著者

服部 圭祐

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.263-276, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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The purpose of this paper is to examine Watsuji Teturo’s unpublished draft “Ethics” in order to shed light on developments in his ethical theory. The draft, which is archived in the National Diet Library, is assumed to be a follow-up of his 1931 paper that bears the same title. However, to our best knowledge, the philosophical and historiographical significance of the text has not been studied up to now. Therefore, this study would be the first attempt to analyze the draft’s significance. The draft is composed of three chapters in analogy to the 1937 and 1942 volumes of Watsuji’s magnum opus “Ethics”. The two works are distinct in terms of Watsuji’s definition of ‘ethics’(rinri-gaku): the draft defines ‘ethics’ as ‘the study of human being,’ whereas the book defines as ‘the study of the ethos’(rinri). The difference suggests that in the draft Watsuji had yet to develop his understanding of human beings in relation to ‘ethos’ as their ontological ground. The draft does not go beyond an attempt at grasping the essence of humanity in terms of its social nature, thereby describing actual human beings as social dynamisms. The above suggests that the main characteristics of Watsuji’s magnum opus consists in its purpose to reveal the nature of ‘ethos’, thereby describing human beings as its products. In other words, it reveals the dual nature of humanity by depicting ‘ethos’ as a dialectical relation between individuals and society. Nevertheless, previous studies tend to neglect the updated definition of humanity, thus overemphasizing the social aspect of human beings. This misinterpretation is probably due researchers’ obliviousness of the existence of Watsuji’s unpublished draft, which sheds light on the intellectual development of his ‘ethics.’

著者

井原 健一郎

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.89-103, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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Descartes’s letter of February 9, 1645, presumably addressed to Mesland (“Mesland Letter”),is considered vital because it seems to provide an explanation of freedom that differs from that found in the Meditations. On this basis, some scholars insist that Descartes changed his view of freedom after the Meditations. Did Descartes change his view? Admittedly, it seems that another kind of indifference was introduced in this letter. In the Meditations, indifference was described as the state in which the will is placed when no evident reason inclines it to do anything. Conversely, in the Mesland letter, Descartes introduced another indifference that can be defined as the positive faculty of the will to determine itself. This new version of indifference seems to be the basis of a new concept of freedom. In the Meditations, it is said that when evident reasons entirely incline us to do something, we cannot but do it; for example, we cannot but give assent to something when we perceive it clearly and distinctly. The novel formulation of indifference in the Mesland letter, however, implies that in a given situation we can do nothing or do the opposite; for example, even when we perceive something clearly and distinctly, we can withhold assent to it or suppose it to be false. Did Descartes thus change his view of freedom? It seems questionable. First, indifference appears in the Meditations too as a positive faculty of the will, although it may not be called “indifference.” Moreover, this work also admits that we have the ability to withhold assent to what we perceive clearly and distinctly or to suppose it to be false. Surely, according to the Meditations, it is possible to do so not at the exact moment when evident reasons incline us, but only after we distract ourselves from them. A strict consideration shows, however, that the same thing is said in the Mesland letter. From the above, it cannot be demonstrated from the Mesland letter alone that Descartes changed his view of freedom.

著者

佐藤 真人

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.105-118, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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L’influence stoïcienne sur la philosophie de Descartes est notée chez les plusieurs commentateurs. Elle se borne pourtant dans la plupart de cas, à notre connaissance, à la morale ou à l’unité de sciences; d’où l’interprétation selon laquelle « suivant la nature » équivaut à « obéir à l’ordre des choses », ce qui est la principale sagesse. Mais, malgré un certain nombre de points communs avec la philosophie stoïcienne, le concept cartésien de la nature se limite-t-il à la sphère éthique ou à l’épistémologie ? Les stoïciens étudient, aussi bien que Descartes, la nature au sens physique, bien évidemment. Et l’un des objectifs ultimes de cette recherche est également chez les deux de contempler la grandeur de Dieu. Quoique la recherche stoïcienne de la nature se renferme dans cette contemplation ou dans la réflexion intérieure, la recherche cartésienne de la nature inclut aussi bien le côté actif de l’art humain que le côté passif de la contemplation, de sorte que la technique est une science inséparable, de même que l’éthique qui en provient, de la considération sur la nature. Étant donné les sens multiples de nature chez Descartes, « l’institution de la nature » pourrait donner aussi plusieurs résultats. Cet article a pour but de présenter, en envisageant ce que la nature peut nous instituer, que trois manières de répondre à l’institution de la nature résident dans trois connaissances pratiques, à savoir, la morale envers la nature de l’homme, la médecine envers la nature individuelle du corps et la technique physique envers la nature en général, et que la philosophie naturelle chez Descartes présente bien, au-delà de l’aspect passif de la recherche stoïcienne, la méthode active et pratique, au moyen de notre libre arbitre en tant que cause efficiente visà- vis de la nature, non seulement pour étudier la nature, mais aussi pour la compléter et la changer.

著者

中野 愛理

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.119-132, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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Although Kant repeatedly states that religion is an inevitable consequence of morality, few people take this seriously. Traditionally, it has been maintained that his ethical system and his theory of religion are theoretically disconnected and that the latter is merely an addendum from outside of his critical philosophy. However, if it is shown that the ethical system involves a teleological conception that necessarily presupposes religious notions such as God, church, and grace, the suggested disconnection cannot be accepted any longer. In this paper, I examine the inner connection between the ethical system and religious notions from such a teleological perspective. In the first section, I outline four possible variants of a teleological conception. In order to get a criterion for discussing which conception best fits Kant’s ethical system, I show that the final end of the system is the highest good in section 2. Based on this result, I indicate that for the sake of the realization of the highest good, it is necessary that I have two beliefs whenever I act towards this end in section 3; the first is the belief that no obstacles can fundamentally prevent the realizability of the highest good, and secondly, the belief that it is possible for a person to make progress towards the highest good. Finally, in sections 4 and 5, I give an answer to the title question: a strong teleological conception is required for Kant’s ethical system. Throughout this paper, I shall conclude not only that Kant’s ethical system is internally connected to the theory of religion, but also that an acknowledgement of this inner connection is necessary for our everyday moral behavior.

著者

石井 雅巳

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.147-160, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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Emmanuel Levinas emphatically reiterates his caustic critique of historiography in Totality and Infinity(1961). For Levinas, “[historiography]rests on the usurpation carried out by the conquerors, that is by the survivors,” and to him, it is a violence of totality that ignores the particularities of the individual and reduces them into a narrative convenient to the victors. In this paper, we first take up the text of Totality and Infinity, where Levinas most explicitly declares his critique of history, and lay out why history is the violence of totality. In doing so, we demonstrate that both ethics and fecundity are deployed as resistance to the violence of history. Secondly, we analyze how Levinas addresses the difficulties that the theory of history in Totality and Infinit faced, in his later works including Otherwise than Being and Beyond Essence( 1974). We summarize our engagement with the other found in the dimension of “trace,” focusing especially on discussions of “survival” and “books.” We then analyze the path of change in Levinas’s strict attitude toward history and the other in the past. The outcome of this series of readings that this paper gains is, first, to show that for Levinas, history and its violence were not just an example of totality to be critiqued, but an important concern closely linked to ethics. Secondly, by analyzing his later writings, this paper illustrates that wary of the violence of historiography, Levinas was seeking a positive relationship with the past and history and that he was once again grappling with the difficulties of the debate faced in Totality and Infinity.

著者

安田 将

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.97-111, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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In his dialogue On the Laws(De legibus), Marcus Tullius Cicero(106─43 B. C.)argues that laws should be something which, when adopted by the people, would allow them to live happy, honorable lives. In the first part(‘Part A’)of book 1, Cicero provides the theoretical foundation for this conception, embodied by the Stoic cosmology. In the second part(‘Part B’), Cicero argues for natural justice independently of this cosmology. In both parts, the naturalness of justice means that justice is common to all. Yet, in Part B, this point does not mean that there is a common ideal state which only a few can correctly recognize as justice, as it does in Part A. Rather, in Part B, all people, including bad people, recognize the basic feature of justice: its naturalness. This change in conclusion cannot be accounted for if, as scholars tend to believe, Part B is a mere appendix, i. e., a repetition of Cicero’s conclusion in Part A, achieved by refuting possible alternatives to his view. In order to provide a reasonable explanation for this change, I intend to start by highlighting the fact that Cicero regards the arguments in both parts as necessary for achieving the aim of this work, i. e., the preservation of the mixed constitution, wherein all people judge what is just or not without leaving such judgments to the few aristocratic leaders. On this basis, I will argue that it is necessary for Cicero to suspend the conclusion in Part A and modify it in Part B, because Part A concludes that the naturalness of justice cannot be recognized by all. The skeptical reservation put forward in Part A seems at first sight to be precisely the perplexing and superficial pretense that scholars considered it to be in the past. Yet, in fact it is necessary. Cicero needs to argue for natural justice as he did in Part B, not A, in order to achieve the overall aim of the work and present laws which can preserve the mixed constitution, i. e., the laws whose justness all people can judge and adopt by their own judgment. In this way, Cicero’s skeptical strategy enables him to evade some ideas from Greek philosophers and unfold his political thought philosophically.

著者

秋保 亘

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.113-127, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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En se fondant entièrement sur la détermination principale de l’esprit humain comme « l’idée même, ou connaissance du Corps humain », la deuxième partie de l’Éthique traite de la nature de l’esprit et de ce que peut l’esprit, c’est-à-dire des divers genres de connaissance. Même chez les commentateurs éminents, cependant, se trouvent une incompréhension à l’égard de cette détermination principale et un malentendu sur le mécanisme de la connaissance imaginative qui constitue l’opération élémentaire de l’esprit humain. Cette incompréhension, à notre avis, revient à celle qui concerne la distinction entre l’idée ou la connaissance qui est l’esprit et la connaissance engendrée par l’esprit. Or, cette distinction, ainsi que le mécanisme de la connaissance imaginative, résulte de la manière dont se produit l’esprit humain à partir de Dieu ou de la Nature qui est la cause de toutes choses. Ou, plus précisément, elle résulte de la place occupée par l’esprit à l’intérieur du processus global qui produit toutes choses naturelles, y compris le Corps humain et les autres corps. C’est pourquoi, dans le présent article, saisissant d’abord la place de l’esprit humain dans le processus global de la production de la Nature tout entière, et ensuite, faisant l’analyse du mécanisme de la connaissance imaginative en considérant la distinction entre l’idée qui est l’esprit et la connaissance engendrée par l’esprit, nous examinerons la structure fondamentale de l’esprit humain selon l’Éthique, et mettrons au clair les propriétés que l’esprit et ses opérations doivent avoir inévitablement en raison de la place occupée par l’esprit dans le processus de la production. Ainsi, à travers notre analyse, nous tenterons de montrer que la théorie de l’imagination dans l’Éthique nous fait comprendre, en en montrant les raisons ou les causes, l’état naturel de notre manière de vivre: nous devons vivre en nous plaçant dans la perspective ouverte par notre corps et nous ne pouvons vivre qu’avec l’illusions et les hallucinations inévitables.

著者

濵田 洋輔

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.145-159, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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Although Ernst Cassirer’s concern is primarily focused on epistemology, he wrote several texts on the history of ethics(especially classical German ethics). He also emphasizes that ethics plays a central role in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, a philosopher whom he greatly respected. Furthermore, the later Cassirer─as a Jew in exile from Nazi Germany─came to assert that a new construction of ethics that can be effective against real social problems is an inevitable philosophical task for his day. However, he did not produce any work explicating his own system of ethics. Why? Beginning with this question, I demonstrate that Cassirer, nevertheless, laid the fundamental foundation of his(unwritten)ethics by widening the application field of Kantian “moral freedom” and that this foundation can be formulated as follows: in order to combat mythical consciousness( symbolic form), which is the only ethical(and social)danger in human life, man must use and promote other kinds of consciousness(symbolic form), such as religious, artistic, linguistic, or scientific consciousness. I then point out some possible problems with this ethical foundation such as the inconsistent variation in his explanations of mythical consciousness in order to directly and exclusively relate the danger of this consciousness to the problems of Nazi Germany; the optimistic view that all types of human consciousness, except for mythical, are morally good; and the lack of serious consideration for actual and concrete social problems or biological and animal elements in human life. Finally, I indicate that what we could learn from these(possible)problems and Cassirer’s attitude toward ethics is, broadly speaking, as follows: we should remind ourselves that one of philosophy’s key tasks is to construct ethics that is effective against real social problems; furthermore, it would not be easy to satisfactorily fulfill this task if one is not prepared in advance or does not take into consideration the real and concrete lives and tangible problems of human existence seriously.

著者

入谷 秀一

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.175-189, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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This paper examines Adorno’s ideas about sexuality and the body. While this approach is quite unprecedented in Japan, it is a theme that has been discussed frequently in Europe and the United States. Opinions are divided among modern women philosophers and feminists about Adorno, whose handling is troublesome. This is because he criticized masculinist values, which had led Western rationalism, while also continuing to obsess over the dichotomy of masculine and feminine principles─naturally with reservations ─as one would find in his indifferent stance on homosexuality. In addition, Adorno only made an insufficient compromise on feminine experiences(as he perceived them), be they about Eros or physical pain. This paper attempts to elucidate this contradiction and inconsistency. This paper considers the contradictions in Adorno’s views on sexual love as something he partly expressed intentionally. He performatively and thoroughly acted as a man, as it were, to reveal its impasse and seize the opportunity for a dialectic self-transformation. Specifically, this approach is observed in Adorno’s disclosure on the weakness of feminine men, who should be oriented toward strength, while showing empathy to determined women who stress their weaknesses and troubles of not being able to entirely become men. However, Adorno is resistant about completely dismantling his stance as a man. This is probably because he had a premonition that the opportunity of self-destruction, which is promoted by an open female stance, could lure people into a trap of violence. For Adorno, this in itself is nothing other than masochism, which feminine men, who are latent homosexuals, have fallen into.

著者

冨田 絢矢

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.191-204, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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It could be said that universalizability is an accepted and plausible thesis for moral discourse. It claims that value-judgments are valid only if they are universalizable. One would not fail to notice that it was R. M. Hare who, in line with Kant, built a unique theory upon the idea of universalizability. Hare presented this thesis not as a substantial claim in normative ethics, but as one based on ‘logic,’ which is counted as an innovation in the history of ethics. Nevertheless, Hare’s argument for this thesis is said to contain a difficulty. According to traditional interpretations, Hare’s second major work Freedom and Reason(FR)left a logical leap. Hare in FR, they say, claims value-judgments are universalizable because value-words have descriptive meaning. However, the trivial fact of descriptive meaning does not logically entail such normative requirements which the universalizability thesis implies. This paper will argue that these traditional interpretations overlook the continuity in Hare’s ethics, namely between his first major work Language of Morals( LM)and FR. The argument for normative requirements of value-judgments in FR presupposes the argument for universalizability in LM. In LM, Hare did argue value-judgments are felicitous only if done in a universalizable manner, for making value-judgments is a form of speech act, i. e. ‘decision of principle.’ Given this, one will easily understand why universalizability as felicity necessarily involve the normative requirements of value-judgements. Put in another way, one will not be able to understand the argument in FR without understanding the one in LM. Hare submitted the universalizability thesis as a ‘logical’ thesis, and the word ‘logic’ here has a wider connotation, which includes internal rules of practice in which we all are engaged. And this indicates Hare’s philosophical insight that why and how we should universalize our value-judgements can only be grasped from the point of view which we have as participants of normative practice.

著者

西川 耕平

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.205-217, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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Dans cet article, nous examinerons la pensée de Foucault sur la loi et le droit et celle de Deleuze, faisant constamment référence au diagramme que celui-ci présente dans son oeuvre sur Foucault. On est encline à souligner, dans les études sur la philosophie française contemporaine, des différences entre ces deux philosophes. Mais, il y a des points communs remarquables dans leurs pensées juridiques, même s’il semble qu’on les ait négligés. Cet article a donc pour but d’éclaircir leur orientation commune dans ce domaine. À cette fin, nous commencerons par mettre en évidence l’interprétation que Deleuze donne de Foucault, et constaterons qu’il est possible de retrouver deux types de loi dans la pensée de celui-ci: une loi stable et une loi instable. Celle-ci, caractérisée comme une réponse à « l’autre », joue un rôle important au moment de la genèse d’une loi ou d’un droit. Puis, nous montrerons que cet aspect de la loi peut se rapporter au thème de « rapport à soi » dont s’occupe Foucault dans ses dernières années. Enfin, nous traiterons de la pensée juridique de Deleuze développée par le terme « jurisprudence », et montrerons qu’elle aussi répond à « l’autre » et s’accompagne du devenir. Nous pourrons extraire de ce qui précède deux points communs entre Deleuze et Foucault: d’abord, tous les deux donnent de l’importance aux processus de fabrication de nouveaux lois et droits à travers la réponse donnée aux cas singuliers, plutôt qu’à travers de simples applications des lois stables; ensuite, ils supposent l’un et l’autre que le sujet n’est pas un sujet tout fait et universel, mais un étant qui se change sans cesse, affecté par le singulier. En bref, le processus de création des lois et droits implique l’éthique de la subjectivation en tant que devenir autre.

著者

小原 拓磨

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.219-232, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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Cette étude traite de la discussion du « brûle-tout » dans Glas(1974)par Derrida et vise à l’élucider à partir de la discussion sur la loi et la justice par le dernier Derrida. L’argument du « brûle-tout », développé sur la base de la lecture de « l’être-essence de lumière » dans Phénoménologie de l’esprit de Hegel, est un principal dans Glas et difficile à comprendre. Derrida dit que des recherches déconstructives ont eu jusqu’à maintenant et auront aussi dès maintenant une problématique du droit, de la loi et de la justice comme leur lieu le plus propre. Suivant cette déclaration, on peut lire la discussion du « brûle-tout » par analogie avec celle de la loi et de la justice. D’abord, la justice derridienne dénonce la violence au moment de la fondation du système légale. L’établissement de la loi est toujours un coup de force en tant qu’il se fait à un lieu sans aucune loi et exclut « l’autre ». La déconstruction commence vers cet autre, et à cet égard elle est la justice. Ensuite, dans Glas, cet autre est discuté comme le « brûle-tout », celui est la consumation insignifiante qui brûle tout complètement, ne laisse rien et n’accumule pas d’histoire. Quand le sujet comme un pour-soi y apparaît, le sens naît et la philosophie ouvrit. Avec cette fondation de la philosophie, la consommation inutile antérieure serait forclose et enterrée. Derrida dans Glas recherche ce moment, c’est-à-dire l’apparition du sujet comme la fondation de la philosophie. À partir d’un mot du texte hégélien, « Opfer (sacrifice)», Derrida découvert que le brûle-tout de la lumière se sacrifie pour la naissance du sujet. Pour la fondation de la philosophie, l’autre se sacrifie, se donne. Il s’éclaire ainsi que l’argument du « brûle-tout » décrit non seulement la forclusion de l’autre, mais aussi son intervention(donation de soi)dans la naissance de la philosophie.

著者

加藤 之敬

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.113-126, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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This paper clarifies Nietzsche’s sense of an ideal human by considering his concept of “genius.” Genius is a traditional concept, and Nietzsche uses it uniquely to express his ideal human in his early period. There are two important points. First, he regards classical Greek culture as the ideal environment for producing a group of geniuses, and he contends that the classical Greek philosophers from Tales to Socrates form a group of geniuses. Second, he was influenced by Schopenhauer’s concept of genius and extracts from Schopenhauer’s view on genius in many of his unpublished works. Focusing on these points clarifies the core of Nietzsche’s concept of genius as “freedom.” He perceives a genius as a free person, in which being free means freedom from others that allows a person to be himself or herself. Nietzsche was influenced by Pindar’s maxim and believed throughout his life that it is important to be oneself. Nietzsche understood a genius as a free person in the sense that she or he endeavors to be herself or himself. The idea of “being oneself” does not mean personally discovering what exists, but personally creating new things. In Schopenhauer as educator, Nietzsche indicates that true selfhood is beyond the present sense of self. Individuals who endeavor to be themselves know their orientations through the models they long to emulate and imitate the models to sublimate what the models embody into their unique forms. Through these activities, geniuses create themselves anew and as unique beings. In sum, a genius, who is Nietzsche’s ideal human, should be a free person in the sense that he or she continually endeavors to create himself or herself.

著者

亀崎 健司

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.157-170, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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Der Zweck dieses Papiers ist, den Seinscharakter der Werte von Scheler zu klären. Insbesondere achtet es auf seinen grundlegeden Teil. Er sagt, dass der Wert objektiv ist. Also öffnet der Weg, um den Wert als objektiv zu denken, durch die Erklärung des grundlegenden Teils. Mit dem Konzept achtet das Papier auf seinen Begriff von Fühlen. Durch erneute Prüfung dieses grundlegenden Begriffs von Ergebnissen wichtiger Studien wird der Seinscharakter der Werte gefragt. Duruch den Erfolg dieser Untersuchung verstehen wir, dass seine Werte unsere Antwortsreaktion erfordern. Von ihm ist Die Auffassung der Antwortsreaktion wichtig, um das Sein der Werte zu erfassen.

著者

山下 真

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.171-185, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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Im letzten Teil des Atombombenbuchs von K. Jaspers(1958)erscheint plötzlich der Begriff »Unsterblichkeit«. Jaspers sagt: nur aus der Unsterblichkeit »kann eine Folge sein, daß der Selbstmord der Menschheit abgewehrt wird«. In welchem Sinne überwindet dieser veraltete Begriff die Krise des Atomkriegs, um die Zukunft des Menschen fortzusetzen? In dieser Abhandlung werden die Struktur und die Bedeutung der »Unsterblichkeit« im Zusammenhang mit der Konzeption der Erweiterung des Begriffs »Gemeinschaft« erläutert. Die Grenzsituation des »Todes« in „Philosophie“(1932)wurde nur vom Einzelnen erhellt und auf sich genommen. Dagegen wird die »Vernichtung« der Menschheit durch die Nuklearwaffen für »die neue Grenzsituation« gehalten. Denn sie ist das gemeinsame Problem, für das alle seiende Menschen verantwortlich sind. Es ist die metaphysische Frage »nach Sein oder Nichtsein«. Daher ist die eigentliche Weise der Menschen angesichts der Vernichtung »die Gemeinschaft der Vernünftigen«, zu der alle Existenzen potentiell gehören. Nach der Bestimmung in „Philosophie“ heißt nun die Unsterblichkeit als Gegensatz zum Tod die Weise der Existenz in ihrer Geschichtlichkeit. Die Existenz ist mehr als das bloß sterbliche Dasein, indem sie einen Aufschwung des Seins im »Augenblick« als Einmaligkeit erreicht. Dazu noch sind die Anderen als die Existenzen auch unsterblich. Der Nächste kann trotz seines Todes in der dauernden existentiellen Kommunikation gegenwärtig bleiben. Jaspers weist hiermit auf die Gemeinschaft mit den Nicht-mehr-Seienden hin. Im Atombombenbuch wird die »Unsterblichkeit« aber wieder auf Grund des existentiellen Augenblicks bestimmt. Denn es kommt im Hinblick auf die Vernichtung eben darauf an, daß das Dasein der Menschheit fortbestehen. Also wird die vernünftige universelle Gemeinschaft im doppelten Sinne »unsterblich«. Nur wenn die Existenzen jeweils in der Gegenwart die Kommunikation vollziehen, dann vermag die Menschheit zugleich ihr Dasein in die offene Zukunft d.h. in den Spielraum alles Seinkönnens zu bringen. Der Begriff »Unsterblichkeit « von Jaspers ist hierdurch als ein Ansatz zur existentiellen Zukunftsethik zu verstehen. Die grenzenlose Erweiterung der Kommunikation ist die Realisierung der Gemeinschaft mit den Noch-nicht-Seienden.

著者

薄井 尚樹

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.201-214, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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Over the last twenty years, the study of implicit attitudes has been significantly developed. Meanwhile, the existence of these attitudes raises an important philosophical question about their relations with our ”real self, ” which makes a moral appraisal of ourselves possible. Do implicit attitudes constitute our real self? In other words, do these attitudes express who we really are? In order to address this problem, I shall divide the model of the real self into the synchronic and the diachronic model, by drawing from the works of H. Frankfurt and his critics. As is commonly-known, Frankfurt provides a hierarchical account in this context, which has been criticized by some philosophers. Thus, I will first examine the controversy between Frankfurt and his critics, and then I shall elicit the core ideas from the synchronic model and the diachronic model which are related to the real self, and are common to both perspectives in the controversy over each model. These core ideas of the synchronic and the diachronic model are expressed as ”the coherence of mental states through the connection among their semantic contents” and ”the inflexibility of the thematic continuity” respectively. Given this, I examine whether implicit attitudes constitute the real self from the perspective of each model. And, based on my examination, I argue that they do not constitute the real self in either one. If my argument thus far is correct, it follows from one perspective of moral responsibility that we are not responsible for behavior caused by our implicit attitudes. However, I point out that the lack of such moral responsibility might be contrary to our intuition or practice related to our ordinary attribution of moral responsibility. Therefore, perhaps it might be the conception of the real self itself that should be reconsidered, which is an issue that I raise for future research

著者

佐々木 拓

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.231-245, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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T. Scanlon showed his “interpretation” of blame in his book Moral Dimensions in 2008. It gave a tremendous boost to debates on blame and many philosophers are getting to theorize their own account by criticizing and comparing to his theory. A preferable reason for that is that it has good explanatory force. It can explain many aspects which phenomena of blame have and give excellent normative foundation to regulate blaming. On the other side, there is an unpreferable reason. It is that his conception of blame seems strange to other philosophers. He denies the emotional aspect, ex. resentment or indignation, as the main element of blame. He instead makes blame depend on relation(ex. friends, families or fellows in business)and argues that to blame is to revise the relationship between blamer and the blamed. In this paper, I aim to introduce his theory, to analyze various critiques of it, and to defend it. There are three kinds of problems in his theory. The first is about his conception of the blame. According to critics, his interpretation includes wrong phenomena as blame and excludes genuine phenomena from blame. The second problem is about his conception of relation. Some opponents argue that relation defined by him seems to be so vulnerable that just one blame could break the relation. They insist that relation should be stronger because blaming is very common and usual to us. The last one is about his conception of morality. He presupposes “moral relation” correspond to moral blame. However, there seems no relation such a thing, to critics. They criticize that it is difficult for him to explain morality between strangers who do not have relational mutuality. I resolve some problems by correcting misunderstandings about his main conceptions. To other problems, I respond by reconsidering our assumption of priority of morality to non-moral value. I finally seek the successful interpretation of Scanlon’s theory in terms of non-moral, personal or individual relation.

著者

鈴木 康則

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.247-260, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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Nous avons pour objectif d’éclaircir la signification du dialogue chez Weil dans sa Logique de la philosophie. Il suggère sa propre logique, dans laquelle le dialogue est un moment essentiel: en effet, selon lui c’est le dialogue qui constitue le discours. Le discours lui-même implique la contradiction, et il essaie de s’orienter vers la cohérence à travers la négation qu’il subit. Pourtant, la cohérence ne s’achève jamais, elle continue d’exister comme Idée au sens kantien. Le dialogue se maintient par les discours contradictoires, qu’il nomme violence: ainsi la violence se rapporte à la logique. C’est la vérité et la violence qui s’opposent, non pas la vérité et la fausseté. Le philosophe a peur de la violence au sens weilien; il ouvre le dialogue dans le but de créer un discours cohérent. Le dialogue que Weil suppose donne de l’importance à sa cohérence pour qu’il choisisse l’accord ou le silence, c’est-à-dire l’abstention de toute communication. Cela ne signifie pas l’incapacité du dialogue, mais indique que la tâche de la philosophie, en délimitant le domaine du dialogue, se pose en tant que confrontation à la violence. Ainsi, le dialogue chez Weil montre que la logique appartient intrinsèquement à une communauté donnée.

著者

河合 一樹

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.277-291, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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“Imina,” the custom that prohibited people from addressing each other by their personal names, was prevalent in pre-modern East Asia, including Japan. Today, most researchers accept this opinion, which was given in a famous study by Hozumi Nobushige. However, Motoori Norinaga, one of the most prestigious scholars in Kokugaku, had a different idea. He argued that “Imina” was only a Chinese custom, and that it did not exist in ancient Japan. Previous research contradicted him, but did not discuss the reason for his insistence. Thus, there is a problem with regard to understanding the meaning of “Imina” in his thought. From this point of view, this study firstly focuses on how he described “Imina” in accordance with “Kojikiden” and “Tamakatsuma.” In these texts, he animadverted on it strongly as “Karagokoro”, the word that he usually use for attacking Confucians. Therefore, “Imina” has a particular meaning in his thought. Second, we examine the history of the idea of “Imina” in the Edo period. We refer to several scholars, including Suzuki Teisai, Dazai Shundai, Arai Hakuseki, Murata Harumi, and Mencius, and disclose that the belief at that time was that “Imina” was based on the emotion of sorrow for the dead. In other words, sorrow for the dead prohibits the use of a person’s name. Finally, we consider why Norinaga attacked “Imina.” In an annotation in “Kojikiden,” he stated that sorrow for the dead should give rise to the impulse to call a person by name, according to a Japanese poem by Kakinomoto Hitomaro. Moreover, he explained that we should express our feelings without protesting with one of his the most important ideas, “Magokoro.” Based on these thoughts, “Imina” was a bad custom that covered “Magokoro” and had to be criticized as “Karagokoro” by him.

著者

高井 寛

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, pp.143, 2017 (Released:2019-04-16)

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This study elucidates the argument which Martin Heidegger developed in his Being and Time(Sein und Zeit)about responsibility. His interest is focused on how far we have to take responsibility for our actions. To forecast this problem, one might think that, rationality or rational deliberation defines its scope. But Heidegger didn’t think that “rationality” provides us a final solution to the problem about responsibility. Heidegger’s evaluation is concerned with the famous distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity, so this study interprets Heidegger’s argument about this distinction as one about responsibility. Heidegger identifies inauthenticity with “the They”(das Man)as our everyday mode of being and analyses our concept of responsibility and our judgments about our actions in terms of this concept. Heidegger introduces the concept of “the They” as “the-one”, who nobody is but everyone is. And according to Heidegger, “the They” defines what we have to do and what we must not do. So we can say that this concept represents the rationality in a society. Actually, we can blame someone, saying “one ordinarily doesn’t do so” or “rational agent should do this.” In doing so, we resort to “the They” or anonymous ratio nality. But following this way of thinking, one cannot blame the other’s action which even unintentionally hurt someone heavily, if only he/she deliberates rationally as a mature agent would do. Heidegger considers this conclusion odd. In contrast to an inauthentic person, authentic person is an agent who is very responsible, Heidegger says. To be become authentic, one must become aware of one’s own weaknesses. These weaknesses which he refers to as our “lacking” concern our omissions. We can never do something unless at the same time we forgo something else. Heidegger’s responsible agent is aware of his/her own weakness, and doing so, he/she is prepared for regretting own actions and for thinking that he/she should have taken the other action he/she never knew. Most importantly, this regret should go beyond the scope of rational deliberation. Responsible agent is prepared to take responsibility which “the They” rationally doesn’t require. This is Heidegger’s conclusion.