著者

中本 和秀

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.3, pp.1-21, 2003-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the development of the mass production system at Morris Engines Co. and the former Coventry works of Hotchkiss et Cie.Hotchkiss et Cie began to produce 50 engine units per week at their Coventry works in 1918. Machine shops were originally general engineering shops, where similar types of machine tools were grouped together. In 1922, Hotchkiss converted these into a hybrid of “machine-tool-based shop” and “components-based shop” for the production of 100 units per week.Morris Engines took over the works from Hotchkiss in 1923, and in 1924 an output of 1, 200 engines per week was achieved. The engineer Woollard implemented a method of continuous flow production at this factory. It was in the context of a flow principle that experiments were made in the development of transfer machines to produce a cylinder block and other components. Power-driven conveyor systems were, however, not used in the assembly lines. Then the factory needed stimulus by piecework to speed up the production pace or to increase the output. Woollard did not call this system “mass production” but called it “continuous production.” These processes were not aimed at attacking enormous quantities but were endeavor to secure continuous flow and were suitable for the scale of the British market.The whole process of these developments were also the outcome of an inherent need to secure continuous flow rather than an adaptation of Fordism as Tolliday asserted.

著者

二谷 智子

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.3, pp.22-47, 2003-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is first to analyze the change in the system that regulated the production and sale of medicine in the latter half of the 19th century and second to make clear how the management of the home distribution system of patent medicines in Toyama changed as its result. This paper examines the case of the Okamoto family, the influential merchant family that owned large tracts of commercial land, and the peddling of patent medicines in Takaoka in the early Meiji era.As a result of the examination, the following point became clear. The merchant in Takaoka financed owners of commercial land to peddle patent medicines. These peddlers lived in villages around Takaoka, and the management of their peddling business changed with the financing from the merchant.By the 1860s, the peddlers in Takaoka were classified into five ranks by income, because several feudal loads had for years forbidden the peddlers from entering their domains. And as a result, this started the division in the management of the business into the sponsor, the chemist's shop, and the peddler in Takaoka. The home distribution system of patent medicines in Takaoka was thus able to adapt to the medical policy of the Meiji government, which regulated both the production and the distribution of patent medicines.

著者

板垣 暁

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.3, pp.48-72, 2003-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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In 1949, the GHQ Occupation authorities allowed Japanese automobile companies to begin producing cars. But the level of price and performance of domestic cars was inferior to that of industrially advanced nations. Consequently, common opinion in the auto-related business circles was that the Japanese automotive industry was inferior.The regulation of car imports was relaxed in 1952, and many foreign-made cars were imported. Car imports became the source of conflict for the Ministry of Transport, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and automobile companies. The Ministry of Transport did not oppose automobile manufacture in Japan but objected to the protective policy that regulated car imports.The primary reason for importing cars was to promote smooth and efficient transportation. Taxi companies were the main users of cars at the time, and they opposed the protective policy as the price and performance of cars influenced their profit and reputation. They appealed to the National Diet in support of car imports, and their views were publicized through magazines and other means.Opposition to the protective policy was resolved in 1954. The foreign currency shortage in 1953 and 1954 prompted public opinion to favor restriction of car imports. In addition, the price of domestic cars dropped and performance improved. Under these circumstances, the Ministry of Transport changed its policy by proposing the import of normal-size cars not widely manufactured in Japan, and thus the debate over car imports was concluded.

著者

小川 功

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.4, pp.102-111, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

川満 直樹

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.1-23, 2003-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1 1

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The principal objective of this paper is to examine how the Pakistani business groups that played major, important roles in Pakistan's industrial development were initially formed and grew subsequently. In addition, the paper also aims to analyze closely the economic as well as entrepreneurial roles they have played successfully since Pakistan's independence.The study chooses the Habib and Dawood zaibatsu (business group) as case studies. There are three reasons in focusing attention on the Habib and Dawood zaibatsu. First, the Habibs belongs to the Khoja community and are Muslims from Gujarat, and the Dawoods belongs to the Memon community from Kathiawar in Gujarat. Gujarat has produced a many great entrepreneurs. After Partition, both Khoja and Memon communities migrated to Pakistan and settled in Karachi. Second, they played a pioneering role of industrial development of Pakistan in the period immediately following the country's independence. Third, they are both well-known business groups in Pakistan. They are regarded as “nation-building” companies. They came to control the financial business since the beginning of the independence movement.The study examines how Pakistani zaibatsu was formed, and what specific contributions they have made toward industrial growth and developments in Muslim society. It shows what problems and difficulties the business groups will have to deal with in the years to come.

著者

岡部 桂史

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.24-49, 2003-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the development process of the Japanese agricultural machine industry during the interwar period. The historical significance of the agricultural machine industry has been mainly studied in the fields of agricultural and industrial technology. This paper is the first attempt to evaluate it form the viewpoint of the industrial and business history.Unlike the American agricultural machine, which had developed from reapers or the tractors, the growth of the Japanese agricultural machines before World War II was led by the development of threshers and hulling machines. We can confirm the progress of agricultural mechanization by small machines. One characteristic of Japanese agriculture is the large number of petty farmers whose diversified small tenable lots made agricultural mechanization by large-sized machines impossible. Big firms like International Harvester in the United States manufactured both engines and machines, but in Japan, each factory specialized in the production of engines or machines (threshers and hulling machines). In this paper, therefore, the petrol engines and agricultural machines are examined separately.The increase in the production of petrol engines was led by both big factories such as Kubota Ironwork, and small- and medium-sized factories (e.g., the network of small factories in Okayama city). In the case of agricultural machines, they established their own production embedded in agricultural implements in the 1920s. Lastly, the distribution system, evolved from dependence on indigenous implements and hardware distribution in the 1920s to a new system supported by dealers specializing in engines and agricultural machines in the 1930s.

著者

韓 載香

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.38, no.1, pp.50-77, 2003-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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Enterprises owned by Koreans have been the largest minority businesses in Japan. Although Lotte and Softbank are now the two most notable companies among them, most Korean-owned firms have historically been small and invisible. This paper aims to illustrate the structural characteristics of Korean-owned enterprises in Japanese economy since World War II. After the de-colonization at the war's end, Koreans, many of whom had emigrated to the Kinki region before the war, started small businesses of their own, partially because they were excluded from the regular labor market because of widespread discrimination. Given their shortage of capital, they utilized the only resources they possessed, i.e., the knowledge accumulated in their prewar experiences as blue-collar workers.For the most part of postwar decades, thus, Korean businesses confined themselves to labor-intensive segments of such limited industries as rubber and plastic footwear, secondary metal processing, textile processing, hosiery making, and civil engineering. They also exhibited an interesting pattern of regional concentration for many of their major industries. Footwear businesses are mostly located in the western part of Kobe city, while the southern part of Osaka prefecture became the center of hosiery making.The development of Korean industries took two forms in the long run. First, particularly since the 1970s, Korean businesses started expanding in such new spheres such as money lending, real estate, and even professional services. Second, throughout the postwar decades, Koreans increased their presence in the pinball (pachinko) entertainment industry, which became a symbol of Korean businesses in Japan. Koreans now control the entire vertical chain of the pachinko industry from machine making to pinball halls.In the economic environment that has not necessarily been friendly, Korean businesses adapted relatively well to open up their own niches, particularly in non-manufacturing sectors. But their position did not follow the developmental direction that Japanese economy took. While the economy exited from labor-intensive industries, Korean enterprises have remained in that economic segment, which is not necessarily conducive to new business dynamics.

著者

古賀 大介

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.2, pp.56-75, 2002-09-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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A long-running and thus-far unsolved issue in British economic history, known as the Macmillan Gap, is the role played by the British capital market in the provision of finance to small- and medium-sized enterprises. There have been numerous allegations of failure in the literature, where it is alleged that the capital market was reluctant to finance such enterprises.But recently a new view has appeared. A considerable proportion of small firms are said to have relied on private sources of finance through a circle of personally acquaintanted investors, and this form of financing worked satisfactorily in the pre-1914 era. However, there is little evidence of private financing, and therefore this picture is conjecture at present.The aim of this paper is to provide evidence to support this new view. We focus on a case of raising finance by White & Pike, a small printing firm in the late nineteenth century, through empirical research, drawing on contemporary records held in Lloyds Bank Archive and the Public Record Office.

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.3, pp.1-27, 2002-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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On May 1, 2001, nine electric power companies, Hokkaido, Tohoku, Tokyo, Chubu, Hokuriku, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu Electric Power, which were established simultaneously by the reorganization of the electric power industry in 1951, celebrated their fiftieth anniversaries. The purposes of this paper are to evaluate the fifty-year history of the Nine Electric Power Companies System (NEPCS) and to detect its future.NEPCS is characterized by four factors: (1) private management, (2) vertical integration, (3) regional division (nine blocks), and (4) monopoly. It is possible to regard that factors (1), (2), and (3) hold in check the potential disadvantage of factor (4), i.e., high power rates owing to lack of competition, as autonomy of NEPCS.The fifty-year history of NEPCS is divided into three periods by two epoch-making incidents, the first Oil Crisis of 1973-74 and the overall revision of the Electric Power Industry Law (EPIL) of 1995. During the first period (1951-73), the autonomy of NEPCS worked well and an electricity supply at low rates was realized. In the second period (1974-94), however, the autonomy of NEPCS suffered as the disadvantages of monopoly became apparent. And, it is the most important task of the third period (1995-) for the nine electric power companies to reestablish NEPCS's autonomy.The revision of EPIL in 1995 was the starting point of liberalization of the electric power industry in Japan. If the behavior of the electric power companies is too conservative, NEPCS could experience sudden death as a result of unbundling by the liberalization. But, if the companies cope well with the liberalization, two key factors of NEPCS, private management and vertical integration, can survive in the future.

著者

西村 成弘

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.3, pp.28-56, 2002-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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This paper examines the patent management of General Electric Company (GE) in Japan before World War II. It is said that its domination of the incandescent lamp industry, which occurred from 1912 to 1919, was brought about on Tokyo Electric's own initiative. But GE had controlled substantial patents for tungsten filament, which included patents applied for and registered by German companies. From 1916, GE filed a series of suits against newly established Japanese lamp companies, Taisho Denkyu, Dainihon Denkyu, and Kansai Denkyu, which were based on the foreigner-owned lamp patents not controlled by GE. By 1919, GE won the suits and absorbed those companies. Therefore, the Japanese lamp industry was dominated by GE, not by Tokyo Electric.In 1919, GE established International General Electric Co., Inc. (IGEC), and IGEC revised its agreement with Tokyo Electric. The new agreement contained a “proxy application” clause, which provided that Tokyo Electric could apply and register GE'S patents in its own name and on own cost. That is, in the interwar period, GE managed its Japanese patents through Tokyo Electric's managerial function. As similar contracts had already been concluded with British Thomson-Houston and Allgemeine Elektricitäts Gesellschaft, GE had completed an international “proxy application” network.In order to carry out the contracts and patent management through Tokyo Electric, GE had to intensify the patent management function of Tokyo Electric. In 1921, J.R. Geary, charged with GE business in Japan, directed Tokyo Electric to establish a patent management department. The Patent Department started “proxy applications” in 1922. Moreover, in order to strengthen the department, Geary recruited Rinji Fujii, former engineer at the Japanese Patent Office, and put him in charge of the department in 1924. With this the functional transfer from GE to Tokyo Electric was completed.

著者

橋本 規之

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.3, pp.57-85, 2002-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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The purpose of this paper is to clarify the function and performance of joint action (cartelization) to reduce excess capacity in the Japanese petrochemical industry, which was based on the Temporary Measures Law for the Structural Adjustment of Specific Industries, enacted in 1983.In this paper, we would like to propound a view that the cartel approach can make industrial adjustment smooth by showing the structure of dealing with excess capacity on joint action, and the contribution it makes to promoting productivity. We would also like to consider the conditions for supporting this adjustment style.The main conclusions of this paper are the following four points:First, joint action made it possible to escape from a “prisoner's dilemma” in reducing excess capacity. This led to concentration of production, reduction of depreciation cost, and relative stabilization of prices.Second, this joint action required security: a relaxation of the criteria of facilities disposal, such as a lowering of the accomplishment rate, adoption of a best-share style, and trading of capacity limits.Third, the capacity share basically determined the share of disposal, but in proportion to the rate of operation the burden of disposal was reduced. Economic loss in pro-rata style was avoided to some extent.Fourth, and last, there was a difference in the explanatory factor for the facilities disposal rate between the cartel and the non-cartel group. Similarly, there was a difference in their respective disposal rates. In the cartel group (ethylene, LDPE, HDPE), on the one hand, the rate of operation mainly determined the disposal rate. In the non-cartel (PP, EO, SM), on the other hand, the capacity share was the main determining factor. We confirmed statistically that the disposal rate of the cartel group was higher than that of the non-cartel group.

著者

濱田 信夫

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.4, pp.25-48, 2003-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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This paper analyzes the process of the Kawasaki strike, which lasted from December 1947 to July 1948, Nishiyama Yataro, later president of Kawasaki Steel, was the director of the steelworks divisions of Kawasaki Heavy Industries. The main operation was in the Fukiai district of Kobe. Nishiyama faced corporate restructuring in a tug-of-war between the management and the radicalized union at Fukiai.The militant union demanded so large a role in management as to infringe on corporate leadership. The national labor federation, Sanbetsu, which was organized by the the Japan Communist Party, and the steel industry arm of Sanbetsu, Zentetsuro, were behind this labor movement. The union had won contracts (labor agreements) along the Sanbetsu model and was influenced by the communist fraction. Japan Federation of Employers' Association, Nikkeiren, identified the Kawasaki strike as a crucial struggle with the enemy, which it identified as communism.In this strike, Nishiyama organized staff and workers to fight the militant agitation that had taken over the union. During the struggle, the membership of the militant “first” union declined, and the membership of the cooperative “second” union rapidly increased. Thus, he broke the radical union and succeeded in formating a new and loyal union.Moreover, this paper points out that this strike marked a turning point for relations between management and union. In 1949, Nishiyama won new labor agreements to keep the industry peace and raise productivity. And he lead Kawasaki Steel, turning it into a major integrated iron and steel production in the 1950s.

著者

久保 文克

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.4, pp.76-92, 2002-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

著者

平尾 毅

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.1, pp.28-52, 2002-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1

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The objective of this paper is to identify the features of the interwar labour policy of Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (I.C.I.) by studying the connection between labour policy and welfare programmes.Industrial welfare was important for I.C.I., which possessed about 70 factories and some 40, 000 employees through amalgamation, as a labour strategy to stabilise industrial relations by reducing employment insecurity and fostering worker loyalty.The I.C.I. welfare schemes underwent a conversion from paternalistic benefits based on unitary ideals, such as personal contact between employers and employees, into systematic benefits based on formal rules, such as a joint contributory scheme. This change was made clear by analysing the systematisation of I.C.I. welfare schemes between the early period when Sir Alfred Mond, the first chairman, needed to lay the foundations for the new company and the latter period when Sir Harry McGowan, the second chairman, had to implement business restructuring by laying off and reshuffling surplus workers after the Great Depression.In the latter period, consequently, the square deal of all I.C.I. workers engaged in various trades in each factory indicated mechanistic unification of industrial relations, which was realised by introducing more comprehensive and systematic welfare programmes. In this respect, I.C.I. welfare programmes functioned effectively as a means to consolidate industrial relations.My conclusion includes the important implication that the role of systematic welfare schemes as a centralised labour policy was to facilitate labour turnover between subsidiary factories and to promote or supplement business restructuring with lay-offs and replacement of redundant labour in the early 1930s, by constructing comprehensive welfare programmes as the safety net in situations where the predecessor and conventional administrations of the constituent companies of I.C.I. remained to some extent.

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.37, no.1, pp.53-72, 2002-06-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

白鳥 圭志

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.3, pp.25-50, 2001-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

被引用文献数

1 1

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During the 1920s, too many banks failed. One of the important reasons for the failures was the arbitrariness of the banks. The Ministry of Finance's (MOF) bureaucrats were aware of it, and strongly advocated the need to correct this.In 1926, the preparatory committee on the reform of financial institutions and the main committee were established. There, the introduction of the system of the joint-stock company with the auditing book rules for banks was determined. MOF's discretionary powers were introduced for the issuing of warnings. MOF's explained that because the Japanese financial system had strong regional varieties according to a multi-strata financial structure, strict adherence to legal regulations was impossible. All the committee members accepted this without objections. Based on MOF's proposals, the draft of the 1927 bank law was drawn up.In 1927, the 52nd Imperial Diet was convened. There, MOF gave the above reasons to explain the need to regulate banks with discretionary powers in MOF hands. The draft passed the Diet, and from January 1928, the 1927 bank law went into effect.One of the important features of the bank regulation based on the 1927 bank law is the prevention of bankers' arbitrariness by introducing organic principles with rules and procedures in bank management. Another is MOF's discretion in the issuing of warnings, which enabled MOF to take action according to each region's financial situation. Thus the regulations reflected the multi-strata and strong regional characters of the financial system during the 1920s crises. These constitute the historical nature of the bank regulation based on the 1927 bank law.

著者

湊 照宏

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.3, pp.51-77, 2001-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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This study intends to clarify the development of the Taiwanese electric power industry by analyzing the Jitsugetsutan Project during the interwar period. Taiwan was then under Japanese colonial rule. The project has therefore been traditionally referred to in the literature as an example of a special enterprise established and owned by the Japanese government in order to strengthen its military sector under its “southern advance” policy.In this study, the author attempts to re-examine such traditional views on the role of the project by tracing the project from its planning stage to completion. The analysis sheds new light on the relationship between the Taiwanese colonial government and the trends of related markets, especially the financial market in Japan and the state of demand for electric power that the enterprise was expected to supply.Our analysis reveals that the project, which was initiated in 1919, had to be cancelled once in 1926 because of the banking crisis and the lack of demand in the first half of the 1920s. When the project was resumed in 1928, it was the chemical fertilizer industry that turned out to be a potential and major consumer of its electric power. However, the final plans changed again. The aluminum industry was to become the major consumer of its electric power in 1932.This re-examination leads to the conclusion that the project was not based on the military goals of the Japanese government but on the industrial policy of the Taiwanese colonial government and the economic motivation of the Japanese industry. Although it is undeniable that the completion of the project brought a rapid growth of the aluminum industry and it consequently strengthened military power a great deal, this should be interpreted as the effect of the project, not as its cause.

著者

廣田 義人

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.3, pp.78-101, 2001-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

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The machine-tool production industry in Singapore is much smaller than in Taiwan or Korea. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy because Singapore's case shows a feature different from the other Asian Newly Industrializing Economies. The Taiwanese machine-tool industry is composed of numerous local small builders. In Korea, the local business groups include prominent machine-tool builders. In contrast, foreign direct investment plays an essential role in building machine tools in Singapore. Presently, three foreign machine-tool builders operate in Singapore. Okamoto was established as a grinding machine builder in 1973. Makino Asia took over LeBlond Asia, an American lathe builder's subsidiary, in 1981 and commenced to build machining centers. The main products of Yamazaki Mazak are numerical controlled (NC) lathes since 1996. Each parent company transferred production technology to these subsidiaries and has been supplying key parts. Their products are exported to developed countries. They depend on neither local vendors nor customers. The business linkage between the foreign builders and the domestic industries is not strong.But Okamoto served as an incubator for local entrepreneurs and technicians. A former Okamoto sales manager and his colleagues founded their own small company, Excel Machine Tools, and started building machine tools in 1987. They had gained their technical and managerial experience at Okamoto over ten years. On the basis of their expertise, Excel received technical assistance from a small machine-tool builder in Japan and obtains substantial financial support from the government. This successful local machine-tool builder is the most remarkable outcome of Japanese direct investment.

著者

橘川 武郎

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.3, pp.102-111, 2001-12-25 (Released:2009-11-06)

著者

大貝 威芳

出版者

経営史学会

雑誌

経営史学 (ISSN:03869113)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.36, no.4, pp.1-24, 2002-03-25 (Released:2010-11-18)

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This article analyzes the catching-up stage of Japanese color television manufacturers in the competitive market of exports to the United States. Around 1964, Japan's color TV industry was far behind the United States in both technology and marketing. Due to the high price of color TVs, a demand in the domestic market was not expected. Suddenly that year, the demand from American TV manufacturers and private label customers changed the situation. Facing uncertainties and obstacles, how did Japanese manufacturers catch up in the competitive export market?In this article, the author studies the case of Matsushita Electric. Around that time at Matsushita Electric, even the head of the R&D Division was pessimistic about the possibility of exporting.The Television Division, however, decided to take the opportunity of the strong demand from the United States and, despite trials and errors, started production in the Osaka main factory. After a few months, Konosuke Matsushita, the founder of the company and chairman at that time, suddenly decided to transfer the export production to a subsidiary on Shikoku island (Saijo factory) that had no experience in color TV production and exports. By Konosuke's decision, a large-scale investment was made, and many unskilled workers were hired. Export model production was begun at Saijo factory under such disadvantageous circumstances. It was an imitation-based operation and OEM/PB business acting as a training school. Uncertainties and obstacles were overcome by substitutes, and organizational learning was provided under the strong leadership of the top management. Many positive traits were created among workers to improve skills. Process innovations were made. After two-three years, the export-exclusive Saijo factory was able to catch up in its competitiveness and claim about a 20% share of the total color TV exports from Japan. The strategies and actions taken at Saijo factory to catch up in export competitiveness are typical cases of speculative and risk-taking Japanese entrepreneurship.Konosuke Matsushita's decision to separate export from domestic production had been considered unreasonable at the beginning. But it proved right when the domestic market took off at high speed. Both the Osaka and Saijo factories were able to comply independently to the growing demand in the respective markets. Unless otherwise carried out, the catching up of export competitiveness could not have been accomplished so smoothly.