著者

渡辺 博

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.2, pp.33-41, 2006-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

著者

竹内 泉

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.2, pp.57-69, 2006-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

5

被引用文献数

1

---

We can extract some information from a wrong testimony. There have been some systems of propositional modal logic called logic of beleaf and knowledge, and they explain this extraction. On the other hand, predicate logic for wrong testimony has not been studied enough. This work proposes a logical system of predicate modal logic which explains such extraction. Especially, our logical system explains the extraction from a testimony which involves misidentification of individuals.

著者

谷川 卓

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.93-107, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

23

被引用文献数

1 1

---

In this paper, I show that David Lewis' theoretical framework is basically sufficient to solve the problem of causal preemption. Causal preemption cases have been regarded as a counterexample to the counterfactual analysis of causation. This view is, however, incorrect. Even under the counterfactual analysis, the problem can be solved by adopting the event theory which defines events as properties of spatio-temporal regions. The source of the problem lies in the assumption that two distinct intuitions should be preserved in causal preemption cases. The appropriate event theory is required in order to sort out the intuitions.

著者

前田 高弘

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.123-138, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

21

---

The essence of representationalism as a theory concerning phenomenal character of experience is the thesis that there is no phenomenal difference without a difference in representational content. So, the obvious threat to representationalism is a counterexample which shows that there is a phenomenal difference without a difference in representational content. Indeed, in so far as experiences are treated as representations on a par with pictures or letters or even beliefs etc., such counterexamples seem rife. But, in so far as experiences are treated that way, the phenomenal difference in question can't be explained representationalistically nor anti-representationalistically. The aim of this paper is to show why this is so, and then make a proposal about how experiences should be treated ontologically in order to account for the phenomenal difference in question.

著者

小島 明彦

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.1-14, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

6

---

This paper aims to show a picture of self-knowledge in light of Moran's view. What kind of feature does self-/other-knowledge asymmetry have? Characterizing the first-person authority (FPA) as cognitive immediacy to one's own thought involves the unacceptable Cartesian picture. But any formal or "grammatical" characterization of it cannot explain a distinctively first-personal feature in turn. I suggest that the best way to see self-knowledge with the FPA as substantial one is to take it as consisting of cognitive stance plus practical stance to one's own thought. The source of the FPA itself is not cognitive immediacy, but the kind of immediacy the latter stance has. It is the intrinsic capacity for us to be rational agents, though what does not work in a particular case.

著者

豊島 徹

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.15-27, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

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According to recent researches on middle- or later-Wittgenstein, it has sometimes been claimed that he showed that self-knowledge (at least, one as having a form of propositional attitude) concerning phenomenal experiences was impossible. But his original arguments seem to be unsuccessful. In this paper, I will present another case for the above conclusion, employing some ideas from early-Wittgenstein. If the argument is correct, then it will follow that one cannot know that she herself is in pain, and moreover, that the epistemological problem concerning why self-knowledge about phenomenal experiences has some kind of authority cannot arise.

著者

Shin Sakuragi

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.29-45, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

18

---

The redundancy theory of truth is normally considered to be a form of the deflationist theory of truth. Frege is sometimes counted as an advocate of the deflationist theory, because he emphasizes the redundancy of the truth predicate. In this paper, following Thomas Ricketts's interpretation, I will argue that this is a misunderstanding of Frege's view. Even if Frege is a deflationist, it cannot be because he accepts the redundancy thesis. Indeed, truth plays an indispensable role in Frege's picture of judgement and assertion. In light of his notion of judgement and assertion, what the redundancy of the truth predicate means to Frege will be clarified.

著者

荒礒 敏文

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.47-61, 2005-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

5

被引用文献数

1 1

---

This paper deals with Donnellan's notion of the referential use of definite descriptions. First, I point out that Donnellan's examples in "Reference and Definite Descriptions" are almost exclusively those in which the speaker uses the description demonstratively. Secondly, however, I shall show that his notion need not be so restricted, and that referential use per se comprises the case of what I call "trace-based reference" -a kind of reference a speaker effects by calling the hearers' attention to the traces made by the intended referent. The rest of the paper will be devoted to the discussion of how one can explain and develop this notion.

著者

白井 仁人

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.63-78, 2005-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

The statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics is based on Einstein's idea that a state function does not represent an individual system but describes an ensemble of similarly prepared systems. It has been believed that the statistical interpretation is inconsistent with the NO-GO theorems. However, as shown in the present paper, the statistical interpretation is consistent with the theorems, when we change the concept of momentum, energy, and spin. We discuss whether it is possible or impossible to regard momentum, energy, and spin as characteristics of statistical ensembles of similarly prepared systems.

著者

重永 哲也

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.79-92, 2005-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

8

---

In this critical notice, I point out that there are two problems for Ishiguro's interpretations of Leibniz. First, I argue that her response to Benson Mates in the defense of her interpretation of the principle of substitutivity sal va veritate as providing a criterion for the identity of concepts is not successful. Secondly, I explain why I cannot agree with her interpretation that Leibniz does not mean to eliminate relational properties in his reconstruals of relational propositions by showing that Leibniz's denial of the existence of extrinsic denominations, which he infers from the predicate-in-subject principle, is not consistent with the interpretation.

著者

野本 和幸

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.1-19, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

69

---

First I will characterize Frege's "logicism" epistemologically. His "logicism" is originated from his epistemological claim of the "analyticity" of arithmetic. In order to confirm this, it needs to show that any arithmetic proposition is derivable from the logical laws with the logical definitions alone. Nevertheless there was no such powerful logic in the 19th century, and so Frege was forced to invent the radically new logic.Further Frege understands inferences and judgments epistemologically. He construes an inference as justifying a conclusion based on its premises, and both premises and conclusion as assertions/judgments, which Frege takes as holding true, whereas he regards the justified conclusion as recognition of its truth (knowledge).Frege's "sense" is not only the contribution to the truth-condition, but is also related to the cognitive value of a proposition, to the modes of presentation of the designation, and to various propositional attitudes, as is well known.Second I expound Fregean semantic explanations of logic, and mention Fregean meta-theoretic proof of independence briefly.

著者

松阪 陽一

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.35-51, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

This paper deals with the question of how one could understand the difference between Frege's notion of thought and Russell's notion of proposition. After briefly discussing how one could make sense of Russell's so-called Gray's elegy argument and its relevance to Frege's notion of indirect sense, I will introduce Kaplan's solution to Russell's argument, and try to explain its significance by appealing to a puzzle raised by Kaplan in connection to his notion of valuated sentence. At the end of the paper, I will claim that the most striking feature of Russell's singular propositions as compared with Frege's thoughts is not that they may contain concrete things, but that they are not meant as representations to begin with.

著者

三平 正明

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.2, pp.53-76, 2005-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

38

---

Today everyone admits that Frege is one of the founders of modern logic. However, there is a wide divergence of views on whether metatheory was possible for Frege. Some insist that Frege had virtually everything that was needed to consider metasystematic questions (consistency, independence, completeness); others urge that it was impossible for Frege to raise those questions in the first place. Our aim in this paper is to reexamine the place of metatheoretical considerations in Frege's thought. We argue that usual model-theoretic techniques could not be accepted by Frege because of his distinctive "logic of judgement." But this doesn't mean that Frege was precluded from metatheory in toto. On the contrary, he planned a different kind of metatheory, namely "Neues Gebiet" resting on the permutation invariance method. We point out further two problems concerning this new conception of metatheory.

著者

岩沢 宏和

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.85-99, 2004-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

8

---

In this paper, I will present a set of basic tools by which we understand the difference of the meanings of words between arguers or between arguments. On the assumption that there is one meaning-theory per person per argument, I will deal with several kinds of elements of an argument including statements and circumstances. Specifically, I will introduce a concept of "grammatical statements" (for an arguer in an argument), which are regarded as unarguable truth. Finally, I will suggest that the difference between meaning-theories can be reduced into the difference between the classes of grammatical statements.

著者

坂本 秀人

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.101-117, 2004-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

Through the past two decades, we found a possibility of utilizing unique features of quantum mechanics, such as interferences and EPR correlations as tools to manipulate information. Eventually, we realized there are a couple of restrictions on doing this, i.e., "Possibility of Quantum Key. Distribution" and "Impossibility of Quantum Bit Commitment". This paper aims to explain how quantum mechanics imposes such restrictions and what exactly it means for the "interpretation of quantum mechanics", which has been discussed over a century. This paper also proposes a new view point in which quantum mechanics can be interpreted as a theory of information rather than a descriptive theory of physical reality.

著者

重永 哲也

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.133-148, 2004-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

6

---

Michael Della Rocca, in his "Essentialism versus Essentialism", pointed out that Kripke's defense of his essentialism is made unstable by his limited use of the method of counterparts. But the defense, if trying to get out of this unstable position, would be circular, and therefore turns out to be unable to be justified. Kripke's version of essentialism, by introducing the method of counterparts into it, has a self-under-mining character, so argues Della Rocca. In this paper, I shall argue that these objections of Della Rocca to Kripke are wrong. After reviewing the objections, I shall argue that Della Rocca, when arguing for the circularity of Kripke's defense of his essentialism, is relying on a false premise and shall object to his objections. Then, I shall outline what more appropriate objections to Kripke's version of essentialism would be like.

著者

Masaharu Mizumoto

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.1-15, 2005-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

16

---

Merely saying that someone believes that p does not imply anything about whether the .belief is held consciously and/ or held with certainty. In this paper I will give some analysis of such subjective differences of belief and try to express them in terms of the combinations of familiar epistemic operators such as the knowledge operator K and the belief operator B. Proper formulation of such differences will in turn clarify the interconnection between consciousness and certainty qua prop-erties of belief, and assure us that we do not have to take special care of these properties when we are concerned with formal theories of belief and knowledge.

著者

入不二 基義

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.1-15, 2004-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

This paper aims to update McTaggart's "contradiction" and to rethink the reality of time. According to McTaggart, every event has all of the incompatible A-characteristics. In other words, "past", "present", and "future" are both incompatible and compatible. This is McTaggart's "contradiction". I try to interpret this contradiction as follows: temporal becoming makes A-characteristics incompatible, while fixing them within description makes them compatible, and that temporal becoming and fixing them within description cannot help subsuming each other repeatedly. My interpretation suggests that this updated "contradiction" provides a proper reality of time (not unreality of time).

著者

植村 恒一郎

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.17-29, 2004-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

---

Richard Taylor claims that fatalism can be constructed out of the law of excluded middle. While allowing that his argument is clear and meaningful, I argue that the fatalism constructed from the law of excluded middle considers two different times to be logically independent. This implies that fatalism rejects the flow of time. Michael Dummett criticizes fatalism in terms of the difference between "change the past" and "bring about the past". His trial of the backward causation suggests the weakness of fatalism.

著者

青山 拓央

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.59-70, 2004-12-25 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

9

---

McTaggart has an insight that changes of property rely on changes of tense (McTaggart 1908). As I show in this paper, he fails to define A-series as a series for changes of tense, and therefore his proof for the unreality of time is unsuccessful. A-series found in the proof is reduced to a number of mere indexicals of time, and this reduction is pushed forward in Dummett's defense. My aim in this paper is not only to check the validity of their arguments but to investigate invincible difficulties faced in defining changes of tense. The latter is my main aim, and the former is a preliminary argument for it.