14 0 0 0 OA 戦争研究における合理的選択アプローチと心理学アプローチ
- 著者
- 籠谷 公司
- 出版者
- 日本感情心理学会
- 雑誌
- エモーション・スタディーズ (ISSN:21897425)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.3, no.1, pp.30-37, 2017-10-01 (Released:2018-01-10)
- 参考文献数
- 44
This article reviews the recent development of war studies with a focus on the rational choice and the psychological approaches. Scholars in international relations have been studying the origins of war. A traditional theory, Realism, emphasized power as the determinant of international outcomes. However, it did not explain how the distribution of power induces the onset of war. Rationalists connected the missing link by highlighting crisis bargaining as a key process and described the outset of war as a negotiation failure. Wars occur because of the uncertainty problem, the issue indivisibility problem, and the commitment problem. Psychologists applied prospect theory to international conflict behavior and explained how the possible loss of territories drives states to take the risk and escalate crisis bargaining to the onset of war. The latter approach shows more difficulties in reaching a peaceful settlement. Moreover, scholars start using experiments to examine which is more important to explain crisis behavior. Some studies detect the importance of psychological factors in crisis bargaining. We will develop the understanding of conflict behavior by examining the relative importance of the rational choice and the psychological approaches.
7 0 0 0 OA 多湖 淳 著『戦争とは何か ――国際政治学の挑戦』
- 著者
- 籠谷 公司
- 出版者
- 国際安全保障学会
- 雑誌
- 国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.48, no.2, pp.112-116, 2020-09-30 (Released:2022-03-14)
3 0 0 0 OA 韓国政治指導者の合理的選択としての対日敵対行動
- 著者
- 籠谷 公司 木村 幹
- 出版者
- 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
- 雑誌
- 国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.2015, no.181, pp.181_103-181_114, 2015-09-30 (Released:2016-06-08)
- 参考文献数
- 33
Since the end of World War II, historical legacy has caused a series of disputes between Japan and South Korea. Scholars attribute these repeated disputes to Japan’s failure to settle the compensation problem, American foreign policy toward Japan in the early period of the Cold War, the unequal distribution of national capabilities between Japan and South Korea during the Cold War, and the particularities of nationalism in both countries. The literature emphasizes the peculiarities in the Japan-South Korea disputes. However, this does not mean that we are not able to explain the Japan-South Korea disputes in a systematic manner. For example, Kagotani, Kimura, and Weber (2014) argue that South Korean leaders are more likely to initiate a political dispute with Japan in order to divert public attention from economic turmoil to Japan-South Korea disputes. What else drives South Korean leaders to start a political dispute with Japan? In this article, we focus on South Korean leaders’ motives and policy alternatives to explain how a trade dispute evolves into a political dispute between Japan and South Korea. We assume that a South Korean president is a policy-oriented actor and prefers to take a soft line toward Japan to manage Japan-South Korea relationships. The president also needs political support from the legislature in order to implement public policy. As the presidential approval rate declines, a candidate for the next president tends to behave as a hard-liner to attract public attention, and the legislature follows the candidate, not the president. To implement good public policy, the president is required to maintain his/her popularity and take a hard line. Given such political constraints, we examine the president’s choice. When the president faces a large trade deficit, he prefers to start a trade negotiation with Japan, not to initiate a political dispute to divert public attention. Only if the negotiation fails, the president initiates a political dispute by addressing historical legacy because issue-linkage can induce mutual concessions, and because even a concession in the political dispute, not the trade dispute, can help the president maintain his/her popularity in order to move back to a soft-line in the subsequent periods. Thus, the president often engages in this diversionary tactic and a trade dispute often evolves into a political dispute. We test whether a trade deficit is more likely to induce more South Korean hostile actions toward Japan. The statistical analysis using the event data confirms that trade imbalance favoring Japan often causes a political dispute regarding historical legacy. The case studies of Presidents Rho Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam reveal political decisions behind the escalation of Japan-South Korean disputes.
2 0 0 0 外交的抗議のラリー効果についての包括的研究
外交的抗議は軍事的行動や経済制裁とは異なり、標的国の国民に物理的な損害を与えない。しかし、安全保障政策が顕著な争点である限り、外国からの否定的な声明でさえも標的国の国民の間に愛国心を引き起こすかもしれない。自国の国益と相手国の対外政策が相反する場合、抗議をしなければ事態の更なる悪化を招き、抗議をすれば相手国内の反発や相手国からの強硬策を招いてしまう。それゆえ、外交的抗議のジレンマが存在する。こうした学術的背景を踏まえ、本研究では「いかなる場合に外交的非難がラリー現象を引き起こし、国家間の緊張を高めるのか」という学術的問いの答えを探す中で、外交的抗議のジレンマの解決策を探る。