著者

雨宮 民雄

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.71-83, 2004-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

20

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The denial of time is the foundation of European manner of thinking. History teaches us that Europeans have always tried to construct their World from self-identical beings which presuppose the denial of time. The most typical timeless beings are Platonic Ideas. Ideas descend from eternal World into the stream of time and make things what they are. Two kinds of time representations, B-series (earlier-later relation of moments) and A-series (past•present•future) are both devices for controlling actual time. Proofs of the Unreality of Time are essentially mere declarations of European manner of thinking. This author confirms the fact by examining proofs by Parmenides and McTaggart.

著者

柳本 武美

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.151-164, 2003-12-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

14

---

Scientific epistemology, which showed innovative developments in the last century, has been expected to involve various implications. Among other things, penetrating criticism of absolute truth to scientific theories is an important one. The concepts developed in relation with this knowledge skepticism include falsifiability, holism and theory ladenness. It looks, however, still sparse to develop their implications to research designs employed in usual research programs. This article attempts to provide five important requirements for obtaining evidences of high quality, and to discuss the relationship of these requirements with scientific epistemology. Special emphases are placed on how to cooperate for obtaining many individual scientific findings and also on how to take account of relativism in scientific researches.

著者

太田 雅子

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.1, pp.15-27, 2004-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

11

---

It is thought that the problem of self-deception is difficult to treat because it includes a paradox. I investigate under what conditions self-deception occurs, rather than how the paradox is solved. I think one of the important conditions of selfdeception is that the two apparently contradicting beliefs coexist without either of them being unconscious. After surveying the discussions concerning whether self-deception is intentional, I focus on the role of "motivation", following Alfred Mele, and try to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of self-deception on the basis of the motivations and situa-tions of the self-deceivers.

著者

福井 謙一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.1, pp.29-42, 2004-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

8

---

The notion of truth conditions of sentences or psychological states plays important roles in various areas of philosophy, but authors who appeal to this notion rarely explain exactly what attribute of those entities truth conditions are. Indeed, there are two notions (not always clearly distinguished) that can legitimately be called the notions of truth conditions, and these are definable by reference to different semantical frameworks. It turns out that there is an important systematic relationship between the two notions, explicitly definable within Kaplan's theory of demonstratives, and this reveals that the two kinds of truth conditions are to be attributed to entities of different ontological types.

著者

中川 大

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.21-32, 2003-12-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

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In this paper we intend to place the early Russell in the context of the refutation of idealism in the school of Meinong. We look into Mally's arguments against idealism, which have recourse to Russell's paradox, and Meinong's critique of them. Then we propose the hypothesis that the early Russell made up his thought in the Meinongian framework. From this point of view, we could point out that the origin of the paradox might be in the early Russell's criticism of Bradley's idealism. And Wittgenstein's resolution which could make Russell's theory of types dispensable might be compared to Mally's method of arguments which Meinong never adopts.

著者

井上 治子

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.2, pp.119-134, 2003-12-30 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

7

被引用文献数

1

---

This paper is an attempt for clarifying what made Hume adapt such an obscure notion as sympathy in establishing the system of passions. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to see that his basic strategy in the Treatise is to hold the analogy between the two systems of the understanding and passions, and that sympathy is intended as the phenomenon in which this analogy is explicitly demonstrated.

著者

前田 高弘

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.29-42, 2003-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

13

---

The aim of this paper is to show that some form of direct realism concerning vision is false. Section 1 defines what it is to see things directly and identifies naïve realism as the target of criticism. Section 2 criticizes naïve realism by arguing that we cannot phenomenally be conscious of three dimensional shapes of physical objects, and also explains how we see physical objects and why we are naïve realists before starting philosophical thinking. The final section concludes with some remarks about the character and limits of my argument against direct realism.

著者

Joseph Johnson

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.57-77, 2003-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

22

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Chomsky claims that linguistics will become part of biology and that truths about language can be given in terms of facts about the brain. While allowing that psycholinguistic structures may be objects of science, I argue that any account of language must involve more than descriptions of the states of individuals. This implies that many linguistic truths cannot be reduced to neurobiological facts, or even captured on the psychological level within Chomsky's framework. Chomsky's rebuttals to arguments of this sort are examined, but found wanting. This leads to anomalous monism and doubts about whether propositionally construed entities will find analogues in brain science.

著者

浪岡 淳

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.79-94, 2003-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

37

---

In this paper I focus on the roles of proprioception and of perception in forming the cognitive picture of ourselves as physical agents in the world. Our proprioceptive awareness is plausibly characterized in terms of its distinctive epistemic unmediatedness and constancy, and this fact may seem to support the view that the primary core of our self-conception is constituted by our proprioceptive self-awareness, not by ordinary modes of self-perception. I criticize some main arguments for this view, and suggest that the proper understanding of the significance of proprioception needs the appreciation of its intricate involvement with our perceptual bodilyawareness. I conclude with the remark that the notion of basic action should be restored on this epistemological footing.

著者

飯野 勝己

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.1, pp.107-120, 2003-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

10

---

In speech act theory, there has been a tendency to concentrate investigations on the single utterance of a sentence. In my opinion, this tendency seems to originate based on a tacit and unproven premise: namely, an illocutionary force should dwell in each single utterance. In this paper, first, I take up the texts of Austin and Searle as examples, and try to show how this premise was smuggled into the theory. Then I argue that there are cases where we do an illocutionary act not by making a single utterance, but by making a group of utterances ("conversational sequence"). Through these examinations, I conclude that the premise in question is to be replaced by an alternative one: Sometimes-or maybe fundamentally -an illocutionary force dwells in a conversational sequence.

著者

浜野 研三

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.29-40, 2002-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

14

---

This paper deals with the question of why intentional vocabulary is distinctive. The question arises from the comparison of the status of normative discourse in the philosophies of W. Sellars and of W. V. Quine. While Sellars gives a significant role to normative discourse, Quine does not. I call into play Bjφrn Ramberg's attempt to combine insights of R. Rorty and of D. Davidson to herald the emergence of what he calls a post-ontological philosophy of mind. Ramberg makes it clear that Rortian pragmatism has every reason to accept openhandedly Davidson's claim of the distinctiveness of intentional vocabulary. On the basis of Ramberg's achievement, I conclude that Sellars's position is more productive than Quine's.

著者

柏端 達也

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.41-54, 2002-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

28

---

W.V.O. Quine's relation with nominalism is complicated and controversial. In one context Quine has been attacked for being "nominalistic", while in another context he has been attacked for not being "nominalistic". Furthermore, Quine considered himself to have abandoned his early "nominalistic" views, but those who attack him for being "nominalistic" do not overlook his conversion.In this paper, I first clear up the misconception about Quine and his association with "nominalism". Then I point out the genuine problems of Quine's nominalism. Finally, I suggest several ways to solve those problems. The solution recommended in this paper is the one suitable for the sailors of Neurath's ship.

著者

浪岡 淳

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.95-111, 2002-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

39

---

Against the prevalence of the social construct view that the concept of a person is a social artifact like that of a nation, most notably David Wiggins offers a more naturalist alternative. He compares "person" to a natural kind term as it is elucidated according to the theory of direct reference, and restricts in effect the extent of personality to the animal kingdom. In this paper I shall examine his proposal and argue for an intermediate position; the concept of a person is much closer to a natural kind concept than social construct theorists maintain, but not so close as Wiggins suggests. Indeed, the social constructionism and Wiggins's naturalism are just two consequences of the untenable ontological dichotomy of natural things as real and artifacts as nominal. A better understanding of the concept of a person requires much deeper appreciation of the reality of natural-cum-artifactual kinds of things.

著者

井上 直昭

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.15-26, 2002-05-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

24

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This paper deals with C. Wright's strategies to establish Frege's logicism. They essentially depend on Frege's Theorem (FT), i.e. the derivability of Peano-Dedekind axioms from the second-order logic plus Hume's principle (HP). HP says that the number of the concept F is identical with that of G if and only if F is equinumerous with G. By regarding HP as the explanatory principle of the number of a concept, Wright seems to assert that FT has already shown that Frege's logicism has been completely established. On the contrary, Frege regarded HP as unsatisfactory for establishing the foundations of arithmetic. It is powerless to decide whether the number of the concept "not identical with itself" is the same as Julius Caesar. This problem is called Julius Caesar problem (JC). Thus if Wright were right, historical Frege would have been rashly convinced that HP alone would not resolve JC, so that there had been no problem such as JC. I think, however, that JC is a genuine trouble to Frege's logicism and then Wright's strategies do not establish it.

著者

水本 正晴

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.27-42, 2002-05-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

14

被引用文献数

2 2

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Wittgenstein was intrigued by the idea of experiments where subjects see their own body through mirror or screen, and move their body relying solely on that visual information. But it is not so clear why such experiments are so important and what they are supposed to show. In this paper I argue that such experiments reveal our naive conception of the relation between intention and body, which is based on two specific models; namely, criticize both of them, and draw some alternative pictures.

著者

吉田 伸夫

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.57-68, 2002-05-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

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A state function which describes some quantum phenomenon includes two types of information in a mixed form: the information on the probabilistic behavior and also on the physical state of the system. The aim of this paper is to show that it is possible to separate the probability information from the description of a quantum process. This is done by applying the consistent history method by Griffiths, Omnes, GellMann, and Hartle to the path-integral formulation. The remainder should be an elementary physical process, the realization of which presumably obeys the law of probability.

著者

浪岡 淳

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.69-83, 2002-05-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

23

---

The recent anti-Lockean Animalists hold that the so-called problem of personal identity is a matter of persistence of a living organism and charge the traditional Lockean view with some ontological puzzles as to how we can be a kind of animals. This newcomer proposal, however, makes it difficult to understand the importance of our distinctive psychological nature, and results in analogous puzzles about the relation between an animal and its body. The problem is to bridge the gap between the mental and the biological so as to make an entire picture of ourselves, i.e. persons as a kind of animals essentially endowed with affluent psychology. A promising solution is to abandon the reductionist assumption prevalent in this controversy and to accept our persistence as primitive relative to both the psychological and the biological continuities.

著者

浪岡 淳

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.1, pp.85-99, 2002-05-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

25

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In his posthumous work, The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans persuasively maintained the incoherence of the concept of "quasi-memo-ry", in favor of the famous circularity objection to the Lockean analysis of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity. Evans' argument against quasi-memory illustrates that the so-called "circularity" is an inevitable consequence of the phenomenon of the identification-freedom (or immunity to error through misidentification) of our thoughts. His conception of this phenomenon implies a plausible interpretation of the circularity objection, which is firmly opposed to the prevailing reductionist theories of personal identity and aims at a sort of non-reductionism. However, it does not entail, and indeed is incompatible with, the current "Non-reductionism", i.e. the view that personal identity is a bare fact completely independent from any kind of continuity and that a person is a pure Ego beyond elucidation.

著者

清塚 邦彦

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.35, no.2, pp.15-28, 2002-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

20

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In "Meaning, Truth and Evidence" (1990), Davidson took issue on Quine's empiricist theory of meaning and knowledge. The point at issue was the concept of 'stimulus meaning' which Quine defined in physiological terms. Davidson argued that physiology should not matter much either in the theory of meaning or in epistemology. This criticism was pertinent to Quine's theory of meaning (Quine eventually abandoned the concept of 'stimulus meaning' itself). But, as I shall argue, it had little effect on Quine's epistemology: though it prompted minor changes on Quine's part, Quine's physiological bent in epistemology was retained, and justifiably, in the face of Davidson's criticism.

著者

西脇 与作

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.34, no.2, pp.25-44, 2001-11-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

19

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The common concept of sex has consisted of many factors, like culture, tradition, scientific fact, and personal experiences and so on. As a result, it includes several prejudices. To explain the true nature of sex, we may have two different types of cause, ultimate and proximate causes, which the variational model of the modern evolutionary theory has and which we cannot find in the usual normal state model. And why-type question is generally answered by using the ultimate causes, and how-type question by using the proximate causes.Using two different types of cause, we explain the development, the structure and the adaptation of sex. In particular, the adaptive explanation of sex, consisting of the explanation of the existence of sex, sexual selection, and the sex ratio, shows not only the mystery of sex but also the emergent meaning of sex.Then we analyze the philosophical meaning of two different types of cause and their relevant problems. Genetic determinism and naturalistic fallacy are interpreted from the ultimate point of view. Lastly the convention, which is introduced as a local law in biology, is clarified naturalistically.