著者

小川 浩之

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.136, pp.79-96,L10, 2004-03-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

63

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The purpose of this paper is to examine how the Commonwealth has experienced enlargement and changes after the Second World War. In this attempt, particular attention is paid to South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961. The Government of the Union of South Africa under H. F. Verwoerd made an application to remain within the Commonwealth as a Republic, but eventually decided, or was virtually forced, to withdraw the application as a result of strong criticism against apartheid mainly from Afro-Asian member countries. Therefore, the Republic of South Africa was established on 31 May 1961 outside the Commonwealth. As increasing number of newly-independent states joined after 1947 (when both India and Pakistan became independent and then joined as new members), the Commonwealth which had been originally formulated by Britain and six ‘white’ Dominions was transformed into a multi-racial institution. The major character of the ‘old Commonwealth’ was that the member states maintained traditional ties among the peoples of British origin and did not regard each other as ‘foreign’, while, at the same time, the mutual recognition of internal and external autonomy was the central raison d'étre. However, as newly-independent non-white countries joined one after another and the norm of racial equality was strengthened, both the old intimacy and the conventional principle of mutual non-interference were increasingly faced with strong pressure.In those changes which the Commonwealth has experienced, the disputes about apartheid among the Commonwealth countries and the departure of South Africa marked a crucial turning point. Firstly, the departure of white-dominated South Africa clearly demonstrated that the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs of member states was increasingly under pressure from the norm of racial equality. Secondly, the often uncontrollable and open rows over South Africa's racial policy symbolized the fact that the old intimacy had been largely curtailed as newly-independent members added ‘alien’ elements into the Commonwealth. Thirdly, the sequence of events culminated in South Africa's departure made some of the original members such as Britain and Australia feel increasingly discontent with the ‘new Commonwealth’ and therefore facilitated the centrifugal forces working in the Commonwealth relations. Britain's attempts to accede to the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community (EC) in the 1960s and the early 1970s were noticeable examples of the centrifugal tendencies. However, at the same time, the inter-Commonwealth disputes on racial issues such as South Africa's apartheid in 1960-61 and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Smith regime of Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) in the mid-1960s can also be considered as inevitable hurdles which the Commonwealth had to tackle in the process of becoming a truly multi-racial association.

著者

河本 和子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.152, pp.19-35,L6, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

57

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This study illustrates the gender norms embedded in the socio-political orders in the Soviet Union in the past and in the Russian Federation in the present days, and also sketches how they differ each other and why. For this purpose the author examines following two aspects: the basic principles on women's role and the actual circumstances of women in the society.In the Soviet ideological principles, all the people, including women as well as men had to work. They thought that wage work would make women economically independent so that they would eventually be emancipated. The Soviet government actually encouraged women to find employment and in later period the number of female workers even slightly exceeded that of male, though female wages in general remained lower.This line of thought appears to exclude the existence of the gender notion. There was, however, another line. The Soviet government not only encouraged women to work but also expected them to bear children and take care of families as mothers. Women then had to do most of housework other than their daily jobs. This so-called “double burden” was mitigated to some extent by the state support in order that female workers could meet their responsibility at work and at home. In other words, family life was not simply a private matter but a matter of the state's concern.In spite of the heavy burden, women seemed to generally accept their gendered role with lower-wage work and housework duties, particularly if their husbands earned more. However, some soviet writers insisted especially in the period of Perestroika that women would prefer to stay home if possible economically.After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been no definite governmental principles on women's role as in the Soviet period. However, political and economic liberalism, which the new Russian government has adopted at least theoretically, has a certain influence on the women's position. Political liberalism draws a line between public and private affairs and this newly introduced ideology, combined with the severe economic crisis, has led to the cut-off of the state support to family. Economic liberalism justifies the dismissal of female workers for they are more expensive than male.Under these circumstances the number of female workers was drastically reduced. However, many women are still working and they represent almost half of the entire number of workers. Several researches show that women in Russia want to work rather than stay home even if possible economically. Same researches also demonstrate that women think that they should take the responsibility of doing housework and indeed they do so. Women's “double burden” and their attitude toward it survived the regime change at the present moment.

著者

西田 敏宏

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.139, pp.91-106,L12, 2004-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

48

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The most prominent champion of internationalism in prewar Japan was Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro, who led Japanese diplomacy from the mid 1920s to the early 1930s. However, Shidehara's policy, while based on international cooperation, was sometimes inclined toward unilateralism. How can we explain this contradiction?In order to answer this question, this paper analyzes Shidehara's perception of Japan's position in the world, particularly in East Asia, where Japanese foreign policy was mainly pursued. This paper focuses on the period during and after World War I. For this was an important formative period for Shidehara's policy of international cooperation: It was a time when Japan faced radical changes within its diplomatic circumstances and eventually began to pursue a policy of international cooperation, which became predominant in the 1920s. It was also a time when Shidehara, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1915-19 and then Ambassador to the United States until 1922, played an increasingly important role in leading Japanese diplomacy, thus establishing himself as leader of the new policy of internationalism.The main idea of this paper is that Shidehara had a strong conviction that Japan was in a special position in East Asia. During World War I, Shidehara pursued a policy of demanding from the Great Powers recognition of Japan's superior position in China. The underlying assumption of this policy was that Japan, unlike other powers, had vital interests in Chinese affairs, and Shidehara began not to doubt that assumption. After the war, Shidehara fairly successfully adapted himself to the worldwide trend toward international cooperation, abandoning the imperialistic policy of the past. He played a pivotal role in the rapprochement between the United States and Japan as one of the delegates at the Washington Conference of 1921-22. Shidehara, however, continued to hold the belief concerning Japan's special position in East Asia, which he declared at that very conference.Shidehara himself believed that the perception of Japan's special position in East Asia was compatible with the policy of international cooperation. Yet in reality the former would turn out to be an important constraint on the latter. Shidehara's perception of Japan's position in East Asia noted in this paper also meant putting a limit on internationalism in prewar Japan.

著者

有賀 貞

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1978, no.60, pp.164-170, 1978-10-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

殷 燕軍

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.110, pp.175-188,L16, 1995-10-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

52

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The letter to John F. Dulles from the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru on December 24th, 1951 is an important document of Japan's policy towards China after World War II. It has been regarded as Dulles's composition by existing research. But, in historical documents of the government of Taiwan, this writer found that when Yoshida Letter was being drafted, the government played an important role, especially in stating the keywords in the letter: “be applicable in all territories which are now, or which may hereafter be under the control of Government of the Republic of China”. And this writer proved that the important decision that includes these keywords was made not by Dulles but by the government of Taiwan under unavoidable conditions as a result of prior consultation between the United States and Taiwan.During the period of conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, the government of Taiwan gave up the rights to make claims for reparations for Taiwan in order that the United States would support to join the treaty. However, because of the opposition by Britain and the other countries, Taiwan was forbidden to join the treaty. By considering global strategy, and furthermore to isolate China who had been fighting in Korea, the United States required Japan to settle the dispute with Taiwan and conclude the Japan-Taiwan Treaty. At that time, the United States persuaded Taiwan to yield on the problem of the treaty so that it was not applicable to mainland China and to propose a detailed scheme of it.Although Taiwan was persistent with her sovereing power over mainland China for a while, she had to propose a detailed applicable scheme of the Japan-Taiwan Treaty to the United States because of the pressure from the United States and the necessity of early conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan. The United States, on the other hand, was required by Taiwan to show the evidence that Japan would positively conclude a peace treaty with Taiwan.The word of application in the draft of Yoshida Letter which was presented afterwards by Dulles during a talk between Dulles and Yashida came from the very scheme of the government of Taiwan. The Yoshida Letter can be regarded as a result of the prior agreement between the United States and the government of Taiwan and as evidence raised by the United States to Taiwan that Japan would really conclude a peace treaty with Taiwan. The procedure of the negotiation concerning the Japan-Taiwan Treaty has also proved that the word of application came from the government of Taiwan.This article base on positivism proves the relationship between Taiwan and Yoshida Letter, which was an important document in Japan's China policy. The elucidation that Taiwan had played an important role in the procedure to draft the Yoshida Letter has practical significance to understand Japan-China relations during the early period after World War II, the relationship between the procedure of the United States's policy planning towards Japan and the government of Taiwan and the triangular relations among China, Japan and the United States.

著者

黒川 修司

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1981, no.67, pp.159-163, 1981-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

土屋 大洋

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.155, pp.155_109-125, 2009-03-20 (Released:2011-07-10)

参考文献数

30

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This paper analyzes political connections using a method based on network theory. Recent developments in network theory, which have been accelerated by advances in computers and data collection, can be applied to various research areas including physics, information society studies, sociology and other social sciences.This paper uses network theory to analyze networks among U.S. senators who submitted bills related to Japan in the 109th Congress, focusing on cosponsorship of bills. Senators sometimes submit bills with other senators to make them more prospective, to gain more attentions, or just to deal with political bargains. This paper assumes that senators who co-submit bills more often have tighter connections and organize wider networks. Although it is difficult for an outsider to know who has what kinds of connections with whom in politics, it is easier to track who acted with whom in co-sponsoring bills in Congress.The results of the analysis show that Japan-related bills were led by influential leaders in the senate such as Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton and Joseph Lieberman, who played important roles in the 2008 Presidential election. They were active in submitting and co-sponsoring bills and had higher scores in network indexes such as degree, between centrality, and closeness centrality. This implies two possible hypotheses. First, those influential leaders themselves were interested in Japan-related issues. Second, no specific senators were interested in the issues and that is why the influential senators seemed to be leading. These hypotheses should be tested in combination with other analytical methods.Network analysis has three advantages. First, it focuses more on relationships among actors instead of looking at the characters of individual actors. Most of conventional analysis methods look at who actors are and what they do. In contrast, network analysis focuses on who is connected to whom and how. Second, the development of network analysis and data collection could give us alternative perspectives and new results based on large amounts of data. Third, network analysis could be used not only for proving hypotheses, but also for finding new ones.Network analysis can be applied both to case studies in international relations and to enriching the theories of international relations. Actors in international relations vary from nation states (or governments), multi-national or global corporations, non-profit or non-state organizations, and even to individuals. Network analysis tells how they are connected and how they are interacting. It should reveal more dynamic relations rather than stable structures.

著者

河野 勝

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.218-221, 2001-02-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

近藤 釼一

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1965, no.28, pp.133-137, 1965-04-27 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

大畑 篤四郎

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1960, no.11, pp.85-98, 1960-01-31 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

85

著者

長谷川 毅

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.90, pp.70-90,L10, 1989-03-30 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

62

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Opinions vary as to whether the Soviet Union has accepted the concept of deterrence in formulating its national security policy. In the author's opinion, the Soviet Union may have in the past rejected deterrence theory as developed in the United States, but it has not only accepted the classical meaning of deterrence as defined by George and Smoke, but also such a concept has until recently become the foundation of its military policy. This article attempts to trace the evolution of Soviet deterrence policy since World War II.During the post-war Stalin period (1945-1953), Soviet deterrence policy was determined by two factors: belief in the inevitability of war and strategic inferiority. Stalin believed that the United States would start a war against the Soviet Union by launching a surprise nuclear attack, and that such a war could be prevented only by raising the cost that the US would have to pay in such an eventuality. Stalin thus took three specific measures to deter such war: he developed Soviet nuclear weapons, took an offensive strategy against Western Europe with the superior Soviet conventional forces, and strengthened strategic defense.The second period was a transitional period, in which Stalin's military doctrine was attacked from two directions. First, the theory of the inevitability of war was rejected by the political leadership. The rejection of this Marxist cannon was first proposed by Malenkov, but later taken up by Khrushchev. The long process of decimation of the Marxist approach to war had thus begun. Nevertheless, Khrushchev attempted to salvage Marxist orthodoxy by insisting on the Soviet quest for military superiority as the guarantee of peace and on belief in victory in nuclear war. Secondly, Stalinist military doctrine was attacked by military theorists who began to assess positively the role of a surprise attack with the use of nuclear weapons at the beginning of war.The crack created in Stalinist military doctrine in the transitional period led to the nuclear revolution in the third period (1959 to 1966/67). Nuclear weapons were recognized as the most decisive weapons in modern warfare, while the Strategic Rocket Force was created. During this period, however, Soviet deterrence policy moved in the opposite direction of that of the US, in a direction that emphasized deterrence through damage limitation by adopting a first-strike counterforce strategy.The Soviet recognition of the possibility of limited war around 1966/67 had a profound impact on the evolution of Soviet strategy. For the first time there emerged a possibility of sparing the Soviet homeland from a US attack even in case of a world war. This led to the idea of keeping its strategic weapons as strategic reserves to be used as second-strike retaliatory weapons. Also, this contributed to lowering the importance of strategic defence, leading to the Soviet acceptance of ABM ban. These factors set the stage for arms control with the US. At the same time, however, Soviet NATO strategy began to move in a more offensive direction. This time, Soviet strategy envisaged destruction of NATO theater nuclear weapons by conventional means, while leaving its own theater nuclear weapons as reserves in case NATO decided to go nuclear.In the last half of the 1970s, the Soviet leadership moved to accept mutual deterrence by removing the two pillars of Khrushchev's military doctrine: the quest for military superiority and the belief in victory in nuclear war. Yet, the notion that the correlation of forces was inexorably moving in favor of the Soviet Union led the Soviet Union to overemphasize the military factor in its foreign policy and to pursue an activist policy in the Third World, whereby contributing to the perception of a Soviet threat among its adversaries.Brezhnev's policy invited a backlash from the West. Particularly, the US decision to deploy INF in Europe and to launch SDI threatened what the Soviets had gained in the pr

著者

松永 泰行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.141, pp.1-9,L5, 2005-05-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

10

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This issue, comprising of eight research articles and one review article, is focused on “the Middle East in International Relations” and comes in the midst of another structural change in the international environment of the Middle East. The previous change resulted from the collapse of the Cold War structure on the global level. Although the change affected globally, the Middle East was one of the first to experience its impact through the way the transregional actors reacted to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The current structural change, however, is more specific to the region and relates to the latter's relationship with the only remaining superpower, the United States. This time, the change followed the 9/11 attack, which is said to have forced the U. S. policy-makers to fundamentally reconsider the relationship between the U. S. and the Middle Eastern states and societies. How this change in international relations will affect the Middle East as a whole and a multitude of state and subnational actors in the region remains to be seen. Yet the transformative processes apparently have already been under way.The articles assembled here differ from one another in their perspective on the Middle East. Some examine recent developments; others focus on historical relations. For the purpose of this introduction, three different perspectives can be identified.The first perspective concerns the relations between the only superpower and actors in the Middle East. The United States, as a transregional actor, stands out in its resources and capacity and is capable of entering into relations with a host of state and subnational actors in the region. Sakai's article adopts this perspective and examines the mutually collaborative relationships between the U. S. Government and a number of anti-Hussein Iraqi groups before and after the U. S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.The second perspective concerns some types of intra-regional dynamics and developments. Tateyama examines the post-Oslo Accord Peace Process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Matsumoto assesses the state of democratization in the region by comparing the party systems in ten Arab states. Yamamoto examines nine Arab states in terms of their policies on controlling internet connections. Kashima's review article examines four theoretically-informed monographs on regional intra-state relations.The third perspective concerns the Middle East as a foreign policy issue. Three articles by Hanzawa, Takayasu, and Okuda, examine British foreign policy historically during separate time periods. All, however, focus on England's dealings with another foreign power of the time on the matters relating to the greater Middle East.

著者

奥薗 秀樹

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.65-80,L11, 2001-02-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

58

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Since the outbreak of the Korean War, South Korean government had heavily depended on the U. S. government for their military and economic security as a frontline state during the Cold War. Park Chung Hee and his Revolutionary Government, which emerged as a bearer of Korean nationalism through the 1961 military coup d'état, faced a difficult question: how to strike a balance between its self-reliance as an independent nation and excessive dependence on the U. S. government as a junior partner within the Cold War regime. The purpose of this paper is to examine how Park and his government struggled for Korean self-reliance while avoiding total dependence on the U. S.. To this end this paper focuses on the following three points.First, this paper examines Korean nationalism as a causal element of the 1961 Coup and an ideological basis of the Revolutionary Government there-after. Analysis of remarks which Park and the graduates of the Korean Military Academy, the main actors of the Revolutionary Government, made before and immediately after the coup, shows that their independence-orientedness and distrust of the big powers became the keynote when they formulated its foreign policy, at least for some time.Second, this paper examines how the Park Administration's perception of the U. S. at the beginning and how the perception transformed as time went on. The Revolutionary Government, in spite of their distrust of the U. S. government, came to conclude that the presence of the U. S. Forces in Korea and their economic assistance were important for preserving Korean independence amid the Cold War conflict. Because of the dilemma they faced, Park and his government had to re-define the balance between its self-reliance as an independent nation and dependence on the U. S. in terms of the reality surrounded them.Finally, this paper examines actual policy steps which the Park Administration took as attempts to achieve Korean self-reliance. Among them, the Revolutionary Government regarded, as the most important steps, its developments in social-economic dimension and improvements of people's everyday life in addition to the build-up of its military power and completing of anti-communism. However, Park's attempts to achieve these things by itself reached a dead end after a while and they realized there was no way other than “temporary dependence” on the U. S. to preserve Korean independence.In the end, Park's struggle for self-reliance resulted in “temporary dependence” on the U. S. However, we have to notice that Park's quest for self-reliance did not end in spite of the acceptance of “temporary dependence.” His endeavour at acquiring Korean self-reliance carried on at all occasions and with his full energy. In this sense, the “temporary dependence” was literally temporal and did not mean “overall dependence” or “subordination” to the U. S. government.

著者

永野 隆行

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.134, pp.86-102,L13, 2003-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

48

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The purpose of this paper is to examine Australian attitudes towards international relations of South East Asia in the late 1960s. In this period, the British government under Harold Wilson began reviewing its defence commitment East of Suez, having in mind a drastic reduction or complete withdrawal of British troops. With domestic pressure to keep defence expenditure down increasing and uncertainty over the tenure of bases in Singapore becoming looming, Britain was leaning in the direction of relinquishing its military hold over Singapore/Malaysia region, which had long been a symbol of the British Empire. Separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, in particular, brought policy makers in the UK home to the vulnerability of the British military positions under the fluctuating Asian political scene. The US commitment to the region was also experiencing drastic changes. Prospect of the Vietnam War obscured the future United States attitudes towards its commitments in South East Asia.Since Britain expressed its intention to pull out its forces from Singapore/Malaysia, the concerned powers, Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and the United States held quadripartite talks on several occasions, which gave the Australians to express their views on the issue. Australia, on the brink of losing ‘security blanket’ the British had provided in the South East Asian region, had strong concerns about the developments in the British thinking about their defence role in the region. Contending that Britain had and would play an important role in the security of the region, and that any British decision to withdraw would have a destabilising effect in the region, Australia argued that Britain should stay as long as possible. Moreover, Australians feared that the British withdrawal would precipitate American disengagement from the region.On the other hand, Australia sought to keep its options flexible and open as to its commitment in the region as long as possible. Although the Australians fully understood that the long-term security of Australia rested in the stability of the areas South East Asia, in the circumstances filled with unknown factors, Australia was not able to make a move forward.In this paper, a particular attention would be paid to the development of Australia's thinking as to its role in the security of the region for the 1970s. We would focus on the period between the British enunciation of its intention to review its defence posture in the region and the Australian government's announcement of its intention to maintain its forces beyond the British withdrawal.

著者

塩崎 弘明

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.121, pp.33-53,L7, 1999-05-21 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

140

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The dominant cause of Vatican Diplomacy and its position at the end of the Cold War, or at the collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc, could be found not only in its Ostpolitik of 1963 to 1990, but also in its previous history of the secret contacts with the Soviet government from 1919 to 1929. To the promoters of the Vatican's Ostpolitik, the Cold War brought to conclusion a policy which had existed from the Russian Revolution to the Revolution of 1989.During the First and Second World Wars, the Holy See, the international spiritual and moral organization under the leadership of the Popes, resumed an active role in international affairs. The war unexpectedly increased the importance and extent of Vatican Diplomacy. Both World Wars coincidentally ended the Vatican's isolation and ushered in a new phase of Vatican Diplomacy, which dates lasted until reign of Pope John XXIII and encompasses the new enemy, Stalinist communism. This remained the clear and continuing enemy of the Holy See until the 1960's.John's “Opening to the East” and the subsequent policy of Ostpolitik developed by Agostino Casaroli in the 1960's and 1970's, illustrate the policy of equidistance between the communist world and the west that has characterized Vatican Diplomacy since early 1960's. The election of a Polish Pope, John Paul II, and the emergence of a new Soviet reformer, M. Gorbachev, contributed to accelerate the coming of the Revolution of 1989 that culminated in the end of the Cold War. Vatican Diplomacy, however, still faced great challenges.To the Far East, the Cold War is not yet over for the Holy See. The Vatican's Ostpolitik has signally failed to penetrate the “bamboo curtain” around China and some of its neighbors. However, Vatican Diplomacy is, more than anything else, expected to promote the spiritual and human values that will become crucial points in international relations in the near future.

著者

竹中 千春

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1984, no.76, pp.186-189, 1984-05-25 (Released:2010-09-01)

著者

田中 世紀

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2009, no.158, pp.158_165-181, 2009-12-25 (Released:2012-02-20)

参考文献数

58

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Why are economic sanctions initiated? This paper will describe through quantitative analysis the conditions under which a state or states impose economic sanctions against autocratic regimes. Conventional wisdom argues that norms or interests are important factors leading to the initiation mechanism: economic sanctions are likely to be imposed against countries which violate democratic norms or do not have significant trade ties with sender states. Norms or interests, however, can not explain the actual pattern of initiation of economic sanctions.In this article I propose that reputation is a key factor in the pattern of initiation of economic sanctions. Specifically, economic sanctions are imposed when the sender's reputation is about to be questioned. To put it another way, states do not consider initiating economic sanctions for purely coercive diplomatic purposes, but rather for the maintenance of their reputation. When does reputation matter? This paper assumes the higher the international concern, the higher the stakes for a state's reputation. For example, when the international community pays great attention to a situation, states must do something to maintain their reputation; but states need not do great things—simply doing something is enough. It follows that states do not implement strong economic sanctions, but rather use weak economic sanctions because the sanctions themselves are implemented as symbolic gestures. I refer to this as the symbolic hypothesis.I use panel probit analysis to test this symbolic hypothesis. The data include 24 sanctions initiated by the EU against African countries from 1990 to 2001. The results of my analysis show that the EU tends to impose economic sanctions in reaction to coups, grave violations of human rights, and major states' misbehavior, all of which seem to draw a great deal of international attention. In contrast, the EU is likely to ignore the retreat of democracy and/or minor states' misbehavior, which do not draw public attention. Concerning the type of economic sanctions, my analysis finds that the EU prefers to use relatively weak and costless sanctions such as suspensions or reductions of economic aid, rather than choosing strong and costly alternatives such as trade embargos. All of my results confirm the symbolic hypothesis' predictions. Economic sanctions, after all, are initiated when the senders' reputation is at stake.The findings also challenge the central paradox of economic sanctions concerning why such sanctions continue to be imposed despite seemingly having little effect on the target states. States do not coerce other states to do what they desire, but instead they continue to be forced to use weak economic sanctions, which might be ineffective, to maintain their reputation.

著者

藤田 泰昌

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2010, no.160, pp.160_108-121, 2012

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What explains the differences in the frequency with which developed democratic countries resort to dispute settlement (DS) under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO)? The present paper proposes three hypotheses: 1) Countries with small constituencies frequently use DS in the GATT/WTO, 2) Countries with few veto players measured by the number of government parties use DS frequently, and 3) Countries with a competitive agricultural sector tend to use DS frequently. The purpose of this paper is to show that both of the two domestic political institutional factors, constituency size and number of government parties, are important determinants of GATT/WTO filing.<br>Existing literature have seldom analyzed these two political factors simultaneously. This is because they not only belong to "consensus model" (Lijphardt 1999) but also are highly correlated. As such, they are often considered as two sides of the same coin and it is rendered useless to put them in the same set of analysis simultaneously. However, there are some studies, such as Nielson (2003), that argue that constituency size and number of government parties, may have opposite effects on foreign policies. This latter finding thus urges us to study the impact of these factors more closely in a combinational manner. The present study employs Qualitative Comparative Analysis as a method to examine combinational effects of the two factors.<br>The result of the analysis shows that either of the following two combinational conditions leads an advanced democracy to become a frequent complainant. First, as "consensus model" indicates, countries with both small constituency and small number of government parties are frequent complainants. Second, countries with competitive agricultural sector and either small constituency or small number of government parties frequently resort to DS. The latter combinational conditions indicate that frequent complainant countries need not have both small constituency and small number of government parties, as in "consensus model".

著者

溝渕 正季

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.178, pp.178_73-178_87, 2014

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Since 1903, the year when Wright brothers made a success of building the world's first successful airplane and making the first controlled, powered and sustained heavier-than-air human flight, airpower has developed astoundingly as an essential component in modern warfare. Up until today, it has been demonstrated by several modern wars. At the same time, however, this was not always the case. In unconventional warfare (or asymmetric warfare, "Non-Trinitarian Warfare," "Fourth Generation Warfare,"or "War amongst the People"), airpower was not able to play a significant role, and sometimes it even caused a negative impact. In these wars, since the opponents usually disappear among "people," it is always very challenging to find and attack them without causing any collateral damage. Taking up the Israel's airpower in the Second Lebanon War (July/August 2006) and the Gaza War (December 2008/January 2009)—these are the two most recent wars in which airpower was employed on the non-state armed group—as the case studies, this article discusses the following questions: Is airpower really incompetent for unconventional warfare? If not so, what would be the essential role for airpower? What airpower actually can and cannot do?<br>Based on the rigorous analysis of the wars in Lebanon and Gaza, the article leads the following three conclusions: Firstly, the impact which airpower could cause to warfare is limited. As in conventional wisdom, while airpower is an important and powerful arm of military force, airpower alone does not lead victory for modern wars. This is true for at least unconventional warfare, in which the enemy has no specific "center of gravity" and blends into the urban, mountainous or forested terrain, as in cases of Lebanon and Gaza. In addition, if they did not have enough information for the opponents, airpower could rarely give significant damage. Although it is the case, the collateral damage will be ineluctable if the opponent disappears in the crowd. Secondly, however, airpower is not always incompetent in conventional warfare under certain conditions. There are two key factors: (1) interoperability between the air force and the ground force, and (2) intelligence about the enemy. As in case of Gaza, when these two factors were fully established in pre-war period, it is possible to cause heavy damage to the enemy. Ensuring the qualitative military edge over the enemy is also important as well. Thirdly, it is essential to minimize the collateral damage. No matter how the cutting-edge military technology is overwhelming or the joint training exercise and the intelligence about the enemy are adequate, however, it is almost equivalent with losing the game if there was significant collateral damage. In case of Gaza, IDF was successfully bearing down the enemy physically, but too much collateral damage turns such a "victory" into "defeat." In any of these wars, Israel's security environment never been improved in the history.<br>It is certain that airpower will keep playing one of the important roles in war given the technological progress in recent years. At the same time, they will face with a dilemma about the cost effectiveness between "rising war expenditure" and "acceptable level of cost." Just by looking at the current situation in Syria (as of June in 2014), it is clear that unconventional warfare is still happening and will happen in the future. This leads the importance of further research for both direct and indirect role by airpower going forward.

著者

皆川 修吾

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.104, pp.35-49,L7, 1993-10-10 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

21

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This paper attempts to find out how the clientelist groups work and what part they play in the process of political institutionalization. First, the paradigm of institutionalization process is tentatively presented in the paper. The paper then locates the political culture in the process of institutionalization. Clientelist behaviour which has been said to be a part of political culture was a key to understanding Soviet politics. Therefore, clientelism associated with Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's leadership was comparatively examined. In conclusion, whether the clientelism is functional or dysfunctional to the political system of transitional period was discussed.A patron-client relationship is an alliance between two persons of unequal status, power or resources, each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself.Under the Soviet regime, clientelist operations were accommodated, if not ideologically, by peculiar institutional set-ups. It was indeed an important aspect of systemic adjusting mechanism in Soviet policy processes.Power politics among contending clientelist groups are in appearance more marked during the transitional period than during Soviet period. That may be so. The paper proves that clientelist politics which are by nature dependable variables, require solid institutional back-ups. Without it, the clientelist groups cannot assert themselves as self-perpetuating elites. It is the latter who can exert a decisive influence upon the course of the Russian political system. One has to admit, however, that the emergence of such an elite cannot be expected unless these groups can pride themselves on the destiny of their own country.