著者

木下 頌子

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.127-141, 2019

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In series of her works, Amie Thomasson has claimed that the revisionary ontology about works of arts is methodologically untenable. Interestingly, her conclusion is drawn from the reflection on the theory of reference of art kind terms. She argues that the "qua problem," which is known as a problem for the causal theory of reference, undermine the possibility of revisionary ontology. The aim of this paper is to critically examine her argument. I argue that even if Thomassonʼs view about the reference of our art kind terms is correct, revisionary metaphysics is still possible.</p>

著者

峯島 宏次

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.2, pp.321-323, 2021

著者

横路 佳幸 高谷 遼平

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.61-83, 2020

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In his "Demonstratives", David Kaplan discussed certain nonintensional operators called monsters. The operators, unlike ordinary ones, change the reference of indexicals by shifting the parameter of context. Although Kaplan denied monsters at least in English on the ground of both the doctrine of direct reference and the principle of compositionality, many monstrous phenomena of singular terms have been confirmed by some semanticists lately, which seems to urge Kaplanian semantics to be revised. In this survey article, we offer a survey of recent developments in the semantics of indexicals, variables, and proper names by focusing on monsters, and give some suggestions about direct reference, monsters, and compositionality.</p>

著者

水本 正晴

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.39, no.1, pp.79-95, 2006

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In this review I comment on the papers in Shiriizu Kokoro No Tetsuhaku, or Philosophy of Mind Series (2004), edited by Y. Nobuhara. This series consists of three volumes, Human Part (vol. 1), Robot Part (vol. 2), and Translation Part (vol. 3). I shall comment on each paper in the first two volumes, since the last one consists of translations of classic papers of philosophy of mind in English-speaking countries.

著者

井頭 昌彦

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.42, no.2, pp.59-73, 2009-10

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Although physicalism is usually understood as an ontological thesis, it is not clear that what implications this position has on the matter of ontology expressed by the question "What there is?" In this paper, I begin with Quine's "indispensability argument," and abstract from it a framework for sorting ontological positions. Then, I try to locate supervenience thesis, which is an important part of physicalism, within the framework above. One conclusion of this paper is that supervenience thesis works, neither as a direct assertion on what there is nor as an assertion on the criterion of ontological commitment we should adopt, but as an assertion on the class of the sentences from which we should extract ontology.

著者

小山 虎

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.85, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-07-03)

著者

筒井 晴香

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.87, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-07-03)

著者

鈴木 貴之

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.2, pp.91, 2020-03-30 (Released:2020-07-03)

著者

竹内 泉

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.53, no.1, pp.25-41, 2020-09-30 (Released:2020-09-30)

参考文献数

10

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In analysing logic of hearsay, the inconsistency of individual notions makes difficulty. Modal logic is suitable for analysing logic of hearsay. The most previous semantics of modal logic such as using possible worlds makes the formula x = y ⊃ □x = y valid. However, in logic of hearsay, it can happen that the quoting person recognises x = y although the quoted person recognises x ≠ y. As such, the formula x = y∧¬□x = y is satisfiable in logic of hearsay. In order to deal with this, this study propose a new semantics with belief structure.

著者

木下 頌子

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.127-141, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)

参考文献数

24

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In series of her works, Amie Thomasson has claimed that the revisionary ontology about works of arts is methodologically untenable. Interestingly, her conclusion is drawn from the reflection on the theory of reference of art kind terms. She argues that the “qua problem,” which is known as a problem for the causal theory of reference, undermine the possibility of revisionary ontology. The aim of this paper is to critically examine her argument. I argue that even if Thomassonʼs view about the reference of our art kind terms is correct, revisionary metaphysics is still possible.

著者

宮園 健吾

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.163-166, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)

参考文献数

3

著者

高谷 遼平

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.23-46, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)

参考文献数

23

被引用文献数

1

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It is a common view in formal semantic theories that the compositional semantic values of sentences in contexts are identical to the assertoric contents expressed by these sentences. Recently, however,there have been challenges to this simple view on the basis of difficulties in theorizing various ‘shifty’ phenomena. In this paper, I argue that these difficulties can be ‘explained away’ by introducing a revised notion of compositionality which allows an expression to have different semantic values in different environments. I then claim that the proposed framework can be not only compatible with the identity but also plausible as a natural language semantics.

著者

四津 雅英

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.93-111, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)

参考文献数

10

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Sometimes an utterance of a (logically) double negative sentence conveys the content of the corresponding positive sentence, and moreover communicates an additional content (e.g., one “weakening” or “strengthening” it) or plays an additional role. Leading accounts of such utterances-Horn's and Levinson's-have some serious problems mainly because they assume that such utterances depend on it that those of the corresponding positive sentence often convey some typical meaning. In this paper I attempt to analyze additional roles of utterances of double negative sentences without such assumption. The analysis seems more adequate than Horn's and Levinson's also in the light of a certain general feature of negative sentences.

著者

鴻 浩介

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.113-125, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)

参考文献数

20

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In this paper, I aim to clarify and vindicate Anscombe's concept of practical knowledge by way of suggesting that some intentional actions are artifacts - i.e. artificial events. Like other artifacts, actions are ontologically dependent upon agents' intention and hence agents can know what they are intentionally doing without any evidence. However, this view comes under attack from skepticism about the reality of artifacts themselves. If artifact kinds are mind-dependent, doesn't it follow that they are nothing but nominal, arbitrary groupings? In reply, I shall argue that artifacts, including actions, are still real in the world we live in because they have characteristic built-in normativity.

著者

金杉 武司

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.59-78, 2018-07-31 (Released:2019-05-02)

参考文献数

9

被引用文献数

1

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What is “otherness”? What is “mind”? Shigeki Noya has been in pursuit of unique answers to these questions through inheriting but confronting the philosophies of Shozo Omori and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This book is positioned as an arrival point of Noya's philosophical investigations. In this paper, I examine how Noya innovatively develops his theory of “otherness” and “mind”, while referring also to the original work of Noya. In addition, introducing criticisms on Noya's previous works, I examine whether new developments in this book provide answers to those criticisms. Last of all, I examine the appropriateness of Naya's theory.

著者

小山 虎

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.1-2, 2018-12-30 (Released:2019-11-27)

著者

鈴木 雄大

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.2, pp.86-91, 2018-12-30 (Released:2019-11-27)

著者

松原 崇

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.50, pp.51-70, 2017-12-20 (Released:2019-05-02)

参考文献数

57

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Deep learning models have already achieved significant results and surpassed other sophisticated models based on features made by experts in various tasks; image processing, sound processing, and natural language processing. They are considered to automatically learn and extract concepts such as “cat face” and “human body” from given big dataset. However, what are indeed called concepts, and how they are extracted? This manuscript provides a rough history of neural networks preceding deep learning, explanation of concepts learned by deep learning models, and then future perspective of deep learning study with (cognitive) neuroscience.

著者

小川 祐輔

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.51, no.1, pp.41-57, 2018-07-31 (Released:2019-05-02)

参考文献数

28

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In this paper, I evaluate Donald Davidson's strategy to escape from “mediational epistemology (ME)”. He presents a critical argument against the crucial idea of ME that conceives of our empirical beliefs as depending on mental intermediaries that convey information to our minds. However, it seems that Davidson shares “inside/outside picture” with ME, and this fact leads him into the wrong direction. After reviewing his approach, I explain which role the picture in question plays within his strategy and argue that, in order to escape from ME satisfactorily, we have to question this picture itself.

著者

榊原 英輔

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.49, no.2, pp.49-65, 2016-12-20 (Released:2017-09-29)

参考文献数

13

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Previous discussion of skepticism about meaning as it appears in Kripke's Wittgenstein has not provided complete examples of an alternative interpretation of a language. Sakakibara recently gave an instance of a nonstandard interpretation of algebra called interpretation Q. The present paper compares interpretation Q and the standard interpretation C of algebra in three respects: complexity of meaning, engagement with reality, and convenience of use. Although both interpretations are equal in complexity and engage with reality properly, interpretation C is superior to interpretation Q because interpretation C alone allows digit-by-digit calculations, which justifies our asserting that interpretation C is the correct one. Since this way of reasoning does not make mention of the linguistic community we belong to, the present case study suggests that the link between language and community is not necessary.