著者

廣瀬 陽子 六鹿 茂夫 大西 富士夫 兵頭 慎治

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.43-68, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

著者

加藤 幸廣

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ソ連・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:03867226)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1989, no.18, pp.58-68, 1989 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

34

著者

大矢 温

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.57-72, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

21

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The main object of this paper is to analyze the prevalence of xenophobia (and Neo-nazism as its political expression) in Russian society today and to examine its persuadable causes. Here the action and the ideology of the People's National Party (Narodnaya national'naya partiya) and of its leader Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevskiy are analyzed as an example of the violent fascist party in Russia because the PNP is considered to have a strong relation with the Skinhead movement among the younger generation today.Today xenophobia and racial antipathy is prevalent throughout European society and racist or fascist movement is gaining ground in many European countries. The question is, does Russian fascism have any relationship with this global movement? If so, does it advocate nationalism owing to the effect of globalism? Does fascism equal to a nationalism of Russia? (We must remember that more than 20 million Soviet people were killed in the war against the fascist Germany.) Is the Neo-nazi in today's Russia is really a Nazism? How does it differ from the classical one?The leader of the People's National Party, Alexander Ivanov-Sukharevskiy, came to be known as a politician only after he became a candidate of the Parliament in 1995. He became widely known by his book “My Faith is Rusism!” (Moya vera - rusizm!) in 1997. In this book, Ivanov names his ideology as “Russism”. Although his “Russism” is composed of many ideological fragmentary elements of popular fascism, it can be formulated as a slogan of “Russia for Russians”, which also can be summed up as an appeal for Russians to emancipate Russia from “non-aryans”, “communists”, and “Jews” and to fight against them.Obviously, Ivanov's “Russism” is not so prominent one among other fascism ideologies. But what is the main reason of its success? Why does it so attract young dissatisfied Russians? What is the background of its prosperity?In this author's opinion, the main cause of Ivanov's prosperity does not seem to be “a confusion” of post-Soviet society. Rather, it must be found in “a relative stability” of Russian society today. In a word, Russian society today is not so confused as the post-Soviet society, say, up to 1995. A fairy tale of a post-Soviet millionaire is not plausible today for those whom live in misery. Because, according to Ivanov, “Jews” have already established “Yid resume” in Russia.Then, what is to be done? The answer is quite simple -- “fight against them”.By arguing so, Ivanov published one document which is named “The ABC's of Russian skinheads” (Azbuki rocciiskikh skinheaov) . In this document, Ivanov encourages the dissatisfied young to eliminate alien elements from Russia and to shave their own heads. In this way, Ivanov connects “Russism” as a political movement with skinheads, which was regarded as a sub-culture of the violent young.

著者

村井 淳

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1993, no.22, pp.68-75, 1993 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

35

著者

松里 公孝

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.51, pp.1-20, 2022 (Released:2023-04-21)

参考文献数

30

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This paper investigates the endeavors to solve the Donbas Conflict typologically. The first and most consistent policy was the Minsk Accord belonging to the category of federalization. As has been the case with other post-Soviet secession conflicts, federalization was a hopeless policy, which produced serious commitment problems, while contradicting the real interests of both the parent state (Ukraine) and the secession polities (the DPR and LPR). In the context of the Donbas War none proposed the second type of solution, that is, land-for-peace. Ineffective diplomatic endeavors induced both Ukraine, Russia, and the DPR/LPR to solve the situation in a military way. Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War in 2020 disposed Ukraine for a coercive solution of the Donbas problem (the reconquest policy). The Russian political and military leadership split into two groups: one supporting the policy to make the secession polities (the DPR and LPR) Russia’s protectorates and another supporting the policy to destroy the parent state (Ukraine). The unsatisfactory results of Russia’s choice in 2008 of the protectorate policy vis-à-vis South Ossetia and Abkhazia and underestimation of Kyiv’s defense capacity made the Russian leaders opt for the destruction of Ukraine itself.

著者

白井 久也

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1994, no.23, pp.33-42, 1994 (Released:2010-05-31)

著者

古矢 旬 馬渕 睦夫 盛田 常夫 青木 睦

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2017, no.46, pp.42-71, 2017 (Released:2019-02-01)

著者

河野 健一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.31, pp.91-106, 2002 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

15

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NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 is first ever “humanitarian intervention” launched without prior authorization of UN Security Council. Though the bombing led by US eventually forced Mirocevic to pull out of Kosovo, it incurred fierce debates over its legality and legitimacy, and over its failure in preventing escalation of abuse of human rights during the campaign. Military wisdom of having resorted solely to air bombing was also challenged.After September 11th 2001 we have been witnessing fundamental changes taking place in the way force is used in international relations. The wars in Afghanistan and then in Iraq compels us to ponder upon a grave question. Can and should force replace diplomacy in dealing with regimes considered to be undemocratic and hostile to established norms and regulations?Notwithstanding differences in political background NATO's armed intervention in Kosovo and the US-led war with Sadam's Iraq have one thing in common. In both cases military force was used in massive scale bypassing UN Security Council. Thus UN's role and authority as guardian of international peace and human rights has come to be seriously contested.In this paper the author tried, by re-examining the political and military aspects of NATO's bombing operation, to draw lessons for building a security architecture which is more widely acceptable and yet better workable in the changed international environment.The gist of lessons drawn is as follows;(1) The UN Charter must be revised to give legality to legitimate humanitarian intervention. An independent committee should work out principled guidelines for legitimate intervention.(2) Resort to force is to be considered only after other peaceful means have fully been exhausted. Use of force should be legitimatized solely by prior approval of UN.(3) The UN organs, in particular Security Council, need to be reformed to enable a fair, quick and effective crisis management.(4) Democratization and economic development are key to regional stability. EU's assistance to and future admittance of the whole of Balkan should be closely observed. It is a test case of proving that soft power rather than hard power plays vital a role in establishing a sustainable peace in regions traditionally vulnerable to chauvinistic nationalism and of war-ridden history.

著者

服部 倫卓

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2014, no.43, pp.2-20, 2014 (Released:2016-09-09)

参考文献数

17

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In this study I will try to survey how Ukrainian oligarchs acted in the course of 2014 upheaval. Viktor Yanukovich’s Party of Regions, whose rule collapsed as a result of the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014, had been a party of interests, not of ideology. For the first couple of years (2010–2011) it was rather a coalition of several factions, with their interests more or less respected. The balance of power and interests of early years came to be disrupted by greedy expansion of the Yanukovich Family. It began to grow rapidly assumedly around the end of 2011 or the beginning of 2012. The President’s son Oleksandr Yanukovich coordinated building of the Family empire, with help from intimate oligarchs like Serhiy Kurchenko and Yuliy Ivanyushchenko. Even some Ministers of national government contributed to money making schemes for the Family. Its spheres expanded sometimes even to the detriment of oligarchs who had been loyal to the regime. By the time mass demonstrations began at the end of 2013, the regime was no longer monolithic, losing full loyalty from Rinat Akhmetov and Dmitro Firtash, the 2 giant oligarchs of the Yanukovich era. Petro Poroshenko supported the Maidan movement most actively among famous oligarchs. Akhmetov, who used to be the biggest sponsor of the Yanukovich Regime, is also believed to have financed Maidan. Key persons of the Yanukovich Family and Andriy Klyuyev, on the other hand, insisted on ruthless suppression of Maidan. Vitaly Klichko, one of the most popular potential candidates of upcoming presidential elections, announced withdrawal from the race in March 2014. This even more ensured victory of Petro Poroshenko in elections on 25 May. Some experts believe that Firtash arranged Poroshenko=Klichko alliance, fearing that his rival Yuliya Tymoshenko might become president and get revenge on him. In Ukraine’s elections, most candidates traditionally appeal to anti-oligarch propaganda. Paradoxically it was Poroshenko, one of the most famous oligarchs in Ukraine, who won the 2014 presidential elections. There are no clear evidence that the oligarchs, who have business interests on the Crimean Peninsula, either supported actively Russia’s incorporation of Crimea or, oppositely, resisted it. It is well known, however, that Sergei Aksenov, who became Premier of Crimean AR and led its incorporation into Russian Federation, had been fostered by Firtash as a politician. Some experts hence believe that Firtash at least tacitly approved incorporation of Crimea. But in reality Firtash’s business on the Peninsula, for example titanium business, is threatened by changes of jurisdiction. In April–May 2014 some suspected that Rinat Akhmetov, a longtime lord of the region, stood behind pro-Russian separatist movements in Donbass. It is true that Akhmetov contacted separatists and attempted to use them. But he only needed a bargaining chip in relations with Kiev. It is very doubtful wheather Akhmetov really committed to separatism of Donbass. If Donbass will be independent from Ukraine or incorporated into Russian Federation, his ferrous metallurgy will inevitably collapse. At present Akhmetov is in distress because of warfare in Donbass and other unpleasant realities.

著者

〆木 裕子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.110-121, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

被引用文献数

1 1

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In the Post-Soviet countries, the results of how the term “ridna mova” (Ukrainian for “mother tongue”) is categorized in the National Census are used for determining the language policies in each country. The 2001 All Ukrainian National Census also includes the question of “ridna mova”, and the results of the census show that 69% of Ukrainian citizens regard the Ukrainian language as their “ridna mova”. However, it is still unclear exactly what meaning is attached to the expression of “ridna mova”, and how each citizen of Ukraine interprets the notion of “ridna mova”.Arel explains the concept of “ridna mova” as being interpreted more as the language of one's nationality (referred to by Arel as “native language”) than as the first language spoken in early childhood or as the language which the person commands best (defined as “mother tongue” by Arel) . Using Arel's sub-classification this paper aims to demonstrate how Ukrainian respondents interpret “ridna mova”.The present thesis analyzes the results of surveys conducted in Kiev in 2006. In addition to the question of “ridna mova”, respondents were asked about their first language using the categories of “the language spoken in childhood”, “the language in which the respondent speaks with parents” and “the language which the respondent commands best”. The results of these three questions differ from the results of the question about “ridna mova”. To examine the connection between these four categories, their coefficient connection (Cramer's V) was calculated. The results show that the connection among “the language spoken in childhood”, “the language in which the respondent speaks with parents” and “the language which the respondent commands best” is very strong, but the connection between “ridna mova” and other categories is comparatively weak. This means that respondents have different interpretations of “ridna mova” and other categories. As Arel states, it seems that the respondents interpret“ridna mova”as the language of one's nationality. But strong connection among “the language spoken in childhood”, “the language in which the respondent speaks with parents” and “the language which the respondent commands best” reveal the possibility that respondents additionally interpret ridna mova as a covert “mother tongue”, not only overt “native language”.In addition, an analysis of “contradictory answers” was conducted concerning the question of “ridna mova” as well as the question, “Which language (s) can you speak other than your “ridna mova”? ” Classifying the respondents who had “contradictory answers” by their“ridna mova”, the respondents who regarded the Russian language as their “ridna mova” tended to give a “contradictory answer”. And the respondents who answered Russian language to the question of first language exhibited the same tendency. The analysis of the “contradictory answers” shows that only respondents who regard Ukrainian as their “ridna mova” and answered only “Ukrainian language” to the question of first language can interpret “ridna mova” without contradiction, because their “native language” and “mother tongue” are same-the Ukrainian language.

著者

⿃飼 将雅

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.144-166, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

参考文献数

42

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As a result of a series of centralization reforms, initiated in 2000, a great number of studies have discussed that the center entrenched its control over regional subjects in Russia. Yet, several regional unrests observed in the recent years demonstrates an urgent need for an overhaul of the Russian center-periphery relationship, to which only limited attention has been paid yet. This study explains this instability by the increase of outsider governor deployments. Exploiting an original dataset of all governors from 1991 to 2019, patterns of outsider deployments and the effect of such deployments on the regional political processes are examined. Although President Boris Yel’tsin initially held the right to appoint and dismiss most governors in the first half of the 1990s, he did not try to dispatch outsider governors not firmly embedded in the regional societies. Whereas governors began to be elected through the popular gubernatorial elections in almost all of the regions since 1995, outsider candidates rarely won the posts of governors. In Vladimir Putin’s first and second terms (2000-2008), the power balance between the center and regions radically changed in favor of the center. In addition, scholars have argued that the center’s dominance over regional elites increased rapidly due to the de facto appointment system of governors was introduced in 2004. Nevertheless, even then, outsider governor deployments remained exceptional cases. Since the influence of United Russia as a dominant party was limited at that time, federal elites had to receive the endorsement of governors, as regional bosses, to secure the stability of the regime. However, after the triumph of United Russia in the 2007 parliamentary election and the advent of President Dmitrii Medvedev, the Presidential Administration embarked on active replacements of regional bosses with outsider governors loyal to the center. Consequently, while the center got capable of controlling regional political processes more tightly, these radical cadre reorganizations caused dissatisfaction and protests of regional elites, as a result of which electoral performances in the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections declined in the eyes of the center. As a compromise to massive protest movements brought about by the immense size of electoral frauds, popular gubernatorial elections were reinstated in 2012. However, the influence of the center over the recruitment of governors continues to be remarkable and the number of outsider governors is still growing. Yet, in the late 2010s, the decline of the regime’s popularity caused instability at the regional level, as demonstrated by the fact that several candidates backed by the federal government lost in gubernatorial elections. While outsider deployments have merits for the federal elites to control regional political processes through them as loyal agents of the federal government, their lack of embeddedness in local elite communities has detrimental effects on regional unrests. To test this argument, this study investigates the relationship between outsider deployments and regional electoral performances. The OLS estimate and Inverse Probability Weighted estimate demonstrate that outsider governors deliver fewer votes than local governors. Those findings imply that the center-periphery relationship in Russia is still in flux even though the rules of the game have changed since the 1990s.

著者

岩下 明裕

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2020, no.49, pp.62-81, 2020 (Released:2021-06-12)

被引用文献数

1

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This essay sheds light on Soviet and Russian Foreign Policy through use of the “critical geopolitical” concept of the “geo-code.” A state’s “geo-code” refers to the construction of narratives regarding its own space and history over time. Borrowing from Klaus Dodd’s ideal-type categories, which he uses to explain geo-coded narratives of British policy (“little England,” “cosmopolitan,” “European” and “American”), this paper proposes to utilize combinations of four ideal-type categories, “Atlantic/European,” “ethnic Russian,” “Eurasian” and “super power,” in order to analyze and explain Soviet and Russian foreign policy.The first section applies the metaphor of a photograph to the memoirs of several foreign policy leaders: Andrei Gromyko and Eduard Shevardnadze in the Soviet-era; and Andrei Kozyrev, Evgenii Primakov and Serghei Ivanov in contemporary Russia. The paper shows how the composite image of Russia held by these individuals shaped the state’s foreign policy. It also stresses that different concepts of sovereignty have been sustained or reconstructed within Soviet/Russian international law theories in dialogue with changes in images held by the foreign policy leader.The latter half of the paper further develops this theory in order to apply it to Putin’s current Russian foreign policy perception of Northeast Asia, and particularly of China and Japan. From the late Soviet period under Gorbachev to the early Russian period of Yeltsin, Japan was considered as one of the “rising” powers able to aid Russia’s political and economic transition, and it was widely recognized that the relationship would be facilitated by a peace treaty resolving the territorial issue between the two countries. However, following reconciliation between Russia and China, China became the more important partner for Russia, not only in Northeast Asia but also throughout Eurasia.Following its disengagement with the West after the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia’s image of itself as close to “Europe” slipped, while that of the state as “ethnic Russian” and “Eurasian” that must become a “great power” to oppose the US was emphasized. This has meant that Japan is no longer an essential partner from the viewpoint of Russia’s dominant foreign policy images. In turn, the significance of China has increased and developed for Russia beyond the two countries historical “love-hate” relationship. Not only policy makers but also ordinary people look to China as Russia’s “No.1” partner, while the United States is its indefatigable “enemy.” There is no room for Japan in this picture while Japan remains so dependent on the US for security matters.In the conclusion, the paper debunks the myths associated with “classical geopolitics,” which associate foreign policy solely with perceptions of state power and geography. It shows that a “geo-politics” which links the positivist and constructive approaches, and which seeks to account for various analytical scales—from micro to macro, below/beyond the state—can analyze foreign policy change more effectively.

著者

鈴木 肇

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2012, no.41, pp.118-120, 2012 (Released:2014-05-27)

著者

淺村 卓生

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.48-60, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

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The Uzbek standard language of today is exceptional among the Turkic languages in lacking vowel harmony. This paper focuses on changes in an ideological position of vowel harmony rules in Uzbek for those who engaged in language politics or educational works in the early Soviet era. The paper deals mainly with the period between 1924, when the National Delimitation in Central Asia took place, and 1934 when vowel harmony rules were abolished from the Uzbek standard written language at the Scientific Conference on Uzbek Orthography.In the 1920's vowel harmony rules were regarded by local intellectuals as a symbol of Uzbek language ties with other Turkic languages and as a legacy of Chagatai literature. At a 1929 Conference the inclusion of vowel harmony rules into the grammar of standard Uzbek, which the chair of the conference proposed, was approved as an “iron law”. However, after the alteration of Moscow's policy on national problems, the vowel harmony rules were attacked as a “dying law” that blocks further development of the Uzbek language, because they were considered to be unsuitable for transcribing international (read “Russian”) words. Vowel harmony rules were abolished not only from transcribed Russian or international words but also from Uzbek orthography in the 1934 Conference, where the number of vowels in Uzbek alphabet was reduced from nine to six, it was decided that the Uzbek standard language should be based on urban dialects in which vowel harmony was weak.It is worth mentioning that it was only after the basic shape of the “Uzbek national language” was determined, that the need for a history of the new national language started to be strongly felt. Many linguists tried to seek its origin and trace back the descent of Uzbek language. In the 1920's scholars were longing for a shape of the “Uzbek national language” in the Turkic languages with Chagatai as the successor, considering that vowel harmony rules remained in the “Uzbek national language” from the past. However, showing a remarkable contrast with studies in the 1920's, studies after 1934 tried to establish a theory that these Turkic languages also lacked vowel harmony rules in the similar way that standardized “Uzbek national language” does. The latter group of studies obscured the historical side of the Uzbek language and substantialized “Uzbek national language” that was being constructed as a part of the cultural essentialism in Uzbekistan. This suggests that, from the viewpoint of the socio-cultural history of Uzbekistan, the abandonment of a written language with vowel harmony rules and the standardization of Uzbek language in 1934 were also some of the extremely important events in the process of the construction of the national representation of Uzbekistan.

著者

松嵜 英也

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.47, pp.117-130, 2018 (Released:2019-10-08)

参考文献数

33

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The amendments in the Ukrainian constitution in the aftermath of the Orange revolution brought about sweeping changes in the semi-presidential system. It formally strengthened the parliamentary role in the political process, particularly in cabinet appointments and dismissal. Although the transition to democracy in Ukraine had been anticipated, the semi-presidential system that was introduced after the Orange Revolution proved to be a failure.Scholars have paid attention to the institutional design and patronalism, which is defined as a social equilibrium in which individuals organize their political and economic pursuits primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments, besides the electoral system that emerged after the Orange Revolution. In particular, they have argued that the president had an initiative to form the cabinet in a multi-party system. However, this led to an intensification of the intra-executive competition between the president and the prime-minister after the formation of the cabinet. How did the semi-presidential system, introduced after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, fail? Although presidential commitment is an important component to consider when trying to understand the reason for institutional dysfunction, the interaction between the president and the prime minister is not clear.Focusing on the intra-executive competition, this article attempts to outline the process of failure of the semi-presidential system following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. First, this article analyzes the wording of the constitutional amendments, comparing it with that of the 1996 Ukrainian constitution. While the constitutional amendments strengthened the role of the Verkhovna Rada, which is also referred to as the Supreme Council of Ukraine, in the political process, the president retained other legislative powers, including the power to veto bills and dissolve the assembly. These amendments authorized the president to intervene in the legislative process.Second, utilizing a case study of the second Yanukovych government (2006-2007), and the second Timoshenko government (2007-2010), the author analyzes the process of intra-executive competition. When Yanukovych and Timoshenko became prime minister in 2006 and 2007, respectively, president Yushchenko was committed to maintaining decisive power over the Verkhovna Rada while appointing a prime minister. The case studies demonstrate that the coalitional cabinet would not have been inaugurated without presidential intervention because of the multi-party system. After the formation of the coalitional government, the president continued to intervene decisively in the legislative process, using both formal and informal power. However, under the 2004 constitutional system, the cabinet alone was responsible for running the parliament. Because the president’s party was a minority party in the parliament, he could not control the activities of the coalitional cabinet. The presidential interventions intensified the conflict with the prime minister over several issues, including NATO membership, the Russia-Georgia war, and so on. The conflict between the two also made parliamentary law-making much less efficient.Thus, the presidential commitment to the parliament produced different results during different periods. While the coalitional cabinet could not have been inaugurated without presidential intervention, the presidential commitment after the formation of coalitional cabinet led to a confrontation with the prime minister, and divided the members of the coalitional cabinet. The intensification of the intra-executive conflicts led to the failure of the semi-presidential system adopted after the Orange Revolution.

著者

齋藤 宏文

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2007, no.36, pp.72-83, 2007 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

53

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This research focuses on the process by which scientific information on Soviet genetics—particularly the Lysenko Doctrine—was accepted by Japanese academic groups in the field of biological science. Nakamura (1967) studied the Lysenko Controversy in Japan and illustrated the process whereby this debate resulted in the inevitable political conflict among Japanese biologists after the conference of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences in August 1948. In order to examine the possibility of the purely scientific debate on Soviet genetics, it is necessary to investigate the various types of literatures available in the few years immediately following Japan's defeat in World War II. In addition, there are three approaches that complement Nakamura's research. First, it is necessary to measure the ideological control given to Soviet science by the Soviet Government's scientific policies, because this control directly affected the quality of information on Soviet genetics. In particular, the discussion prepared by the editorial board of the Pod znamenem marksizma in 1939 will be highlighted as the turning point of this control. Second, Western scientific literatures were the most important channel of information transfer for Japanese biologists; in this case, it is necessary to consider the acceptance of this literature and the extent to which it influenced Japanese biologists. Third, Japanese academic groups lagged behind the West in accepting information, at least in the two years after the Japanese defeat in World War II; therefore, it is interesting to compare the acceptance times between the West and Japan. In 1946, the ideological control granted to Soviet science was at its weakest, and it was at this time that western biologists accepted the most detailed literatures and wrote numerous scientific criticisms on the Lysenko Doctrine. On the other hand, at this time, Japanese biologists were still concerned with the lack of availability of scientific literatures.

著者

杉山 秀子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:21854645)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1995, no.24, pp.118-125, 1995 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

8

著者

細川 隆雄

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ソ連・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:03867226)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1992, no.21, pp.58-65, 1992 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

12

被引用文献数

1

著者

藤井 陽一

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.44, pp.70-86, 2015 (Released:2017-08-18)

参考文献数

69

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This article is devoted to examining the formation of Soviet bioethics since the 1970s by focusing on the activities and viewpoints of Ivan Frolov, who played a prominent role in laying the ground-work for this interdisciplinary study, and who would later become an adviser to the General Secretary of the CPSU in the Gorbachev era. In doing so, this paper aims to demonstrate the differences between the Soviet bioethics and that of the Western school of thought, as well as to identify the shortcomings of Frolov’s attempt to establish the field in the USSR. Soon after Trofim Lysenko’s group lost its power in the Soviet academic community in 1964, not only the field of genetics but also eugenics were resurrected with a new look supported by leading-edge molecular biological and genetic engineering; which had hitherto been developed mainly in the West. In 1970, the Soviet journal “Questions of Philosophy” held a round-table discussion chaired by Frolov with the title “Human Genetics, and its Philosophical, Social-Ethical Problems”. There an embryologist, a general geneticist, a demographer, as well as an ethicist and philosophers argued over the social-ethical aspects of science, especially in regard to gene manipulation and neo-eugenics. Today this round-table is regarded as the main origin of the Soviet, —and later— Russian bioethics. Since the 1970s, influenced by a global trend towards regulating recombinant DNA experiments, and opposition to human enhancement, Frolov published his works. These introduced the new world currents in genetic engineering and neo-eugenics; criticised human enhancement from the Marxist paradigm of the “new human”, whose personality must be developed all-roundly; supported the Western scholars, who were struggling against neo-eugenics; and appealed for the necessity of an international approach to controlling biology and genetics. At the same time, the Soviet bio-philosopher developed networks of contacts within UNESCO alongside US bioethics institutes, and gave presentations on the socio-ethical aspects of genome science for those foreign associates. Since the middle of the 1980s until the 1990s, Frolov made attempts to get Soviet bioethics recognised by his Western counterparts, by forming a panel of experts engaged in bioethics in various areas. As a result, Soviet bioethics, based on talks among biologists, doctors, philosophers, lawyers, in addition to an Orthodox priest, was established at the end of 1980s. In April of 1991, the Soviet national bioethics committee was established in the Soviet Academy of Sciences in the wake of Frolov’s appeal to the Presidium. In May, the International Meeting on Bioethics and the Social Consequences of Biomedical Research was held in Moscow under the auspices of UNESCO. Therefore, it is indeed clear that Frolov contributed to the foundation of bioethics in the Soviet academic community, but he failed in his moral obligation to develop an interest in bioethics amongst the general public, and to involve them in the debate, whereas in the West national debates centring on bioethics had been flourishing since the 1970s. The result of Frolov’s ignorance was evident in a 1993 survey, which demonstrated broad support for neo-eugenic treatments by the Russian populace. Now Boris Yudin, Frolov’s successor, highlights the importance of familiarising oneself with this theme and inspiring popular debate on the topic through mass media and education.

著者

加藤 幸広

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ソ連・東欧学会年報 (ISSN:03867226)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1990, no.19, pp.60-69, 1990 (Released:2010-05-31)

参考文献数

44