- 著者
-
下斗米 伸夫
- 出版者
- ロシア・東欧学会
- 雑誌
- ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.2014, no.43, pp.21-42, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)
- 参考文献数
- 41
This essay traces on the evolvements of Russian political class over the issue of Ukraine from the demise of the USSR to 2014 crisis, culminating in the annexation of the Crimea peninsula. Russian attitudes towards the rebirth of Ukraine nationalism were ambiguous, especially among elite level. The August coup against the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev took place in Ukraine, where its nationalistic elements were independent oriented, while the conservatives, including the military industrial complex were negative. After the December 1991 referendum, where opinions were in favor for independence, Leonid Kravchuk, once ideological secretary of the Ukraine communist party could rely on the support of the West oriented voice of western Ukraine, where European and Catholic influence was vocal. From the Russian point of view, this region was alien from the Orthodox tradition and was never been part of the Russian Empire. Thus, Ukraine as the nation state was weak and far from united as political identity was concerned. Economy was also divided between agrarian west and the east, where Soviet type of military industrial complex was dominant. This east-west divide caused political instability in Ukraine, that was revealed when Kravchuk was replaced by Kuchima who first relied on the support of Russian speaking east, though he eventually turned to the west. Moscow was particularly concerned the fate of the Black Sea fleet and Crimea, where Russians were dominant and never belonged to Ukraine until 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev, Ukrainian oriented Soviet leader changed the status of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine. Though Russian President Boris Yel’tsin was in favor for the Ukraine status quo, his nationalistic minded semi-oppositionists like Moscow Mayor Luzhkov were against the Ukraine position overt the fleet and Crimea. It was only pragmatism of Yevgeny Primakov, Foreign Minister, who could pass the bill on the partnership in 1997. New President Vladimir Putin was more oriented Russian nationalism, and was particularly against the color revolution, when western oriented President Yushchenko won over the East oriented Yanukovich in a 2004 election. East-West divide, coupled with the corruption and ungovernavility, became Kremlins worry on Ukraine. Still they succeeded in winning Yanukovich victory in the following election and could deal over the 25 years continuation of the Black Sea Fleet, in turn for cheaper gas supply in 2010. Ukraine thus became a grand over which domestic East-West divide was coupled by the influence of the NATO-EU and Moscow contested. The Maidan revolution was thus seen from Kremlins nationalists oriented policy makers to be an attempt to cut the influence of Russia over Ukraine. The Izborskii club or another religious-Orthodox oriented politicians were thus backing sudden policy changes of the President Putin, who took Maidan revolution as another attempt of regime change by the West, and eventually annexed the Crimea Peninsula. Thus, in turn, brought about the civil war situation, particularly in the east Ukraine, that was already uncontrolled by neither Moscow nor Kiev authority.