accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. Turkey submitted its accession application in 1987 preceding all of the ten new member states of the year 2004. Why has it taken so long for Turkey? What is the basic agenda for Turkey to realize its EU membership? To find answers to these questions, the concept of “focal point” might be useful.Thomas Schelling introduced the concept of “focal point” that [most bargaining situations ultimately involve some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at all. … Any potential outcome is one that either party could have improved by insisting, yet each knows that the other would rather concede than do without agreement. … These reflexive expectations somehow converge on a single point at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat.] Garett and Weingast elaborate the concept by referring to the “mutual recognition” introduced in a decision of “the Cassis de Dijon” by the European Court of Justice in 1979, and embedded in the European Single Act as a legal system for the single market project. That is, when a natural focal point does not exist, an institution may propose a constructed focal point for an enhancement of expectation towards a possible agreement of a negotiation.In the light of the above understanding of a focal point, there may have been, at least, two potential focal points between Turkey and the EU: the Copenhagen Criteria and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The former was set out unilaterally by the EU as the conditionalities for the EU membership, therefore, the Copenhagen Criteria was meant to be a constructed focal point. But it was originally set out to facilitate and control the accession of the former socialist countries which were making efforts to transform their national regimes, while Turkey with its established nationalist idea and regime had tremendous difficulties in renovating the systems in accordance with the EU criteria. The constructed focal point, unlike the former socialist countries, failed to work automatically in Turkey, but started to function with an additional impetus of the promise to give a starting date of negotiation. Turkish domestic situation required an extra motivation for a constructed focal point to be useful.The latter seemed to have had more chance to become a natural focal point, but Turkey stuck to its national interest particularly with the view to sustaining its de-facto governing influence over Cyprus. Greece, securing the interest of Cyprus, also insisted on the national interest. Under such circumstances, there was no place for the “reciprocal expectations” to develop in order to identify a focal point. Thus, a potentially existed natural focal point was unable to function.It should be expected for the EU to set a focal point in view with the Turkish membership including a solution to the divided Cyprus. What may be critical for identifying a focal point is not the problems such as a mass movement of labour, or huge financial aids to suppress the EU budget, often sited by Turkish antagonists. But whether the EU would be able to convince the European citizens of the significance of the Turkish membership, and to the same importance, whether Turkey would be able to internalize the Copenhagen Criteria that would inevitably transform the principles that Turkey has been standing on since its foundation in 1923..

著者

五月女 律子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.142, pp.63-78,L10, 2005-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

53

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Among the member states of the European Union (EU), Sweden is one of the most EU-skeptic countries. Opinion polls have shown strong skepticism of the Swedes since Sweden's accession to the EU in 1995. This article examines anti-EU and EU-skepticism in Sweden and tries to investigate reasons why many Swedes are skeptical about the EU.The first part of this article discuses Sweden's change of support rating for the EU and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), presenting data from opinion polls. The Swedes strongly favored EU membership in 1991, and although their support declined after 1992, it increased again during 1994. After Sweden's entry into the EU, the Union's popularity immediately slumped and a majority of the Swedes became anti-EU. Then support for the EU gradually increased and supporters of the membership outnumbered its opponents in late 2001. Support for EMU has fluctuated since 1997, and by 2004, half of the population opposed the introduction of the “euro” to Sweden.The second part of this article examines the anti-EU/EU-skeptic faction, and investigates its activities and assertions in the campaign of referendum on Sweden's EU membership in 1994 and the European Parliament elections in 1995 and 1999. The anti-EU camp consisted of the Left Party and the Green Party (anti-EU parties), some trade unions, and members of the Social Democrats and the Center Party. The lack of transparency in EU decision-making is their prime issue. Slightly more than half of the electorate voted “yes” to Sweden's EU membership in the referendum and Sweden became an EU member state in 1995. In European Parliament elections, voter turnout was fairly low and anti-EU parties, the Left and Green Parties, gained higher vote percentages compared to national elections.The third part of this article analyses Sweden's referendum on the euro in 2003 and the European Parliament election in 2004. The anti-euro camp opposed further transfer of Sweden's policy-making power to the EU. A majority of the Swedes voted “no” to the adoption of the euro, effective from 2006. An EU-and Federo-skeptic political organization, Junilistan (The June List), which was established for the European Parliament election, became the third largest political party in Sweden's European Parliament delegation, though voter turnout was the lowest of any nation-wide Swedish election in over 80 years.In Sweden, the rise of anti-EU sentiments spawned anti-EU and EU-skeptical groups. These groups would seek to reform the EU. Many Swedes are not satisfied with the democracy, openness, transparency, social policy and environmental policy of the EU.

著者

鈴木 陽一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.132-149,L16, 2001-02-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

62

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The aim of this article is to rethink why the twin nation of Malaysia and Singapore, emerged. Malaysia is a nation that the Malay-Muslims dominate, Singapore is a nation the Chinese make its core part, but both have strong transnational linkages in Maritime Southeast Asia and the global economy. This article reviews the emergence, focusing on transformation of collaborative relationship between the British government, the Federal government (Malaya, later Malaysia) and Singapore government, which made the formal and the informal British Empire in Southeast Asia.Malaysia and Singapore emerged at the end of Empire. What moved the Metropole and the local collaborators to make Greater Malaysia —Malaysia including Singapore— was an impulse to restructure the British Empire. Against communism in Southeast Asia, they tried to build a new united nation, which would become a new imperial collaborator. However the attempt to embed the conventional collaborator in a new federation led to conflicts among them. The Federal government and the Singapore government both had similar industrialization plans which competed with each other. However, Britain paid little attention to the old collaborators such as Singaporean, because they put more importance in the stability of a new junior partner. Therefore, Singaporean could do nothing but leave the Federation, and without the non-Muslim Singaporeans, Malaysia became more and more Malay-Muslim- oriented. The old Empire fell and a new order emerged. After the failure of Greater Malaysia, the British lost their will and power to maintain their Empire. The new rising power, the United States, did not make an empire, unlike the former imperial powers. She encouraged an anti-communism regionalism, and tried to organize people into a global economy. The Southeast Asians accepted the new power and became local collaborators of the imperialism without empireNationalism played little role in the formation of two nations. Rather, the Federal government and Singapore government worked for their preservation of imperial privileges as imperial collaborators. They worked for the colonial grand design for the reorganization of Empire. Singapore left the Federation to defend its economic autonomy rather than their multiethnic policy. The divided Southeast Asians decided to live as different nations in the new order supported by the new power, to utilize regionalism and globalism.Decolonization saw its peak in 1960s. In many cases, empires advanced to decolonize with collaboration between the metroples and the local collaborators. Therefore, it was not necessarily accompanied by nation-building. The collaborators conflicted with each other. Irresponsible imperialists renounced their burden, and invented a situation of so-called quasi-states. those left engaged in nation-building and globalization, which sometimes contradict.

著者

深川 美奈

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.79-95,L12, 2000-10-13 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

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John J. McCloy, the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, wrote to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles when Konrad Adenauer won the election of parliament in 1953: “We cannot in my judgment, lift our hand and influence from the internal German developments. The roots of sound parliamentary behavior are not deeply enough embedded in German soil for us to take a different position. This is a great step forward domestically but German nationalism and its demoniac counterparts have not been completely exorcised.” Why did he point out that German society was not yet democratized after more than five years of defeat? This paper deals with the formation of democratization policy of American military Government and its successor, the American High Commission. It focuses on the period from defeat of Germany (May 1945) to June 1952 in which American democratization program ended at the local level. I pay attention to the formation and development of denazification policy by both the American Military Government and German and re-education (re-orientation) program by Kreis Resident Officer of Land commission. In this paper, I divide the period into four parts according to its peculiarities. I examine how American policies developed and why these policies failed finally. American Military Government carried out denazification and re-education on purpose to democratize German society. How and where did Americans locate democratization policy after a switch in economic recovery policy in 1947?Denazification in the American zone was carried out with initial severity. In applying the rough-and-ready procedure to Germans, the consequences have been more than ordinarily severe. Proof of this action can be seen in the dismissal not only of those whose removal was required by the directive but also of those in whose case discretion was allowed. Since the influence of Nazism was rather stronger than American authority had predicted, American officials realized that denazification could not be accomplished without German help.German law, entitled “For Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism, ” which was enacted on March 5, 1946, classified ideological offenders in terms of past guilt and future danger and tried to assess penalties proportionate to the guilt and danger. But the number of cases to be handled by judicial machinery was amounting to the great majority of the adult population that the process of rectification was slow as the complications accumulated. Germans were not satisfied with prohibition and restriction of employment.Though process of denazification was promoted by amnesties and amended law, staffs of local authority on denazification could not deal with the cases of major offenders. As a result, the ex-Nazi forces which succeeded in rehabilitation were much more than those who were politically purged.It was estimated that denazification policy ended in failure or was not completely carried out. However, the matter was not so simple for the democratization in postwar west Germany. Although denazification was not completely carried out as a whole, it contributed to change in the German top leadership in the postwar era. American army authority appointed the persons on the “White List, ” who were anti-Nazi or non-Nazi, and could be pro-American to the post of leadership after the examination of denazification. They proceeded to democratization with collaboration with the American Military Government. Hence, antidemocratic power could not be strong when the Federal Republic of Germany was establised.Nevertheless, denazification of the middle class was not fully carried out. Since the influence of Nazism mostly penetrated into the middle class, it was impossible to eliminate the influence completely by denazification.

著者

川村 陶子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2000, no.125, pp.180-196,L21, 2000-10-13 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

49

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The official concepts of foreign cultural policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, formalized in three policy papers issued in the 1970s, preempt the philosophy of cultural activities in the interdependent and globalized world of the late 1990s. In the three papers, the German government does not actively constitute a “national culture” through presenting publicly authorized cultural elements to people in foreign countries, but it rather promotes transnational relations by encouraging free activities by various social actors across national borders.The formalization of these uniquely “liberal ” concepts —or, the “reform” of foreign cultural policy— resulted from multiple factors at different levels of the policy process concurring during the period from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. Although students of German politics might be tempted to regard the “reform” as a variable dependent upon general political change such as the formation of the social-liberal coalition and Willy Brandt's new Ostpolitik, the reality of policymaking and the content of policy papers, such as the key idea “enlarged concept of culture”, cannot be explained by such a parsimonious model.By tracing the history of the policy process, especially the development of the philosophy of cultural relations itself, one can recognize two factors which were of vital importance for the formalization of new concepts: the changing identity of policymakers, which lay at the base of the very formation of the Brandt government, and the reform initiative within the policy process taken by Ralf Dahrendorf, then the Parliamentary State Secretary of the Foreign Office. On the one hand, the quest for a new “FRG-identity” in the transition period of postwar international relations, which also meant the quest for a new Federal Repubulic open toward the world and contributing to international cooperation, was embodied in the “enlargement of the concept of culture” in the new philosophy. On the other hand, Dahrendorf influenced the making of the policy papers not only in the sense that he took the first step in the “reform” process of the Foreign Office, but also that the opposition party in the Bundestag felt obliged by this popular sociologist to organize a parliamentary inquiry committee for foreign cultural policy, which would produce a thorough report supporting the core of liberal ideas proposed by Dahrendorf himself.Although Dahrendorf left the Foreign Office within 10 months, he played a decisive role in the formalization of new concepts because Dahrendorf, with his progressive liberal theory and distinguished career in the Anglo-American social scientific field, personified the new identity and reform-mindedness of FRG-policymakers at that time. The fact that he could not stay in office for a long time indicates that the genuine Reformeuphorie was transient, but the timing for his initiative was good enough to get the “reform” started. The new concepts of the official FRG-cultural relations are not the byproduct of Brandt's new Ostpolitik, but, through the personality of Dahrendorf, rather reflects the Zeitgeist of the time, which sought for democracy and open-minded transnational cooperation in a changing world.

著者

倉科 一希

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.134, pp.42-55,L9, 2003-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

67

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This article discusses the development of the Junktim between East-West disarmament/arms control negotiations and German reunification and the changes in American policies regarding the Junktim under the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. It argues that the United States government at that time changed the Junktim in order to make current disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union possible. At the same time, the Eisenhower administration did not enforce the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to abandon the latter's objection to the issues relating to European security and to accept the US policy changes in these matters.The Junktim was established as a US policy and as a common Western policy in 1955-56. The Eisenhower administration had inherited a policy of the Junktim from the previous administration. Discussions about US disarmament/arms control policies before and after the Geneva four-power summit meeting in July 1955 reconfirmed this policy with the support of all major members of the administration, including Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. The major Western allies had agreed to a Junktim between European security and German reunification before the Geneva summit meeting, but the British, the French and the West Germans soon found themselves divided regarding the definition of this Junktim. US efforts to close the gap among Europeans led to agree another Junktim between German reunification and arms reduction by stages as an allied position in May 1956.The Eisenhower administration tried to change the Junktim in order to widen the range of discussions with the Soviets. First, Stassen tried to define the first stage of an arms reduction proposal which would be implemented without progress toward German reunification. After Stassen's failure in 1957 and departure in the next year, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles opened a way to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviets and the British without discussing German reunification. After a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin in November 1958, President Eisenhower and the newly appointed Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, connected nuclear test ban negotiations with Berlin negotiations in order to improve prospects of the latter.These US efforts upset Bonn, but Washington did not totally neglect Bonn's concerns. First, Washington modified the Junktim but did not abandon its principle. Second, Bonn's objection against accepting European security measures without progress toward reunification was recognized by the Eisenhower administration.Washington's effort to modify the Junktim indicates its willingness to negotiate with the Soviets and its desire not to destroy the alliance with the FRG. This study shows the second half of the 1950s as a dynamic period of the Cold War and gives a hint that can explain the developments in the following decades.

著者

三尾 真琴

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.121, pp.140-156,L15, 1999-05-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

70

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The purpose of this paper is to portray two different aspects of Hizbullah: that of a radical armed organization-some scholars refer to it as a typical “terrorist” organization, and as a “social welfare party, ” especially for Shiite communities. In addition, through the study of relations between the Hizbullah and other actors, this paper tries to point out its effects on Lebanese society and on politics of the Middle East.Hizbullah was born in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon. It is not always clear by what process it was established and organized. It is estimated, however, that Hizbullah is composed of several independent sects leaded by a collective “Ulama, ” like Iran. At present, members of Hizbullah are around 15, 000 and it has come to share influence on the Shiite population with Amal.The basic goals and strategies of the Hizbullah are 1) establishment of a Lebanese Islamic state modeled on Iran, 2) Liberation of south Lebanon (a “security zone” occupied by Israel), 3) struggle against Israel and support for the establishment of a Palestine state, 4) the abolishment of “confessionalism, ” which refers to fixed rights and political power given to each religious sect, 5) support for Shiite communities. In order to complete these objectives, and especially in order to liberate south Lebanon and fight against Israel, Hizbullah took Western foreigners hostage and performed “suicide” bombings against buildings such as the embassy or military compounds of Western powers in Lebanon in the 1980s.Since 1992, however, Hizbullah carried out a big change in accordance with the realities of the Lebanese political system and became one of the political parties representative of Shiite communities. Because Hizbullah took great care of agriculture, infrastructure, school education, social welfare in Shiite residences, which the Lebanese government has been ignoring so far, it gained support in Shiite communities and took twelve seats in the Lebanese parliament in 1992.It is true that Hizbullah is increasing its political power in Lebanese society. However, the situation surrounding Hizbullah is quite complicated. For example, most of Hizbullah's budget still depends on Iran, and much of the freedom given to Hizbullah is only allowed by Syria. Furthermore, the relation between the Hizbullah and Christian sects, a domestic matter, has remained strained and dangerous. Therefore, this paper concludes that we need to study Hizbullah from the point of view of political relations in the Middle East, and at same time from that of religious balance in Lebanon.

著者

土佐 弘之

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.110, pp.195-198, 1995-10-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

斎藤 正寿

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.113, pp.199-201, 1996-12-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

石田 勇治

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.96, pp.51-68,L9, 1991-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

82

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The election of an avowed monarchist, seventy-seven-years old Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as the president of the Weimar Republic in April 1925 symbolizes the remarkable continuity in political attitude of the Germans from the time of empire to the republic. Many of them were uncritically attached to the old “Kaiserreich”.In spite of the total defeat and the revolution 1918-19 the aims and roles of imperial German policy in the outbreak of the World War had not yet been clarified. Every government during the Weimar period blocked full disclosure of the empire's war aims and engaged in a political cover up.It was the Independent Socialist Kurt Eisner, head of the revolutionary government in Munich, who released special reports in November 1918 showing the responsibility of the German Empire for the beginning of the World War. Eisner wished to discredit the old regime and persisted in purging the representatives of the “Kaiserreich”.Threatened by Eisner's revelation the foreign ministry insisted that such a free debate about the war guilt question would make the peace negotiations unfavorable to Germany. The new foreign minister Urlich Graf von Brockdorff-Rantzau decided to take the lead and refute any charges that Germany had made preparations for the war in 1914 and was responsible for it. He was determined to exonerate the imperial German policy.After the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty in June 1919 the foreign ministry planned an antiwar-guilt campaign. With the purpose of revising the treaty the foreign ministry mobilized the Germans beyond all classes and parties and lead a national movement (“Volksbewegung”) against the Allies' verdict on Germany's war guilt. A War Guilt Section (“Schuldreferat”) was established in the ministry which should direct research and discussion about this question at home and abroad in favour of German foreign policy.The purpose of this paper is firstly to describe how the war guilt question was dealt with in the German foreign ministry at the first stage of the Weimar Republic. It will show the process how the antiwar-guilt campaign was formed and developed.The second purpose is to analyze the meaning of this campaign for the Weimar political culture. Its influence on the radical-right thoughts and movements such as Nazism will be also discussed.

著者

クラインシュミット ハラルド 仙石 学

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.96, pp.69-84,L10, 1991-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

67

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The article seeks to demonstrate the wide range influence of the principles of cultural nation-building in Weimar Germany. Cultural nation-building is understood as a set of administrative measures designed to build a ‘nation’ in Germany, held to be ‘split and torn’ by class struggles and pressures from abroad, by means of the cultural traditions as manifested in classical literature and art. These principles were laid down in the Weimar Constitution of 1919 (dealt with in section 2); and they were supported by the professional organizations of lower middle class artisans (section 3), the Social Democrat based popular education movement (section 4), and various intellectuals (section 5).Hence, while it has always been known that nation-building was an issue argued for by the right, it becomes clear that the issue received wide support also in the center and the moderate left. Therefore, the conclusion seems safe that the isolationist tendencies in Weimar Germany (as forming the basis for Nation Socialism) resulted from a general current in political life.

著者

田嶋 信雄

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.112, pp.189-191, 1996-05-18 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

鹿島 正裕

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1996, no.113, pp.135-151,L15, 1996-12-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

56

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The third Arab-Israeli war of 1967 quickly ended in an overwhelming victory for Israel, in what is called the “Six-day war” by her. At that time, the Arab countries claimed that the United States had participated in the war on the Israeli side, and severed diplomatic relationship with her. Because the U. S. -Egyptian relationship had already been bad before the war, and the Israeli aerial attack was far more efficient than Egyptians had expected, they suspected U. S. -Israeli complicity. In fact, the Johnson administration had repeatedly warned Israel not to initiate hostility, while trying to organize an international fleet to deter Egypt from the use of force. The Arab side, however, continued to maintain that the United States had encouraged Israel to attack Egypt in order to weaken the revolutionary Nasser regime. The then unofficial spokesman of Nasser, Mohamed Heikal, still does so in his recent thick book “1967 al-Infijal (outbreak)” (Cairo, 1990), which is based on declassified documents of the United States and Egypt.According to him, when Egypt demanded the United Nations Emergency Force (which had been stationed in Sinai Peninsular since the 1956 Suez War) to leave from the Israeli border area, United Nations Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche, an American, advised Secretary-General U Thant not to accept partial withdrawal, thus provoking Egypt to demand total withdrawal and to occupy Sharm el-Sheikh and then close the Strait of Tiran for Israel. It was an American plot to give Israel a casus belli. After that the United States warned Egypt, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, not to initiate hostility while hinting to Israel that she would not, unlike on the occasion of the Suez War, support any United Nations move to sanction Israel if she attacked Egypt.On the American side, serious studies based on declassified documents as well as interviews with then policy-makers have been accumulated, some of which expressly try to refute the Egyptian accusations. I have studied and compared these books and articles, checked many of the documents and interviewed some people myself, and concluded that it is not that the United States “unleashed” Israel to attack Egypt, but that the Nasser regime itself let, through a series of miscalculations, the Egyptian military provoke Israel into war. However, Israeli decision-makers were wise enough not to attack Arab forces prematurely—they gave time to the U. S. and Britain to try to organize the international fleet. When the Johnson administration found the efforts rather fruitless, it was in fact inclined to let Israel help herself. In this sense the United States was involved in the political process leading to the outbreak of the war.