著者

今道 友信

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.20-30, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

著者

安藤 恵崇

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.31-49, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

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This paper is intended as an investigation for the problem of Body in Bergson and Nishida. In the both philosophers, the problem of body plays an important role to overcome the conflict between materialism and spiritualism, between realism and idealism, between subjectivism and objectivism. Bergson’s theory of “Image” defines the representation perceived in function of the possible action of body. But the presence of “Image” rests irreductible. Moreover, when he attempt to include the material world in the “Duration”, he seems to confront with some difficulties. Criticizing Bergson, the philosophy in Nisida’s later period oppose the individual-time-consciousness against the universal-space-matter in dialectic schema, where the matter has expression. We can say that Nishida's, philosophy of Nothingness has possibility to surmount the conflict in the philosophy of “Being”.

著者

谷 徹

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.50-68, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

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This presentation attempts to show how Nishida’s philosophy and phenomenology relate to each other in terms of the “body” and “history”. Roughly speaking, phenomenology bases itself upon the principle that “what appears, appears”[das Erscheinende erscheint].(This is not a mere tautology.)Contrary to the prevalent view, body and history are central issues for phenomenology. Phenomenology describes how the Erscheinendes is initially accomplished and how it appears as a sense-unity. The medium of this process is the body, and the sense that appears through the process plays in history the role of a signifier of direction. These analyses relate to Nishida’s concept of the “historical body”. In today’s historical situation, bodies encounter other bodies interculturally and become hybridized(not only in the biological sense, but in the sense that intercultural encounters influence the constitutive functions of the body). New things appear, and those who live within the framework of tradition can easily lose their way. The dialogue between Nishida’s philosophy and phenomenology, which has already begun, can expand our view of this new reality.

著者

須藤 訓任

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.69-87, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

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Nietzsche sagt: „es handelt sich vielleicht bei der ganzen Entwicklung des Geistes um den Leib: es ist die fühlbar werdende Geschichte davon, daß ein höherer Leib sich bildet.“ In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich das Verhältnis vom Leib zum Geist beim späten Nietzsche am Leitfaden seiner Ansichten über Kunst und Moral aufzuklären. 1. Nietzsche bestimmt den Geist als Selbst-Auslegung der leiblichen Zustände, die aber nicht dem Leib selber zugeschrieben werden, die also als zum vom Leib unabhängigen Gebiet gehörend falsch geurteilt werden; dann entsteht der Dualismus von Materie und Geist(oder Seele). 2. Moral ist im Grund „ein langer Zwang“, d. h. Orientierung und Festlegung der geistigen(nämlich: mißinterpretierten leiblichen)Kräfte, wodurch Möglichkeiten dieser Kräfte zugleich verwirklicht und beschränkt werden; nach Nietzsche hat besonders die christliche Moral durch die Interpretation von bestimmten leiblichen kränklichen Zustände als geistige „Sünde“ die Entwicklung der leiblichen Möglichkeiten gehemmt. Dagegen 3. kann die „dionysische“ Kunst neue virtuelle leibliche Kräfte freilegen und zur Durchführung gelangen lassen, was zugleich die Entwicklung der noch unentwickelten geistigen Kräfte bedeutet. Deshalb will Nietzsche gerade in der Kunst eine Möglichkeit der Überwindung der europäischen Nihilismus erkennen.

著者

石田 正人

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.88-105, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

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This paper develops a comparative analysis of the philosophies of Kitaro Nishida, William James, and Charles Sanders Peirce, who was James’ contemporary logician and lifelong friend. The influence of James on the early philosophy of Nishida is widely known, but there are significant differences between what James and Nishida respectively understand as pure experience. The main view of this paper is that for both Nishida and Peirce pure experience is marked with phenomenal as well as logical unity, whereas James fervently rejected such logical unity. Torataro Shimomura once noted that Nishida was sympathetic with James’ notion of pure experience and that he inherited the term junsuikeiken from James, but not its philosophical content. By focusing on logic in An Inquiry into the Good, this paper identifies striking commonalities between Nishida and Peirce rather than between Nishida and James. Given Nishida’s strong leaning toward logic, on the one hand, and James’ persistent repulsion for logic, on the other, it is unsurprising that this reading receives solid textual support, which may lead to a reappraisal of James’ influence on Nishida’s early philosophy.

著者

石井 砂母亜

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.105-120, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

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Nishida discussed the problem of love in his two philosophico-religious works, “A study of Good”(1911)and “Self-conscious Realization of Nothingness”(1932). At first Nishida considered the essence of religion as “Unity of Human with God”, and love as a “Unifying Act” in “A Study of Good”. His concept of religion seems, however, to have been radically changed and deepened in “Self-conscious Realization of Nothingness”: the essence of religion is not to be seen as an immediate unity of Human with God, but as the retrieved oneness mediated through God’s “Agape”, i.e. His self-emptying love. In this paper, I will explain why such a radical sift has happened. To this purpose, I would like to focus on Nishida’s idea of “Reality” and “the historical world” as a new theme of his later philosophy, heralding a new dimension of dialogue between Nishida’s philosophy and Christianity.

著者

中嶋 優太

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.121-137, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

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When presented with some forms of nature and works of art, we feel they are beautiful. These kinds of experiences are generally believed to be quite different to cognitive experience and are called “aesthetic experience”. This paper aims to reveal what Nishida thought about aesthetic experience through his paper “Problems of consciousness”. In his theory, aesthetic experience is different from cognition, and does not serve a cognitive purpose. However, it is not purely subjective ― it also has an objective aspect. We think that the world of art is subjective and the world of experience is objective, but artists also have an objective world to discuss with each other(“Problems of consciousness”). In his argument for the objectivity of aesthetic experience, he uses Kant’s argument for the objectivity of cognition to argue for the apriority of aesthetic experience. Cognition has its language of concepts as the base of its apriority and, in the same way, aesthetic experience has its language of senses as the base of its apriority. This is called‘pure seeing’ after Fiedler’s theory of expression(“Über den Ursprung der künstlerischen Tätigkeit”). Nishida also argues that cognition and aesthetic experience represent the same reality in their own languages. By arguing in this way, he invokes the unity of apparently diverse experiences, which is one of the main theses of Nishida’s philosophy.

著者

日高 明

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.138-153, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

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Dans l’ouvrage De l’agissant au voyant(1927), Kitarô Nishida écrit que les mots ne sont que des signes, mais apprécie aussi positivement le langage comme corps de la pensée. Cet article se propose de lire ensemble ces deux affirmations en examinant les positions de ce livre. Nishida parle, à cette époque, de la réalité intuitive comme d’un hypokeimenon qu’il définit, en référence à Aristote, comme ≪Ce qui est sujet mais jamais prédicat≫. Cependant l’hypokeimenon n’est pas le sujet grammatical d’une proposition, car il est ≪un concept extrême qui n’est même pas sujet≫. En fait, sujet et prédicat sont tous deux des abstractions de cet hypokeimenon, des choses simplement dites ou écrites. Selon Nishida, la définition de l’hypokeimenon s’interprète donc comme ≪ce qui n’est jamais exprimé par le langage≫. Or si l’hypokeimenon transcende le langage, les jugements n’entretiendront plus aucun rapport avec lui, et ils ne pourront plus constituer de connaissances logiques. Nishida établit alors, d’une part, le jugement comme auto-détermination de l’hypokeimenon et, d’autre part, considère celui-ci comme la limite des déterminations de notions universelles formant des séries subsomptives. Nishida renouvelle ainsi le modèle traditionnel de définition par le genre et la différence spécifique.

著者

米山 優

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.154-158, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

著者

白井 雅人

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.159-162, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

著者

ダリシエ ミシェル

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.119-140, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

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This essay represents an attempt to interpret the philosophy of Nishida Kitarô(1870-1945), through the leading concepts of “unification”, “place”, “being”, “non-being” and “nothingness”, especially emphasizing the relation to Western philosophy as well as Contemporary Japanese philosophy. Nothingness shows us some diffuse traces we would like to clear out with the light of being and the shadows of non-being. For the destiny of being is always to return to the scene of presence. However, once logically apprehended and phenomenologically approached, nothingness reveals a remarkable topological structure, that we try to explain by distinguishing the three main categories of “ontology”, “me-ontology” and “neontology”. Understood in this way, Nishida philosophy can be defined as a radical endeavor to put into question the traditional problems of metaphysics and moral, in particular concerning the distinction between space and place, fullness and void and the relation of the one and the many.

著者

秋富 克哉

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.141-144, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

著者

朝倉 祐一郎

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.145-148, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

著者

浅見 洋

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.149-152, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

著者

熊谷 征一郎

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.153-156, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

著者

レオナルディ アンドレーア

出版者

Nishida Philosophy Association

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.183-158, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

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The notion of locus(場所)is arguably the most important philosophical concept introduced by Nishida Kitarō. Not only did it have a pivotal role in the development of Nishida’s thought, but also it is his most original contribution to world philosophy, and is at the same time a useful tool for understanding the intellectual tradition of East Asia. As such, locus has been at the center of many interpretations of Nishida’s philosophy. However, its relationship to the concept of space has been neglected in the hermeneutical literature, likely to avoid an oversimplifying interpretation of locus as a sort of empty container. However, the fact that locus is more than a spatial arena containing entities does not diminish the importance of the spatial connotations of the concept for its correct understanding. In this paper, I follow the development of Nishida’s ideas of space and time in relation to the basic features of his thought, showing how the recognition of the ontological relevance of the two categories, in conjunction with an implicit shift from a position centered on the idea of time to a position centered on the idea of space, led Nishida to formulate his notion of locus.

著者

メギール イーエン

出版者

Nishida Philosophy Association

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.203-184, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

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This paper has for its principal purpose a description of the logical foundations and special characteristics of Nishida’s basho of Absolute Nothingness, as presented in his philosophical essay “Basho.” This is then followed by a similar description of the concept of Emptiness as presented by Nagarjuna in his Mulamadhyamaka-Karika. Finally, some essential elements of these two concepts are compared and contrasted, and it is shown that due to their completely divergent foundations, elaborations and implications, they express the fundamental concepts of two radically different but complementary ontological approaches.

著者

竹村 牧男

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.8, pp.1-19, 2011 (Released:2020-03-23)

著者

藤田 正勝

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.1-12, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

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Hajime Tanabe übte in seiner Abhandlung “Ich bitte Herrn Prof. Nishida um seine Lehre”(1930)scharfe Kritik an die Philosophie Kitaro Nishidas, welcher sein Vorgänger an der Universität Kyoto war. Er hatte zu dieser Zeit angefangen, mit der Philosophie Hegels zu ringen und sie im Rückgriff auf die Philosophie Schellings, besonders auf dessen Begriff der “Natur in Gott” zu kritisieren. Er wurde gewahr, dass Nishidas Philosophie unter demselben Gesichtspunkt kritisiert werden könne. Schellings Philosophie wurde bereits am Anfang der Meiji Ära z. B. von Amane Nishi in Japan bekannt gemacht, aber der, wer sich zuerst damit auseinandersetzte, war gerade Nishida. Das Interesse für Schellings Philosophie wurde danach schnell grösser. Bemerkenswert ist, dass die Forschungen der Schüler Nischidas umgekehrt Einfluss auf ihn und Hajime Tanabe ausübten. Nishida warf von der Kritik Tanabes angeregt erneut seinen Blick auf Schelling. Diese Geschichte zeigt, dass die Philosophie Schellings in der Entwicklung der japanischen Philosophie eine entscheidende Rolle spielte.

著者

小坂 国継

出版者

西田哲学会

雑誌

西田哲学会年報 (ISSN:21881995)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.7, pp.13-34, 2010 (Released:2020-03-23)

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After systematizing the so called logic of the place as a self-awakening system comprised of the manifold universals in Ippansha no Jikakuteki Taikei(1930), Nishida Kitaro, in his next book Mu no Jikakuteki Gentei (1932), began to discuss the personal world as the world of self-awakening limitation of the place of absolute nothingness itself, which was of ultimate metaphysical reality. The personal world is, as it were, the actual world seen from the place of absolute nothingness, and it is regarded as the world in which the personal I and Thou mutually interact at their foundation, which is absolute nothingness. With the change of his perspective, Nishida’s concept of self-awakening (jikaku)also changed. Up until this time, self-awakening had been thought as “seeing one in oneself,” but it came to be thought as “seeing oneself in the other” or “seeing the other in oneself.” According to Nishida, I meet Thou in the place of absolute nothingness that is the deepest bottom of oneself. Thus, I do not meet Thou in the outer objective world but in the inter-subjective world leading to absolute nothingness. Therefore, the Thou seen at the bottom of I is essentially nothing but me. I am Thou, and Thou are I. I and Thou are one and the same. By the way, Nishida’s notion of I and Thou reminds us of that of Martin Buber. In fact, there are places in both theories that overlap. Both regard I and Thou as interacting and respecting each other’s personality. But Buber talks of I and Thou confronting each other in dialogue, while Nishida thinks of I and Thou meeting at the bottom of oneself. The eternal Thou spoken by Buber can be said to correspond to Nishida’s absolute nothingness. Both eternal Thou and absolute nothingness underlie I-Thou relationship. But eternal Thou is met through a concrete individual Thou; I and Thou do not meet in the eternal Thou. Rather, eternal Thou is thought to be met through the meeting of the I and Thou. Thus, eternal Thou is seen as the result of the meeting of I and Thou, while according to Nishida I meets Thou in absolute nothingness. So absolute nothingness is I, and at the same time he is also Thou. It is thought that such differences represent the differences in their idea of reality, or, perhaps, reflect the differences in the cultural background on which their thinking is based.