著者

下斗米 伸夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.21-42, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

参考文献数

41

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This essay traces on the evolvements of Russian political class over the issue of Ukraine from the demise of the USSR to 2014 crisis, culminating in the annexation of the Crimea peninsula. Russian attitudes towards the rebirth of Ukraine nationalism were ambiguous, especially among elite level. The August coup against the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev took place in Ukraine, where its nationalistic elements were independent oriented, while the conservatives, including the military industrial complex were negative. After the December 1991 referendum, where opinions were in favor for independence, Leonid Kravchuk, once ideological secretary of the Ukraine communist party could rely on the support of the West oriented voice of western Ukraine, where European and Catholic influence was vocal. From the Russian point of view, this region was alien from the Orthodox tradition and was never been part of the Russian Empire. Thus, Ukraine as the nation state was weak and far from united as political identity was concerned. Economy was also divided between agrarian west and the east, where Soviet type of military industrial complex was dominant. This east-west divide caused political instability in Ukraine, that was revealed when Kravchuk was replaced by Kuchima who first relied on the support of Russian speaking east, though he eventually turned to the west. Moscow was particularly concerned the fate of the Black Sea fleet and Crimea, where Russians were dominant and never belonged to Ukraine until 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev, Ukrainian oriented Soviet leader changed the status of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine. Though Russian President Boris Yel’tsin was in favor for the Ukraine status quo, his nationalistic minded semi-oppositionists like Moscow Mayor Luzhkov were against the Ukraine position overt the fleet and Crimea. It was only pragmatism of Yevgeny Primakov, Foreign Minister, who could pass the bill on the partnership in 1997. New President Vladimir Putin was more oriented Russian nationalism, and was particularly against the color revolution, when western oriented President Yushchenko won over the East oriented Yanukovich in a 2004 election. East-West divide, coupled with the corruption and ungovernavility, became Kremlins worry on Ukraine. Still they succeeded in winning Yanukovich victory in the following election and could deal over the 25 years continuation of the Black Sea Fleet, in turn for cheaper gas supply in 2010. Ukraine thus became a grand over which domestic East-West divide was coupled by the influence of the NATO-EU and Moscow contested. The Maidan revolution was thus seen from Kremlins nationalists oriented policy makers to be an attempt to cut the influence of Russia over Ukraine. The Izborskii club or another religious-Orthodox oriented politicians were thus backing sudden policy changes of the President Putin, who took Maidan revolution as another attempt of regime change by the West, and eventually annexed the Crimea Peninsula. Thus, in turn, brought about the civil war situation, particularly in the east Ukraine, that was already uncontrolled by neither Moscow nor Kiev authority.

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.19-40, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

参考文献数

48

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In this study, I tried to survey economic effects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on Russia and other Eurasian Countries as its transit nations. Economic effects can be categorized into ‘investment effects,’ ‘transport effects’ and ‘areal effects.’I found that ‘investment effects’ of BRI on the railway sector of Eurasian countries were rather limited. Few fulfilled projects include China Eximbank’s loan to finance construction of Kamchik railway tunnel in Uzbekistan, China Eximbank’s loan to finance electrification of Belarus’s railway and, though the details were unknown, China’s commitment to invest in establishing the special economic zone ‘Khorgos-Eastern Gate.’ Other investment projects on the list of prospective joint works by Eurasian Economic Union members and China, such as the Moscow-Kazan high-speed rail project, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project and the project to connect rail networks of Armenia and Iran, had not been materialized so far.As for ‘transport effects,’ thus far the most remarkable success story is the rapid growth of China Railway Express connecting China and Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus by container trains, which is believed to bring about over 100 million US dollars of transit revenue annually to each of them. Companies from European regions of Russia and Belarus also begin to explore the Chinese market by virtue of China Railway Express, which may play some positive role in expanding non-resource, non-energy exports, a priority for Putin administration. One must, however, put it into consideration that according to balance of payment statistics railway service export revenue of the three countries is stagnating. In addition, China-Europe container transport is still dominated by maritime modal, not railway. Beijing plans to reduce subsidies by local governments to container trains, which also makes the future of China Railway Express uncertain.Lastly, we can regard the development of ‘Khorgos-Eastern Gate’ in Kazakhstan and the birth of industrial park ‘Great Stone’ in Belarus, both with investments from China, as typical cases of ‘areal effects,’ while the ambitious Moscow-Kazan high-speed rail project in Russia came to a deadlock because it needs larger investments and more complicated arrangements.

著者

木本 麻希子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.105-120, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

参考文献数

48

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This study aims to clarify Sergei Prokofiev’s compositional characteristics and techniques used in his late piano sonatas through both aesthetic and theoretical analyses based on the manifestation of his so-called “five lines.” This research also focuses on the historical background and conceptual origin of his five lines to highlight his usage of these lines in his works. In his autobiography, Prokofiev specifically mentioned that his five lines permeated all his compositions. These lines have distinct musical characteristics: classical, which takes a neo-classical form in pieces such as sonatas or concertos and is indispensable for exploring the form and structure of his piano sonatas; modern, which is mainly found in his harmonic language, including melody, orchestration and dramatic features; toccata or motor, traceable to the Toccata Op. 7, which is one of Robert Schumann’s solo piano works, and its driving energy from its repetitive rhythmic pattern reflecting the industrialization of the early 20th century; lyrical, which reflects a thoughtful and meditative mood and links long melodic lines, showing Prokofiev’s romanticism; and grotesque, a term used by his contemporaries that Prokofiev himself described as “scherzo-ish.” In addition, Prokofiev’s five lines manifest his standing in music among his contemporaries, and compositions based on them echo several aesthetic ideas such as neo-classicism, primitivism and constructivism. Prokofiev’s musical career in piano sonatas is generally divided into the following three periods. The first period constitutes his formative years in Russia, namely 1891–1918 (Piano Sonatas Nos. 1–4); the second period includes his years in the USA and Europe, namely 1918–1936 (Piano Sonata No. 5), and the third period includes his final years in the U.S.S.R., namely 1936–1953 (Piano Sonatas Nos. 7–9). Prokofiev wrote many works during this latter period, which include ballet music for “Romeo and Juliet” Op. 64 and “Cinderella” Op. 87 and film music for “The Queen of Spades” Op. 70, the opera “War and Peace” Op. 91, and Symphony No. 5 Op. 100. Above all, his late Piano Sonatas (i.e., No. 6 Op. 82, No. 7 Op. 83, and No. 8 Op. 84), commonly referred to as “The War Sonatas” since they were composed during the Second World War, are most representative of his piano writing. However, previous analytical studies on his late piano sonatas allow plenty of scope to reconsider these works for an aesthetic and historical investigation against the political background at the time (such as against the existing socialist realism). This study explores Prokofiev’s five lines principle and its compositional practice against the social background in his later works to illustrate the composer’s approach during the political repression of the time. The results of this investigation show that, despite the intense political pressure in the U.S.S.R. during the 1930s and 1940s, Prokofiev managed to maintain his own musical identity and expressive style through his manifestation of the five lines concept.

著者

石郷岡 建

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, no.35, pp.46-59, 2006 (Released:2010-05-31)

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This article analyzed the so-called “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. The “Orange Revolution” is widely understood by the western media and countries as a part of political, democratic changes in the former Soviet Union, and also very often called or mentioned as a “Democratic Revolution.” The author has a different opinion and a strong feeling of uneasiness to call it as a “Democratic Revolution.”However it is rather difficult to explain those changes such as The “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (2003), the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2004), the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgys (2005), as simply a coincidental happening. There should be some explanation of similarities and should be a comparative analysis.From this point of view the author picked up the general election in Ukraine which was held in March, 2006, and made an analysis of political changes in Ukraine as a whole.The result of the analysis showed the following: 1) The most of the people in Ukraine have now a feeling of the disillusion by the “Orange Revolution.” 2) The political confrontation in the “Orange Revolution” were based on the geopolitical different direction of the West and the East. This confrontational pattern has not changed so much before and after the revolution. 3) The direction of the West and the East are completely opposite, and almost impossible to compromise. The Ukrainian society is divided by the West and the East, and the power balance is very narrow and full of the tension. 4) However the new element of political changes is now emerging within the Ukrainian society. Especially the economical changes based on the development of the market economy are now becoming more important for the Ukrainian politics, and should not be ignored.After the election in March, 2006, the former “Orange Revolution” coalition forces tried to establish a new government, but failed. Instead, the opposition pro-Russian forces with the leader of Mr. Jankovich, have succeeded to form a new government. This outcome can be also explained by the economical changes in Ukraine.After the collapse of Soviet Union the so-called socialism system were broken down one by one, but all the former socialist countries had same (or similar) problems and difficulties. Behind those problems and difficulties you can find out always the friction among the society because of the introduction of market economy. In this context it may be possible to find out the logics and rules of political changes in postsocialist countries based on the analysis of the economic developments. The author has a hypothesis that behind the “Color-Democratic” revolution the economic factor, especially the development of market economy has played a very important role.

著者

村井 淳

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.32, pp.145-161, 2003 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

17

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Crimes are mirrors of society. This article analyzes the contents of the Russian criminal statistics that began to be released to the public from the end of the Soviet era and examines the changes of the Russian society behind the crimes.There are three particular periods when crimes in Russia rapidly increased from 1982 to 2002. The first period is 1983, one year after the general secretary Brezhnev died. In 1983, the number of thefts remarkably increased, but the increase rate is not as prominent as the other two periods. The second period is 1989-1992, before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the number of crimes increased because morality and social order collapsed due to the following: introduction and expansion of the market economy, the social maladaptation of the returned soldiers from Afghanistan, and the confusion brought by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From 1989 to 1992, atrocious crimes such as murders, rapes and robberies especially increased. The third period is 1998-1999. The financial crisis in 1998 deprived millions of people of their savings and wages. From 1998 to 1999, the number of robberies, thefts and drug-related crimes increased. After Putin was officially elected as president of Russia in 2000, however, the crime rate increase slowed and, crimes started to reduce in number in 2002.Today the most serious crimes are crimes related to drugs, psychotropic medicines and deadly poisons. Drugs such as heroin and poppy seeds come to Russia mainly from Afghanistan and Tadzhikistan through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz and Turkmenistan, and the part of them flows out to Ukraine and Western Europe. Drugs are expanding to smaller cities in Russia, not to mention the large cities. A large number of crimes, including drug-related crimes, are rapidly increasing in Khabarovsk, Tyumen', Ekaterinburg, Irkutsk, Kaliningrad, Novosibirsk, and so on. Of late, the number of crimes in Moscow is more than that in Sankt-Peterburk. Behind that, there exist movements of Russian Mafias.The unemployment rate rose after the collapse of the Soviet Union and became the highest in 1998 (13.2%) . The number of crimes, criminals and prisoners increased in proportion to the unemployment rate. Moreover, the number of crimes caused by the unemployed especially increased. This phenomenon, of course, was related to the economic conditions behind it. Among the young, those who don't go to school and have no job, increased in number and they tend to commit crimes such as robberies and thefts. In 2002, the number of crimes in Russia reduced a little, but the number of murders and drug-related crimes were larger, and the number of thefts were smaller compared to America, Japan, Britain, France and Germany. It seems that a large amount of illegal drugs flows underground in Russia.Now not only does the Russian government have to reinforce anticrime and anti-Mafia measures, but also have to reinforce the redistribution of wealth for the week, to promote national welfare, to regulate corruption of government officials and to promote tax collection in order to reduce the number of crimes. To do so, first of all, the government must further develop the economy and accumulate wealth.

著者

宮川 真一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.181-198, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

60

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In Russia, “fundamentalism” in the Russian Orthodox Church has been on the rise since the early 1990's. “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” stand for restoration of autocracy, restriction against the Jews and the confessions other than the Orthodox one, the imperial principle of state structure, the Russian Orthodox Church status as the state church, for complete rejection of the concepts of democracy and human rights (in particular, as concerns the freedom of conscience), opposition to any forms of Western influence within the country and struggle against it beyond its borders, and compulsory imposition of “Orthodox values” in every-day life, culture and even economy. Their worldview is based on extremely mythologized notions about the pre-revolutionary Orthodox monarchy.Inside the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan of Saint Petersburg and Ladoga Ioann, a person of a greatest authority among the conservatives, prodused the most convincing arguments in favor of a “fundamentalist” position. Many Orthodox “fundamentalist” leaders including an activist Konstantin Dushenov, Editor-in-Chief of “Orthodox Rus” newspaper, have followed Ioann. Some church bishops and the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and of the True Orthodox Church have represented “fundamentalist” circles in these churches. A number of Orthodox brotherhoods, such as the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, the Christian Regeneration Union, the Union of Orthodox Citizens, ideologically hold extremely nationalist positions. Same as the similar extra-Church groups, such brotherhoods are not supported by the bishops, but it is impossible to expel anybody from the Church for political views and the nationalist brotherhoods continue working actively. Moreover, right-wing extremist organizations, such as “Pamyat”, “Black Hundred”, “Russian National Unity” actively cooperate in many regions with Russian Orthodox Church clerics. These persons and organizations can be classified into “fundamentalism” and “quasi-fundamentalism” for the moment. The clerics in the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox church Abroad, the True Orthodox Church are the former. The Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, the Christian Regeneration Union are included in it. The Union of Orthodox Citizens and the right-wing extremist organizations are the latter.“Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” fight back to defend their national and religious identity and worldview, fight with fundamentals of “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality”, and fight against their enemy. such as Western Europe, globalization under the name of God. “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalism” is similar to Russian Right-wing Extremism, and both of them are violent and aren't tolerant. “Russian Orthodox Fndamentalists” base their core identity on religion and they try to construct structual violence. Russian Right-wing Extremists emphasise race, nationality, state in their identity and they resort to physical violence. In addition, Russian New Right-wing Extremism borrow various ideologies othar than Russian Orthodox Christianity.In 2002, conflict between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church has come to the surface. It seems that since the early 1990's the unstable balance between “fundamentalists” and the Patriarchate has been gradually shifting in favor of “fundamentalists”. It is impossible to ignore the influence of “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” at the aspects of politics, society, and public opinion in Russia today.

著者

中川 八洋

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ソ連・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:03867226)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.18, pp.54-57, 1989 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

7

著者

三井 光夫

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.28, pp.126-135, 1999 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

40

著者

勝田 吉太郎

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1999, no.28, pp.1-4, 1999 (Released:2010-05-31)

著者

村井 淳

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1994, no.23, pp.76-84, 1994 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

44

著者

仙⽯ 学

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2021, no.50, pp.59-71, 2021 (Released:2022-06-11)

参考文献数

24

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The article documents and compares the childcare support policy reforms in Central Eastern Europe implemented after the Global Financial Crisis. On the one hand, Estonia and Poland have maintained or expanded their childcare support policies after the crisis. Especially, Poland has expanded both cash benefits for families and public childcare during this period. On the other hand, Hungary and Slovenia have decided to cut back on childcare support measures during this period. While Slovenia was forced to cut back on childcare support due to the financial crisis, Hungary has intentionally adopted policies of focusing on the middle class with children by expanding tax credits and reducing cash benefits. As a result of these policies, the employment situation for women improved in Estonia, but it worsened in Slovenia, and the situation remained largely unchanged in Hungary. As for Poland, despite the expansion of measures to support childcare, the employment situation of women has not improved. This situation is provably caused by the fact that the ruling party of Poland, Law and Justice (PiS) emphasizes on the traditional role of women based on Catholic values.

著者

杉山 茂雄

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1998, no.27, pp.68-73, 1998 (Released:2010-05-31)

著者

清水 聡

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2008, no.37, pp.58-68, 2008 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1

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On March 10th, 1952 the USSR sent a document called “Stalin's Note” to the representatives of the Western Powers; the USA, the UK and France. It proposed both making a “peace treaty” with Germany and unifying Germany. For seven years following the end of World War II, Germany had been divided into two states. The separate governments of West and East Germany were provisionally formed in 1949. To resolve this situation, “Stalin's Note” proposed that Germany form a Unified Government and establish a “peace treaty” on a principal of neutrality. However, the USA, the UK, France and the West German leader, Konrad Adenauer, were pursuing a policy of West European Integration of West Germany, and rejected “Stalin's Note” forthwith.Since the Western Powers didn't accept “Stalin's Note”, the real intention of the USSR has remained a big mystery in post WWII history. Academic disputes continue to this day, as to the real intentions of the Soviet Diplomacy. These disputes are roughly split into two groups. One group, the positive group, argues that “Stalin's Note” was a peaceful attempt to establish a “Neutral German State”, while the other, negative group, believes that it was an “Obstructive Operation” to disturb Western diplomacy and cut off the military connection between West Germany and the Western Powers.Following the end of the Cold War, historical materials were released in the former East Germany. Researchers had hoped to find the truth of “Stalin's Note”. Many papers have been presented by historians specializing in diplomatic history of Germany and the USSR, but the disputes have not ended between the positive and the negative groups. This paper investigates the truth of “Stalin's Note” and its relation to the Cold War through rethinking its problems from the viewpoint of the East German leaders. As a result, this investigation finds that East German leaders had formed two groups; supporters of “Stalin's Note, ” the domestic group, and dissidents, the Moscow group.

著者

中澤 孝之

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ソ連・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:03867226)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.20, pp.72-79, 1991 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

16

著者

五十嵐 徳子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1997, no.26, pp.110-119, 1997 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

24

著者

岩倉 洸

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.90-102, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

参考文献数

40

著者

土田 陽介

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2019, no.48, pp.41-54, 2019 (Released:2020-05-30)

参考文献数

15

被引用文献数

1

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This paper examined the effect of the belt and road initiative by the Chinese government on the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEs), with focusing on the motorway project in Montenegro, named Bar-Boljare highway.For the Montenegro government, this project had been the national desire since its independence. But the European Union (EU) had not accept to assist Montenegrin highway project because of economic inefficiency and so on. In such a circumstance, the Chinese government supported the Bar-Boljare highway project by supplying loans 687 million euros to enhance its influence on the CEEs. As a result, the government of Montenegro increased its debt by 10 percent point of GDP. Western society criticized the China government because its loans made Montenegro to public debt crisis. However, this view was only one-side based on western values.The analysis in this paper concluded that the conflict between EU and China on Montenegrin highway project worked as one of the external pressures on forcing EU rethink its enlargement strategy to the Western Balkans, the peripheral countries in CEEs. Joining other pressures, for example, geopolitical confliction with Turkey and Russia and so on, EU changed its enlargement stance to Western Balkans from negative to positive. EU has started a summit with Western Balkans to communicate deeply. But EU has not yet provided the financial support for economic development.These facts asked EU whether its expansion strategy is correct or not. Its passive stance to Western Balkans allowed expansion of the Chinese political and economic power to there. If EU regards Western Balkans strategically important regions, EU must change its passive support stance to more vigorous one. As the same time, EU needs improve its lack of determination.

著者

ムヒナ・ヴァルヴァラ

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.180-198, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

29

著者

伊東 孝之

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.44, pp.5-28, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)

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When World War 1 broke out, most of the nations in Eastern Europe identified themselves with the existing Empires. Poles were mobilized into the three Empires that divided them. They ran the risk of fighting against each other. Germans in the Russian Empire fought in the Russian army against Germany. As the war progressed, however, they became aware of their ethnic identity. They were discriminated against by the authorities or the populace of the ruling nationality. Or they were manipulated by the belligerent nations against the enemy. A lot of new states came into being in Eastern Europe after the war in the name of national self-determination. Most of them, however, were not “ethnic states” in the proper sense of the word. They included many citizens of different ethnicity. On the other hand, as a result of the Russian Revolution a state based on the completely new principle came into being: the Soviet Union. It adopted ethnicity as the constituting principle of the state and formed a federation of ethnic republics. Ethnic republics were, however, just on paper. There were no institutional arrangements that would promote citizens’ allegiance to the given republic. The all-mighty Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the institution that should secure citizens’ allegiance to the federal center. So long as the ideological mobilization worked, they managed to succeed in resurrecting citizens’ civic loyalty to the state as a whole. As the international tension mounted in the course of the 1930s, the Soviet leadership started to look with mistrust on national minorities on the periphery which resulted in the mass murder in Eastern Europe. The famine in 1932–33 in Ukraine was the first case. It was no natural, but man-made disaster to which 3.3 million people fell victim. It was caused by the excessive requisition of grain that the authorities forced through for the ambitious industrialization program. Ukraine had to pay a particularly heavy toll for it. Those who tried to resist were blamed for “Ukrainian nationalism” and “actions to serve the interests of the enemy”. Most of the victims of the so-called “Great Purge” in 1937–38 were citizens of national minorities in Eastern Europe. They were suspected to be spies for Japan in the case of the “Kulak operation” and for Poland in the case of the “Polish operation”. 625,000 people were incriminated and shot to death. During World War 2 Germans and Soviets did ethnic cleansing in a huge scale in Eastern Europe. Germans considered Eastern Europe as nothing more than suppliers of raw materials, foods and labor forces, and were not interested in integrating peoples there. They starved to death about one million inhabitants of Leningrad and 3.1 million soldiers of the Red Army most of whom were conscripted from Eastern Europe. 5.4 million East European Jews fell victim to the German extermination policy after July 1941. Soviets, on the contrary, were interested in integrating peoples they captured. However, they shot to death most of the elite who cooperated with the previous regime and exiled “enemy nationalities” en masse to Central Asia or Siberia. Beneath the German-Soviet war another ethnic cleansing unfolded: Ukrainian nationalists killed about one hundred thousand Poles and Jews in Volynia. (View PDF for the rest of the abstract.)

著者

生田 泰浩

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.121-134, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

参考文献数

23

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The perspective of a split of modern Ukraine into the East (Donbass) and the West (the rest) remains one of the most pressing issues in the discussions over pessimistic scenarios of the current unfolding crisis. While the US and the EU have imposed an array of sanctions on Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea and the crisis in the Donbass region, the first Minsk ceasefire has failed on the ground. From this point of view, this study aims, firstly, to clarify the actual conditions that explain the so called “east- west division” in modern Ukraine, based on an analysis of previous research and qualitative data, and putting a particular focus on the timeframe from Euromaidan to the war in Donbass. In the following section, this study aims to explore the actual conditions prevailing in Ukrainian society and in people’s minds as a result of the changing dynamics themselves, using reference data from the Kyiv International Institution of Sociology and the Razumkov Center, in addition to the questionnaire survey that was conducted by the author. The actual information provided by statistics and sociological research indicates that the issue of the country’s split is a kind of myth and is basically a product of an artificial concept inspired mainly by both internal and external political actors. In other words, the division in Ukraine stems from political struggles rather than an east-west divided society originating in the cleavage of Ukraine as well as in Europe and Russia. Indeed, at the time of the Euromaidan demonstrations in Kyiv, protestors made it clear that the challenge was not between one region and another, but between the corrupt elites and the people, whatever region they are from. It is obvious that Euromaidan, in essence, was aimed at achieving the drastic political reforms, however, the Crimean and Donbass crisis should be defined as a political phenomenon, which includes the external factors. Although the current situation should be defined using the above-mentioned elements, some analysts still argue that the crisis has exposed deep divisions in Ukrainian society between the European-oriented west and the Russian-oriented east. However, this understanding is not adequate, and it maybe more correct to state that no single factor can capture or explain this crisis. What is happening in Ukraine is complicated and is driven by many factors. This means that we should take into consideration changes in the social environment of Ukraine as well as the other factors that exists in Ukrainian society and that caused the “division”. In this process, it becomes clear that the consciousness of civil society has produced some positive changes in demonstrating a sense of solidarity. On the other hand, political and economic issues significantly influence the Ukrainian society, and they are the conceivable cause of this divided society. Nevertheless, this study is still ongoing and needs further consideration before revealing what the causal co-relations and its final conclusions are.