著者
相馬 尚之
出版者
日本科学史学会
雑誌
科学史研究 (ISSN:21887535)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.291, pp.214-232, 2019 (Released:2021-01-24)

This paper discusses the eugenics of Paul Kammerer (1880–1926), an Austrian biologist active from the early 20th century to the interwar period, in context of chance, population, and causality in science. After World War I, selective eugenics permeated Western society. Kammerer, however, asserted that creating good characteristics was more important than eliminating bad characteristics. Kammerer gravitated to Eugen Steinach (1861–1944) and his discovery: "Stainach Operation." When their spermatic ducts are ligated, menʼs bodies accumulate hormones that generate musculature and vitality. According to the theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, these patients might sire offspring who had improved abilities from their start. Kammerer advocated vasoligation as a method of his alternative claim: "productive eugenics." Kammerer was led to this curious advocacy by his obsession with causality and insufficient understanding of "population thinking." Population thinking, a new way of scientific thinking that Francis Galton (1822–1911) established, considers population phenomena not from the accumulation of individuals but from the whole populations themselves. Galton introduced statistical methods to analyze population phenomena and gave science new statistical laws to replace old Newtonian. Kammerer, however, resisted the concept of chance mutation and the application of statistics, and insisted that the highest aim of science was the clarification of the relationship between cause and effect. Kammererʼs bizarre productive eugenics and even his reappearance as the father of epigenetics show that the longing for causality is an inevitable trap for scientific thinking.
著者
加藤 聡
出版者
日本科学史学会
雑誌
科学史研究 (ISSN:21887535)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.290, pp.112-125, 2019 (Released:2021-01-24)

John Harris (ca. 1666-1719) was a fellow of the Royal Society of London. He is known for his masterpiece, Lexicon technicum (1704). As the first encyclopedia written in English, his work enjoyed considerable success and was frequently reprinted through the eighteenth century. My article examines Harrisʼs compilation method and publishing strategy. I aim to account for his success within its historical and intellectual context. The first section of the article addresses the early history of the Royal Society and the writings of its members, John Evelyn (1620-1706) and John Dryden (1631-1700). Under the influence of academies active in Florence and Paris, they argued that the modern English language had been corrupted by exaggerated expressions. To remedy the situation, they promoted plain style and unified usage of expressions. The next section focuses on Harrisʼs proposal, entitled Lexicon technicum magnum (1702), so as to interpret his strategy for publication. He used this proposal as a sample to show the typefaces and quality of papers to be used in his planned encyclopedia. He also declared that his compilation was to be sold by subscription in order to avoid financial risks. In addition, he was able to collect a large number of experiments from various dictionaries and journals and summarize them by plain explanation. Finally this article argues that Harris used his proposal in a very strategic way and reveals that he was heavily influenced by his predecessors not only in England but also in France and other European countries.
著者
松野 誠也
出版者
日本科学史学会
雑誌
科学史研究 (ISSN:21887535)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.290, pp.144-161, 2019 (Released:2021-01-24)

The Japanese Imperial Army worked on the production of liquid chlorine when it began research and development of chemical weapons that appeared in the WWI. The objective was to have liquid chlorine produced by commercial companies and delivered to the army. However, this project failed because of the high costs and lack of demand for the product in the civilian sector. Subsequently, the Japanese Imperial Army took up the challenge to procure the regular supply of liquid chlorine through dual use. This was made possible because disarmament allowed for increases in the research budget. It was also based on the initiative of Colonel Taneki Hisamura, who investigated in detail the chemical combat capabilities of European countries and the United States. Japan deemed it essential to realize the production of liquid chlorine in order to secure the raw material of the chemical agent. Having a total war in mind, Hisamura hoped that the liquid chlorine industry would cooperate with the military in times of war. His plan was to develop bleach that used liquid chlorine as the raw material. He believed that, if such a product spread, the civilian demand for liquid chlorine would soon expand. In the case of Japan, the dual use promoted by the army succeeded in the development of the liquid chlorine industry. In this way, the Japanese Imperial Army built a system that enabled mass production of liquid chlorine in peacetime.
著者
雨宮 高久
出版者
日本科学史学会
雑誌
科学史研究 (ISSN:21887535)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.290, pp.126-143, 2019 (Released:2021-01-24)

Japanese researchers who initiated fusion research were of the common view that “fusion research should start from basic research.” However, the A-plan (“developing and realizing new ideas”) and the B-plan (“building medium-sized devices”) proposed in March 1959 by Kakuyugo Senmonbukai (the Special Panel on Nuclear Fusion Research, established in 1958) of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission under the auspices of the Prime Ministerʼs Office took a different view from the above-mentioned common view. These future plans led to an intense dispute that in later years was referred to as the A-B plans dispute. A particular focus of the A-B plans dispute was the B-planʼs aim of building in Japan the type of medium-sized devices that had obtained some success in foreign countries. Many previous studies have emphasized the influence of the second United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (September, 1958) on Senmonbukaiʼs drafting of the B-plan; but in addition to this, domestic arguments also had a strong influence, such arguments arising from the results of questionnaires that Kakuyugo Kondankai (Nuclear Fusion Research Group) had carried out about how to proceed with nuclear fusion research, and the insistence of some researchers, especially experimentalists, that the B-plan should be carried out as “basic research of engineering.” At first, many Senmonbukai members approved the implementation of the B-plan. However, Kakuyugo Kenkyu-iinkai (the B-plan committee) did not resolve a type of the B-plan device. Therefore, some Senmonbukai members changed an opinion and didnʼt agree with the B-plan. Subsequently, the B-plan was postponed.
著者
舘野 淳
出版者
日本科学史学会
雑誌
科学史研究 (ISSN:21887535)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.289, pp.22-38, 2019 (Released:2021-01-24)

In early 1950s USAEC launched the strategic step of R&D named “Power Reactor Demonstration Program” in the nuclear power reactors development. The purpose of the program was to enlist private resources to demonstrate the technical and economic feasibility of power reactors. In this program, the light water reactors established a basic design concept in a short development period, but it was economically unsuccessful. After that, reactor manufacturers were able to make light water reactors successful products by pursuing economic efficiency by means of increasing the scale and the power density of reactors, though these reactors were technologically unmature. Such procedure of the development led to weakness of the reactors in safety, that is, core melting due to loss of cooling function.